Davis v Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia (No 3)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Davis v Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia (No 3) [2010] FCA 69

Citation: Davis v Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia (No 3) [2010] FCA 69
Parties: PETER LEWIS DAVIS v INSOLVENCY AND TRUSTEE SERVICE AUSTRALIA , CHILD SUPPORT REGISTRAR, MAGISTRATES OF NEW SOUTH WALES and DC BEALE, MJ HORTON AND AJ MCMINN AS TRUSTEES OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE DR ERIC L DAVIS
File number: NSD 52 of 2009
Judge: FOSTER J
Date of judgment: 12 February 2010
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – summary dismissal of judicial review proceedings relating to child support orders made by a Local Court of NSW in 2005 – causes of action relied upon have no reasonable prospects of succeeding – proceedings dismissed pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 17 and s 21
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), ss 5, 6 and 8
Child Support (Assessment ) Act 1989 (Cth)
Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth), s 72A
Constitution, s 51
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 31A
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 39B(1A)
Local Courts Act 1982 (NSW), ss 4, 6(1), 7, 8 and 8A
Cases cited:

Davis v Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia (No 1) [2009] FLC 98-038, [2009] FCA 562, [2009] ALMD 4410 related
Davis v Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia (No 2) [2009] FCA 589 related
Adsteam Harbour Pty Ltd v Registrar of the Australian Register of Ships [2005] FCA 1324 followed
Airservices Australia v Canadian Airlines International Ltd (1999) 202 CLR 133 followed
Breavington v Godleman (1987) 169 CLR 41 followed
Commonwealth v Mewett (1997) 191 CLR 471 followed
Guthrie v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 672 followed
Federated Sawmill, Timberyard and General Woodworkers’ Employees’ Association v Alexander (1912) 15 CLR 308 followed
Flanagan v Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (2004) 138 FCR 286 followed
Luton v Lessels (2002) 210 CLR 333 applied
Ly v Jenkins (2001) 114 FCR 237 followed
Meriton Apartments Pty Ltd v Industrial Court of New South Wales (2008) 171 FCR 380 applied
Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (1994) 179 CLR 155 applied
Nintendo Co Ltd v Centronics Systems Pty Ltd (1994) 181 CLR 134 cited
Peacock v Newtown Marrickviile General Co-Operative Building Society No 4 Ltd (1943) 67 CLR 25 followed
Wang v Anying Group Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 1500 followed
White Industries Aust Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2007) 160 FCR 298 followed

Butt, Land Law (5th ed, 2006)  

Date of hearing: 29 May 2009
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: CATCHWORDS
Number of paragraphs: 66
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr PE King
Solicitor for the Applicant: McKells Solicitors
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Mr N Gouliaditis of Australian Government Solicitor
Solicitor for the First and Third Respondents: The First and Third Respondents submitted save as to costs
The Fourth Respondents did not appear

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

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Details
Case
[2010] FCA 69
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Davis v Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia (No 3) involves the Registrar of the Child Support Agency seeking summary dismissal of proceedings brought by Mr Davis against the Commonwealth, the Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia, and others. Mr Davis challenges the constitutionality of the statutory scheme under which child support is collected and seeks to prevent the enforcement of Local Court orders made against him in relation to unpaid child support and penalties. The case raises questions about the Registrar's authority to enforce child support liabilities and the validity of the statutory framework governing child support collection.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Registrar had the power under s 31A of the Federal Court Act to summarily dismiss Mr Davis's proceedings. The court also had to consider whether the statutory scheme for the collection of child support was constitutional and if the Local Court orders enforcing the child support liability were valid. The Registrar argued that Mr Davis had no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceedings, while Mr Davis contended that the statutory scheme was unconstitutional and that the Local Court orders were erroneous.

The court examined the principles governing the exercise of the power under s 31A of the Federal Court Act, which allows for summary judgment if the court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending or prosecuting the proceeding. The court found that the Registrar had satisfied the statutory test for summary dismissal because Mr Davis had not presented any evidence that could lead to a different outcome at trial. The court held that the statutory scheme for child support collection was constitutional and that the Local Court orders were valid. The court also rejected Mr Davis's argument that the Registrar lacked the authority to enforce child support liabilities.

The court granted the Registrar's application for summary dismissal, finding that Mr Davis had no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceedings. The court dismissed Mr Davis's challenge to the constitutionality of the child support collection scheme and upheld the validity of the Local Court orders. The court ordered that Mr Davis pay costs of the proceedings.

