Hallett Concrete Pty Ltd v Adelaide Brighton Cement Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Appeal: Civil)

HALLETT CONCRETE PTY LTD v ADELAIDE BRIGHTON CEMENT LTD & ORS

[2024] SASCA 80

Judgment of the Court of Appeal  

(The Honourable Acting Chief Justice Livesey, the Honourable Justice Doyle and the Honourable Justice Bleby)

27 June 2024

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - PLEADINGS - GENERALLY

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - COURT SUPERVISION - AMENDMENT - ORIGINATING PROCESS, PLEADINGS ETC

This matter is listed for trial in mid-August 2024 with eight weeks set aside.  The applicant, Hallett, seeks leave to appeal orders refusing it leave to amend its pleading to introduce allegations of breach of contract arising from supplies of cement made by the respondent, Adelaide Brighton, to another entity Boral, pursuant to a “swap arrangement”.

The effect of the orders under appeal is that Hallett is shut out of prosecuting a claim which it asserts exceeds $11 million in addition to interest. Hallett fears that should it later attempt to ventilate these issues in separate proceedings, Adelaide Brighton will likely attempt to meet these with a defence based on Anshun estoppel.

Adelaide Brighton opposes the application for leave to appeal and the appeal. It questions whether there is any real basis for concern about Anshun estoppel.  It filed a notice of alternative contention seeking to uphold the primary judge’s refusal to permit the amendments on discretionary grounds.  It says that the proposed claim is untenable and grossly overstated.

Hallett filed an interlocutory application to adduce fresh evidence obtained from Adelaide Brighton on 27 May 2024. Hallett claims that this evidence supports an inference that there was a swap arrangement between Adelaide Brighton and Boral, in breach of the 2008 Cement Supply Agreement between Hallett and Adelaide Brighton. Adelaide Brighton contends that Hallett has misinterpreted the evidence and it does not support the inference which it seeks to draw.

HELD (the Court), setting aside the orders made by the primary judge; leave to appeal should be granted and, based upon the fresh evidence, the appeal should be allowed, the notice of alternative contention dismissed, and Hallett given leave to amend in substantially the terms sought:

1.The Notice of Appeal dated 19 April 2024 and the Notice of Alternative Contention dated 2 May 2024 have been overtaken by Hallett’s application dated 30 May 2024 to lead fresh evidence in support of its revised plea. 

2.The fresh evidence is capable of providing some support for an inference that there was a swap arrangement between Adelaide Brighton and Boral before 2016.  Though the contrary answer of Adelaide Brighton may prove correct, it is not appropriate for this Court to engage in the fact-finding necessary to determine the meaning and effect of the documents relied on by Hallett as part of this appeal.  That is properly a matter for the trial.

3.In some cases it may be appropriate, if not preferable, for the issue of leave concerning a revised plea based on newly discovered documents…

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Details
Case
[2024] SASCA 80
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia considered an appeal by Hallett Concrete Pty Ltd against Adelaide Brighton Cement Ltd. The dispute arose from a Cement Supply Agreement, as varied in 2014, which included a "most favoured customer term" and an "exclusivity obligation" for Hallett to purchase bulk cement exclusively from Adelaide Brighton. Adelaide Brighton commenced proceedings alleging Hallett breached the exclusivity obligation by procuring cementitious material in two-tonne bags from other suppliers from early 2018. Hallett denied this, arguing the bagged cement was not "bulk cement" under the agreement. Hallett subsequently filed a cross-claim alleging Adelaide Brighton breached the most favoured customer term.

The legal issues before the court included whether Hallett should be granted leave to amend its cross-claim to plead the breach of the most favoured customer term, and whether fresh evidence, discovered shortly before the appeal, should be admitted. Hallett sought to rely on this fresh evidence to support its claim that Adelaide Brighton engaged in non-arm's length arrangements with other customers, thereby breaching the most favoured customer term. Adelaide Brighton did not oppose the admission of the evidence but argued it did not support the inferences Hallett sought to draw.

