Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Lactalis Australia Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Lactalis Australia Pty Ltd [2022] FCA 1087

File number: QUD 245 of 2021
Judgment of: DERRINGTON J
Date of judgment: 16 September 2022
Catchwords:

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – interpretation of industry code – interpretation of  provisions imposing civil penalties – interpretation of undefined words or expressions –meaning of “publish” on its website – whether agreement constitutes a “single document” – reading additional words into statute – meaning of “prohibit” – meaning of “material breach” – whether material breach differs from fundamental breach – material breach in context of unilateral termination – intersection of contract law and Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes–Dairy) Regulations 2019 (Cth) (Dairy Code) – Chevron principle

PRIMARY INDUSTRY – Dairy Code – alleged breaches of mandatory industry code – milk supply agreements between farmers and processors – non-exclusive supply agreements – legal and practical effect of agreements

EVIDENCE – expert evidence – admissibility – whether opinion shown to be based on specialised skill and knowledge

Legislation:

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)

Legislation Act 2003 (Cth)

Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes—Dairy) Regulations 2019 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Androvitsaneas v Members First Broker Network Pty Ltd [2013] VSCA 212

AstraZeneca AB v Apotex Pty Ltd (2015) 257 CLR 356

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Valve Corp (No 3) (2016) 337 ALR 647

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Yazaki (2018) 262 FCR 243

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v King (2020) 270 CLR 1

Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross (2012) 248 CLR 378

Chevron USA Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council Inc (1984) 467 US 837

Collector of Customs v Agfa-Gevaert Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 389

Commissioner of Taxation v Auctus Resources Pty Ltd (2021) 284 FCR 294

Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union v Mammoet Australia Pty Ltd (2013) 248 CLR 619

Country Roads Board v Neale Ads Pty Ltd (1930) 43 CLR 126

Empirnall Holdings Pty Ltd v Machon Paull Partners Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 523

Fonterra Brands (Australia) Pty Ltd v Bega Cheese Ltd [2021] VSC 75

Gnych v Polish Club Ltd (2015) 255 CLR 414

Goldsbrough, Mort & Co Ltd v Quinn (1910) 10 CLR 674

Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council v Sanpine Pty Ltd (2007) 233 CLR 115

Legal Services Board v Gillespie-Jones (2013) 249 CLR 493

Lennard v Jessica Estates Pty Ltd (2008) 71 NSWLR 306

Minister for Immigration v SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541

Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Moorcroft (2021) 95 ALJR 557

Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355

Re Section 46L of theCriminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA); ex parte Commissioner of Police (2020) 56 WAR 209

Sindel v Georgiou (1984) 154 CLR 661

SST Consulting Services Pty Ltd v Rieson (2006) 225 CLR 516

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362

Tallerman & Co Pty Ltd v Nathan’s Merchandise (Victoria) Pty Ltd (1957) 98 CLR 93

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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 1087
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case involved proceedings by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) against Lactalis Australia Pty Ltd (Lactalis), a dairy processor, for alleged breaches of the Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes–Dairy) Regulations 2019 (Cth) (Dairy Code). The primary issues before the court were whether Lactalis contravened specific provisions of the Dairy Code in its agreements with dairy farmers. The court needed to determine the meaning of certain undefined terms in the Dairy Code, such as "publish" on its website and "material breach," and whether certain agreements constituted a "single document." These issues required careful statutory interpretation in accordance with established principles, including the Chevron doctrine.

The court held that Lactalis breached the Dairy Code by failing to publish the standard form Milk Supply Agreements on its website before the deadline, as required by s 12(2). The court rejected Lactalis's argument that its method of providing access to the agreements, though indirect, was functionally equivalent to publishing. The court also found that Lactalis breached s 13 and s 17 of the Dairy Code by publishing and entering into agreements that allowed for unilateral termination without a material breach by the farmer. The court clarified that "material breach" in the context of the Dairy Code did not differ from "fundamental breach" in contract law, and that the agreements in question were not single documents but rather a combination of several documents, including the Milk Supply Agreement and the Regional Handbooks.

