Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission [2023] FCA 177

File number(s): NSD 274 of 2020
Judgment of: PERRY J
Date of judgment: 7 March 2023
Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – application for leave to appeal from a decision of a single judge of the Federal Court summarily dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision by the Australian Human Rights Commission – where applicant sought relief at first instance with respect to the Commission’s failure to bring proceedings in the International Court of Justice– where proposed grounds of appeal are not particularised, utterly hopeless, and would have no prospects of success if leave to appeal were granted –where application below raised non-judiciable issue – application for leave to appeal dismissed  

Legislation:

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)

Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) s 20(2)(ba)

Federal Court of Australia Act1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 26.01

Cases cited:

Bienstein v Bienstein [2003] HCA 7; (2003) 195 ALR 225

Décor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; (1991) 33 FCR 397

Duncan v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2007] FCA 507; (2007) 99 ALD 241

FEY17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 1014

Fokas v Mansfield as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Maria Fokas (No 2) [2020] FCA 30

Kaur v Sikh v Gurdwara Perth (Inc) [2017] WASC 270

Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81; (1985) 159 CLR 550

Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission (No 2) [2018] FCA 473

Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission [2018] FCA 25

Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission [2020] FCA 198

Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission [2021] FCA 1398

Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission [2022] FCA 1249

Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission [2022] FedCFamC2G 1072

R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal: Ex parte Hardiman [1980] HCA 13; (1980) 144 CLR 13

SZTVU v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1394

Thorpe v Commonwealth of Australia (No 3) [1997] HCA 21; (1997) 71 ALJR 767

Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; (2022) 96 ALJR 819

WZAVW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 760

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 38
Date of last submission/s: 1 February 2022
Date of hearing: Determined on the papers
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: The Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs
Solicitor for the Intervener: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

NSD 274 of 2020
BETWEEN:

MIROSLAW PRZYBYLOWSKI

Applicant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

Respondent

ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH

Intervener

ORDER MADE BY:

PERRY J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 MARCH 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

2.The applicant is to pay the intervener’s costs as agreed or taxed.

Note:   Entry of…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCA 177
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Mr Przybylowski, sought leave to appeal against a decision of the Federal Court, which had summarily dismissed his application for judicial review of a decision by the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC). The dismissal was based on the AHRC's decision not to pursue Mr Przybylowski's complaints, which related to his dissatisfaction with the registration of Polish court orders regarding spousal and child support in Australia. Mr Przybylowski had sought relief on the basis that the AHRC failed to bring proceedings in the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

The central legal issue was whether the applicant's proposed grounds of appeal were justiciable and had any reasonable prospects of success. The applicant's grounds for review were predicated on the notion that the AHRC was required to pursue proceedings in the ICJ. The court needed to determine whether such a requirement could be judicially reviewed and if it had any reasonable prospects of success.

The court found that the proposed grounds of appeal were non-justiciable because they required the court to compel the Commonwealth to act in specific ways in relation to the United Nations, which is a matter reserved for the Executive Government. This conclusion was based on the principles established in Thorpe v Commonwealth of Australia (No 3), where it was held that the court could not dictate how the Commonwealth should act in international fora. Additionally, the court held that even if the grounds were justiciable, the allegation of a breach of natural justice lacked reasonable prospects of success. The applicant had already been afforded an opportunity to provide submissions and materials to the AHRC, which were considered in the decision-making process.

In light of the above, the court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the proposed grounds of appeal were not particularised, were utterly hopeless, and would have had no prospects of success. The court further ordered that the applicant pay the costs of the intervener as agreed or taxed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