In summary, the court held that the Registrar had the power to summarily dismiss Mr Davis's proceedings, that the statutory scheme for child support collection was constitutional, and that the Local Court orders were valid. The court's decision effectively upheld the Registrar's authority to enforce child support liabilities and dismissed Mr Davis's challenges to the statutory framework and the Local Court orders.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

In the course of explaining the relevant legislation in Davis No 1, I referred to Luton v Lessels (2002) 210 CLR 333. I noted that, although no argument was advanced in Luton 210 CLR 333 that the scheme was invalid because it could not be supported by s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution, at least two members of the Court (Gleeson CJ and McHugh J) expressly held that the legislation was supported by the powers conferred by s 51(xxii), (xxxvii) and (xxxix) and s 122 of the Constitution. The remaining members of the Court in Luton 210 CLR 333 proceeded upon the basis that the legislation was valid.THE RELEVANT FACTS At [26]–[47] in Davis No 1, I set out a summary of the relevant facts as they were established before me for the purposes of determining the Application with which I was dealing in those Reasons for Judgment. Subject to one or two additions and alterations, that summary holds good for the purpose of determining the Registrar’s summary dismissal Motion. I set out below [26]–[47] from Davis No 1: 26At some time prior to 8 November 2005, the amount of $27,629.11 became a registrable maintenance liability of Mr Davis within the meaning of that expression as used in the Collection Act. That amount comprised $18,997.80 in arrears of child support and $8,631.31 in late payment penalties. There was no direct and clear evidence before me which established the circumstances in which that liability arose. The most likely circumstances were that, in maintenance proceedings brought by Mr Davis’ former wife in the Family Court, that Court made an order that maintenance be paid by Mr Davis to his former wife as carer of one or more of Mr Davis’ children and that, by August 2005, the amount of $27,629.11 comprised the arrears due under that order plus penalties. The other possibility is that the liability arose as a result of a child support assessment determined by the Registrar under the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) (the Assessment Act). Such an assessment is made after application by the children’s carer (see Pt 4 of the Assessment Act and s 4 and s 17 of the Collection Act). 27In the present case, it does not matter how the liability first arose. It is clear that a registrable maintenance liability within the meaning of that expression as used in the Collection Act did arise at some time before 8 November 2005. Counsel for Mr Davis did not suggest otherwise. Furthermore, Mr Davis does not claim that the underlying debt due in respect of maintenance which ultimately became a registered maintenance liability was not, in fact, due. In Mr Davis’ world, the relevant events for present purposes commenced with the making of the Local Court orders on 8 November 2005. 28As explained by the High Court in Luton 210 CLR 333, the Registrar must register in the Child Support Register kept under the Act a registrable maintenance liability once such a liability arises (see ss 23, 24 and 24A of the Collection Act).29The obligation to register such a liability does not arise if the carer to whom the maintenance is owed elects to pursue his or her own remedies and not to take advantage of the Commonwealth’s collection scheme under the Collection Act (s 23(3) and s 24A(2) of the Collection Act). 30Once the registrable maintenance liability is registered under the Collection Act, the underlying debt created by the child support assessment or Court order becomes a debt due to the Commonwealth from the payer in accordance with the particulars of the liability entered in the Child Support Register (s 30 of the Collection Act).31The registrable maintenance liability of $27,629.11 owed by Mr Davis in the present case was registered in the Child Support Register under the Collection Act at some time prior to 8 November 2005. Upon registration, that amount became a debt due from Mr Davis to the Commonwealth. Subject to a limited exception, once registration was effected, the carer/payee was no longer entitled to enforce the debt.32The Registrar then brought proceedings against Mr Davis in the Local Court of NSW (Family Matters) at Sydney in order to recover as debts due to the Commonwealth the unpaid maintenance and penalties and the amount due on account of costs under the Family Court costs order which had been made on 31 August 2005. This action was plainly authorised by the Collection Act. 33On 8 November 2005, a NSW State Local Court Magistrate, sitting in the Local Court (Family Matters) at Sydney, made a declaration and orders in those proceedings. On that day, the Local Court made a declaration that:there is owing to the Commonwealth in respect of amounts owing as follows:(a)under registered maintenance liabilities of [Mr Davis] the sum of $27,629.11; and(b)in legal costs awarded by the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia on 31 August 2005 in the amount of $11,692.00.34It is not necessary for present purposes to consider whether the appropriate way of reflecting the debts due to the Commonwealth was to make declarations in that form. Nor is it necessary for present purposes to understand the basis upon which the Family Court costs order made on 31 August 2005 became a debt due from Mr Davis to the Commonwealth. The substance of the matter was that the Local Court gave judgment in favour of the Registrar against Mr Davis in the two amounts specified. Subject to Mr Davis’ constitutional arguments, there is no dispute in the present proceedings as to Mr Davis’ obligation to pay the two amounts referred to in those declarations. 