The court's interpretation of the Dairy Code was grounded in the natural and ordinary meaning of the terms, considering the context and purpose of the code. The Chevron principle was applied, where the court defers to the regulator's interpretation of ambiguous terms unless it is plainly contrary to the statutory text. The court emphasised the importance of adhering to the text and purpose of the Dairy Code, rejecting any attempt to read additional words into the statute.

In summary, the court declared that Lactalis breached the Dairy Code by failing to publish standard form Milk Supply Agreements on its website, by publishing agreements that allowed for unilateral termination without a material breach, and by entering into such agreements. The court also declared that Lactalis contravened s 51ACB of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) by its conduct in breach of the Dairy Code. The matter was to be further heard to determine any additional relief and the question of costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. It is declared pursuant to s 21 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the Federal Court Act) that Lactalis Australia Pty Ltd breached s 12(2) of the Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes–Dairy) Regulations 2019 (Cth) (Dairy Code) by failing to publish standard form Milk Supply Agreements on its website at or before the publication deadline of 2.00pm on 1 June 2020.

2. It is declared pursuant to s 21 of the Federal Court Act that from at least 17 June 2020 Lactalis Australia Pty Ltd breached s 13 of the Dairy Code by publishing on its website Milk Supply Agreements that did not comply with the requirements of s 34(2) and (3) of the Dairy Code in that such agreements as were published provided that Lactalis Australia Pty Ltd may unilaterally terminate them in circumstances which did not involve a material breach by a farmer.

3. It is declared pursuant to s 21 of the Federal Court Act that between 1 January 2020 and 14 January 2021, Lactalis Australia Pty Ltd breached s 17 of the Dairy Code by entering into Milk Supply Agreements that did not comply with the requirements of s 34(2) and (3) of the Dairy Code in that they provided that Lactalis Australia Pty Ltd may unilaterally terminate them in circumstances which did not involve a material breach by a farmer.

4. It is declared pursuant to s 21 of the Federal Court Act that Lactalis Australia Pty Ltd, in trade and commerce, breached s 51ACB of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) by its conduct in contravention of the Dairy Code identified in Orders 1 to 3 hereof.