2. The applicant is to pay the intervener’s costs as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the following reasons, that application for leave to appeal from the decision of the primary judge is hopeless, and should be refused with costs.2. BACKGROUND The primary judge set out the relevant background in his Honour’s reasons at [1]-[9]. It is not necessary to repeat all of the detail in these reasons, and I have focused on the matters of most direct relevance to the present application. In December 2018, Mr Przybylowski lodged complaints with the Commission in relation to his marriage in Poland and subsequent divorce in Australia in 2002. As a result of his divorce, a Polish Court ordered him to pay his former wife spousal support maintenance and child support (the Polish Court orders). The Polish Court orders were subsequently registered by the Child Support Registrar, as a consequence of which Mr Przybylowski had a spousal support liability and a child support liability in Australia. Mr Przybylowski was dissatisfied with the registration of the Polish Court orders in Australia, as well as subsequent decisions made by the Department of Human Services regarding his liability for child support. Mr Przybylowski lodged complaints against the Australian Human Rights Commissioner, the Commonwealth Attorney-General, and various other Australian government agencies. The Commission accurately summarised these complaints in its reasons as follows (at 4):Summary of your current complaintThe following claims can be discerned from the complaint forms and associated documents and submissions you provided to the Commission:•You claim the Commission did not revise its decision even though you say you proved that the Commission’s ‘boss’ is responsible for the United Nations Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance (UNCRAM).•You claim the Commission did not disclose information to you about the UNCRAM and the Attorney-General’s responsibilities.•You claim the Commission has twice breached its independence and impartiality by politically motivated decisions.•You say that Poland has denied sending any maintenance request for any child support/spousal maintenance after your maintenance obligations ended on 21 June 2013 and the registration of the maintenance order is corruption.•You claim the Commission misled the FCA that Complaint 207–01021 was under the ICCPR when in fact it was under the Age Discrimination Act, 2004 (Cth)(ADA).•You are unable to enter or live in Poland, the country of your birth, because of the inaction of the Commission.•You claim the Commission has breached Article 12 of the ICCPR from 2014.You have requested that all the documents you provided to the Commission in relation to Complaint 2017–01021 and Complaint 2018–10660 also be considered in relation to your complaint. On 13 June 2019, the Commission decided not to continue to inquire into Mr Przybylowski’s complaints under s 20(2)(ba) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (AHRC Act) on the basis that it was satisfied, having regard to all of the circumstances, that the continuation of an inquiry into the act or practice was not warranted. Specifically, the Commission decided that Mr Przybylowski’s claims lacked merit and considered that the practical outcomes and remedies sought by him could not be achieved through the Commission’s complaint process.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The primary judge summarily dismissed the judicial review application on 27 February 2020.3. THE DECISION OF THE PRIMARY JUDGE The primary judge found that the application for judicial review should be summarily dismissed pursuant to r 26.01 of the FCR for the following reasons. First, the primary judge held that the grounds of review relied upon by Mr Przybylowski, both of which were founded on a requirement that the Commission pursue proceedings in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), gave rise to a non-justiciable question, applying the decision of Kirby J in Thorpe v Commonwealth of Australia (No 3) [1997] HCA 21; (1997) 71 ALJR 767 (at [12]-[14]). In Thorpe, the applicant sought orders that the Commonwealth move the United Nations General Assembly for an advisory opinion from the ICJ “as to the separate rights and legal status of the original peoples of this land”. Kirby J held (at 797, in a passage relied upon by the primary judge) that the relief sought by Mr Thorpe was non-justiciable by the Court under the Australian Constitution for the following reasons:The court may not take upon itself the function, by the declarations sought by Mr Thorpe, in effect to require the Commonwealth on behalf of Australia to act in particular ways in relation to the organs of the United Nations. This court has never done this. It should not start now.The court has no knowledge of the many considerations which would have to be taken into account in deciding whether Australia should seek such a resolution from the General Assembly. It has no means of knowing how any such application would affect Australia’s international relations generally or its relations with particular countries or its other activities within the United Nations and its agencies. These are all matters which the Australian Constitution reserves to the Executive Government of the Commonwealth. They defy judicial application. They turn on a multitude of considerations unknown to this court. They are matters upon which the Australian Government speaks to the international community with a single voice. That voice is the voice of the Executive Government chosen from the Parliament elected by the people of Australia. It is not the voice of this court.(Emphasis added.) The primary judge held that the non-justiciability of Mr Przybylowski’s claims meant that relief must be refused (at [14], citing Kaur v Sikh Gurdwara Perth (Inc) [2017] WASC 270 at [82] (Le Miere J)) and the application for judicial review summarily dismissed. Secondly, the primary judge held that the allegation of a breach of natural justice lacked any reasonable prospects of success. In this regard, the primary judge held at [16] that:The difficulty inherent in the manner in which Mr Przybylowski seeks to advance his grounds of review, and even assuming those grounds could raise justiciable issues, is the fact that the rules of natural justice or procedural fairness would not require the President to actively take steps to secure a judgment from the International Court of Justice, or to await a decision of that Court. On the facts of the present case, those rules would simply require the President to consider such materials and submissions as were placed before her by Mr Przybylowski, and to disclose to him such other materials as were before her and of arguable relevance to the decision to be made. Such an opportunity to provide materials and make submissions was in fact extended to Mr Przybylowski, and he availed himself of that opportunity.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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