FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Featherby v Commissioner of Taxation [2016] FCA 454
File number: WAD 532 of 2015 Judge: GILMOUR J Date of judgment: 3 May 2016 Catchwords: TAXATION - application to re-open matter after hearing, the judgment reserved – whether applicant ought to be permitted to advance further submissions - whether in the interest of justice to allow application – application dismissed Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37M
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) ss 170, 171, 175
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Cases cited: DJL v Central Authority (2000) 201 CLR 226
Eastman v DPP (2003) 214 CLR 318
Hii v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCA 375
Independent Commission against Corruption v Cuneen [2015] HCA 14
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476
Texas Company (Australasia) Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1940) 63 CLR 382
Date of hearing: 26 April 2016 Registry: Western Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Taxation Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 26 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr JW Fickling with Mr MA Robson Solicitor for the Applicant: Robson Hayes Legal Counsel for the Respondent: Mr JC Vaughan SC with Mr AJ Musikanth Solicitor for the Respondent: Jackson McDonald ORDERS
WAD 532 of 2015 BETWEEN: GLENN ROBERT FEATHERBY
Applicant
AND: COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
JUDGE:
GILMOUR J
DATE OF ORDER:
3 MAY 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The interlocutory application dated 17 February 2016 be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application to be taxed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
GILMOUR J:
The applicant, by interlocutory application dated 17 February 2016, seeks an order to reopen the hearing of certain preliminary questions in this proceeding conducted before me late last year. Judgment was reserved but was due to be delivered in the near future.
He seeks to do so in order to make further submissions as to the reach of s 175 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (ITAA36) as that provision affects s 170 of that Act.
In particular, he seeks to make further submissions based on the following authorities: Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476; Woods v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2011] TASSC 68; and Independent Commission against Corruption v Cuneen [2015] HCA 14.
The application is opposed by the respondent Commissioner.
Background
Orders were made on 9 November 2015 for the trial of preliminary questions upon a statement of agreed facts.
Question A in substance was whether, given the terms of s 175 of the ITAA36, the applicant’s complaint based on ss 171 and 170 (if made good) is a jurisdictional error that invalidates the amended assessment as issued.
The hearing in…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 454
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the well-established principles that a superior court has the power to review its judgment before it is perfected but must exercise this jurisdiction with caution. The court emphasised that the power is not to be used to re-agitate arguments already considered or for the purpose of supplementing arguments not properly presented at the hearing. The applicant's failure to present the new argument during the hearing was attributed to the fault of the applicant's counsel. The court found that the applicant had been afforded procedural fairness during the hearing and that allowing the application would be contrary to the interest of justice and the finality of litigation.
The court concluded that the applicant's request for supplementary submissions was essentially a new argument that had not been previously raised, and permitting this would be antithetical to the interests of justice. Accordingly, the application to re-open the matter was dismissed. The court ordered that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The interlocutory application dated 17 February 2016 be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application to be taxed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Accordingly, I would apply those principles to this application.Consideration The failure to advance the submissions now sought to be made was solely contributable to the fault of Counsel for the applicant. The applicant was not denied procedural fairness. It would be contrary to the interest of justice to allow the application. I would refuse the application to re-open. Lest I be wrong in resolving the matter on that basis I will consider whether it is otherwise in the interests of justice to permit the hearing to be re-opened. In my opinion, the contrary is the case for the further following reasons. Properly understood, the applicant’s wish to advance submissions by reference to the decision in Plaintiff S157 is not to supplement or reinforce what was put in submissions at the hearing in December. Rather, it is a completely new argument, namely that as the decision of the High Court in Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v Futuris Corporation Limited (2008) 237 CLR 146 was not concerned with ITAA36 s 170 and its wider relationship with s 175 that I should now consider that question in light of what was said in Plaintiff S157, concerning the need to reconcile a privative clause provision (s 175) with another provision in the legislation with which it appears to be in conflict (s 170). It is correct to say that Futuris was not concerned with s 170 of the ITAA36. It was not cited for that purpose at the hearing in December, but rather for the proposition that in review proceedings under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) relief will be granted by reason of jurisdictional error upon only two available bases to impugn the privative clause protection otherwise afforded by s 175 of the ITAA36 to an assessment, made beyond power, namely in the case of a tentative or provisional assessment, or in a case involving conscious maladministration. In this case, the applicant has always contended that s 175 does not save the amended assessment in question because it was issued beyond power under s 170 due to the operation of s 171. Indeed that it was beyond power was assumed for the purpose of considering Question A. Section 175 was not considered in isolation. It was considered in light of the amended s 170. Accordingly, the interplay between these statutory provisions was at the very heart of Question A. As part of the Court’s consideration it received submissions from both parties as to the decision in Woods. ICAC v Cuneen was referred to by the applicant in his written submissions in reply in the December hearing and was also an authority cited by him in Pt A of his list of authorities at that time. In any event, nothing said in ICAC v Cuneen touches directly on this case beyond its articulation at [57] of orthodox principles of statutory construction. I am satisfied that the applicant has had every opportunity to advance his arguments. It is antithetical to the interests of justice and to the overarching purpose of this Court as contained in s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) to permit these matters to be re-agitated in supplementary submissions. I would for these additional reasons refuse the application.