CNM v Chief Executive, Department for Child Protection

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Appeal: Civil)

CNM v CHIEF EXECUTIVE, DEPARTMENT FOR CHILD PROTECTION

[2025] SASCA 9

Judgment of the Court of Appeal  

(The Honourable Justice S Doyle and the Honourable Justice Bleby)

7 February 2025

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - WHEN APPEAL LIES - FROM SUPREME COURT - BY LEAVE OF COURT - GENERALLY

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW - REVIEWABLE DECISIONS AND CONDUCT

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - ENDING PROCEEDINGS EARLY - SUMMARY DISPOSAL - SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT OR RESPONDENT: STAY OR DISMISSAL OF PROCEEDINGS

In April 2024, the applicant sought judicial review of an adverse finding concerning him in a letter written by the respondent about the risk of harm to the applicant’s children due to domestic violence. The respondent had advised the applicant that a risk of harm had been identified on the basis that the ability of the children’s mother ‘to make safe choices for the children was impaired’ by the applicant’s ‘use of violence and coercive control’.

The respondent sought, and a judge of this Court granted, summary judgment of the claim for judicial review on the basis that the finding complained of had no legal effect on the applicant, and there had been no consequential action affecting his rights or those of his children.

The applicant seeks to appeal on grounds that the primary judge proceeded on an erroneous understanding of the facts, failed to take into account (or gave inadequate weight to) relevant considerations, and acted upon a wrong principle; and that the decision below was clearly wrong.

Held, per the Court, dismissing the application for leave to appeal:

1.The weight of authority favours the view that a decision to grant summary judgment against an applicant on the basis that the applicant’s claim does not have any reasonable basis is interlocutory and hence requires leave to appeal; and

2.In circumstances where the applicant has not identified any reasonably arguable basis for challenging the primary judge’s decision, the proposed appeal does not raise any issue of general principle, and relates to a matter of limited practical, legal, or indeed reputational, significance for the applicant, the interests of justice do not favour a grant of leave to appeal.

Children and Young People (Safety) Act 2017 (SA) ss 7, 23, 31, 31(1), 32, 32(1), 32(2), 32(3), 32(3)(a), 34, 34(3), 35, 36, 51 150, 152; Children and Young People (Safety) Regulations 2017 (SA) r 11; Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) rr 144.2, 256.5(3)(a), referred to.
Adelaide Brighton Cement Ltd v Hallett Concrete Pty Ltd (2020) 137 SASR 117; Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564; Attorney-General (SA) v Kowalski [2015] SASC 123; City of Port Adelaide Enfield v Bingham (2014) 119 SASR 1; CNM v Chief Executive, Department for Child Protection [2024] SASC 118; Commissioner of Taxation v Bosanac (No 5) [2019] FCA 2126; Gheorghiu v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2007] VSCA 83;

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Details
Case
[2025] SASCA 9
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant sought leave to appeal from a decision of the primary judge. The dispute concerned an "adverse finding" made by the respondent, the Chief Executive of the Department for Child Protection, which identified a risk of domestic violence based on the applicant's alleged use of violence and coercive control. This finding arose from a notification received by the Department regarding a child exhibiting indicators of sexual harm. Following an investigation, the Department determined the children were safe in their mother's care, referred them to therapy, and closed the file. The applicant sought judicial review of the adverse finding, alleging a failure to accord procedural fairness and legal unreasonableness, specifically a lack of prior notice, opportunity to respond, and evidentiary support for the finding.

The court was required to determine whether there was a reasonably arguable basis for impugning the primary judge's reasoning or conclusion, and whether the interests of justice favoured granting leave to appeal. The applicant's grounds for judicial review centred on the respondent's alleged failure to provide procedural fairness by not giving prior notice of the adverse finding or an opportunity to respond, and the alleged unreasonableness and lack of evidence supporting the finding.

The court found that the applicant had not identified any reasonably arguable basis for challenging the primary judge's decision. The court considered the submissions made by the applicant in support of the proposed appeal and concluded they did not provide a sufficient basis to overturn the primary judge's reasoning or conclusion. The court noted that the proposed appeal did not raise any issue of general principle and related to a matter of limited practical or legal significance.

Consequently, the court determined that the interests of justice did not favour granting leave to appeal. The application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant now seeks leave to appeal. For the reasons that follow we are not persuaded that there is sufficient merit in the application to grant leave to appeal.Background On 23 June 2023, the Department for Child Protection received a notification pursuant to s 31 of the Children and Young People (Safety) Act 2017 (SA) (‘the CYPS Act’) to the effect that a child of the applicant had exhibited suspicious indicators consistent with sexual harm and may be at risk. The respondent caused an assessment of the notification to be undertaken. Upon completion of the assessment, an investigation into the circumstances of the child and his brother (‘the children’) was undertaken in accordance with ss 32(3)(a) and 34 of the CYPS Act. During the course of the investigation, the Department identified a risk of domestic violence. As a result, on 24 October 2023, the applicant was interviewed by Department employees. In the course of the interview, the applicant was asked about historical issues relating to domestic violence. By letter dated 1 November 2023, the respondent advised the applicant that a risk of domestic violence had been identified on the basis that the ability of the children’s mother ‘to make safe choices for the children was impaired’ by the applicant’s ‘use of violence and coercive control’ (‘the adverse finding’). The children’s mother was also notified of the adverse finding. However, following a risk assessment in accordance with the Department’s risk assessment framework, a determination was made that the children were considered to be safe and at low risk in the mother’s home. The children were referred to a therapy service, the file was closed and no further action was taken by the Department. The applicant sought judicial review of the adverse finding made by the respondent. The grounds relied upon involved complaints of a failure to accord procedural fairness and legal unreasonableness. In particular, the applicant complained that (i) the respondent failed to provide prior notice of the adverse finding, a summary of the information it was based upon, or an opportunity to comment or respond; (ii) the respondent’s reasons for making the adverse finding were unreasonable; and (iii) there was no evidence to support the finding. The applicant sought an order setting aside the adverse finding.Legislative framework It is appropriate to provide a brief overview of the legislative framework within which the respondent made the adverse finding in relation to the applicant. Under s 7 of the CYPS Act, the paramount consideration in the administration, operation and enforcement of the Act is to ensure that children and young people are protected from harm. To that end, Part 1 of Chapter 5 imposes mandatory reporting obligations upon persons employed or otherwise working in a number of prescribed occupations. Under s 31(1), if such persons, in the course of their employment, form a suspicion on reasonable grounds that a child or young person is, or may be, at risk, then they must report that suspicion as soon as is reasonably practicable.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

We have had regard to the balance of the submissions made by the applicant in support of his proposed appeal. It is sufficient to observe that we do not think they provide any reasonably arguable basis for impugning the primary judge’s reasoning or conclusion.Conclusion For the reasons set out, the applicant has not identified any reasonably arguable basis for challenging the primary judge’s decision. In circumstances where the proposed appeal does not raise any issue of general principle, and relates to a matter of limited practical or legal, or indeed reputational, significance for the applicant, the interests of justice do not favour a grant of leave to appeal. The application for leave to appeal should be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established