Davis v Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Davis v Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia (No 2) [2011] FCAFC 9

Citation: Davis v Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia (No 2) [2011] FCAFC 9
Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: Davis v Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia (No 1) [2009] FCA 562
Application for leave to appeal: Davis v Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia (No 2) [2009] FCA 589
Application for leave to appeal: Davis v Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia (No 3) [2010] FCA 69
Parties: PETER LEWIS DAVIS v INSOLVENCY AND TRUSTEE SERVICE AUSTRALIA, CHILD SUPPORT REGISTRAR, MAGISTRATES OF NEW SOUTH WALES and BEALE AND ORS AS TRUSTEES OF THE ESTATE OF DR DAVIS
File number(s): NSD 52 of 2009
NSD 229 of 2010
Judges: KEANE CJ, BESANKO & PERRAM JJ
Date of judgment: 4 February 2011
Catchwords:

JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS – Prohibition on publication of reasons – Whether proceeding is “under this Act” – Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 121 – Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) s 105

JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS – Review of judgment before perfection – Whether the Court has proceeded under a misapprehension of fact or law not solely attributable to the applicant   

Words and Phrases: “Proceeding under this Act”
Legislation: Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth)
Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) ss 19, 105, 113
Constitution s 51(xxxi)
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 121
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 5(2)
Federal Court Rules O 35 r 7; O36 rs 3, 5, 7
Cases cited: Atkinson v Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) [2000] FCA 637 cited
Australian Forest Managers Ltd (in liq) v Bramley (1996) 65 FCR 13 cited
Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No 2) (1993) 176 CLR 300 applied
Bankstown Handicapped Children’s Centre Association v Hillman (2010) 182 FCR 483 cited
Davis v Davis [2007] HCATrans 71 cited
Davis v Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia [2010] FCAFC 141 cited
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 cited
DJL v Central Authority (2000) 201 CLR 226 cited
Felton v Mulligan (1971) 124 CLR 367 cited
John Alexander's Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 1 cited
Livingston v Commissioner for Stamp Duties (Qld) (1960) 107 CLR 411 cited
PD v CD [2005] FamCA 827 cited
Re Struthers (Liquidator of Project Management, Architecture and Construction Interior (PACI) Pty Ltd) (No 3) (2005) 64 NSWLR 392 cited
Texas Co (Australasia) Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1940) 63 CLR 382 applied
Wentworth v Woollahra Municipal Council (1982) 149 CLR 672 cited
Date of hearing: Heard on the papers
Date of last submissions: 17 December 2010
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 39
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr P E King
Solicitor for the Applicant: McKells Solicitors
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Mr N Gouliaditis of Australian Government Solicitor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 52 of 2009

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Details
Case
[2011] FCAFC 9
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Davis v Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia (No 2), the Court was required to consider an application by Mr Davis to vacate and reconsider a prior judgment dismissing his appeal and application for leave to appeal against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court. The prior decision had found that Mr Davis’ appeal was incompetent and that leave to appeal should be denied. The present case focused on two main issues: whether the Court should reconsider its previous judgment and whether it should allow the publication of its reasons for that judgment.

The first issue involved the principles governing the power of the Federal Court to review its own judgment before it is perfected. The Court noted that while it has the inherent power to review its judgments before they are entered, this power must be exercised with caution due to the public interest in the finality of litigation. The Court must be satisfied that it has proceeded under a misapprehension of fact or law, and that this misapprehension cannot be attributed solely to the applicant. The applicant bears the onus of demonstrating that they have not been heard. In this case, the Court found that there was no misapprehension of fact or law, as the absence of evidence regarding Mr Davis’ ability to meet his child support obligations was expressly pointed out to counsel during the hearing, and no further evidence was presented to the Court.

The second issue concerned the publication of the Court’s reasons for its judgment. The Court considered the relevant provisions of the Family Law Act 1975 and the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988, which restrict the publication of reasons in certain proceedings. After examining these provisions, the Court concluded that there was no prohibition on publishing the reasons for its judgment in this case.

The Court ultimately dismissed Mr Davis’ application for reconsideration, finding that there was no basis for rehearing the matter. The Court also found that there was no reason to prevent the publication of its reasons. Consequently, the Court ordered that Mr Davis’ Notice of Motion be dismissed with costs.

