FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis (No 9) [2018] FCA 385
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 385
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the respondents' conduct materially prejudiced the interests of Storm, as required by s 180(1) of the Act. It concluded that the conduct was serious and likely to be discovered, exposing Storm to significant risks. The court held that exposing Storm to such risks adversely affected its interests. The court also considered the need for general deterrence and the devastating consequences for investors. It concluded that relief beyond declarations was necessary to achieve the aim of protecting the public and ensuring compliance with the Act.
The court granted the relief sought by ASIC, including disqualification orders preventing the respondents from holding an AFSL or providing financial services under any AFSL for ten years. The court found that declarations alone were insufficient in these circumstances, as they would not achieve the aim of protecting the public or ensuring compliance with the Act. The court emphasized the seriousness of the contravening conduct, its duration, and the need for general deterrence.
The final orders required the parties to provide agreed draft orders within seven days, as per Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. within 7 days the parties provide agreed draft orders giving effect to these reasons.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
ASIC seeks to restrain each respondent from holding an AFSL or from providing financial services under any AFSL, for a period of ten years.WHETHER RELIEF (OTHER THAN DECLARATIONS) SHOULD BE GRANTED ASIC submits that declarations are not a sufficient penalty in the circumstances of this case, as they will not, by themselves, achieve the aim of protecting the public. It submits that the other relief sought is justified by the seriousness of the contravening conduct, the duration of that conduct, and the need for general deterrence. It also points to the effect of the conduct upon third parties who dealt with Storm, namely the relevant investors. For them Storm’s advice has had devastating consequences. ASIC submits that the respondents prejudiced Storm’s interests by exposing it to the risk that it would be found to have contravened provisions of the Act which, in turn, may have exposed it to penalties, litigation at the suit of disappointed investors, loss of its AFSL and/or other regulatory action. At [774] Edelman J observed that:Although many of the relevant investors suffered significant, life-altering, losses after the GFC, these losses were neither necessary nor sufficient for Storm’s breach of s 945A of the Corporations Act. Further, although losses of this nature, whether due to the GFC or any other large market fall, might have been one way that the application of the Storm model to vulnerable investors became clear to many people outside Storm, the discovery of these breaches by Storm was not necessarily dependent upon these losses. It is not necessary to speculate upon the different ways that the breaches might have come to the attention of ASIC, whether by an adviser, a client, a competitor, a bank, or otherwise. The short point is that the likelihood of breaches, and the not insignificant size of the class of potentially vulnerable investors (retirees, with limited income and few assets) was such that the breaches were likely to be discovered at some point. At the very least, a reasonable director with Mr and Mrs Cassimatis’ responsibilities, and in Storm’s circumstances, should have realised that discovery of the likely breaches was a real possibility. And the consequences of discovery were catastrophic for Storm. ASIC also submits that the respondents’ contraventions were serious. The respondents submit that whatever risk of prejudice there may have been, it did not lead to any loss by Storm. No regulatory proceedings have been taken, and none of the relevant investors has commenced proceedings. This approach necessarily equates the proposition “materially prejudices the interest of” to the proposition “causes loss to”. The word “prejudice”, according to the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary relevantly means “[a]ffect adversely, or unfavourably”. I have no difficulty in concluding that to expose Storm to the very real risks to which I have referred was to affect its interests adversely or unfavourably. This conclusion is easily drawn when one is dealing with the interests of a corporation, the business of which is offering financial advice and investment opportunities, and the prejudice is a threat to its capacity to do so.