The Full Court reasoned that leave to amend the cross-claim should be granted, acknowledging that Hallett could not fully articulate its claim without discovery and that the proposed amendments relied on an inferential basis for the alleged breaches. The court also granted leave to appeal and allowed the appeal, finding that the fresh evidence, which comprised internal management reporting documents, was relevant to Hallett's claim. While Adelaide Brighton contended the documents did not support Hallett's inferences, the court's preliminary view was that the evidence was capable of supporting the suggested inference, and the question of whether that inference should be drawn should be determined at trial.

Consequently, the Full Court ordered that leave to appeal be granted, the appeal be allowed, and the notice of alternative contention be dismissed. Hallett was granted leave to amend its cross-claim in substantially the terms sought. The court also reserved the question of costs to the primary judge.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

For the following reasons, leave to appeal should be granted and, based upon the fresh evidence, the appeal should be allowed, the notice of alternative contention dismissed, and Hallett given leave to amend in substantially the terms sought.Background – the proceedings Hallett is a manufacturer of pre-mixed concrete. Adelaide Brighton is a manufacturer of cementitious products. In April 2008 they entered into a Cement Supply Agreement (the 2008 CSA) which was subsequently varied on 1 July 2014 (the 2014 CSA). The 2014 CSA required Adelaide Brighton to supply specified cementitious products to Hallett at a lower price than it supplied those products to other customers of Adelaide Brighton. This has been described as “the most favoured customer term”. In addition, Hallett was required to purchase the “bulk cementitious material” required for its business exclusively from Adelaide Brighton. This has been described as “the exclusivity obligation”. In September 2019 Adelaide Brighton commenced proceedings against Hallett for alleged breach of the exclusivity obligation. Its case is that from early 2018 Hallett did not purchase its cement exclusively from Adelaide Brighton and, together with named respondents, entered into arrangements designed to circumvent the exclusivity obligation by procuring cementitious material in large shipments of two tonne bags. That claim is denied on grounds which include that the bagged cement was not bulk cement the subject of the 2014 CSA. On 14 February 2020, Hallett filed a cross‑claim against Adelaide Brighton. By that claim it alleged breach of the most favoured customer term. An early attempt to plead that claim was refused because the pleaded allegations were inadequate to support the inference that there were unspecified, widespread breaches of the 2014 CSA.[2] In that first decision Doyle J (as he was) rejected an attempt to invoke the processes of the court where a plaintiff had no evidence to support a case but sought discovery in order to find if it had one. That was described as an example of a form of abuse of process. That was contrasted with a permissible plea by which an applicant asserted the existence of a reasonable inferential basis for its claim, though it could not fully articulate that claim without the benefit of discovery.[3][2] Adelaide Brighton Cement Ltd v Hallett Concrete Pty Ltd & Ors (2020) 137 SASR 117, [143] (Doyle J).[3] Adelaide Brighton Cement Ltd v Hallett Concrete Pty Ltd & Ors (2020) 137 SASR 117, [26]-[28] (Doyle J). Following that decision, Hallett repleaded its cross‑claim. The application for leave to amend was again opposed. However, leave to amend was granted on the basis that the pleading was in a different form, necessarily relying on an inferential basis for the claims of breach of contract. It was acknowledged that, absent discovery, Hallett could not plead the actual prices Adelaide Brighton charged to Hallett’s competitors. In the case of Boral, the cross-claim pleaded that there were “swap arrangements” in place between Adelaide Brighton and Boral. The existence of these was inferred from Boral’s commercial conduct.[4] The primary judge observed that there was a paradox associated with this pleading because it would inevitably need to be amended so as to incorporate particular instances of breach by reference to particular supplies of cement by Adelaide Brighton at prices which could only be addressed on the basis of discovery yet to be made by Adelaide Brighton.