In summary, the Court affirmed its earlier decision and ruled against Mr Davis’ application for reconsideration and his request for publication of the Court’s reasons. The Court’s decision underscores the principles governing the review of judgments before perfection and the importance of the finality of litigation.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant’s Notice of Motion filed on 8 December 2010 be dismissed with costs.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Not only were these matters obvious but, in any event, the Court pointed them out during the course of argument. Mr King was put very precisely on notice that the Court was concerned that the evidential record before it contained no evidence that Mr Davis was unable to meet his child support obligations. This is confirmed by two exchanges which took place during the course of the hearing. The first was between the Chief Justice and Mr King:KEANE CJ: Mr King, is there evidence – I mean, you may say it’s irrelevant, and if you do, please say so. Is there evidence that your client doesn’t have any other means of paying the $62,000?MR KING: I think the answer to that is there’s no evidence one way or the other.….KEANE CJ: …But just for my purposes, the position is that there is no evidence one way or the other as to whether you client has means other than this property, or other than the sale of this property - - -MR KING: Or the estate.KEANE CJ: Quite.MR KING: Yes, that’s right.(emphasis added) This was followed by an exchange between Perram J and Mr King immediately prior to the completion of the hearing:PERRAM J: Before you go to that, can I just say the difficulty I have with that is that insofar as the sale were to proceed in a way that might actually bring about some loss sounding in damages, absent evidence that your client isn’t able to discharge the debt, and thus obviate any interference with the property, it’s hard to see that any such damage isn’t self-inflicted.MR KING: Well, there is no evidence that he couldn’t, your Honour. There is no evidence that he - - -PERRAM J: No, no, quite, quite. But what I’m concerned about is that that deficit, that absence of evidence is a deficit in your case. It’s certainly a deficit in any argument that there is a substantial injustice or that there would be a substantial injustice that would be left uncured by a refusal of leave to appeal.MR KING: Well, the onus is on my friend in section 31A cases, as Gordon J pointed out.PERRAM J: No, no, so far as leave to appeal is concerned, we come back to the point that if you lose on the first point, you’re in leave territory and if you’re in leave territory you’re the one who has to show a substantial injustice.MR KING: Yes. Well, can I just deal with it.PERRAM J: What I’m struggling – yes.MR KING: Deal with it in two stages: we respectfully submit that we don’t lose on the first point.PERRAM J: I understand, we understand.MR KING: Can I just briefly deal with it…..[After this point Mr King proceeded to explain why leave to appeal was not required and did not return to the evidentiary point.] A number of things flow from these exchanges. To begin with, Mr King expressly conceded that there was no evidence either way concerning this topic. Despite this deficiency in the evidence being expressly raised together with the implications it posed for the leave application, no suggestion was made to the Court that it should proceed other than on the basis of that which Mr King had told it, namely, that there was no evidence one way or the other. Mr King was expressly told the absence of this evidence was a problem for Mr Davis (“the absence of [such] evidence is a deficit in your case”). In those circumstances, there could be no procedural unfairness in the Court proceeding on the very basis explained to the Court by Mr King, namely, that there was no evidence before it which suggested Mr Davis could not meet his obligations.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The result of these applications was that this Court dismissed Mr Davis’ appeal as incompetent and dismissed his application for leave to appeal: Davis v Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia [2010] FCAFC 141. By a notice of motion filed on 8 December 2010, Mr Davis seeks to re-agitate his application before this Court, requesting that the Court vacate its judgment of 3 December 2010 and reconsider afresh its reasons in light of matters disclosed in an accompanying affidavit. Apart from the matters raised by Mr Davis, the Court also reserved in its first decision the question of whether, in light of s 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and s 105 of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) (“the Collection Act”), it was appropriate for the Court to permit its reasons to be provided to the Australian Legal Information Institute for publication on its website at >We conclude that Mr Davis’ application for reconsideration should be dismissed with costs and that there is no reason not to provide our original reasons (and these reasons too) to In Part II we deal with Mr Davis’ claim for reconsideration and in Part III with the publication question.IIThe application for reconsideration It is a well established principle that “[a] superior court of justice… has full power to rehear or review a case until judgment is drawn up, passed and entered…”: Texas Co (Australasia) Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1940) 63 CLR 382 at 457 per Starke J, cited with approval in DJL v Central Authority (2000) 201 CLR 226 at [34] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ. The Federal Court, by reason of s 5(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), is a superior court of record and, therefore, subject to the necessary factual precondition of the orders having not been entered, has such a power. Additionally, the Court is empowered to vary or set aside a judgment or order before it has been entered under Order 35 rule 7(1) of the Federal Court Rules. The entry of orders in the Federal Court is governed by Order 36 rule 3(1) which states that orders may be entered by authentication (defined in rule 7) either by a Registrar (under rule 3(2)) or a Judge of the Court (under rule 5). In these proceedings, the orders made on 3 December 2010 have not been entered and, therefore, the Court retains the power to review its own decision. It is important to note that entry of the Court’s orders onto its computerised system “Casetrack” (which has occurred in this case) does not constitute the entry of orders for the purposes of the Court’s rules. So much was recently made clear by the High Court in John Alexander's Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 1 at [152]. The principles surrounding the Court’s power to review its own judgment before its perfection are clear: “[w]hat must emerge, in order to enliven the exercise of the jurisdiction, is that the Court has apparently proceeded according to some misapprehension of the facts or the relevant law and that this misapprehension cannot be attributed solely to the neglect or default of the party seeking the rehearing.” (Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No 2) (1993) 176 CLR 300 at 303 per Mason CJ). Because of the importance of the public interest in the finality of litigation, it is a jurisdiction “to be exercised with great caution” (at 302). The onus is on the applicant to demonstrate that he or she has not been heard: Autodesk at 302 citing Wentworth v Woollahra Municipal Council (1982) 149 CLR 672 at 684 per Mason ACJ, Wilson and Brennan JJ.