FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Lactalis Australia Pty Ltd [2022] FCA 1087
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- Case
- [2022] FCA 1087
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that Lactalis breached the Dairy Code by failing to publish the standard form Milk Supply Agreements on its website before the deadline, as required by s 12(2). The court rejected Lactalis's argument that its method of providing access to the agreements, though indirect, was functionally equivalent to publishing. The court also found that Lactalis breached s 13 and s 17 of the Dairy Code by publishing and entering into agreements that allowed for unilateral termination without a material breach by the farmer. The court clarified that "material breach" in the context of the Dairy Code did not differ from "fundamental breach" in contract law, and that the agreements in question were not single documents but rather a combination of several documents, including the Milk Supply Agreement and the Regional Handbooks.
The court's interpretation of the Dairy Code was grounded in the natural and ordinary meaning of the terms, considering the context and purpose of the code. The Chevron principle was applied, where the court defers to the regulator's interpretation of ambiguous terms unless it is plainly contrary to the statutory text. The court emphasised the importance of adhering to the text and purpose of the Dairy Code, rejecting any attempt to read additional words into the statute.
In summary, the court declared that Lactalis breached the Dairy Code by failing to publish standard form Milk Supply Agreements on its website, by publishing agreements that allowed for unilateral termination without a material breach, and by entering into such agreements. The court also declared that Lactalis contravened s 51ACB of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) by its conduct in breach of the Dairy Code. The matter was to be further heard to determine any additional relief and the question of costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. It is declared pursuant to s 21 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the Federal Court Act) that Lactalis Australia Pty Ltd breached s 12(2) of the Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes–Dairy) Regulations 2019 (Cth) (Dairy Code) by failing to publish standard form Milk Supply Agreements on its website at or before the publication deadline of 2.00pm on 1 June 2020.
2. It is declared pursuant to s 21 of the Federal Court Act that from at least 17 June 2020 Lactalis Australia Pty Ltd breached s 13 of the Dairy Code by publishing on its website Milk Supply Agreements that did not comply with the requirements of s 34(2) and (3) of the Dairy Code in that such agreements as were published provided that Lactalis Australia Pty Ltd may unilaterally terminate them in circumstances which did not involve a material breach by a farmer.
3. It is declared pursuant to s 21 of the Federal Court Act that between 1 January 2020 and 14 January 2021, Lactalis Australia Pty Ltd breached s 17 of the Dairy Code by entering into Milk Supply Agreements that did not comply with the requirements of s 34(2) and (3) of the Dairy Code in that they provided that Lactalis Australia Pty Ltd may unilaterally terminate them in circumstances which did not involve a material breach by a farmer.
4. It is declared pursuant to s 21 of the Federal Court Act that Lactalis Australia Pty Ltd, in trade and commerce, breached s 51ACB of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) by its conduct in contravention of the Dairy Code identified in Orders 1 to 3 hereof.
5. The parties are to be heard as to the nature of any further relief to which the applicant may be entitled.
6. The parties are to be heard on the question of costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
On 7 occasions during the period from 1 January 2020 to 14 January 2021, Lactalis entered into MSAs with farmers (being Farms 5130, 5150, 5234, 5350, 5354, 5538 and 6925) which contained the clauses outlined in paragraph 20 above but did not contain the clause outlined in paragraph 21 above.ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION The issues requiring consideration in this matter are appropriately categorised by reference to the ACCC’s four distinct allegations referred to above. They are discussed in that order in these reasons. However, before turning to them, it should be observed that several issues raised between the parties involved the consideration and interpretation of certain words or expressions which are undefined in the Dairy Code. That code, being a suite of regulations, is to be construed in the same manner as a statute: Collector of Customs v Agfa-Gevaert Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 389 at 398; Legislation Act 2003 (Cth) s 13(1). Accordingly, weight must be given to matters of text, context and purpose: see Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Moorcroft (2021) 95 ALJR 557, 562 at [15]; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v King (2020) 270 CLR 1, 15 at [24] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Keane JJ). Moreover, the approach to the proper construction of such words or expressions must not be divorced from the text of the Dairy Code itself. The High Court has repeatedly stated that words of a statute should be interpreted according to their natural and ordinary meaning, in light of the context and purpose: Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, 384 at [78] (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ). As stated by Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ in SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362, 368 at [14]: The starting point for the ascertainment of the meaning of a statutory provision is the text of the statute whilst, at the same time, regard is had to its context and purpose. Context should be regarded at this first stage and not at some later stage and it should be regarded in its widest sense. This is not to deny the importance of the natural and ordinary meaning of a word, namely how it is ordinarily understood in discourse, to the process of construction. Considerations of context and purpose simply recognise that, understood in its statutory, historical or other context, some other meaning of a word may be suggested, and so too, if its ordinary meaning is not consistent with the statutory purpose, that meaning must be rejected.(Footnotes omitted). In Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross (2012) 248 CLR 378, 389 at [24] – [25], French CJ and Hayne J further explained the importance of context and purpose in the interpretive exercise in the following terms: The context and purpose of a provision are important to its proper construction because, as the plurality said in Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority, “[t]he primary object of statutory construction is to construe the relevant provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all the provisions of the statute” (emphasis added). That is, statutory construction requires deciding what is the legal meaning of the relevant provision “by reference to the language of the instrument viewed as a whole”, and “the context, the general purpose and policy of a provision and its consistency and fairness are surer guides to its meaning than the logic with which it is constructed”. Determination of the purpose of a statute or of particular provisions in a statute may be based upon an express statement of purpose in the statute itself, inference from its text and structure and, where appropriate, reference to extrinsic materials. The purpose of a statute resides in its text and structure. Determination of a statutory purpose neither permits nor requires some search for what those who promoted or passed the legislation may have had in mind when it was enacted. It is important in this respect, as in others, to recognise that to speak of legislative “intention” is to use a metaphor. Use of that metaphor must not mislead. “[T]he duty of a court is to give the words of a statutory provision the meaning that the legislature is taken to have intended them to have”…(Footnotes omitted).