[5] [4] Adelaide Brighton Cement Ltd v Hallett Concrete Pty Ltd& Ors(No 2) [2021] SASC 56, [57]-[62] (Kourakis CJ).[5] Adelaide Brighton Cement Ltd v Hallett Concrete Pty Ltd& Ors(No 2) [2021] SASC 56, [30] (Kourakis CJ).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Notice of Appeal dated 19 April 2024 and the Notice of Alternative Contention dated 2 May 2024 have, in a sense, been overtaken by Hallett’s application dated 30 May 2024 to lead what is described as fresh evidence. That application is also opposed by Adelaide Brighton.The application to lead fresh evidence Hallett says that on 27 May 2024, in connection with further discovery produced for inspection, Adelaide Brighton produced for the first time a bundle of spreadsheets comprising working documents prepared in connection with internal management reporting. They have been exhibited to the affidavit of Hallett’s solicitor. Whilst many details recorded in these documents have been redacted, the unredacted portions show that in the years 2010 to 2014 Adelaide Brighton engaged in transactions described as “Borrow & Loan” concerning the supply of “Bulk SL Ex Berrima”, which Hallett takes to be a reference to the supply of SL cement to Adelaide Brighton by Boral from its plant at Berrima in New South Wales. The submission of Hallett is that this material supports the inference that there was a supply of cement between Boral and Adelaide Brighton pursuant to a form of “borrowing” or “lending” which did not involve purchases and sales in an ordinary commercial manner. In short, Hallett asserts that this provides a proper basis to infer the existence of a form of swap arrangements, or some other non-arm’s length arrangements, during the period of the 2008 CSA. Accordingly, Hallett contends that it is in the interests of justice that this evidence be received on appeal in the exercise of the discretion of the Court of Appeal pursuant to r 215.1(2)(i) of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA).[15][15] CDJ v VAJ (No 1) (1998) 197 CLR 172, [109]-[111]; Viscariello v Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner [2021] SASCFC 24, [93]-[97] (Tilmouth AJ, with whom Lovell and Hughes JJ agreed); P J Nash Pty Ltd v Food and Beverage Australia Limited [2021] SASCA 86, [66]; Return To Work Corporation of South Australia v BI (Contracting) Pty Ltd (2022) 141 SASR 171, [72]-[93]. Adelaide Brighton does not suggest that the evidence should not be received. Rather, it contends that the evidence does not support the inferences that Hallett seeks to draw from the evidence and that a form of these documents has been available to Hallett for well over twelve months because they were relied on by an expert it retained. In addition, the affidavit of Adelaide Brighton’s solicitor explains that Hallett has misinterpreted these documents and they do not support the inference which it seeks to draw. The term relied on by Hallett has nothing to do with Boral:[16]For the reasons that I set out below, [Hallett’s] critical proposition is incorrect. Instead, the term “Borrow & Loan” is used by ABCL in respect of transactions with its related entities that are, relevantly, subsequent to the purchase by ABCL of SL cement from Boral. That is, the term “Borrow & Loan” is entirely unrelated to ABCL’s transactions with Boral (save that, in this instance, it concerns cement that had been purchased from Boral).[16] Affidavit of Leo Gerard Walsh sworn 6 June 2024, [6].

Decision

Reasons for decision

However, subject to hearing from the parties, our preliminary view is that the question of costs (before the primary judge and this Court) should be reserved to the primary judge, to be resolved when the issues in dispute have been determined, including the question whether the suggested inference arising on the amendment should in fact be drawn.Conclusion The orders of the primary judge must be set aside and the following orders made:1.Leave to appeal is granted.2.The appeal is allowed.3.The notice of alternative contention is dismissed.4.Leave to amend paragraphs 39.4A and 64 of the cross-claim is granted in substantially the terms set out in paragraph 7 of the fourth affidavit of Michael James O’Donnell affirmed 30 May 2024.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established