SZTVU v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZTVU v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 30

Appeal from: SZTVU v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCCA 1962
File number: NSD 1368 of 2018
Judges: PERRY, DERRINGTON AND WHEELAHAN JJ
Date of judgment: 22 February 2019
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court – whether primary judge applied appropriate standard in deciding summarily to dismiss the appellant’s application – whether the appellant was a “fast track applicant” within the meaning of s 5(1AA)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) by reason of specification in a legislative instrument – whether the appellant was specified in a legislative instrument – whether the Minister had the power to specify any “person” as a “fast track applicant” for the purposes of the Act – leave refused for the appellant to file proposed amended notice of appeal – appeal dismissed

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – observations as to the circumstances in which it is appropriate to use the show cause procedure under rule 44.12 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth)

Legislation:

Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth), s 17A

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A

High Court Procedure Act 1903 (Cth)

Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth)

Legislation Act 2003 (Cth), s 15J(2)(f)

Migration Act1958 (Cth) s 5(1), s 5(1AA), s 48A, s 48B, s 189, s 257A, s 336E, s 336FD, s 411, s 473CA, s 473DD

Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth)

Migration Litigation Reform Act 2005 (Cth)

Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth) s 16(3)(c)

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 1.06, r 44.12, r 44.13

Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2005 (Cth)

Federal Magistrates Court Amendment Rules 2005(No. 1) (Cth)

High Court Amendment (Constitutional Writs and Other Matters) Rules 2018 (Cth)

High Court Rules 2004 (Cth) r 25.03, r 25.04

High Court Rules 1952 (Cth) Order 55(1) and (2)

Migration (IMMI 17/015: Person who is a Fast Track Applicant) Instrument 2017 (Cth)

Bennion on Statutory Interpretation (7th ed (2017) LexisNexis Butterworths

Jenks, E, “The Prerogative Writs in English Law” (1923) 32 Yale Law Journal 523

Holdsworth W, A History of English Law (Sweet and Maxwell, 1964) vol XIV, 245-247  

Cases cited:

Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27

Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172

Australian Postal Corporation v Forgie (2003) 130 FCR 279

Australian Postal Corporation v Sinnaiah (2013) 213 FCR 449

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis (2013) 220 FCR 256

Birmingham City Council v Walker [2007] 2 AC

Buck v Comcare (1996) 66 FCR 359

CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172

Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1

Dempster v National Companies & Securities Commission (1993) 9 WAR 215

Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd (2012) 250 CLR 503

General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125

Kelly v…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCAFC 30
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SZTVU v Minister for Home Affairs, the appellant, SZTVU, challenged the decision of the Federal Circuit Court to summarily dismiss their application for judicial review of a decision made by the Minister for Home Affairs. The core dispute revolved around the interpretation of the term "fast track applicant" under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and whether the Minister had the authority to specify certain individuals as "fast track applicants" through legislative instruments. The central legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge correctly applied the appropriate legal standards in dismissing the appellant’s application summarily and whether the appellant qualified as a "fast track applicant" based on the legislative specification.

The court meticulously examined the statutory language and structure of the Migration Act, particularly focusing on the definition of "fast track applicant" and the associated terms such as "fast track decision" and "fast track reviewable decision". The court highlighted that the definition of "fast track applicant" encompasses both individuals and classes of persons, without an explicit restriction to protection visa applicants. The court found that the appellant’s argument for a narrower interpretation of "fast track applicant" was not supported by the statutory text or context, and the absence of such a limitation in the definition suggested a broader scope. Consequently, the court ruled that the Minister had the power to specify any person as a "fast track applicant" under the legislative instrument.

The court dismissed the appellant’s appeal and also denied their application for leave to file an amended notice of appeal. The decision was grounded on the court’s interpretation of the statutory provisions and the appellant’s failure to meet the necessary legal standards. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

ORDERS:
1. The application for leave to file an amended notice of appeal be dismissed.
2. The appeal be dismissed.
3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal to be assessed in default of agreement.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to file an amended notice of appeal be dismissed.

2. The appeal be dismissed.

3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal to be assessed in default of agreement.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Both “fast track decision” and “fast track review applicant” are deployed in the definition of the critical term “fast track reviewable decision” in s 473BB of the Act –fast track reviewable decision means:(a) a fast track decision in relation to a fast track review applicant; or(b) a fast track decision determined under section 473BC;but does not include a fast track decision in relation to which the Minister has issued a conclusive certificate under section 473BD. The defined term “fast track applicant” therefore informs a number of other provisions of the Act which culminate in the duty on the Minister in s 473CA to refer a “fast track reviewable decision” to the Immigration Assessment Authority, and s 338(1) and s 411(2) of the Act which have the effect of excluding a “fast track decision” from the review jurisdiction of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal under Parts 5 and 7 of the Act respectively. The appellant’s submissions invite the Court to construe paragraph (b) of the definition of “fast track applicant” so that it is limited to specifying “persons who are protection visa applicants”. We evaluate the appellant’s submissions on the basis that the task of statutory construction must begin with a consideration of the statutory text and “[s]o must the task of statutory construction end”: Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd (2012) 250 CLR 503 at 519 [39], citing Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27 at 46 [47]. Paragraph (b) of the definition of “fast track applicant” is, relevantly, unambiguous on its face. It uses the terms “a person” and “a class of persons”. The reference in paragraph (b) to “classes of person” militates against the construction advanced by the appellant. There is no express limitation in the definition that would confine the instrument-making power in s 5(1AA) of the Act so that only persons, or classes of persons, who have made a valid application for a protection visa can be specified for the purposes of the definition. This may be contrasted with sub-paragraph (a) of the definition of “fast track applicant” which contains three cumulative conditions, including the condition in (a)(iii) that the person has made a valid application for a protection visa in accordance with a determination referred to in sub-paragraph (a)(ii). The absence of such a condition in paragraph (b) of the definition is a powerful consideration against the construction advanced on behalf of the appellant. We do not consider that that there is anything about the context of the definition, including the operation of other provisions of the Act that deploy, or which are dependent upon, the definition of “fast track applicant”, that supports the construction advanced by the appellant. The operative provisions of the Act, such as s 473CA affect only persons who have made a valid application for a protection visa. This is a consequence of the content of the definition of “fast track decision” referred to at paragraph [57] above, and of s 47(3) of the Act referred to at paragraph [58] above which mandates that the Minister is not to consider a visa application that is not a valid application. There is therefore no incongruity that arises from the terms of the definition construed without the limitation advanced by the appellant.