Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis (No 9)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis (No 9) [2018] FCA 385

File number: QUD 574 of 2010
Judge: DOWSETT J
Date of judgment: 22 March 2018
Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – where the respondent directors contravened s 180(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (“the Act”) by causing or permitting inappropriate financial advice to be given to persons with certain characteristics – where the applicant seeks declarations and orders as to penalties and other relief – consideration of declarations pursuant to s 1317E, pecuniary penalties pursuant to s 1317G, disqualification orders pursuant to ss 206C and 206E, and injunctions pursuant to s 1324 of the Act
Legislation:

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 180(1), 206C, 206E, 911A, 911B, 912A, 913A, 913B, 914A, 920A, 920B, 945A, 1041E, 1101B, 1317E, 1317G, 1324, 1325A

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 50(1)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 39.04, 39.05

Cases cited:

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Adler (2002) 42 ACSR 80

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v ActiveSuper Pty Ltd (in liq) (2015) 106 ACSR 181

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis (No 7) [2016] FCA 624

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis (No 8) [2016] FCA 1023

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Gramax Investment Club Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 1708

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Ingleby (2013) 39 VR 554

Australian Securities and Investments Commission vLindberg (2012) 91 ACSR 640

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Macdonald (No 12) (2009) 259 ALR 116

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Preston [2005] FCA 1805

Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Rich (2004) 220 CLR 129

Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No 2) (1993) 176 CLR 300

Davis v Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia (No 2) (2011) 190 FCR 437

Dubbo Refrigerating Co v Rutherford (1898) 14 WN 180

Foster v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2006) 149 FCR 135

Gilfillan v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2012) 92 ACSR 460

JT Stratford & Son Ltd v Lindley [1969] 3 ALL ER 1122

Markarian v R (2005) 228 CLR 357

McDougall; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Fuelbanc Australia Limited (2007) 162 FCR 174

Mesenberg v Cord Industrial Recruiters Pty Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 128

Morley v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2010) 81 ACSR 285

Morley v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (No 2) (2011) 83 ACSR 620

Queensland North Australia Pty Ltd v Takeovers Panel (No 2) (2015) 236 FCR 370

Re Idylic Solutions Pty Ltd (2013) 93 ACSR 421

Re McDougall (2006) 229 ALR 158

Shafron v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2010) 81 ACSR 285

Shafron v Australian Securities and Investments Commission(No 2) (2011) 83 ACSR 620

Date of hearing: 1 February 2017
Date of last submissions: 8 February 2017 and 15 February 2017 (Applicant)
13 February 2017 (Respondents)
Registry: Queensland
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Regulator and Consumer Protection
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 173
Counsel…
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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 385
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) sued Mr and Mrs Cassimatis, who were directors of Storm, a financial advisory company. The company was in administration and liquidation, and the case concerned whether the respondents contravened s 180(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) by causing or permitting inappropriate financial advice to be given to certain investors. ASIC sought declarations, pecuniary penalties, disqualification orders, and injunctions. The central issue was whether ASIC should be granted relief beyond mere declarations of contravention, considering the nature and consequences of the conduct of the respondents.

The court examined whether the respondents' conduct materially prejudiced the interests of Storm, as required by s 180(1) of the Act. It concluded that the conduct was serious and likely to be discovered, exposing Storm to significant risks. The court held that exposing Storm to such risks adversely affected its interests. The court also considered the need for general deterrence and the devastating consequences for investors. It concluded that relief beyond declarations was necessary to achieve the aim of protecting the public and ensuring compliance with the Act.

The court granted the relief sought by ASIC, including disqualification orders preventing the respondents from holding an AFSL or providing financial services under any AFSL for ten years. The court found that declarations alone were insufficient in these circumstances, as they would not achieve the aim of protecting the public or ensuring compliance with the Act. The court emphasized the seriousness of the contravening conduct, its duration, and the need for general deterrence.

