Davis v Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Davis v Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia [2010] FCAFC 141

Citation: Davis v Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia [2010] FCAFC 141
Appeal from: Davis v Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia (No 2) [2009] FCA 589
Davis v Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia (No 3) [2010] FCA 69
Parties: PETER LEWIS DAVIS v INSOLVENCY AND TRUSTEE SERVICE AUSTRALIA, CHILD SUPPORT REGISTRAR, MAGISTRATES OF NEW SOUTH WALES, BEALE AND ORS AS TRUSTEE OF THE ESTATE OF DR DAVIS and FOFIE LAU
File number(s): NSD 52 of 2009
NSD 229 of 2010
Judges: KEANE CJ, BESANKO & PERRAM JJ
Date of judgment: 3 December 2010
Catchwords:

FAMILY LAW AND CHILD WELFARE – Child Support – Enforcement mechanisms for payment of – Garnishee order pursuant to s 72A Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) – Whether exercise of judicial power contrary to Chapter III Constitution – Distinction between declaring and deciding pre-existing rights and creating new rights

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Appeals – Appeals may only be brought from interlocutory judgment unless Court gives leave – Whether decision under s 31A Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) is interlocutory or final – s 24(1D)(b) Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 operative

Legislation: Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) s 31
Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) ss 10, 25, 31, 72A, 72D, 76, 104, 105, 113
Constitution ss 51(xxxi), 77(iii)
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 121
Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) rs 20.07, 20.18, 20.21A
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24, 31A
Local Courts Act 1982 (NSW) ss 6, 7, 8, 8A, 9
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39
Jurisdiction of Courts (Foreign Land) Act 1989 (NSW) s 3
Cases cited: Atkinson v Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) [2000] FCA 637 cited
Attorney-General (Cth) v Schmidt (1961) 105 CLR 361 cited
British South Africa Company v Companhia de Moçambique [1893] AC 602 cited
Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1 cited
Davis v Davis [2007] HCATrans 71 cited
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 applied
Flanagan v Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (2004) 138 FCR 286 cited
Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd (2008) 167 FCR 372 cited
Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51 cited
Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (2009) 178 FCR 401 cited
Luton v Lessels (2002) 210 CLR 333 applied
Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1994) 179 CLR 155 cited
Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173 cited
PD v CD [2005] FamCA 827 cited
Peacock v Newtown Marrickville & General Co-operative Building Society No. 4 Ltd (1943) 67 CLR 25 applied
Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 269 ALR 233 cited
Whittaker v Child Support Registrar [2010] FCAFC 112 cited
Date of hearing: 11 November 2010
Date of last submissions: 11 November 2010
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
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Details
Case
[2010] FCAFC 141
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Davis v Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia, the applicant sought leave to appeal from the dismissal of his proceedings against the respondent. The applicant argued that he was entitled to appeal as of right and that the leave requirement under the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) did not apply to his case. The legal issues before the court were whether the applicant needed leave to appeal and, if so, whether leave should be granted. The court determined that leave was required, but it should not be granted because there was no doubt about the primary judge’s conclusions and no injustice would result from the refusal.

The court examined several arguments made by the applicant. Firstly, it was argued that the primary judge had incorrectly applied the standard under section 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). The court found that while summary dismissal should not be awarded in cases with disputed factual issues that are material, it was not necessary to withhold relief where factual disputes were not material to the resolution of the litigation. The applicant had nominated several factual issues that were either not in dispute or not material to his claims. Secondly, it was submitted that the execution orders made by the Magistrate were beyond his authority. The court found no merit in this argument. Thirdly, the applicant claimed that the notice issued to the solicitors for the respondent was beyond the Registrar’s legal competence. The court rejected this argument as well. Fourthly, the applicant argued that amendments seeking to challenge the constitutional validity of the garnishee provision should have been permitted. The court found no basis for this claim. Finally, it was argued that the notice under section 72A had not been served in a timely fashion or by an authorised officer. The court found this argument to be without merit.

The court concluded that none of the applicant’s criticisms of the primary judgment were well-founded. The application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs. The matter was listed for directions on a specified date.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the second respondent’s costs.

3. The matter be listed for directions on Friday, 10 December 2010.

Note:

