BWP Management Limited v Ipswich City Council

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

BWP Management Limited & Anor v Ipswich City Council [2020] QCA 104

PARTIES:

BWP MANAGEMENT LIMITED
ACN 082 856 424
(first applicant)
W & V NOMINEES PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE FOR THE ELTON FAMILY TRUST NO 3
ACN 606 755 239
(second applicant)
v
IPSWICH CITY COUNCIL
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 8250 of 2019
LAC No 3 of 2018

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Application for Leave Land Court Act

ORIGINATING COURT:

Land Appeal Court at Brisbane – [2019] QLAC 1

DELIVERED ON:

19 May 2020

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

14 February 2020

JUDGES:

Morrison and McMurdo JJA and Boddice J

ORDERS:

1.   Grant leave to appeal.

2.   Allow the appeal.

3.    Set aside the orders made by the Land Appeal Court made on 21 June 2019 and order instead that the appeal to the Land Appeal Court be dismissed.

4.    Set aside the orders made by the Land Appeal Court on 16 July 2019.

5.   The respondent to pay the appellants’ costs of the proceeding in this Court, the proceeding in the Land Appeal Court and the proceeding at first instance.

CATCHWORDS:

REAL PROPERTY – RATES AND CHARGES – RATING OF LAND – CATEGORIES OF LAND – OTHER TYPES OF PROPERTY – where there is a Bunnings Warehouse on each applicant’s land – where each applicant’s land is within the area governed by the Ipswich City Council – where the Council has categorised each property, under its 2015-2016 Budget, as a “Drive-In Shopping Centre” – where the applicants say that the correct category is that of a “Shop – Single” – where the Land Court held that the correct category was “Shop – Single” – where the Land Appeal Court overturned that finding – whether the Land Appeal Court erred in law in its construction of the Budget

STATUTES – SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION – CONSTRUCTION – GENERALLY – where the meaning of the words of a statutory definition are not to be construed by reference to the term which is defined, for the reason that this would involve circularity – where the use of the lands fell within the text of each category of land – where the question of construction had to be resolved by the implication of a qualification to the words of one category or the other –whether the expression “Shop – Single” should be qualified by an implication – whether it is necessary to consider the terms of the instrument as a whole, including the term “Drive In Shopping Centre” – whether there is circularity in referring to the language of the defined term for that purpose

Esso Australia Resources Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2011) 199 FCR 226; [2011] FCAFC 154, considered
Owners of Shin Kobe Maru v Empire Shipping Co Inc (1994) 181 CLR 404; [1994] HCA 54, distinguished
Tovir Investments Pty Ltd v Waverley Council [2014] NSWCA 379, considered
Wacal Developments Pty Ltd v Realty Developments Pty Ltd (1978)…

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Details
Case
[2020] QCA 104
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the applicants, BWP Management Limited and W & V Nominees Pty Ltd as trustee for the Elton Family Trust No 3, sought to appeal the Ipswich City Council's categorisation of their respective properties as "Drive-In Shopping Centre" under the Local Government Regulation 2012 (Qld). The applicants argued that the correct category was "Shop – Single". The Land Court initially found in favour of the applicants, but this decision was later overturned by the Land Appeal Court. The applicants now seek leave to appeal against the Land Appeal Court's decision.

The primary legal issue the court had to decide was whether the Land Appeal Court erred in law in its construction of the Budget. The court had to determine whether the expression "Shop – Single" should be qualified by an implication, and whether it is necessary to consider the terms of the instrument as a whole, including the term "Drive In Shopping Centre". The court also had to consider whether there is circularity in referring to the language of the defined term for that purpose.

The court held that the Land Appeal Court erred in law in its construction of the Budget. The court held that the meaning of the words of a statutory definition are not to be construed by reference to the term which is defined, for the reason that this would involve circularity. The court held that the use of the lands fell within the text of each category of land, and that the question of construction had to be resolved by the implication of a qualification to the words of one category or the other. The court held that the expression "Shop – Single" should be qualified by an implication, and that it is necessary to consider the terms of the instrument as a whole, including the term "Drive In Shopping Centre". The court held that there is no circularity in referring to the language of the defined term for that purpose.

The court granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, set aside the orders made by the Land Appeal Court, and ordered that the respondent pay the appellants' costs of the proceeding in this Court, the proceeding in the Land Appeal Court and the proceeding at first instance.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Grant leave to appeal.

