HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
KIEFEL CJ,
GAGELER, KEANE, NETTLE AND GORDON JJAUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS
COMMISSION APPELLANTAND
MICHAEL CHRISTODOULOU KING & ANOR RESPONDENTS
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v King
[2020] HCA 4
Date of Hearing: 9 October 2019
Date of Judgment: 11 March 2020B29/2019
ORDER
1.Appeal allowed.
2.Set aside paragraphs 1, 2 and 7 of the order made by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland on 18 December 2018 in Appeal No 6320 of 2017 and, in their place, order that the appeal to the Court of Appeal be dismissed.
3.Set aside the order made by the Court of Appeal dated 18 June 2019 in Appeal No 6320 of 2017 and, in its place, order that Mr King pay the Australian Securities and Investments Commission's costs of the appeal to the Court of Appeal.
4.Mr King pay the Australian Securities and Investments Commission's costs of the appeal to this Court.
On appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland
Representation
S P Donaghue QC, Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth, with M T Brady QC and O M Ciolek for the appellant (instructed by Corrs Chambers Westgarth)
D F Jackson QC with B J Kabel for the first respondent (instructed by Tucker & Cowen Solicitors)
Submitting appearance for the second respondent
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
KIEFEL CJ, GAGELER AND KEANE JJ. The principal issue in this appeal concerns the construction of the word "officer", as defined in s 9 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ("the Act"). The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland concluded that for the appellant ("ASIC") to establish that the first respondent ("Mr King") was an "officer" of the second respondent ("MFSIM") within para (b)(ii) of the definition of that term as it applies to a corporation, it was necessary for ASIC to prove that Mr King had acted in an "office" of MFSIM, in the sense of "a recognised position with rights and duties attached to it"[1]. For the reasons that follow, the Court of Appeal erred in so concluding; and so ASIC's appeal must be allowed.
[1]King v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2018) 134 ACSR 105 at 160-161 [246], 161 [249].
Background
Mr King was the Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") and an executive director of MFS Ltd, a formerly listed public company that was the parent company of the MFS Group of companies ("the MFS Group")[2]. The MFS Group commenced business before the turn of the century as the mortgage lending arm of a firm of Gold Coast solicitors. By 2007, its business had grown and it fell into two broad categories: tourism and travel-related services ("the Stella Group"); and funds management and financial services, including managed investment schemes[3]. Of the latter, the Premium Income Fund ("PIF") was the largest registered managed investment scheme in the MFS Group.
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- Case
- [2020] HCA 4
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was the proper construction of paragraph (b)(ii) of the definition of "officer" in section 9 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Specifically, the court had to determine whether this paragraph required a person to hold a recognised position within a corporation, with associated rights and duties, to be considered an officer. ASIC contended that Mr King, by virtue of his actions and capacity to significantly affect MFSIM's financial standing, met the definition of an officer, even though he was not a director of MFSIM and did not hold a formal office within that entity.
The High Court reasoned that the definition of "officer" in paragraph (b)(ii) extends beyond individuals holding named offices within a corporation. The court found that the contrasting language between paragraph (a) and paragraph (b) of the definition indicated Parliament's intention to capture a wider class of individuals under paragraph (b), including those who do not hold a formal office. The court emphasised that the focus under paragraph (b)(ii) is on the individual's capacity to significantly affect the corporation's financial standing, rather than the existence of a recognised position with defined rights and duties. The court noted that Mr King's directive to defer investment transactions, as evidenced by meeting minutes, illustrated his preparedness to intervene in MFSIM's business in a manner that could significantly affect its financial standing.
Consequently, the High Court allowed ASIC's appeal, setting aside the orders of the Court of Appeal. The court ordered that the appeal to the Court of Appeal be dismissed and that Mr King pay ASIC's costs of both the appeal to the Court of Appeal and the appeal to the High Court.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal allowed.
2. Set aside paragraphs 1, 2 and 7 of the order made by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland on 18 December 2018 in Appeal No 6320 of 2017 and, in their place, order that the appeal to the Court of Appeal be dismissed.
3. Set aside the order made by the Court of Appeal dated 18 June 2019 in Appeal No 6320 of 2017 and, in its place, order that Mr King pay the Australian Securities and Investments Commission's costs of the appeal to the Court of Appeal.
4. Mr King pay the Australian Securities and Investments Commission's costs of the appeal to this Court.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: KIEFEL CJ, GAGELER AND KEANE JJ, NETTLE AND GORDON JJ
It will be necessary in due course to address in more detail the suggestion that Grimaldi supports the understanding of para (b)(ii) of the definition successfully urged by Mr King upon the Court of Appeal. First, however, it is necessary to consider the proper construction of para (b)(ii) by reference to considerations of text, context and purpose having regard to the mischief at which it was directed[45].[45]CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384 at 408; Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 at 381 [69].Textual considerations The approach adopted by the Court of Appeal to para (b)(ii) of the definition of "officer" departs from a literal application of the text by adding a requirement that the "officer" referred to in para (b)(ii) be acting in an "office" within the company. Textual differences between paras (a) and (b) of the definition make it clear that para (b) of the definition extends the scope of the term "officer" beyond its ordinary meaning of "office holder". While para (a) of the definition captures individuals who hold a named office in a corporation for which the Act prescribes certain duties and functions, para (b) captures those who do not hold such an office. Paragraph (b) defines "officer" by reference to the facts of the relationship between an individual and a corporation in relation to the affairs of the corporation. The contrasting language is a powerful textual indication that Parliament did not intend to confine the class of persons described in para (b), including sub‑para (ii), by an unexpressed requirement that the relationship between an individual and a corporation be identified by reference to a recognised position with rights and duties attaching to it. The significance of the contrasting language of paras (a) and (b) is confirmed by what was said by French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ in Shafron v Australian Securities and Investments Commission[46], albeit that it was said specifically in relation to para (b)(i) of the definition. It is what the putative officer does or has the ability to do, in relation to the company, that is material for the purposes of para (b) of the definition. Their Honours said[47]:"[E]ach of the three classes of persons described in para (b) of the definition of 'officer' is evidently different from (and a wider class than) the persons identified in the other paragraphs of the definition. Persons identified in the other paragraphs of the definition all hold a named office in or in relation to the company; those identified in para (b) do not. Persons identified in the other paragraphs all hold offices for which the legislation prescribes certain duties and functions; those identified in para (b) do not. Persons identified in the other paragraphs of the definition are bound by the legislation to make certain decisions and do certain acts for or on behalf of the corporation; those identified in para (b) are identified by what they do (subpara (i)), what capacity they have (subpara (ii)) or what influence on the directors they have had and continue to have (subpara (iii)). There being these differences between para (b) of the definition and the other paragraphs (especially para (a)), it is not to be supposed that persons falling within para (b)(i) must be in substantially the same position as directors: those to whom the management and direction of the business of the company is usually ... given."[46](2012) 247 CLR 465.[47]Shafron v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2012) 247 CLR 465 at 478‑479 [25].