1. The appeal be dismissed as incompetent.

2. The appellant pay the second respondent’s costs.

3. The matter be listed for directions on Friday, 10 December 2010.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Before the Court is an application for leave to appeal from orders of a judge of this Court dismissing summarily Mr Davis’ proceedings. Mr Davis contends that leave is not required to appeal from such a decision and he is entitled to appeal as of right. The questions to be resolved are, therefore, whether he requires leave to appeal and, if he does, whether leave should be granted. Should leave be required it is established that its grant is generally limited to those cases where the decision below is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its being reconsidered by a Full Court and where substantial injustice will result if leave were to be refused. For reasons which follow leave is required but in this case should not be granted. This is not only because there is no reason to doubt the conclusions of the primary judge but more importantly because no injustice is occasioned to Mr Davis by reason of that refusal. II – SOME FACTS The laws of the Commonwealth attach significance to the obligation of separated parents of children to provide for their proper financial support. The important features of these laws are a set of provisions by which the liability of parents to pay child support is assessed and another set by which the payments thus assessed to be due are collected. The amount of child support payable by a parent to the child’s carer is assessed by the Child Support Registrar, a Commonwealth office established under s 10 of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) (the Collection Act). The Registrar is empowered, on application by a child’s carer, to assess the liability of a parent to pay child support and the process of assessment bears similarities to the way in which income tax is assessed. Once assessed the parent must pay the amount of child support to the child’s carer in accordance with the assessment (s 31 of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth)). A carer may choose to register the liability with the Registrar (s 25 Collection Act). Where this occurs the child’s carer is no longer entitled to enforce the child support obligation against the other parent and that obligation becomes, instead, a debt due by the parent to the Commonwealth (s 30 Collection Act). The carer becomes entitled to a payment from the Commonwealth in respect of whatever has been collected from the parent (s 76 Collection Act). To aid the efficacy of this régime the Registrar is equipped with ample powers to secure compliance with it. They include, by way of example, a power to sue in a court to obtain judgment for the child support amount (s 113 Collection Act); appurtenant powers to enforce any resulting judgment debt against the judgment debtor such as the levying of execution or the appointment of receivers (s 105 Collection Act and Chapter 20 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)); powers of garnishment by which those owing moneys to a person with child support obligations may be compelled to pay those moneys directly to the Registrar (s 72A); and, a power to prevent a person with such an obligation from leaving the country (s 72D).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

In those circumstances, even if we were of the view that there were reasonable arguments that the primary judge’s order should be set aside we would not be disposed to grant leave. We do not perceive that Mr Davis suffers any loss. Even if we did, however, whatever injustice exists is entirely of Mr Davis’ own making.VI – NO REASONABLE ARGUMENT ABOUT CORRECTNESS OF PRIMARY JUDGMENT In any event, we do not accept that any of Mr Davis’ criticisms of the primary judgment are well-founded. Five basic points were made on his behalf. First, it was said that the primary judge had approached the standard to be applied under s 31A incorrectly and had reached views about various factual matters which ought not to have been reached on such an application. Secondly, a submission was made that the execution orders made by the Magistrate were beyond his authority. Thirdly, it was put that the notice issued to the solicitors for Dr Davis’ estate was beyond the Registrar’s legal competence. Fourthly, Mr Davis claimed that the amendments which sought to challenge the constitutional validity of the garnishee provision (s 72A) should have been permitted. Finally it was said that the notice under s 72A had not been served in a sufficiently timely fashion or issued by an authorised officer. It is convenient to deal with each in turn.(a) the application of s 31A (Proposed Grounds 2, 5, 6 and 7) This is not a case to ponder long the principles governing the exercise of relief under s 31A. Mr Davis’ point, as developed before us, was that s 31A ought not to be utilised where there are any disputed questions of fact or disputed questions of mixed fact and law. Certainly authority supports that submission (“Where there are factual issues capable of being disputed and in dispute, summary dismissal should not be awarded to the respondent simply because the court has formed the view that the applicant is unlikely to succeed on the factual issue”: Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 269 ALR 233 at 243 [25] per French CJ and Gummow J). However, we do not read Spencer as requiring that summary relief be withheld where there are factual disputes about matters which are not material to the resolution of the litigation. Mr Davis nominated eight matters said to require resolution at trial. The first was whether the Gold Coast land was jointly owned by Mr Davis with his wife. However, this was not, in fact, in issue nor, even if had been, material to any claim made by Mr Davis. The second was whether the Official Receiver has any interest in the Gold Coast land “by reason of a severance of the joint tenancy by operation of law or otherwise”. Plainly, if the orders of the Magistrate were effective the Official Receiver holds Mr Davis’ former interest by paramount force of federal law. Whether the Official Receiver holds Mr Davis’ interest by transfer from him or whether instead merely succeeds to his title may have an impact on whether the joint tenancy has been severed. We fail, however, to see why that question has any impact on any claim made by Mr Davis. The third matter was whether the actions of the Official Receiver to sell the land “have caused the land to be sold or are at risk of being sold at an undervalue”. The land has not been sold so the first limb of this may disregarded. Mr Davis submitted that it was an important matter which had not been admitted by the respondent. However, there would be no purpose submitting that question to trial unless there was some sensible argument that the actions of the Registrar were unlawful. Mr Davis’ claim rests entirely for its efficacy upon depriving the actions of the Registrar (and the Magistrate) of their legal effect so as to provide the platform for an argument that the Registrar was a tortfeasor. If that venture be hopeless (as the learned primary judge held) then it would be idle to let through to trial damages issues which could never arise. Put another way, Mr Davis’ argument that the Registrar is a tortfeasor does not rest on this allegation which can only go to the question of loss.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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