2. Allow the appeal.

3. Set aside the orders made by the Land Appeal Court made on 21 June 2019 and order instead that the appeal to the Land Appeal Court be dismissed.

4. Set aside the orders made by the Land Appeal Court on 16 July 2019.

5. The respondent to pay the appellants’ costs of the proceeding in this Court, the proceeding in the Land Appeal Court and the proceeding at first instance.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicants appealed to the Land Court against the Council’s categorisation decision. Initially they were successful.[1] However, that decision was overturned by the Land Appeal Court.[2] The applicants now seek leave to appeal against that decision, pursuant to s 74 of the Land Court Act 2000 (Qld), arguing that the Land Appeal Court erred in law.[1]BWP Management Limited v Ipswich City Council; W & V Nominees Pty Ltd as trustee for the Elton Family Trust No 3 v Ipswich City Council [2018] QLC 14.[2]Ipswich City Council v BWP Management Limited & Anor [2019] QLAC 1.The facts There is no dispute as to any relevant fact. The evidence before the Land Court, by an agreed statement, was that a Bunnings Warehouse, such as the two premises in this case, sells goods to “the home improvement and outdoor living retail market”, as well as to “project builders, commercial tradespeople and the housing industry.” But it was agreed that the predominant use of a Bunnings Warehouse is the carrying out of a retail business. Premises such as these operate “as a single warehouse with various product categories”. Each is a stand-alone premises, in that it shares no building, carparking or any part of the land with any other business. Bunnings occupies each property under a lease for the whole of the land, including carparking areas, for which the ingress and egress points are for the exclusive use of Bunnings’ customers only.The legislation Rates and charges are levied by a local government under the Local Government Act 2009 (Qld). By s 92, provision is made for various types of rates and charges, including, relevantly, “general rates (including differential rates)”.[3] General rates are levied “for services, facilities and activities that are supplied or undertaken for the benefit of the community in general (rather than a particular person)”.[4][3]s 92(1)(a).[4]s 92(2). That Act provides, by s 96, that a regulation may provide for, amongst other things, “the categorisation of land for rates and charges”.[5][5]s 96(b). The Local Government Regulation 2012 (Qld), by s 80, empowers a local government to levy general rates that differ for different categories of rateable land, called “differential general rates.” The categorisation is effected under s 81 of the Regulation as follows:“81 Categorisation of land for differential general rates(1)Before a local government levies differential general rates, it must decide the different categories (each a rating category) of rateable land in the local government area.(2)The local government must, by resolution, make the decision at the local government’s budget meeting.(3)The resolution must state—(a)the rating categories of rateable land in the local government area; and(b)a description of each of the rating categories.…” By s 88 of the Regulation, a local government which has decided to levy differential general rates must ensure that the relevant rate notice is accompanied by a document which states a rating category for the land which is the subject of the notice. By s 90(1) of the Regulation, a landowner who wishes to object to the categorisation may lodge an objection notice, on the ground that the land should belong to a different category. A right of appeal to the Land Court, against a dismissal of the objection, is provided by s 92 of the Regulation.The Council’s Budget