5. The parties are to be heard as to the nature of any further relief to which the applicant may be entitled.

6. The parties are to be heard on the question of costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

These reasons concern only whether the ACCC has established the occurrence of the alleged breaches and the declarations which might be made consequent upon any findings. Whether additional relief should be granted, including by the imposition of penalties or the making of injunctions, is to be determined following a further hearing.BACKGROUNDThe agreed facts Prior to the hearing the parties reached agreement as to the factual basis on which the ACCC’s claims arise. That agreement was reduced to writing in the Amended Statement of Agreed Facts, the Supplementary Statement of Agreed Facts and the Further Supplementary Statement of Agreed Facts. The following recitation of facts is derived mostly from those documents. There is no dispute as to the corporate status of Lactalis or the ACCC’s entitlement to bring these proceedings under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (Competition and Consumer Act) and the Dairy Code. Since at least 1 January 2020 Lactalis has been a “processor” of milk within the meaning of that term as defined in s 5 of the Dairy Code in that it has conducted a business, in trade or commerce, in the course of which it purchases milk from farmers, including for the purpose of processing that milk for sale as milk or other dairy products such as butter, cheese, milk powder, yoghurt and custard. The Dairy Code commenced operation on 1 January 2020. It is delegated legislation made under the Competition and Consumer Act and prescribes a mandatory industry code in relation to processors purchasing milk from farmers. The Australian dairy industry consists of around 5,700 dairy farm businesses of which about 98% are family owned and operated. Lactalis is one of the largest processors in Australia which purchases milk from dairy farmers, largely for drinking milk sold to grocery retailers. In 2020, it purchased around 950 million litres of milk (approximately 11% of Australia’s raw milk production) and contracted with over 400 dairy farmers across all of Australia’s major dairying regions. It directly employs over 2,500 people across Australia. Approximately 90% of drinking milk supplied in Australia is supplied as conventionally pasteurised (as opposed to UHT) milk with a shelf life of less than approximately 20 days from the date of milking. Drinking milk in Australia is sold and consumed relatively consistently across the year. Processors of conventionally pasteurised drinking milk generally prefer supplies of fresh milk from farm to factory with relative consistency across the year. On and from 17 June 2020 Lactalis published on its website the following documents:(a)seven sets of the boilerplate Milk Supply Agreement documents as follows:(i)Milk Supply Agreement – Queensland Payment Region;(ii)Milk Supply Agreement – Queensland Payment Region – New Supplier;(iii)Milk Supply Agreement – New South Wales – New Supplier;(iv)Milk Supply Agreement – Victoria, Tasmania and NSW (Southern Riverina);(v)Milk Supply Agreement – South Australia Payment Region;(vi)Milk Supply Agreement – Western Australian Payment Region (for the supply period 1 January 2021 to 30 June 2021); (vii)Milk Supply Agreement – Western Australian Payment Region – New Supplier;(b)five editions of several Handbooks, each of which was applicable to a particular region as follows (collectively referred to herein as “Regional Handbooks”):(i)Queensland & Northern NSW Region - Milk Supplier Handbook - Queensland and Northern NSW – Edition effective from 1 July 2020;(ii)Victoria, Southern Riverina & Tasmania Region - Milk Supplier Handbook – Victoria & Riverina, South Australia and Tasmania – Edition effective from 1 July 2020;(iii)South Australia Region - Milk Supplier Handbook – Victoria & Riverina, South Australia and Tasmania – Edition effective from 1 July 2020;(iv)New South Wales Region - Milk Supplier Handbook – Central and Southern NSW – Edition effective from 1 July 2020;(v)Western Australia Region - Milk Supplier Handbook – Western Australia – Edition effective from 1 July 2020; and (c)the QDairy Farm Food Safety Manual which is a food safety program manual.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Finally, Lactalis rightly took issue with the ACCC citing its own guidance documents published after the commencement of the Dairy Code, to support its proffered construction of the publication requirement in s 12(2). It submitted that it was irrelevant that the ACCC had made a public statement about its interpretation of this requirement. That submission should be accepted. It is unnecessary to consider the content of the guidance issued by the ACCC, and the conclusions reached in these reasons have had no regard to it. Likewise, the ACCC’s submission based on a letter from the ACCC of 14 May 2020 recommending that Lactalis take a particular course lacks relevance and has no bearing whatsoever on the construction question. Evidence relied on by the ACCC The ACCC relied on affidavit evidence of two of its employees, namely Mr Hedge and Ms Vaughan (who swore two affidavits dated 8 April 2022 and 12 April 2022 respectively) to establish that Lactalis contravened s 12(2) of the Dairy Code. Mr Hedge deposed that at around 2.00pm (AEST) on 1 June 2020, he visited Lactalis’s website and found that no standard form MSAs were displayed on the webpages he visited, nor did any webpage contain any links that would open the standard form MSAs. Instead, in order to obtain the standard form MSAs, Lactalis required persons to (a) complete a web form; (b) indicate whether they were a current Lactalis milk supplier, milk supplier to another company, or a member of the public; (c) provide their contact details; and (d) select the region for which they wished to receive documentation. Relevant documentation, including a standard form MSA, was then emailed to the person at the email address provided. Ms Vaughan’s affidavit provided evidence of what occurred were one to indicate on Lactalis’s website that they were a supplier to another company. Her affidavit annexed various screenshots which disclosed questions such as the following: “Are you currently contracted for the 2021 year, yes or no? If so, with which companies?”. This required the farmer to disclose to whom they were supplying, provide details of the numbers of cows, annual milk volumes, as well as their personal details. Ms Forsyth QC rightly submitted that this was significant commercial information that a farmer was seemingly to disclose before they obtained a copy of an MSA. The evidence of Mr Hedge and Ms Vaughan was unchallenged and ought to be accepted. It clearly establishes that from 1 June 2020 until 17 June 2020, Lactalis did not publish any standard form MSAs on its website with the result that it contravened s 12(2) of the Dairy Code. The contraventions were not rectified until 17 June 2020, when as evident from Mr Houlihan’s affidavit, standard form MSAs became “visible on Lactalis’s website”. Lactalis’s failure to publish on the website It follows that the ACCC has established Lactalis’s contraventions of s 12(2) of the Dairy Code. The clear language of s 12(2) required publication of the MSAs on its website at or before the publication deadline of 2.00pm on 1 June 2020. For the reasons stated above, Lactalis did not comply with this publishing requirement during the period 1 June 2020 to 17 June 2020. The construction put forward by Lactalis about the proper meaning of “publish on its website” cannot be maintained and it is irrelevant to the question of contravention that the mechanism provided by it for those 17 days may have had a similar result to providing a link where one could download an MSA to their computer. Did Lactalis publish a non-exclusive MSA?

