Shafron v Australian Securities and Investments Commission

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FRENCH CJ,
GUMMOW, HAYNE, HEYDON, CRENNAN, KIEFEL AND BELL JJ

PETER JAMES SHAFRON  APPELLANT

AND

AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS
COMMISSION  RESPONDENT

Shafron v Australian Securities and Investments Commission
[2012] HCA 18
3 May 2012
S173/2011

ORDER

Appeal dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales

Representation

B W Walker SC with R P L Lancaster SC and N J Owens for the appellant (instructed by Middletons Lawyers)

S J Gageler SC, Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth with A J L Bannon SC, R T Beech-Jones SC and S E Pritchard for the respondent (instructed by Clayton Utz Lawyers)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, CRENNAN, KIEFEL AND BELL JJ.   This appeal arises out of the same circumstances as, and was heard immediately after, the appeals brought by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission ("ASIC") against Meredith Hellicar and others including the appellant in this matter, Peter James Shafron.  The reasons in this matter should be read with the reasons in those other matters[1] for it is there that the facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are fully described.  It is convenient, however, to set out shortly some of the more important facts relevant to this appeal.

  2. In August 1998, Mr Shafron was employed as "general counsel and company secretary" of James Hardie Industries Ltd ("JHIL").  He was appointed company secretary on 13 November 1998.  Just over a year later, on 17 November 1999, Mr Donald Cameron was appointed joint company secretary of JHIL with Mr Shafron.

  3. The Court of Appeal found[2] that Mr Shafron had contravened s 180(1) of the Corporations Law, and thus incurred a liability under the equivalent provision of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ("the Corporations Act")[3], in two respects that are put in issue in this appeal.  Both contraventions were contraventions by omission:  failing to give certain advice, in the one case, to the chief executive officer (Mr Macdonald) or the board of JHIL and, in the other, to the board of JHIL.  To paraphrase the provisions of s 180(1), the Court of Appeal found that Mr Shafron, an officer of JHIL, did not exercise his powers and discharge his duties with the degree of care and diligence that a reasonable person would exercise if that person were an officer of a corporation in JHIL's circumstances and occupied the office held by, and had the same responsibilities within the corporation as, Mr Shafron.

    [3]The Corporations Law of New South Wales as set out in s 82 of the Corporations Act 1989 (Cth) applied at the time of the events relevant to this appeal: Corporations (New South Wales) Act 1990 (NSW), s 7. The Corporations Act 1989…

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Details
Case
[2012] HCA 18
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Mr Shafron against a decision of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). The dispute concerned whether Mr Shafron, as company secretary and general counsel of James Hardie Industries Ltd (JHIL), had breached his duty of care and diligence under section 180(1) of the *Corporations Act 2001* (Cth). ASIC alleged that Mr Shafron failed to exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a reasonable person in his position and with his responsibilities.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether Mr Shafron qualified as an "officer" of JHIL under paragraph (b)(i) of the definition in section 9 of the Act, which includes a person who "participates in making" decisions that substantially affect the business of the corporation. This involved determining the scope of "responsibilities within the corporation" for an officer and whether providing information and advice, even if making a "real contribution," constituted participation in decision-making. The court also considered whether section 180(1) applied to all tasks performed by an officer within the corporation and whether the responsibilities of a company secretary and general counsel were divisible for the purposes of this duty.

The High Court affirmed that the inquiry under paragraph (b)(i) of the definition of "officer" must focus on the role played by the person within the corporation, not solely on their actions concerning the specific issue of alleged breach. The court found that Mr Shafron's argument that "participation in making a decision" required a role in the actual making of the decision, distinct from providing information and advice, was too narrow. The court held that a person could participate in decision-making by making a "real contribution" to it, and that the scope of an officer's responsibilities within the corporation was not confined to their specific title but encompassed their actual role and the decisions they influenced. The court also noted that considering an officer's conduct on occasions other than the alleged breach was relevant to assessing how a reasonable person in their position would have discharged their duties.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, CRENNAN, KIEFEL AND BELL JJ HEYDON J
This being so, it is not strictly necessary to consider the arguments advanced by Mr Shafron about the engagement of par (b)(i) of the definition of "officer". It is as well, however, to say something shortly about the question.Participation in making decisions The proposition central to Mr Shafron's argument about the application of par (b)(i) of the definition of "officer" – that he was not a person who participated in making decisions that affected the whole, or a substantial part, of the business of JHIL – was that "in order to 'participate in making a decision' a person must have a role in actually making the decision" (emphasis in original). While Mr Shafron accepted that this "does not mean that a person must have 'ultimate control'", the idea of participating in making a decision was, it was submitted, "quite different from being concerned in or taking part in the management of a company". Mr Shafron argued that the fact that he "provided information and advice to the board to assist it in its decision making" did not mean that he "participated" in that decision making, even if it could be said that he made a "real contribution" to it. That is, Mr Shafron submitted, demonstrating a "real contribution … to the making of the decisions"[17] was not sufficient to establish participation in the making of the decisions, and it was the board (not he) who decided whether the separation proposal should be adopted and what information should be given to the ASX.[17](2010) 274 ALR 205 at 378 [893]. Several points should be made about the proper construction and application of par (b)(i) of the definition of "officer". First, the inquiry required by this paragraph of the definition must be directed to what role the person in question plays in the corporation. It is not an inquiry that is confined to the role that the person played in relation to the particular issue in respect of which it is alleged that there was a breach of duty. Thus in this case the inquiry to be made about Mr Shafron's role was not confined to what he did in connection with the separation proposal. Of course, the role he played in connection with the separation proposal may itself demonstrate that he made or participated in making decisions of the requisite character, but that need not be the only material to which attention may be directed. Second, in a case like the present, where the breaches of duty alleged were omissions to provide advice, it is evident that determining how a reasonable person occupying the same office and having the same responsibilities would exercise the powers and discharge the duties of that office may be assisted by consideration of how the officer in question acted on occasions other than the one which is alleged to give rise to a breach of the duties imposed by s 180(1). It was, therefore, relevant for the Court of Appeal to notice[18] what Mr Shafron had done at JHIL in connection with matters other than the separation proposal and, contrary to Mr Shafron's submission, there was no denial of natural justice in its doing so.[18](2010) 274 ALR 205 at 378 [894].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, CRENNAN, KIEFEL AND BELL JJ, HEYDON J