Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner v Fittock

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

LEGAL PROFESSION CONDUCT COMMISSIONER v FITTOCK

[2017] SASCFC 169

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, The Honourable Justice Blue and The Honourable Justice Parker)

19 December 2017

PROFESSIONS AND TRADES - LAWYERS - COMPLAINTS AND DISCIPLINE - DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - PROCEEDINGS IN TRIBUNALS

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - EXTENSION OR POSTPONEMENT OF LIMITATION PERIODS - OTHER CAUSES OF ACTION AND MATTERS

The Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal allowed an application from the Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner who sought an extension of time within which a charge of unprofessional conduct may be laid against the respondent. The Tribunal constituted itself with a single presiding member pursuant to section 80(1b) of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA), as it considered the application for an extension of time to be a ‘procedural or interlocutory matter’ with respect to section 80(1b).

This is an appeal against the decision of a Judge of this Court who allowed an appeal against the orders of the Tribunal, setting aside the Tribunal’s decision and remitting the matter back to the Tribunal for fresh consideration.

In issue on the appeal to the single Judge and on this appeal is whether the matter was ‘procedural or interlocutory’ within the meaning of s 80(1b) and therefore whether the Tribunal was not permitted to sit as a singular presiding member.

Held, per Kourakis CJ and Blue J (Parker J concurring):

1. An application for an extension of time is not a procedural or interlocutory matter within the meaning of section 80(1b) (at [34]).

2.       Appeal dismissed (at [35]).

Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) ss 68, 69, 80, 80(1), 80(1b), 82, 82(1), 82(2), 82(2a), 82(2a)(b), 82(4); Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) s 38A, referred to.
Cowie v State Electricity Commission of Victoria [1964] VR 788; Mibor Investments Pty Ltd & Ors v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1994] 2 VR 290; Hall v The Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423; Agtrack (NT) Pty Ltd v Hatfield (2005) 223 CLR 251; Licul & Ors v Corney (1976) 180 CLR 213; Hardel Pty Ltd v Burrell & Family Pty Ltd (2009) 103 SASR 408, discussed.
City of Onkaparinga v Hassell Pty Ltd & Ors [2007] SASC 163, considered.

LEGAL PROFESSION CONDUCT COMMISSIONER v FITTOCK
[2017] SASCFC 169

Full Court:  Kourakis CJ, Blue and Parker JJ

  1. KOURAKIS CJ and BLUE J:        On 31 July 2017 a Judge of this Court allowed an appeal brought by the legal practitioner, Mr Fittock, against an order made by a single member of the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) allowing the Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner (‘the Commissioner’) an extension of time in which to charge Mr Fittock with unprofessional conduct. The particulars of the charge were that Mr Fittock engaged in false and misleading conduct in that he purported to assert that certain legal works had been performed by him, and that monies were owing to him for the said works,…

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Details
Case
[2017] SASCFC 169
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner (the Commissioner) appealed a decision of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (the Tribunal) concerning disciplinary proceedings against a legal practitioner, Mr Fittock. The dispute centred on the Tribunal's jurisdiction to hear a complaint of unprofessional conduct that was laid more than three years after the alleged conduct occurred.

The primary legal issue before the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia was whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to inquire into a charge of unprofessional conduct laid by a complainant other than the Attorney-General, where the conduct occurred more than three years prior to the charge being laid. This involved interpreting section 82(2a) of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) (the LP Act) and its interaction with the concept of "interlocutory or procedural matter" as referred to in section 80(1b) of the LP Act.

The Court reasoned that section 82(2a) of the LP Act confers immunity on legal practitioners from charges of unprofessional conduct laid by persons other than the Attorney-General if the conduct occurred more than three years before the charge is laid. The Court held that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to inquire into such "stale" charges unless an extension of time is granted. Crucially, the Court determined that an application for an extension of time to lay a charge is not an "interlocutory or procedural matter" within the meaning of section 80(1b) of the LP Act. This is because a favourable decision on such an application finally determines a condition precedent to the Tribunal's power to inquire into the practitioner's conduct and make disciplinary orders.

The appeal was dismissed. The Court affirmed that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear a stale charge brought by a complainant other than the Attorney-General unless an extension of time is granted.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

KOURAKIS CJ (dissent)
The purpose of s 38A of the Limitation Act is to remove the uncertainty of the common law conflict rules by providing that a limitation law is treated in the same way as laws governing liability. The statutory characterisation of a limitation law as a ‘substantive law’ cannot control the meaning of the phrase ‘interlocutory or procedural matter’ in s 80(1b) of the LP Act.Conclusion Section 82(2a) confers on a legal practitioner immunity from a charge of unprofessional conduct laid by a person other than the Attorney-General relating to conduct occurring more than three years before the charge is laid. Moreover, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to conduct an inquiry into a stale charge brought by a complainant other than the Attorney-General. Whether or not a decision dismissing an application for an extension of time is a final order, and whether a subsequent application relating to the same conduct may be brought after dismissal, need not be decided for the purposes of this appeal. There is some utility in allowing subsequent applications having regard to the protective nature of the jurisdiction. More cogent evidence of the same charge may be discovered or other charges of similar conduct may be made. On the other hand, because the application is brought within, and as part of the laying of a charge, the refusal of the extension of time may effect a final dismissal of the charge. Whether an order dismissing an application is interlocutory or not, the ‘matter’ constituted by an application for an extension of time is not a procedural or interlocutory matter because the disposal of the application favourably to the applicant will finally determine a condition on the Tribunal’s power to inquire and discipline. The Tribunal will thereafter proceed to inquire into the practitioner’s conduct, and to make final orders on that inquiry. It is therefore not a ‘procedural or interlocutory matter’ within the meaning of s 80(1b) of the LP Act. We would dismiss the appeal. PARKER J: I agree that the appeal should be dismissed. I also agree with the joint reasons of the Chief Justice and Blue J, save that I would take a different approach to one aspect of the matter. The Chief Justice and Blue J have discussed at [14] the contention by the practitioner that a provision should be read into the LP Act that empowers a complainant other than the Attorney-General to apply for an extension of time before laying a charge and also confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal to hear such an application. Their Honours have rejected that contention and found that a stale charge properly invokes the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, unless and until the Tribunal refuses to allow an extension of time. The grant of an extension retrospectively authorises the laying of the charge and empowers and requires the Tribunal to inquire into the impugned conduct. My analysis proceeds on a somewhat different basis. In my view, the introductory words in s 82(2a) operate as a prohibition upon the laying of a charge against a practitioner after three years have passed from the impugned conduct. Paragraph (a) creates an exception to that prohibition where the charge is laid by the Attorney-General. Paragraph (b) creates a further exception. That further exception only operates in cases where the Tribunal has allowed an extension of time.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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