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

On 7 occasions during the period from 1 January 2020 to 14 January 2021, Lactalis entered into MSAs with farmers (being Farms 5130, 5150, 5234, 5350, 5354, 5538 and 6925) which contained the clauses outlined in paragraph 20 above but did not contain the clause outlined in paragraph 21 above.ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION The issues requiring consideration in this matter are appropriately categorised by reference to the ACCC’s four distinct allegations referred to above. They are discussed in that order in these reasons. However, before turning to them, it should be observed that several issues raised between the parties involved the consideration and interpretation of certain words or expressions which are undefined in the Dairy Code. That code, being a suite of regulations, is to be construed in the same manner as a statute: Collector of Customs v Agfa-Gevaert Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 389 at 398; Legislation Act 2003 (Cth) s 13(1). Accordingly, weight must be given to matters of text, context and purpose: see Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Moorcroft (2021) 95 ALJR 557, 562 at [15]; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v King (2020) 270 CLR 1, 15 at [24] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Keane JJ). Moreover, the approach to the proper construction of such words or expressions must not be divorced from the text of the Dairy Code itself. The High Court has repeatedly stated that words of a statute should be interpreted according to their natural and ordinary meaning, in light of the context and purpose: Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, 384 at [78] (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ). As stated by Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ in SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362, 368 at [14]: The starting point for the ascertainment of the meaning of a statutory provision is the text of the statute whilst, at the same time, regard is had to its context and purpose. Context should be regarded at this first stage and not at some later stage and it should be regarded in its widest sense. This is not to deny the importance of the natural and ordinary meaning of a word, namely how it is ordinarily understood in discourse, to the process of construction. Considerations of context and purpose simply recognise that, understood in its statutory, historical or other context, some other meaning of a word may be suggested, and so too, if its ordinary meaning is not consistent with the statutory purpose, that meaning must be rejected.(Footnotes omitted). In Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross (2012) 248 CLR 378, 389 at [24] – [25], French CJ and Hayne J further explained the importance of context and purpose in the interpretive exercise in the following terms: The context and purpose of a provision are important to its proper construction because, as the plurality said in Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority, “[t]he primary object of statutory construction is to construe the relevant provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all the provisions of the statute” (emphasis added). That is, statutory construction requires deciding what is the legal meaning of the relevant provision “by reference to the language of the instrument viewed as a whole”, and “the context, the general purpose and policy of a provision and its consistency and fairness are surer guides to its meaning than the logic with which it is constructed”. Determination of the purpose of a statute or of particular provisions in a statute may be based upon an express statement of purpose in the statute itself, inference from its text and structure and, where appropriate, reference to extrinsic materials. The purpose of a statute resides in its text and structure. Determination of a statutory purpose neither permits nor requires some search for what those who promoted or passed the legislation may have had in mind when it was enacted. It is important in this respect, as in others, to recognise that to speak of legislative “intention” is to use a metaphor. Use of that metaphor must not mislead. “[T]he duty of a court is to give the words of a statutory provision the meaning that the legislature is taken to have intended them to have”…(Footnotes omitted).