FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZTVU v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1394
Appeal from: SZTVU v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCCA 1962 File number: NSD 1368 of 2018 Judge: PERRY J Date of judgment: 7 September 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for leave to appeal – where application for judicial review dismissed at show cause hearing in the Federal Circuit Court – where applicant sought to appeal from decision that Administrative Appeals Tribunal had no jurisdiction to undertake merits review as he was a fast track applicant – whether reasonably arguable that the applicant was not a fast track applicant pursuant to a Ministerial instrument made under subs 5(1AA)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether reasonably arguable that Ministerial instrument was invalid – application for leave to appeal allowed Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth)
Cases cited: BZADA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 1062
CHM16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1132
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Duncan v Sec, Department of Family and Community Services [2007] FCA 507; (2007) 9 ALD 241
Ex parte Bucknell (1936) 56 CLR 221
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125
Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516
Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 564
MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391
MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 110
Perera v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1417
Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 28; (2010) 241 CLR 118
SZTVU v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 1620
SZTVU v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1449
Date of hearing: 30 August 2018 and 7 September 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 37 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr S E J Prince with Mr E L Olivier Solicitor for the Appellant: Westside Legal Counsel for the Respondents: Ms R Graycar Solicitor for the Respondents: Minter Ellison Lawyers ORDERS
NSD 1368 of 2018 BETWEEN: SZTVU
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
PERRY J
DATE OF ORDER:
7 SEPTEMBER 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicant’s application for leave to appeal is allowed.
2.The first respondent is to pay the applicant’s costs of the application for leave to appeal as agreed or assessed.
3.The first respondent, by himself or by his Department, officers, delegates or agents is restrained from removing the applicant from Australia until the proceedings are determined by the Court or withdrawn.
4.Costs of the application for an interim injunction are reserved.
5.There be liberty to apply on 48 hours’ notice.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 1394
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues the court had to decide were whether there was a reasonably arguable basis for SZTVU's contention that he was not a fast track applicant under the Ministerial instrument and whether this instrument was valid. Additionally, the court needed to determine if there was sufficient doubt about the FCC’s decision to warrant reconsideration and if refusing leave to appeal would result in substantial injustice to SZTVU.
The court reasoned that the application for leave to appeal should be granted because there was a reasonably arguable view that the applicant was not a fast track applicant as defined in the Ministerial instrument. This was due to a potential discrepancy in the identification process and the application's classification. Furthermore, there was a reasonably arguable contention that the Ministerial instrument might be invalid as it could contravene legislative provisions. The court also found that the FCC’s decision had a significant impact on the applicant's rights and that there was sufficient doubt about the FCC's decision to warrant reconsideration. Therefore, the court granted leave to appeal and referred the matter to the Full Court for determination.
In conclusion, the Federal Court granted SZTVU’s application for leave to appeal, ordering the Minister to pay SZTVU's costs of the application and restraining the Minister from removing SZTVU from Australia until the proceedings are determined. The matter was referred to the Full Court for further consideration.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant’s application for leave to appeal is allowed.
2. The first respondent is to pay the applicant’s costs of the application for leave to appeal as agreed or assessed.
3. The first respondent, by himself or by his Department, officers, delegates or agents is restrained from removing the applicant from Australia until the proceedings are determined by the Court or withdrawn.
4. Costs of the application for an interim injunction are reserved.
5. There be liberty to apply on 48 hours’ notice.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Part 7 of the Act provides for the review of Part 7-reviewable decisions by the Tribunal in its Migration and Refugee Division, being decisions which relate to the grant or cancellation of protection visas in some circumstances. However, by virtue of subs 411(2)(c), “fast track decisions” are not “Part 7– reviewable decisions”. 5. CONSIDERATION5.1 Relevant principles It is not in issue that the applicant requires leave to appeal from the decision of the FCC for the reason that the dismissal of the application at a show cause hearing under rule 44.12 of the FCC Rules is interlocutory in nature: see rules 44.12(1)(a) and 44.12(2), FCC Rules; subs 24(1A), FCA Act; Perera v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1417 at [4]–[6] (Bromberg J); BZADA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 1062 at [3] (Rangiah J). In deciding whether or not to grant leave to appeal, the relevant factors include whether the decision of the FCC:(1)is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration; and(2)if the decision is assumed to be wrong, substantial injustice would be suffered by the applicant if leave to appeal were refused.(Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-399 (the Court)). In considering the applicant’s prospects of success on an appeal, the Court should not conduct a summary hearing of the appeal but is to “assess ‘the merits’ in a fairly rough and ready way”: Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516 at [9] (Brennan CJ and McHugh J). In other words, the grounds should be considered on their face and examined at a “reasonably impressionistic level”; the Court should not descend into a fuller consideration of the arguments for and against each ground: see MZABP at [62]. Furthermore, it is important to emphasise that the judgment of the FCC is effectively final in so far as the applicant is concerned. In such a case, French J (Beaumont and Finkelstein JJ agreeing) held in Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 564 that:43. Artificial distinctions may be drawn because of the requirement that the Court looks to the legal rather than the practical effect of the order in question… But such artificiality as may arise can be overcome by a sensible exercise of the discretion to grant leave informed by the underlying policy of that requirement. Interlocutory orders cover a spectrum from those concerned solely with the mechanics of case management and pre-trial preparation to those which may, for one reason or another, have a significant impact upon the scope and outcome of the proceedings. If the order, the subject of the application for leave to appeal, is concerned with the mechanics of the pre-trial process then the scales are likely to be weighted against the grant of leave. However if while interlocutory in legal effect it has the practical operation of finally determining the rights of the parties ‘a prima facie case exists for the granting of leave’ … If a proceeding is dismissed because it is frivolous or vexatious or because no reasonable cause of action is disclosed the decision is treated as interlocutory. However leave will usually be granted in such a case if there is any doubt about the decision at first instance…(citations omitted)