SZTVU v Minister for Home Affairs

Link copied
Case Copied 19 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZTVU v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1394

Appeal from: SZTVU v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCCA 1962
File number: NSD 1368 of 2018
Judge: PERRY J
Date of judgment: 7 September 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for leave to appeal – where application for judicial review dismissed at show cause hearing in the Federal Circuit Court – where applicant sought to appeal from decision that Administrative Appeals Tribunal had no jurisdiction to undertake merits review as he was a fast track applicant – whether reasonably arguable that the applicant was not a fast track applicant pursuant to a Ministerial instrument made under subs 5(1AA)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether reasonably arguable that Ministerial instrument was invalid – application for leave to appeal allowed
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth)

Cases cited:

BZADA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 1062

CHM16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1132

Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397

Duncan v Sec, Department of Family and Community Services [2007] FCA 507; (2007) 9 ALD 241

Ex parte Bucknell (1936) 56 CLR 221

General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125

Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516

Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 564

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 110

Perera v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1417

Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 28; (2010) 241 CLR 118

SZTVU v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 1620

SZTVU v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1449

Date of hearing: 30 August 2018 and 7 September 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 37
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr S E J Prince with Mr E L Olivier
Solicitor for the Appellant: Westside Legal
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms R Graycar
Solicitor for the Respondents: Minter Ellison Lawyers

ORDERS

NSD 1368 of 2018
BETWEEN:

SZTVU

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRY J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 SEPTEMBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant’s application for leave to appeal is allowed.

2.The first respondent is to pay the applicant’s costs of the application for leave to appeal as agreed or assessed.

3.The first respondent, by himself or by his Department, officers, delegates or agents is restrained from removing the applicant from Australia until the proceedings are determined by the Court or withdrawn.

4.Costs of the application for an interim injunction are reserved.

5.There be liberty to apply on 48 hours’ notice.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read SZTVU v Minister for Home Affairs and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1394
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SZTVU v Minister for Home Affairs involves an applicant, SZTVU, who arrived in Australia in 2013 without a visa and subsequently applied for a protection visa which was refused. Following unsuccessful judicial review, SZTVU was barred from further protection visa applications under section 48A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). However, the Minister exercised his power under section 48B of the Act, allowing SZTVU to make another application for a protection visa, specifying him as a fast track applicant. SZTVU subsequently applied for a Temporary Protection visa, which was also refused, and sought review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal). The Tribunal found that SZTVU's application for review was invalid as it pertained to a fast track applicant, and thus not reviewable under Part 7 of the Act. SZTVU applied for leave to appeal this decision to the Federal Circuit Court (FCC), which was dismissed at a show cause hearing. SZTVU then sought leave to appeal the FCC’s decision to the Federal Court.

The central legal issues the court had to decide were whether there was a reasonably arguable basis for SZTVU's contention that he was not a fast track applicant under the Ministerial instrument and whether this instrument was valid. Additionally, the court needed to determine if there was sufficient doubt about the FCC’s decision to warrant reconsideration and if refusing leave to appeal would result in substantial injustice to SZTVU.

The court reasoned that the application for leave to appeal should be granted because there was a reasonably arguable view that the applicant was not a fast track applicant as defined in the Ministerial instrument. This was due to a potential discrepancy in the identification process and the application's classification. Furthermore, there was a reasonably arguable contention that the Ministerial instrument might be invalid as it could contravene legislative provisions. The court also found that the FCC’s decision had a significant impact on the applicant's rights and that there was sufficient doubt about the FCC's decision to warrant reconsideration. Therefore, the court granted leave to appeal and referred the matter to the Full Court for determination.

In conclusion, the Federal Court granted SZTVU’s application for leave to appeal, ordering the Minister to pay SZTVU's costs of the application and restraining the Minister from removing SZTVU from Australia until the proceedings are determined. The matter was referred to the Full Court for further consideration.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant’s application for leave to appeal is allowed.

2. The first respondent is to pay the applicant’s costs of the application for leave to appeal as agreed or assessed.

3. The first respondent, by himself or by his Department, officers, delegates or agents is restrained from removing the applicant from Australia until the proceedings are determined by the Court or withdrawn.

