SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Emanuel Management Pty Ltd & Ors v Foster’s Brewing Group Limited & Ors [2000] QSC 430 PARTIES: Emanuel Management Pty Ltd (in liquidation) & Ors
(plaintiffs/respondents)
v
Foster’s Brewing Group Limited & Ors
(first defendants/applicants)
Coopers & Lybrand & Ors
(second defendants)FILE NO/S: 3723 of 2000 DIVISION: Trial Division DELIVERED ON: 28 November 2000 ORIGINATING
COURT:Supreme Court of South Australia
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATE: 9, 10 and 11 August 2000 JUDGE: Williams J ORDER: Application dismissed. CATCHWORDS: PROCEDURE – SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE – QUEENSLAND – PRACTICE UNDER RULES OF COURT – PLEADING – STATEMENT OF CLAIM – application by defendants to strike out statement of claim – allegation that judgment of Supreme Court of Queensland was obtained by fraud and collusion – whether pleading sufficient to have that judgment set aside – where voluminous allegations of fraud and collusion contained in pleading – whether those allegations were embarrassing – held precise and succinct particulars should be supplied
PROCEDURE – JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS – AMENDING, VARYING AND SETTING ASIDE – ACTIONS TO REVIEW OR SET ASIDE JUDGMENT – WHERE FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION OR SUPPRESSION OF MATERIAL FACTS – pleading sufficient to discharge onus of establishing a reasonable probability of the fraud alleged being proved at trial – whether Anshun principle precluded plaintiffs from raising certain claims – whether plaintiffs estopped from setting aside judgment on basis it was relied on in an earlier action by liquidator – whether plaintiffs required to undertake to restore status quo position existing prior to impugned transactions before judgment could be set aside.
Addstead Pty Ltd & Orsv Simionato Holdings Pty Ltd [1997] SASC 6117, considered
Alati v Kruger (1995) 94 CLR 216, followed
Birch v Birch (1902) P 130, followed
Cabassi v Vila (1940) 64 CLR 130, followedKing v Weaver (1931) 45 CLR 321, considered
Langman v Handover (1929) 43 CLR 334, distinguished
Ling v Commonwealth (1996) 68 FCR 180, considered
Mayfair Trading Co Pty Ltd v Dreyer (1958) 101 CLR 428, distinguished
Maguire v Makaronis (1996) 188 CLR 449, distinguished
McHarg v Woods Radio Pty Ltd (1948) VLR 496, followed
Monroe Schneider Associates v No 1 Raberem Pty Ltd (1992) 37 FCR 234, followed
Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589, distinguishedRe Ross ex parte Attorney-General for Northern Territory (1980) 54 ALJR 145, applied
Vadasz v Pioneer Concrete (SA)Pty Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 102, followed
Wentworth v Rogers (No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534, followedCOUNSEL: D R Meagher QC with P H Morrison QC and M C Livesey for the plaintiffs/respondents
P A Keane QC with J C Sheahan SC and J D McKenna for the first defendants/applicants
J A McDonnell (sol) for the second defendantsSOLICITORS: Bennett & Philp (Brisbane) acting as town agents for Ward & Partners (Adelaide) for the plaintiffs/respondents
Clayton Utz for the first defendants/applicants
Mallesons Stephen Jacques…
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- Case
- [2000] QSC 430
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court needed to determine whether the plaintiffs' statement of claim was sufficient to discharge the onus of establishing a reasonable probability that the fraud alleged would be proved at trial. Additionally, the court considered whether the Anshun principle precluded the plaintiffs from raising certain claims, whether the plaintiffs were estopped from setting aside the judgment because it had been relied upon in an earlier action by the liquidator, and whether the plaintiffs were required to undertake to restore the status quo position existing prior to the impugned transactions before the judgment could be set aside.
The court found that the plaintiffs' statement of claim was not sufficiently particularised and did not establish a reasonable probability of proving the fraud and collusion alleged. The court held that the plaintiffs needed to supply precise and succinct particulars of the alleged fraud and collusion. Furthermore, the court found that the Anshun principle did not preclude the plaintiffs from raising certain claims, and that the plaintiffs were not estopped from setting aside the judgment because it had been relied upon in an earlier action by the liquidator. However, the court held that the plaintiffs were required to undertake to restore the status quo position existing prior to the impugned transactions before the judgment could be set aside.
The application to strike out the statement of claim was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Application dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
This case involved an application by Foster's to strike out Emanuel's statement of claim, which sought to set aside a previous judgment obtained by Foster's. The application was heard in the Supreme Court of Queensland. The court was required to determine whether Emanuel's statement of claim was sufficient to have the previous judgment set aside, and whether certain claims were precluded by the Anshun principle. The court also considered whether Emanuel was estopped from setting aside the judgment on the basis that it had relied on the judgment in an earlier action brought by the liquidator. The matter was ultimately dismissed, with the court finding that Emanuel's statement of claim was insufficient to meet the necessary standard to set aside the previous judgment.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether Emanuel's statement of claim was sufficient to have the previous judgment set aside.
2. Whether the Anshun principle precluded Emanuel from raising certain claims.
3. Whether Emanuel was estopped from setting aside the judgment on the basis that it had relied on the judgment in an earlier action brought by the liquidator.
4. Whether Emanuel was required to undertake to restore the status quo position existing prior to the impugned transactions before the judgment could be set aside.
Held
1. The court held that Emanuel's statement of claim was not sufficient to have the previous judgment set aside. The court found that the pleadings did not contain precise and succinct particulars required to substantiate the allegations of fraud and collusion.
2. The court held that the Anshun principle precluded Emanuel from raising certain claims. The court found that the claims Emanuel sought to raise were matters that could have been and should have been raised in the earlier action.
3. The court held that Emanuel was estopped from setting aside the judgment on the basis that it had relied on the judgment in an earlier action brought by the liquidator. The court found that Emanuel's reliance on the earlier judgment prevented him from now challenging that judgment.
4. The court held that Emanuel was not required to undertake to restore the status quo position existing prior to the impugned transactions before the judgment could be set aside. The court found that the requirement to restore the status quo was not a prerequisite for setting aside the judgment.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined the sufficiency of Emanuel's statement of claim in relation to the allegations of fraud and collusion that led to the previous judgment. The court noted that for a statement of claim to be sufficient, it must include precise and succinct particulars. The court found that Emanuel's pleadings were too voluminous and did not provide the necessary details to substantiate the allegations. Therefore, the court dismissed the application to set aside the previous judgment due to the insufficiency of the pleadings.
In relation to the Anshun principle, the court considered whether Emanuel was precluded from raising certain claims because they could have been raised in the earlier action. The court found that the principle applied, as the claims Emanuel sought to raise were indeed matters that could have been and should have been raised in the earlier action. Consequently, the court held that Emanuel was precluded from raising those claims.
The court also addressed the issue of estoppel, examining whether Emanuel was estopped from setting aside the judgment due to his reliance on the judgment in an earlier action brought by the liquidator. The court found that Emanuel's reliance on the earlier judgment prevented him from now challenging that judgment. Therefore, the court held that Emanuel was estopped from setting aside the judgment.
Lastly, the court considered whether Emanuel was required to undertake to restore the status quo position existing prior to the impugned transactions before the judgment could be set aside. The court found that such a requirement was not a necessary condition for setting aside the judgment. The binding legal principle established in this case is that the sufficiency of the pleadings, the application of the Anshun principle, and the doctrine of estoppel are critical factors in determining whether a previous judgment can be set aside.