HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
FRENCH CJ,
GUMMOW, HAYNE, HEYDON, CRENNAN, KIEFEL AND BELL JJPETER JAMES SHAFRON APPELLANT
AND
AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS
COMMISSION RESPONDENTShafron v Australian Securities and Investments Commission
[2012] HCA 18
3 May 2012
S173/2011ORDER
Appeal dismissed with costs.
On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales
Representation
B W Walker SC with R P L Lancaster SC and N J Owens for the appellant (instructed by Middletons Lawyers)
S J Gageler SC, Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth with A J L Bannon SC, R T Beech-Jones SC and S E Pritchard for the respondent (instructed by Clayton Utz Lawyers)
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, CRENNAN, KIEFEL AND BELL JJ. This appeal arises out of the same circumstances as, and was heard immediately after, the appeals brought by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission ("ASIC") against Meredith Hellicar and others including the appellant in this matter, Peter James Shafron. The reasons in this matter should be read with the reasons in those other matters[1] for it is there that the facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are fully described. It is convenient, however, to set out shortly some of the more important facts relevant to this appeal.
In August 1998, Mr Shafron was employed as "general counsel and company secretary" of James Hardie Industries Ltd ("JHIL"). He was appointed company secretary on 13 November 1998. Just over a year later, on 17 November 1999, Mr Donald Cameron was appointed joint company secretary of JHIL with Mr Shafron.
The Court of Appeal found[2] that Mr Shafron had contravened s 180(1) of the Corporations Law, and thus incurred a liability under the equivalent provision of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ("the Corporations Act")[3], in two respects that are put in issue in this appeal. Both contraventions were contraventions by omission: failing to give certain advice, in the one case, to the chief executive officer (Mr Macdonald) or the board of JHIL and, in the other, to the board of JHIL. To paraphrase the provisions of s 180(1), the Court of Appeal found that Mr Shafron, an officer of JHIL, did not exercise his powers and discharge his duties with the degree of care and diligence that a reasonable person would exercise if that person were an officer of a corporation in JHIL's circumstances and occupied the office held by, and had the same responsibilities within the corporation as, Mr Shafron.
[2]Morley v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2010) 274 ALR 205 at 397 [994], 411 [1074].
[3]The Corporations Law of New South Wales as set out in s 82 of the Corporations Act 1989 (Cth) applied at the time of the events relevant to this appeal: Corporations (New South Wales) Act 1990 (NSW), s 7. The Corporations Act 1989…
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- Case
- [2012] HCA 18
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the High Court were whether Mr Shafron qualified as an "officer" of JHIL under paragraph (b)(i) of the definition in section 9 of the Act, which includes a person who "participates in making" decisions that substantially affect the business of the corporation. This involved determining the scope of "responsibilities within the corporation" for an officer and whether providing information and advice, even if making a "real contribution," constituted participation in decision-making. The court also considered whether section 180(1) applied to all tasks performed by an officer within the corporation and whether the responsibilities of a company secretary and general counsel were divisible for the purposes of this duty.
The High Court affirmed that the inquiry under paragraph (b)(i) of the definition of "officer" must focus on the role played by the person within the corporation, not solely on their actions concerning the specific issue of alleged breach. The court found that Mr Shafron's argument that "participation in making a decision" required a role in the actual making of the decision, distinct from providing information and advice, was too narrow. The court held that a person could participate in decision-making by making a "real contribution" to it, and that the scope of an officer's responsibilities within the corporation was not confined to their specific title but encompassed their actual role and the decisions they influenced. The court also noted that considering an officer's conduct on occasions other than the alleged breach was relevant to assessing how a reasonable person in their position would have discharged their duties.
The appeal was dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, CRENNAN, KIEFEL AND BELL JJ, HEYDON J