35On the same day and as part of the same orders, the Local Court Magistrate made orders that Mr Davis pay the costs of the proceedings before the Magistrate as well as pay the two amounts the subject of the declarations to which I have referred. 36Paragraphs 3 to 9 of the orders made by the Magistrate on 8 November 2005 were in the following terms:3.That the Respondent’s interest in the property described below be charged with the debt in Orders 1 and 2 herein until the debt and costs have been paid in full:a)the real property known as 20 St. Kevins Avenue, Benowa in the State of Queensland, being comprised in Lot 33 of Group Titles Plan of Re-subdivision 2199 County of Ward, Parish of Nerang and contained in title reference no. 17449213(“the Property”)b)the shares of the Respondent in FPD Pty Ltd.4.That the Respondent be restrained from assigning, transferring, encumbering or otherwise dealing with the real property and shares detailed in paragraph 3 hereof until further order of the court, or the debt and costs in orders 1 and 2 hereof have been paid in full or unless with the written consent of the Applicant.5.That an enforcement warrant issue as attached hereto marked with the letter “A” (“the enforcement warrant”) for the seizure and sale of the Property described in paragraph 3 herein and that the Official Receiver in Bankruptcy be appointed as the authorised enforcement officer.6.That for the purpose of sale pursuant to the enforcement warrant, the Respondent shall within 14 days of being so requested in writing by the Enforcement Officer sign all documents and do all things necessary to transfer his interest in the Property to the Enforcement Officer to be held on trust for sale pursuant to Chapter 20, Part 20.3 of the Family Law Rules 2004 and the proceeds of sale applied:(i)firstly, in payment of all costs, commissions and expenses of the trust, transfer and sale including all costs incurred by the Enforcement Officer; (ii)secondly, in discharge of any encumbrance upon the Property;(iii)thirdly, in payment of the outstanding balance of the total sum payable under Orders 1 and 2 herein;(iv)fourthly, in payment as to his/her share (either as agreed or subject to partition order) of the balance of proceeds remaining, to any other joint tenant owner of the Property (“the joint tenant”)(v)fifthly, in payment of the residue to the Respondent.7.That in the event that the Respondent is in default of Order 6 herein, the Enforcement Officer or the Registrar of the Court shall be empowered to sign all documents and do all things necessary to transfer the Respondent’s interest in the property into the name of the Enforcement Officer.8.On satisfaction of the debt in Orders 1 and 2 above, the Applicant will withdraw any charge that has been registered over the Respondent’s property. 9. That there be liberty to the Applicant to apply:(A)with respect to any issue arising under Orders 3 and 8 hereof; and(B)for orders with respect to the shares of the Respondent in FPD Pty Ltd.37Orders 1 and 2 made on 8 November 2005 required Mr Davis to pay to the Commonwealth:(a)The Commonwealth’s costs of the Local Court proceedings (assessed at $4,274.00); and(b)The two sums referred to in the declaration made on the same day (viz $27,629.11 and $11,692.00).38The “Respondent” referred to in the Local Court orders is Mr Davis. The draft Enforcement Warrant attached to the orders required the seizure and sale of such of the real and personal property of Mr Davis as may be required to realise sufficient funds to satisfy the total debt due as at 8 November 2005 viz $43,595.11. A warrant in the form of the draft Warrant was issued by the Local Court on 21 November 2005. 39Mr Davis had a right to appeal to the Family Court from the Local Court orders but did not do so within the time stipulated in the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and the Family Law Rules 2004.40On 13 January 2006, Mr Davis made a belated attempt to overturn the Local Court orders. On that day, Mr Davis filed an Application in the Family Court in which he sought leave to appeal from the Local Court orders out of time. In the grounds of appeal relied upon in the draft Notice of Appeal which accompanied that Application, Mr Davis raised several alleged breaches of the Family Law Rules and also asserted that the statutory provisions allowing for the assessment and collection of child support by the Registrar were unconstitutional and invalid. On 3 April 2006, Lawrie J dismissed that application with costs (assessed at $1,129.55). 