SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
BWP Management Limited & Anor v Ipswich City Council [2020] QCA 104
PARTIES:
BWP MANAGEMENT LIMITED
ACN 082 856 424
(first applicant)
W & V NOMINEES PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE FOR THE ELTON FAMILY TRUST NO 3
ACN 606 755 239
(second applicant)
v
IPSWICH CITY COUNCIL
(respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 8250 of 2019
LAC No 3 of 2018DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Application for Leave Land Court Act
ORIGINATING COURT:
Land Appeal Court at Brisbane – [2019] QLAC 1
DELIVERED ON:
19 May 2020
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
14 February 2020
JUDGES:
Morrison and McMurdo JJA and Boddice J
ORDERS:
1. Grant leave to appeal.
2. Allow the appeal.
3. Set aside the orders made by the Land Appeal Court made on 21 June 2019 and order instead that the appeal to the Land Appeal Court be dismissed.
4. Set aside the orders made by the Land Appeal Court on 16 July 2019.
5. The respondent to pay the appellants’ costs of the proceeding in this Court, the proceeding in the Land Appeal Court and the proceeding at first instance.
CATCHWORDS:
REAL PROPERTY – RATES AND CHARGES – RATING OF LAND – CATEGORIES OF LAND – OTHER TYPES OF PROPERTY – where there is a Bunnings Warehouse on each applicant’s land – where each applicant’s land is within the area governed by the Ipswich City Council – where the Council has categorised each property, under its 2015-2016 Budget, as a “Drive-In Shopping Centre” – where the applicants say that the correct category is that of a “Shop – Single” – where the Land Court held that the correct category was “Shop – Single” – where the Land Appeal Court overturned that finding – whether the Land Appeal Court erred in law in its construction of the Budget
STATUTES – SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION – CONSTRUCTION – GENERALLY – where the meaning of the words of a statutory definition are not to be construed by reference to the term which is defined, for the reason that this would involve circularity – where the use of the lands fell within the text of each category of land – where the question of construction had to be resolved by the implication of a qualification to the words of one category or the other –whether the expression “Shop – Single” should be qualified by an implication – whether it is necessary to consider the terms of the instrument as a whole, including the term “Drive In Shopping Centre” – whether there is circularity in referring to the language of the defined term for that purpose
Esso Australia Resources Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2011) 199 FCR 226; [2011] FCAFC 154, considered
Owners of Shin Kobe Maru v Empire Shipping Co Inc (1994) 181 CLR 404; [1994] HCA 54, distinguished
Tovir Investments Pty Ltd v Waverley Council [2014] NSWCA 379, considered
Wacal Developments Pty Ltd v Realty Developments Pty Ltd (1978)…
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- Case
- [2020] QCA 104
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue the court had to decide was whether the Land Appeal Court erred in law in its construction of the Budget. The court had to determine whether the expression "Shop – Single" should be qualified by an implication, and whether it is necessary to consider the terms of the instrument as a whole, including the term "Drive In Shopping Centre". The court also had to consider whether there is circularity in referring to the language of the defined term for that purpose.
The court held that the Land Appeal Court erred in law in its construction of the Budget. The court held that the meaning of the words of a statutory definition are not to be construed by reference to the term which is defined, for the reason that this would involve circularity. The court held that the use of the lands fell within the text of each category of land, and that the question of construction had to be resolved by the implication of a qualification to the words of one category or the other. The court held that the expression "Shop – Single" should be qualified by an implication, and that it is necessary to consider the terms of the instrument as a whole, including the term "Drive In Shopping Centre". The court held that there is no circularity in referring to the language of the defined term for that purpose.
The court granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, set aside the orders made by the Land Appeal Court, and ordered that the respondent pay the appellants' costs of the proceeding in this Court, the proceeding in the Land Appeal Court and the proceeding at first instance.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Grant leave to appeal.
2. Allow the appeal.
3. Set aside the orders made by the Land Appeal Court made on 21 June 2019 and order instead that the appeal to the Land Appeal Court be dismissed.
4. Set aside the orders made by the Land Appeal Court on 16 July 2019.
5. The respondent to pay the appellants’ costs of the proceeding in this Court, the proceeding in the Land Appeal Court and the proceeding at first instance.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The respondent rejects the contention that the judgment would result in absurd consequences. It argues that a single shop with only one or two car spaces as off-street parking would not be a Drive-In Shopping Centre as defined.[29] It was submitted that there is a question of degree involved in judging whether the extent of the off-street parking would place the land in one category or the other. It was said that “[i]t’s a question of which category best reflects the use of the land.”[30][29]Transcript of the hearing in this Court, T1-25.[30]Ibid.Consideration In Wacal Developments Pty Ltd v Realty Developments Pty Ltd,[31] the question was whether the contract between the parties was an “instalment contract” as defined in s 71(2)(b) of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld). Gibbs J rejected an argument that the word “instalment”, in the expression “instalment contract”, itself coloured the meaning to be given to the definition. Gibbs J said:[32]“With all respect it is impermissible to construe a definition by reference to the term defined. The expression is given by the statute a special meaning which must be applied whether or not it accords with the ordinary meaning.”[31](1978) 140 CLR 503; [1978] HCA 30 (“Wacal Developments”).[32]Wacal Developments at 507. In Owners of Shin Kobe Maru v Empire Shipping Co Inc, the High Court rejected a submission that the word “proprietary”, in a defined term “proprietary maritime claim”, could be used to colour the meaning to be given to the definition, saying that “[i]t would be quite circular to construe the words of a definition by reference to the term defined”.[33][33][1994] HCA 54; (1994) 181 CLR 404 at 419 (“Shin Kobe Maru”), citing Wacal Developments. In 2011, these cases were analysed by the Full Federal Court in Esso Australia Resources Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation.[34] The Court (Keane CJ, Edmonds and Perram JJ) doubted that Wacal Developments was authority for the proposition that the term defined may not be used to resolve antecedent ambiguity in the definition.[35] Nevertheless, the Court said, Shin Kobe Maru did seem to establish that principle.[36] The Court suggested that there was a difficulty in reconciling this principle with “the general approach to interpreting statutes which requires that the meaning of a provision be determined ‘by reference to the language of the instrument as a whole”’, citing Blue Sky.[37] This was because the defined phrase or expression “is just as much a part of the statute as any other part.”[38] Their Honours referred to the statement by Lord Hoffmann, in MacDonald (Inspector of Taxes) v Dextra Accessories Ltd,[39] that:“… a definition may give the words a different meaning from their ordinary meaning. But that does not mean that the choice of words adopted by Parliament must be wholly ignored. If the terms of the definition are ambiguous, the choice of the term to be defined may throw some light on what they mean.”[34][2011] FCAFC 154; (2011) 199 FCR 226 at [100]-[107] (“Esso Australia Resources”).[35]Esso Australia Resources at [102].[36]Esso Australia Resources at [103].[37]Esso Australia Resources at [104], citing Blue Sky at [69].[38]Esso Australia Resources at [104].[39][2005] 4 All ER 107 at [18].