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Member then addressed the question of “[w]hat is the correct position when 2 categories can apply?” He referred to this Court’s judgment in AAD Design Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council,[12] saying that what was to be applied were orthodox legal principles of interpretation.[13] After referring also to s 14A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) and Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority,[14] the Member said that by the application of those principles, either category could apply, so that the “deadlock” was to be resolved by “an outcome that has the least impact on the taxpayer.”[15] He therefore allowed the applicants’ appeal, and held that the rating category should be changed from Category 52a to Category 44b.[16][12][2013] 1 Qd R 1; [2012] QCA 44 (“AAD Design”).[13][2018] QLC 14 at [69], referring to AAD Design [2013] 1 Qd R 1; [2012] QCA 44 at [49].[14](1998) 194 CLR 355 (“Blue Sky”); [1998] HCA 28.[15][2018] QLC 14 at [86].[16][2018] QLC 14 at [89].The decision of the Land Appeal Court The principal judgment was given by President Kingham, with whom Mullins J and Member Isdale agreed. President Kingham noted that it was common ground that only one rating category could apply, so that there was no “deadlock” which had to be resolved.[17] But her Honour endorsed the Land Court Member’s observation that it was not a question of finding which category was the “best fit”, for which her Honour referred to the observations of Chesterman JA in AAD Design Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council,[18] that:“The result that several definitions may be satisfied by the one proposal with different or inconsistent consequences may be a powerful reason for construing the definitions to avoid the inconsistency or conflict. The construction must however occur in accordance with orthodox legal principles.”[17][2019] QLAC 1 at [5], [6] and [9].[18][2013] 1 Qd R 1; [2012] QCA 44 at [49]. President Kingham said that in Blue Sky, the High Court acknowledged that, in many cases, the only way in which to give effect to the purpose and language of apparently competing provisions, while maintaining the unity of all the provisions, is to determine a hierarchy of provisions, identifying the leading provision, and the subordinate which must give way to the other.[19] Her Honour was evidently referring to this passage from the judgment of McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ in Blue Sky:[20]“A legislative instrument must be construed on the prima facie basis that its provisions are intended to give effect to harmonious goals. Where conflict appears to arise from the language of particular provisions, the conflict must be alleviated, so far as possible, by adjusting the meaning of the competing provisions to achieve that result which will best give effect to the purpose and language of those provisions while maintaining the unity of all the statutory provisions. Reconciling conflicting provisions will often require the court “to determine which is the leading provision and which the subordinate provision, and which must give way to the other”. Only by determining the hierarchy of the provisions will it be possible in many cases to give each provision the meaning which best gives effect to its purpose and language while maintaining the unity of the statutory scheme.(Footnotes omitted.)[19][2019] QLAC 1 at [13].[20][1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355 at 381-382 [70].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The respondent rejects the contention that the judgment would result in absurd consequences. It argues that a single shop with only one or two car spaces as off-street parking would not be a Drive-In Shopping Centre as defined.[29] It was submitted that there is a question of degree involved in judging whether the extent of the off-street parking would place the land in one category or the other. It was said that “[i]t’s a question of which category best reflects the use of the land.”[30][29]Transcript of the hearing in this Court, T1-25.[30]Ibid.Consideration In Wacal Developments Pty Ltd v Realty Developments Pty Ltd,[31] the question was whether the contract between the parties was an “instalment contract” as defined in s 71(2)(b) of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld). Gibbs J rejected an argument that the word “instalment”, in the expression “instalment contract”, itself coloured the meaning to be given to the definition. Gibbs J said:[32]“With all respect it is impermissible to construe a definition by reference to the term defined. The expression is given by the statute a special meaning which must be applied whether or not it accords with the ordinary meaning.”[31](1978) 140 CLR 503; [1978] HCA 30 (“Wacal Developments”).[32]Wacal Developments at 507. In Owners of Shin Kobe Maru v Empire Shipping Co Inc, the High Court rejected a submission that the word “proprietary”, in a defined term “proprietary maritime claim”, could be used to colour the meaning to be given to the definition, saying that “[i]t would be quite circular to construe the words of a definition by reference to the term defined”.[33][33][1994] HCA 54; (1994) 181 CLR 404 at 419 (“Shin Kobe Maru”), citing Wacal Developments. In 2011, these cases were analysed by the Full Federal Court in Esso Australia Resources Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation.[34] The Court (Keane CJ, Edmonds and Perram JJ) doubted that Wacal Developments was authority for the proposition that the term defined may not be used to resolve antecedent ambiguity in the definition.[35] Nevertheless, the Court said, Shin Kobe Maru did seem to establish that principle.[36] The Court suggested that there was a difficulty in reconciling this principle with “the general approach to interpreting statutes which requires that the meaning of a provision be determined ‘by reference to the language of the instrument as a whole”’, citing Blue Sky.[37] This was because the defined phrase or expression “is just as much a part of the statute as any other part.”[38] Their Honours referred to the statement by Lord Hoffmann, in MacDonald (Inspector of Taxes) v Dextra Accessories Ltd,[39] that:“… a definition may give the words a different meaning from their ordinary meaning. But that does not mean that the choice of words adopted by Parliament must be wholly ignored. If the terms of the definition are ambiguous, the choice of the term to be defined may throw some light on what they mean.”[34][2011] FCAFC 154; (2011) 199 FCR 226 at [100]-[107] (“Esso Australia Resources”).[35]Esso Australia Resources at [102].[36]Esso Australia Resources at [103].[37]Esso Australia Resources at [104], citing Blue Sky at [69].[38]Esso Australia Resources at [104].[39][2005] 4 All ER 107 at [18].