41By way of enforcement of the Local Court orders, the first respondent subsequently acquired Mr Davis’ interest in the Queensland property known as 20 St Kevins Avenue, Benowa (the Queensland property). The Commonwealth had lodged a caveat against the title to that property on 23 November 2005. Mr Davis asserts that the first respondent has for some time threatened to sell the Queensland property and continues to threaten to effect such a sale. As I have already mentioned, the Queensland property was held by Mr Davis as joint tenant with Ms Fofie Lau. 42On 25 March 2009, the Registrar issued the Notice. Because Mr Davis has mounted a very vigorous attack upon the form of the Notice, I have attached a copy of the Notice to these Reasons for Judgment as Attachment “A”. The Notice was received by the Estate’s solicitors on 30 March 2009.43Apparently, both Mr Davis and the Estate’s solicitors had been forewarned that the Registrar intended to serve a s 72A Notice on the Estate’s solicitors. The Estate’s solicitors were told of this on 17 March 2009. They immediately informed Mr Davis who then wrote to the Estate’s solicitors on 22 March 2009 foreshadowing a technical challenge to the Notice. Mr Davis’ letter dated 22 March 2009 was not tendered in evidence before me. On 30 March 2009 the Estate’s solicitors asserted to the Registrar that, as at that date, there were no funds available to pay to Mr Davis and thus no funds to be attached by the s 72A Notice. 44At the hearing before me, the solicitor for Mr Davis made certain assertions based upon the instructions of Mr Davis. Some relevant facts were proven in this way. These were:(a)The Estate’s solicitors are the solicitors acting for the executor of the Will of Dr Davis in the administration of the estate; (b)Each of Dr Davis’ five grandchildren was left a specific legacy of $5,000 with the balance of the estate being divided equally between Dr Davis’ wife, his daughter and Mr Davis;(c)Dr Davis died on 25 October 2008;(d)Probate of the Will of Dr Davis was granted to Mr Cowley on 22 January 2009;(e)Dr Davis’ estate has not yet been fully administered;(f)No debt was due from Dr Davis to Mr Davis as at the date of Dr Davis’ death; and(g)The value of the estate (leaving aside real estate owned by Dr Davis and his wife as joint tenants) is approximately $210,404.00. Mr Davis’ share is thus about $62,000.00 before testamentary expenses are taken into account. 45The solicitor for Mr Davis (and Mr Davis) also asserted that there was no Public Officer of the description referred to in the Notice. Neither Mr Davis nor his solicitor stated the basis for their knowledge of this asserted fact. I do not accept this assertion. The three persons named as addressees in the Notice are solicitors practising under the firm name RBHM Commercial Lawyers. It is very likely that that firm does have a Public Officer for income tax and other regulatory purposes. 46It is Mr Davis who contends that there is no such person. I do not think that he has established that fact. To the contrary, I think that the evidence establishes that there is such a person. If it matters, that is the finding which I make. 47In the period from 30 March 2009 to 24 April 2009, correspondence passed between Mr Davis’ solicitors and the solicitors for the respondents. In that correspondence, Mr Davis’ solicitors sought undertakings in respect of the Queensland property. As at 24 April 2009:(a)The solicitors for the Registrar had informed the solicitors for Mr Davis that:… pending the determination of the current proceedings, [the Registrar] will not instruct ITSA to take action to sell the property [referring to the Queensland property].This statement was first made in a letter from the Australian Government Solicitor to the solicitors for Mr Davis dated 17 April 2009. It was made in response to a request for an undertaking first made by the solicitors for Mr Davis to the Registrar by letter dated 14 April 2009. It was repeated in a letter passing between the same parties dated 23 April 2009;(b)In a letter dated 24 March 2009 from the solicitors for the first respondent to the solicitors for Mr Davis, the solicitors for the first respondent said: INSOLVENCY & TRUSTEE SERVICE AUSTRALIA & ORS ats PETER LEWIS DAVISNSD 52/2009We refer to our telephone conversation with your Counsel, Peter King on 23 March 2009.We are instructed to consent to Order number 3 of the Applicant’s Amended Application dated 6 March 2009, restraining the First Respondent from selling the property until the disposition of the current proceedings (NSD 52 of 2009) in the Federal Court of Australia.Should you wish to discuss this matter, please do not hesitate to contact Tiffany Thomas of our office.(c)The Estate’s solicitors had authorised Mr McKell, the solicitor for Mr Davis, to act as their agent; and(d)The Estate’s solicitors had informed Mr McKell that they consented to Order 1 in the Notice of Motion filed in Court on 24 April 2009 (the order sought in that paragraph is an interlocutory injunction restraining the Registrar from taking further steps to recover moneys from the estate of Dr Davis pending the final hearing of the proceedings).