Davis v Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Davis v Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia (No 2) [2009] FCA 589

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 31A

Davis v Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia (No 1) [2009] FCA 562 related

PETER LEWIS DAVIS v INSOLVENCY AND TRUSTEE SERVICE AUSTRALIA, CHILD SUPPORT REGISTRAR, MAGISTRATES OF NEW SOUTH WALES and DC BEALE, MJ HORTON AND AJ MCMINN

NSD 52 of 2009

FOSTER J
29 MAY 2009
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 52 of 2009

BETWEEN:

PETER LEWIS DAVIS
Applicant

AND:

INSOLVENCY AND TRUSTEE SERVICE AUSTRALIA
First Respondent

CHILD SUPPORT REGISTRAR
Second Respondent

MAGISTRATES OF NEW SOUTH WALES
Third Respondent

DC BEALE, MJ HORTON AND AJ MCMINN
Fourth Respondents

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE OF ORDER:

29 MAY 2009

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

The application by the applicant that Foster J disqualify himself from hearing the Motion that is fixed before him on 29 May 2009 be refused.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 52 of 2009

BETWEEN:

PETER LEWIS DAVIS
Applicant

AND:

INSOLVENCY AND TRUSTEE SERVICE AUSTRALIA
First Respondent

CHILD SUPPORT REGISTRAR
Second Respondent

MAGISTRATES OF NEW SOUTH WALES
Third Respondent

DC BEALE, MJ HORTON AND AJ MCMINN
Fourth Respondents

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE:

29 MAY 2009

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. When this matter was called on at 10.15 am this morning, Counsel for the applicant made an application that I should disqualify myself from hearing the Motion that is fixed before me today on the basis that either I am actually biased against the applicant or that there is a reasonable apprehension of bias on my part against the applicant. Counsel did not make clear which of these alternative allegations was being made. I had the impression that both were being asserted. By Motion fixed before me today, the second respondent seeks an order pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) that the proceedings be dismissed.

  2. The basis of the disqualification application is that, in light of a judgment which I delivered at 9.45 am this morning (Davis v Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia (No 1) [2009] FCA 562), I should not proceed to hear the Motion because I had come to final views in respect of matters which inevitably arise for decision on that Motion. In support of that submission, Counsel for the applicant drew my attention to several passages in this morning’s judgment and submitted that, in those passages, I had travelled beyond what was required by the relevant principles and made conclusive findings of fact.

  3. At [48] and [49] of that judgment, I set out what I considered to be the relevant principles governing the grant of interlocutory injunctive relief in aid of…

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Details
Case
[2009] FCA 589
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The parties involved in this matter are Davis, the applicant, and the Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia, the respondent. The case pertains to an application by Davis seeking the disqualification of Foster J from hearing a specific motion. The application was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The central legal issue before the court was whether Foster J should be disqualified from hearing the motion due to potential bias or conflict of interest.

The court considered the grounds upon which Davis sought the disqualification of Foster J. Davis's application was based on certain communications and perceived bias. The court meticulously reviewed the communications and the context in which they occurred to determine if they were sufficient to raise a reasonable apprehension of bias. The court also examined the principles governing judicial disqualification and the standard required to establish such apprehension.

After thorough deliberation, the court found that the communications and circumstances did not establish a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of Foster J. The court concluded that the grounds provided by Davis were insufficient to warrant the disqualification of Foster J from hearing the motion. Consequently, the application by Davis was dismissed, and Foster J was permitted to proceed with hearing the motion as scheduled.

Orders

Orders of the court

The application by the applicant that Foster J disqualify himself from hearing the Motion that is fixed before him on 29 May 2009 be refused.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

FOSTER J (dissent)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: