Adelaide Brighton Cement Ltd v Hallett Concrete Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil: Application)

ADELAIDE BRIGHTON CEMENT LTD v HALLETT CONCRETE PTY LTD & ORS

[2020] SASC 161

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Doyle

28 August 2020

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - PLEADINGS - STRIKING OUT - DISCLOSING NO REASONABLE CAUSE OF ACTION OR DEFENCE

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - ENDING PROCEEDINGS EARLY - SUMMARY DISPOSAL - GENERALLY

The plaintiff (ABCL) and first defendant (Hallett) are parties to a cement supply agreement (the CSA), originally entered into in April 2008, but amended from 1 July 2014.  Under the CSA, ABCL was obliged to supply cement to Hallett on favourable terms, and Hallett was obliged to purchase cement exclusively from ABCL.

In its second statement of claim ABCL alleges that from early 2018 Hallett has not purchased exclusively from ABCL, in breach of its purchase obligations under the CSA.  It also alleges other related causes of action.  Hallett has filed a second defence in which it denies ABCL’s claim. 

Hallett also wishes to pursue a counterclaim.  The essence of the proposed counterclaim is an allegation of breach by ABCL of its obligation to supply Hallett with cement on favourable terms.  It contends that from time to time during the period from July 2014 to the present, ABCL has charged Hallett higher prices than it charged its other customers. 

Hallett was late in filing its counterclaim and applied for an extension of time to file its counterclaim.  On the eve of the argument of its application, Hallett proffered a second version of its proposed counterclaim.  Argument proceeded on the second version of the proposed counterclaim. Following the argument, the Court delivered reasons to the effect that there was “sufficient substance to the inferential case” to permit the counterclaim to be filed.  However, before the proposed orders came to be perfected by entry into the records of the Court, ABCL notified its intention to apply to reopen Hallett’s application for leave to file its counterclaim.

ABCL ultimately brought a formal application in which it seeks to reopen argument on Hallett’s application. In the alternative, ABCL’s application seeks summary judgment on the counterclaim, summary dismissal of the counterclaim, or an order striking out the counterclaim.

Held, per Doyle J:

1.      It would not be appropriate to reopen Hallett’s application for permission to file its counterclaim. The public interest in finality outweighs any prejudice occasioned to ABCL.

2.      As there is a reasonable basis for some of the particulars of breach alleged by Hallett, it would not be appropriate to enter summary judgment on, or summarily dismiss, Hallett’s counterclaim.

3.      However, the pleading does not disclose a proper basis for Hallett’s allegation of breaches of the breadth that is currently made in the counterclaim. The case as presently pleaded by Hallett in its counterclaim is not reasonably sustainable. It should be struck out as either an abuse of process or on the basis that the pleading does not disclose a reasonable cause…

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Details
Case
[2020] SASC 161
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Adelaide Brighton Cement Ltd sued Hallett Concrete Pty Ltd in the Supreme Court of South Australia. The dispute centred around allegations of negligence and breach of contract related to concrete supply and quality issues. The court was tasked with addressing procedural applications, including a motion to strike out certain defences and a motion for summary judgment. The primary legal issues involved the admissibility of hearsay evidence in summary judgment applications and the criteria for granting summary judgment under the Uniform Civil Rules.

The court addressed the admissibility of hearsay evidence, noting that while such evidence is generally permissible in strike out and summary dismissal applications, its use in summary judgment applications is more restrictive. The court considered the relevant rules and previous cases, particularly Settlement Wine Co Pty Ltd v National and General Insurance Co Ltd, which held that hearsay evidence was inadmissible in final proceedings. The court also examined the Uniform Civil Rules, which permit the use of first-hand hearsay in certain circumstances if it saves time or expense and complies with specific conditions.

In determining the application for summary judgment, the court assessed whether there was a reasonable basis for prosecuting the claim. The court compared the relevant tests under the Uniform Civil Rules, the Supreme Court Rules 2006, and the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976. The court concluded that the test for summary judgment under the Uniform Civil Rules was not materially different from its predecessor and that the bar for granting summary judgment had not been substantially lowered.

The court granted the motion to strike out certain defences and the motion for summary judgment in favour of Adelaide Brighton Cement Ltd, dismissing Hallett Concrete Pty Ltd's claims.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

While I have attempted to summarise what I see as the key features of, and differences between, summary judgment, summary dismissal and strike out applications, I accept that in practice the distinctions are often difficult to draw and observe, and there is, quite appropriately, scope for overlap and flexibility in their operation.Admissibility of hearsay evidence An issue which has arisen in the present matter is the extent to which it is permissible for the parties to rely upon hearsay evidence (or evidence given by way of affidavit ‘on information and belief’) on applications such as the present. The parties accept, and I agree, that such evidence will often be admissible on strike out and summary dismissal applications. However, the position is less clear in relation to summary judgment applications. In contesting the admissibility of hearsay evidence on a summary judgment application, Hallett relied upon Settlement Wine Co Pty Ltd v National and General Insurance Co Ltd.[33] In that case, the plaintiff succeeded in obtaining judgment in its favour via an application for immediate relief under r 25 of the 1987 Rules. King CJ reasoned that because the 1987 Rules only contemplated the receipt of affidavits on information and belief in interlocutory proceedings, and because the application for immediate relief involved final rather than interlocutory proceedings, the hearsay evidence tendered by the plaintiff was inadmissible.[33] Settlement Wine Co Pty Ltd v National and General Insurance Co Ltd (1988) 146 LSJS 150 at 151-152. Under both the 1987 Rules (r 83.04) and the 2006 Rules (r 162(2)), the admissibility of hearsay affidavit evidence was conditioned upon its use being for “interlocutory proceedings”. However, under UCR 101.4(1), the position is as follows:(1)Unless the Court otherwise orders or these Rules otherwise provide, an affidavit to be tendered at a directions hearing may contain first hand hearsay if it will save time or expense and it complies with rule 31.7(12). The receipt of first hand hearsay affidavit evidence under UCR 101.4(1) is thus conditioned upon (i) it being tendered at a “directions hearing”; (ii) it saving time or expense; (iii) compliance with UCR 31.7(12) (which requires that the deponent identify the source of the hearsay statement and his or her belief in it); and (iv) the Court not exercising its discretion to make an order to the contrary. Before returning to the conditions associated with the receipt of hearsay evidence under UCR 101.4(1), I also note that UCR 101.4(5) is potentially relevant in this context. It provides:(5)The Court may inform itself on any matter without requiring formal proof on the basis of information the Court considers reasonably reliable. The primary purpose of UCR 101.4(5) is to permit a level of informality when the Court considers that formal evidence is not required; for example, when making routine timetabling orders, or otherwise dealing with issues where it would be inefficient to require formal evidence (as opposed to information received from the bar table). However, it is potentially also available to facilitate the Court’s reliance upon hearsay evidence in circumstances where it considers that such evidence is reasonably reliable and otherwise appropriate to be relied upon.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In respect of summary judgment, UCR 144.2 provides:144.2—Summary judgment (1)The Court may, on application by a party, give summary judgment in favour of an applicant—(a) on a claim if there is no reasonable basis for defending the claim;(b) on a cause of action in a claim if there is no reasonable basis for defending the cause of action; or(c) on a separate issue that arises in a claim if there is no reasonable basis for contesting that issue.(2)The Court may, on application by a party, give summary judgment against an applicant—(a) on a claim if there is no reasonable basis for prosecuting the claim;(b) on a cause of action in a claim if there is no reasonable basis for prosecuting the cause of action; or(c) on a separate issue that arises in a claim if there is no reasonable basis for contesting that issue.(3)An application for summary judgment must be made by filing an interlocutory application and supporting affidavit in accordance with rule 102.1.Summary judgment: general principles Focussing upon the situation where, as here, a respondent seeks summary judgment on the applicant’s claim, under UCR 144.2(2)(a) the respondent must establish that there is “no reasonable basis for prosecuting the claim”. This may be contrasted with the test under SCR 232 of the 2006 Rules (“no reasonable basis for the claim”), and the test under s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (“no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding”). I do not think that there is any material difference between the test under UCR 144.2(2)(a) and the test that applied under SCR 232. The focus remains upon the existence of a “reasonable basis” for the claim, and the addition of the words “for prosecuting” does not add anything (other than, perhaps, to achieve some symmetry with the reference to “for defending” which appeared in SCR 232(2)(a), and remains in UCR 144.2(1)). Assuming equivalence between these tests, I note that there has been some discussion in the authorities by way of comparison between the test under SCR 232 and the test under its predecessor in the 1987 Rules. While it has been accepted that SCR 232 was intended to “lower the bar”, there has been some disagreement as to the extent to which this is so. In Ceneavenue Pty Ltd v Martin,[12] Debelle J (with whom Duggan and Anderson JJ agreed) accepted that there had been a lowering of the bar, but also suggested that it did not involve any “material difference” or “substantial relaxation” in the approach to be taken to summary judgment.[13] Subsequently, in Davies v Minister for Urban Development and Planning,[14] Bleby J doubted whether the Full Court in Ceneavenue Pty Ltd v Martin had given proper effect to the words used in SCR 232. But perhaps more significantly, his Honour also expressed the view that the Full Court’s decision had in any event been overtaken by the decision of the High Court in Spencer v Commonwealth.[15][12] Ceneavenue Pty Ltd v Martin (2008) 106 SASR 1.[13] Ceneavenue Pty Ltd v Martin (2008) 106 SASR 1 at [93]; cf JT Nominees Pty Ltd v Macks (2007) 97 SASR 471 at [81], [86].[14] Davies v Minister for Urban Development and Planning (2011) 109 SASR 518 at [43].[15] Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118. at [43].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established