4. Costs of the application for an interim injunction are reserved.

5. There be liberty to apply on 48 hours’ notice.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons given below, the application for leave to appeal is allowed and the matter should be referred for determination by a Full Court.2. BACKGROUND2.1 The initial decision refusing the protection visa application on refugee Convention grounds The applicant arrived in Australia in early 2013 by air on a genuine passport but did not have a visa and was not immigration cleared. As such, the applicant was described as an Unauthorised Air Arrival and was detained under s 189 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) (Tribunal’s reasons at [4]). The applicant applied for a protection (Class XA) visa which was refused on 23 September 2013. The then Refugee Review Tribunal (now the Tribunal) affirmed that decision on 8 January 2014. An application by the applicant for judicial review of that decision was unsuccessful: SZTVU v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 1620; appeal dismissed in SZTVU v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1449. As a consequence, the applicant was barred from making any further protection visa application by s 48A of the Act.2.2 Exercise of the power under s 48B of the Act and specification of the applicant as a fast track applicant in IMMI 17/015 Correspondence was tendered before the primary judge and this Court identifying that the applicant sought ministerial intervention and on 5 September 2017, the applicant was informed by letter that the Minister had decided to exercise his power under s 48B of the Act to allow the applicant to make an application for a protection visa. The letter further stated that the applicant had been specified as a fast track applicant in a legislative instrument made under subs 5(1AA)(b) of the Act (FCC reasons at [3]). The same letter advised that the applicant had been given a Personal Identification Digit (PID) for processing and correspondence purposes which was recorded at the top of the letter. The applicant was subsequently informed that he was identified by this PID in the legislative instrument made under subs 5(1AA)(b) of the Act. 2.3 The second application for a temporary protection visa and application for review by the Tribunal On 6 September 2017, the applicant applied for a Temporary Protection visa. On 30 November 2017, the delegate refused the application. The delegate also found that the applicant was an excluded fast track applicant because he had made claims for protection in countries other than Australia that were refused by those countries: see the definition of an excluded fast track applicant in subs 5(a)(iii) of the Act. On 21 December 2017, the applicant sought review of the delegate’s decision before the Tribunal. The Tribunal wrote to the applicant on 18 January 2018 advising that his application for review to the Tribunal on 21 December 2017 appeared not to be a valid application because it was an application for review of a decision made in relation to a fast track applicant, and afforded him an opportunity to comment on the validity of his application. An extension of time within which to respond to this invitation to comment was granted to 6 February 2018.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Finally, in the event that leave to appeal were granted, the applicant sought that the matter be referred for determination by a Full Court pursuant to subs 25(1AA)(b) of the FCA. In this regard, the parties were agreed that the decision is likely to affect a significant number of other persons being those specified in IMMI 17/015 which may also include persons who are not excluded fast track applicants. In those circumstances it is in my view appropriate to make the referral sought. 7. CONCLUSION For these reasons leave to appeal is granted. The first respondent is to pay the applicant’s costs of the application for leave to appeal as agreed or assessed. The matter is referred to the Full Court for consideration of the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Part 7 of the Act provides for the review of Part 7-reviewable decisions by the Tribunal in its Migration and Refugee Division, being decisions which relate to the grant or cancellation of protection visas in some circumstances. However, by virtue of subs 411(2)(c), “fast track decisions” are not “Part 7– reviewable decisions”. 5. CONSIDERATION5.1 Relevant principles It is not in issue that the applicant requires leave to appeal from the decision of the FCC for the reason that the dismissal of the application at a show cause hearing under rule 44.12 of the FCC Rules is interlocutory in nature: see rules 44.12(1)(a) and 44.12(2), FCC Rules; subs 24(1A), FCA Act; Perera v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1417 at [4]–[6] (Bromberg J); BZADA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 1062 at [3] (Rangiah J). In deciding whether or not to grant leave to appeal, the relevant factors include whether the decision of the FCC:(1)is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration; and(2)if the decision is assumed to be wrong, substantial injustice would be suffered by the applicant if leave to appeal were refused.(Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-399 (the Court)). In considering the applicant’s prospects of success on an appeal, the Court should not conduct a summary hearing of the appeal but is to “assess ‘the merits’ in a fairly rough and ready way”: Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516 at [9] (Brennan CJ and McHugh J). In other words, the grounds should be considered on their face and examined at a “reasonably impressionistic level”; the Court should not descend into a fuller consideration of the arguments for and against each ground: see MZABP at [62]. Furthermore, it is important to emphasise that the judgment of the FCC is effectively final in so far as the applicant is concerned. In such a case, French J (Beaumont and Finkelstein JJ agreeing) held in Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 564 that:43. Artificial distinctions may be drawn because of the requirement that the Court looks to the legal rather than the practical effect of the order in question… But such artificiality as may arise can be overcome by a sensible exercise of the discretion to grant leave informed by the underlying policy of that requirement. Interlocutory orders cover a spectrum from those concerned solely with the mechanics of case management and pre-trial preparation to those which may, for one reason or another, have a significant impact upon the scope and outcome of the proceedings. If the order, the subject of the application for leave to appeal, is concerned with the mechanics of the pre-trial process then the scales are likely to be weighted against the grant of leave. However if while interlocutory in legal effect it has the practical operation of finally determining the rights of the parties ‘a prima facie case exists for the granting of leave’ … If a proceeding is dismissed because it is frivolous or vexatious or because no reasonable cause of action is disclosed the decision is treated as interlocutory. However leave will usually be granted in such a case if there is any doubt about the decision at first instance…(citations omitted)