The final orders required the parties to provide agreed draft orders within seven days, as per Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. within 7 days the parties provide agreed draft orders giving effect to these reasons.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The respondents submit that I should only make declarations as to contraventions.BACKGROUND Mr and Mrs Cassimatis were the founders, sole shareholders, and executive directors of Storm, a financial advisory company. Storm primarily provided advice in accordance with the "Storm model". Edelman J described the Storm model in detail. Below, I provide a brief description. Shortly before the global financial crisis in 2008, Storm’s annual revenue was $77 million. It held $120 million in consolidated gross assets. In early 2009 Storm went into administration and then, liquidation. I am presently concerned solely with Mr and Mrs Cassimatis’ conduct. The Storm model The Storm model of advice was recommended to almost 90% of Storm’s clients. In effect it advised clients to borrow against the value of his, her or their home to secure a loan, and to use those loan moneys to invest in funds based on the ASX300 (a market capitalization weighted index made up of the 300 largest companies listed on the Australian Securities Exchange). Storm also encouraged further investment “steps”, based on movements in the share market. For example, a rise or fall of 10% in the market might trigger a recommendation for further investment. Edelman J found that it was a risky strategy, inappropriate for some investors. Mr and Mrs Cassimatis’ role in Storm His Honour found that Mr and Mrs Cassimatis exercised an “extraordinary degree of control over every aspect of the Storm model and Storm’s operations”. Edelman J identified eight elements of such control. Firstly, Mr and Mrs Cassimatis controlled the executive committee and the company board. Such control was “extensive to the point that it substantially stifled much possibility of dissent or contradiction, as they would have been aware”. For example, executive committee members did not propose resolutions or vote on issues. Rather, they were informed about decisions which had already been made by Mr and Mrs Cassimatis. Similarly, at board meetings, non‑executive directors discussed issues, but did not raise new issues. His Honour found that the independent non‑executive directors were “passive at these meetings”. Secondly, “even apart from management level decisions”, Mr and Mrs Cassimatis asserted a high level of control over all aspects of Storm’s finances. The Chief Financial Officer could not generally make any payment without the approval of Mrs Cassimatis. For some time only Mr and Mrs Cassimatis had the authority to sign cheques. Later, other people were authorized to do so, but only in their absence and when immediate payment was necessary. Thirdly, Mr and Mrs Cassimatis had “considerable control over the financial advisers and the process for giving advice concerning the Storm model”. The advice was prepared centrally by Storm in a process over which Mr and Mrs Cassimatis had control. His Honour noted one instance where an adviser had not sent an advice to clients because he did not think that they should receive it. After discovering this conduct, Mr Cassimatis said to him that he should not “assume the advice is not appropriate for the clients, we are the specialists and you should present it as it is sent to you”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

ASIC seeks to restrain each respondent from holding an AFSL or from providing financial services under any AFSL, for a period of ten years.WHETHER RELIEF (OTHER THAN DECLARATIONS) SHOULD BE GRANTED ASIC submits that declarations are not a sufficient penalty in the circumstances of this case, as they will not, by themselves, achieve the aim of protecting the public. It submits that the other relief sought is justified by the seriousness of the contravening conduct, the duration of that conduct, and the need for general deterrence. It also points to the effect of the conduct upon third parties who dealt with Storm, namely the relevant investors. For them Storm’s advice has had devastating consequences. ASIC submits that the respondents prejudiced Storm’s interests by exposing it to the risk that it would be found to have contravened provisions of the Act which, in turn, may have exposed it to penalties, litigation at the suit of disappointed investors, loss of its AFSL and/or other regulatory action. At [774] Edelman J observed that:Although many of the relevant investors suffered significant, life-altering, losses after the GFC, these losses were neither necessary nor sufficient for Storm’s breach of s 945A of the Corporations Act. Further, although losses of this nature, whether due to the GFC or any other large market fall, might have been one way that the application of the Storm model to vulnerable investors became clear to many people outside Storm, the discovery of these breaches by Storm was not necessarily dependent upon these losses. It is not necessary to speculate upon the different ways that the breaches might have come to the attention of ASIC, whether by an adviser, a client, a competitor, a bank, or otherwise. The short point is that the likelihood of breaches, and the not insignificant size of the class of potentially vulnerable investors (retirees, with limited income and few assets) was such that the breaches were likely to be discovered at some point. At the very least, a reasonable director with Mr and Mrs Cassimatis’ responsibilities, and in Storm’s circumstances, should have realised that discovery of the likely breaches was a real possibility. And the consequences of discovery were catastrophic for Storm. ASIC also submits that the respondents’ contraventions were serious. The respondents submit that whatever risk of prejudice there may have been, it did not lead to any loss by Storm. No regulatory proceedings have been taken, and none of the relevant investors has commenced proceedings. This approach necessarily equates the proposition “materially prejudices the interest of” to the proposition “causes loss to”. The word “prejudice”, according to the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary relevantly means “[a]ffect adversely, or unfavourably”. I have no difficulty in concluding that to expose Storm to the very real risks to which I have referred was to affect its interests adversely or unfavourably. This conclusion is easily drawn when one is dealing with the interests of a corporation, the business of which is offering financial advice and investment opportunities, and the prejudice is a threat to its capacity to do so.