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Registrar relies on s 31A of the Federal Court Act as the source of power for the summary dismissal order which she seeks. Section 31A is in the following terms:31ASummary judgment(1)The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:(a)the first party is prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and(b)the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.(2)The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:(a)the first party is defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and(b)the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.(3)For the purposes of this section, a defence or a proceeding or part of a proceeding need not be:(a)hopeless; or(b)bound to fail;for it to have no reasonable prospect of success.(4)This section does not limit any powers that the Court has apart from this section.(5)This section does not apply to criminal proceedings. In Wang v Anying Group Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 1500, I set out the principles which govern the exercise of the Court’s power pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court Act. At [43] and [44], I said:43The critical words of s 31A(1), when applied to the present case, require me to be satisfied that the respondents have “… no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding …”. The following principles may be extracted from the authorities:(a)The moving party does not have to demonstrate that the defence is hopeless or unarguable;(b)The Court must consider the pleadings and the evidence with a “critical eye” in order to see whether the respondent party has evidence of sufficient quality and weight to be able to succeed at trial (Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd (2008) 167 FCR 372 at [23] (p 382) (per Finkelstein J));(c)The respondent party is not obliged to present its whole case in order to defeat the summary judgment applicant but must at least present a sufficient outline of the evidence in order to enable the Court to come to a preliminary view about the merits for the purpose of considering the statutory test in s 31A(1)(b) (Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd 167 FCR 372 at [22] (p 382) (per Finkelstein J)); and (d)The test may require greater scrutiny of the pleadings and evidence in some cases than in others. In my judgment, the words of s 31A(1) compel a flexible approach. The real question in every case is not so much whether there is any issue that could arguably go to trial but rather whether there is any issue that should be permitted to go to trial. This seems to be the approach of Finkelstein J in Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd 167 FCR 372 and of Gordon J in the same case (as to which see [123]–[134] (pp 406–409)), although Rares J in that case at [73]–[74] (p 394) and in Boston Commercial Services Pty Ltd v GE Capital Finance Australasia Pty Ltd (2006) 236 ALR 720 esp at [45] (p 731) favoured a test which is much closer to the older test articulated in authorities decided under Rules of Court expressed in terms different from the language of s 31A(1)).44I agree with the helpful summary of the relevant principles given by Gilmour J in Dandaven v Harbeth Holdings Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 955 where, at [5] and [6] of his Honour’s Reasons, his Honour said:Section 31A of the Act5Section 31A lowers the bar for obtaining summary judgment: White Industries Australia Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2007) 160 FCR 298. The second reading speech of the Migration Litigation Reform Bill 2005 which introduced s 31A stated that its purpose was to strengthen “the power of the courts to deal with unmeritorious matters by broadening the grounds on which federal courts can summarily dispose of unsustainable cases”: Boston Commercial Services Pty Ltd v GE Capital Finance Australasia Pty Ltd (2006) 70 IPR 146 at [45]; Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd [2008] FCAFC 60 at [124]. 6Success under s 31A does not require a demonstration that the case is hopeless or bound to fail. The following principles are of general application to an application under s 31A: (a)the Court must be very cautious not to do a party an injustice by summarily dismissing proceedings;(b)the Court ought not dismiss a claim based on a predictive assessment of prospects, where it is possible that if the claim went to trial, it may succeed; (c)in a case where evidence can give colour and content to allegations, and where questions of fact and degree are important, the Court should be more reluctant to dismiss a proceeding on the face of a pleading; (d)it is not Parliament's intention to require the Court to engage in lengthy and elaborate trials on an interlocutory basis for the purposes of determining whether or not a proceeding has no reasonable prospects of success. It may be necessary for the opposing party to provide no more than an outline of evidence, sufficient to show that there is a genuine dispute, to prevent the summary application becoming a trial;(e)if there is a real issue of fact or law to be decided, and the rights of the parties depend upon it, it is obviously appropriate that the matter goes to trial. It cannot be said that where there is a real factual dispute and that factual dispute must be resolved to determine whether the claim succeeds that there is ‘no reasonable prospect of success’; (g)it ought not be used to shut out proceedings where, on a proposition of law, there may be room for doubt. On questions of law, an inquiry as to their merit should not be for the purpose of resolving them and also not simply to determine whether the argument is hopeless, but in order to decide if it is sufficiently strong to warrant a trial;(h)evidence of an ambivalent character will usually be sufficient to amount to reasonable prospects; (i)in determining if there are real issues of fact in issue so as to preclude summary judgment the courts must draw all reasonable inferences in favour of the non-moving party. See Genovese v BGC Construction Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 923 at [5]; Boston Commercial Services Pty Ltd v GE Capital Finance Australasia Pty Ltd (2006) 70 IPR 146 at [42]-[48]; Hicks v Ruddock (2007) 156 FCR 574 at [13]; Bond v Barry (2007) 73 IPR 490 at [46]; Commonwealth Bank of Australia v ACN 000 247 601 Pty Ltd (in Liq) (formerly Stanley Thompson Valuers Pty Ltd) [2006] FCA 1416 at [30]; Fortron Automotive Treatments Pty Ltd v Jones (No 2) [2006] FCA 1401 at [21]; Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Limited [2008] FCAFC 60.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The following additional matters are relevant:(a)The applicant’s former wife applied to the Registrar for an administrative assessment of child support soon after he and his wife separated in January 1990. That application was accepted and the child support liability commenced on 13 February 1990.(b)The applicant remarried in May 1995, on this occasion to Ms Lau.(c)On 26 August 2003, the Registrar filed an Enforcement Summons in the Local Court of NSW seeking to recover $20,446.37 in child support arrears and late payment penalties owed by the applicant to the Commonwealth.(d)Various interlocutory applications were made by the applicant and his wife in the period from late 2003 to late 2005.(e)On 23 November 2005, a caveat was registered against the Queensland property in favour of the first respondent.(f)On 24 July 2007, the applicant’s interest in the Queensland property, which was, at that time, held in joint tenancy with Ms Lau, was transferred to the first respondent.(g)The effect of that transfer was to sever the joint tenancy and to commute Ms Lau’s interest to a tenancy in common in respect of 50% of the Queensland property.CONSIDERATIONThe Challenge to the Local Court Orders The relevant terms of the Local Court orders are set out at [36] in Davis No 1 (as to which see [27] above). The Local Court orders may be reviewed by this Court pursuant to s 39B(1A) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) if it can be demonstrated that there were errors in the making of those orders and that those errors were jurisdictional errors (Adsteam Harbour Pty Ltd v Registrar of the Australian Register of Ships [2005] FCA 1324 at [6] and [7] (per Allsop J) and the cases cited therein; Meriton Apartments Pty Ltd v Industrial Court of New South Wales (2008) 171 FCR 380 at [155]–[157] (per Greenwood J) and at [215] and [249]–[250] (per Perram J)). Those orders are not reviewable under the ADJR Act because they do not constitute a decision to which [the ADJR Act] applies because they do not amount to a decision of an administrative character. The Registrar submitted that the Magistrate who made the Local Court orders had jurisdiction to make those orders. At the time those orders were made, the Local Court of NSW was established by ss 6(1), 8 and 8A of the Local Courts Act 1982 (NSW) (the Local Courts Act) as a court of record constituted by Magistrates sitting alone. At that time, s 7 was in the following terms:(1)Every Court shall have the same jurisdiction, civil and criminal, as courts of petty sessions possessed in New South Wales immediately before the appointed day.(2)Courts shall have the jurisdiction conferred or imposed on them by or under any Act or other law. Section 4(3)(a) provided that a reference to an Act in the Local Courts Act included a reference to an Act of the Commonwealth. The Local Courts Act therefore recognised that the Commonwealth Parliament may confer Federal jurisdiction on local courts. In Ly v Jenkins (2001) 114 FCR 237 at [99] Sackville J, as a member of the Full Court which decided that case, said:Section 7(2) of the Local Courts Act recognises that Local Courts, in addition to the jurisdiction possessed by Courts of Petty Sessions immediately before the appointed day, also have the jurisdiction conferred or imposed upon them by any other Act or law. Section 7(2), having regard to the terms of s 4(3) of the Local Courts Act, specifically contemplates that jurisdiction may be conferred on Local Courts not only by State law but by Commonwealth enactments. In other words, the New South Wales Parliament has recognised that the Commonwealth Parliament, in the exercise of its constitutional powers, may confer jurisdiction on Local Courts in relation to summary offences created by Commonwealth law.