Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZAPN

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FRENCH CJ,
KIEFEL, BELL, GAGELER AND KEANE JJ

Matter No M17/2015

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER
PROTECTION  APPELLANT

AND

WZAPN & ANOR  RESPONDENTS

Matter No P10/2015

WZARV  APPELLANT

AND

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER
PROTECTION & ANOR  RESPONDENTS

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZAPN
WZARV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

[2015] HCA 22

17 June 2015

M17/2015 & P10/2015

ORDER

Matter No M17/2015

1.Appeal allowed.

2.Set aside the declaration of the Federal Court of Australia made on 3 September 2014.

3.Set aside orders 5 and 6 of the orders of the Federal Court of Australia made on 3 September 2014 and, in their place, order that:

(a)order 2 of the orders of the Federal Magistrates Court made on 31 January 2013 be set aside; and

(b)the appeal be otherwise dismissed.

4.The appellant is to pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal to this Court.

Matter No P10/2015

Appeal dismissed with costs. 

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation

S P Donaghue QC with L T Brown for the appellant in M17/2015 and the first respondent in P10/2015 (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

S E J Prince with P W Bodisco for the appellant in P10/2015 (instructed by Rasan T Selliah & Associates)

R M Niall QC with A F Solomon-Bridge for the first respondent in M17/2015 (instructed by Maddocks)

Submitting appearances for the second respondent in both matters

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

Migration – Refugee status – Section 91R(1)(b) of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) provides persecution must involve "serious harm to the person" – Section 91R(2)(a) lists "threat to the person's life or liberty" as instance of serious harm – Where person faces period or periods of temporary detention – Whether that constitutes "threat to liberty" amounting to serious harm, without qualification as to severity of threat.

Migration – Refugee status – Section 91R(1)(a) of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) requires Refugees Convention reason to be "essential and significant reason" for persecution – Where Federal Court held there was failure to accord procedural fairness to claimant – Whether independent merits reviewer failed to draw claimant's attention to relevant issue or information – Whether no fair opportunity to address argument that could materially affect assessment.

Words and phrases – "persecution", "serious harm", "threat to life or liberty".

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 91R(1)(a), 91R(1)(b), 91R(2)(a).
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) as amended by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (1967), Art 1A(2).

  1. FRENCH CJ, KIEFEL, BELL AND KEANE JJ.   In each of these two appeals from single Justices of the Federal Court of Australia, which were heard together, the claimant for a protection visa contends that he is a refugee from persecution in the country of his nationality or former habitual residence.  Each will be referred to as a "claimant" in these…

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Details
Case
[2015] HCA 22
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered appeals by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection concerning decisions relating to refugee status assessments. The primary dispute involved whether periods of temporary detention, coupled with verbal abuse, constituted "serious harm" as defined by the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth), and whether a failure to accord procedural fairness in the assessment process vitiated the outcome. The matter before the court concerned the interpretation of provisions within the Act relating to the definition of persecution and serious harm for the purposes of refugee claims.

The legal issues before the High Court included whether a "threat to liberty" under section 91R(2)(a) of the *Migration Act* automatically amounted to "serious harm" without requiring an assessment of the severity or duration of the threat. Additionally, the court had to determine whether an independent merits reviewer had failed to provide a claimant with a fair opportunity to address an argument that could materially affect the assessment of their refugee claim, thereby breaching procedural fairness. This also involved considering whether the reason for persecution was an "essential and significant reason" as required by section 91R(1)(a).

The High Court reasoned that the concept of "serious harm" under section 91R(2)(a) requires a qualitative judgment, involving an assessment of the likelihood and gravity of the apprehended harm. It held that a threat to liberty, while potentially constituting serious harm, does not do so automatically and without qualification as to its severity. The court found that the periods of detention and abuse experienced by the claimant did not, on the facts, amount to a catastrophic loss of liberty or autonomy, and therefore did not meet the threshold for serious harm. Regarding the procedural fairness issue, the court concluded that even if there had been a breach, it would not have altered the ultimate outcome of the refugee status assessment, as the claimant's circumstances did not meet the definition of serious harm.

In Matter No M17/2015, the appeal was allowed, the Federal Court's declaration and orders were set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Federal Magistrates Court with specific directions, ultimately dismissing the appeal to that court. In Matter No P10/2015, the appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Matter No M17/2015

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Set aside the declaration of the Federal Court of Australia made on 3 September 2014.

3. Set aside orders 5 and 6 of the orders of the Federal Court of Australia made on 3 September 2014 and, in their place, order that:

(a) order 2 of the orders of the Federal Magistrates Court made on 31 January 2013 be set aside; and

(b) the appeal be otherwise dismissed.

4. The appellant is to pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal to this Court.

Matter No P10/2015

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

These appeals arise out of applications in the Federal Magistrates Court and the Federal Circuit Court (as it became) for judicial review of recommendations of Independent Merits Reviewers who were part of a process established with respect to offshore entry persons to inform the exercise of the ministerial discretion under s 46A of the Act to determine whether or not an offshore entry person claiming to be a refugee may be permitted to apply for a protection visa. The nature of the process, its connection to the exercise of the ministerial statutory powers, and the way in which federal judicial review is engaged were explained in Plaintiff M61/2010E v The Commonwealth[9].[9](2010) 243 CLR 319; [2010] HCA 41.Background – Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZAPN The claimant in this matter is a stateless Faili Kurd who was born in Iran, and for whom Iran is his former habitual residence. He is between 26 and 30 years of age. He arrived in Australia on 21 July 2010 as an "offshore entry person", as that expression was then defined in s 5(1) of the Act. He applied for a refugee status assessment ("RSA") and, on 27 September 2010, an RSA officer concluded that he did not qualify for refugee status.The Independent Merits Reviewer The claimant sought review of that assessment by an Independent Merits Reviewer ("IMR"). Before the IMR, the claimant's case centred on his fear of harm arising from persistent detention and interrogation at the hands of the Basij, a paramilitary force of vigilantes whose activities are tolerated by the government of Iran. One period of detention to which he had been subjected lasted for 48 hours; otherwise, the periods did not exceed 12 hours. The claimant did not claim to have been physically harmed while detained, although he suffered extreme verbal abuse. It was claimed that this treatment was due to his ethnicity and his membership of a particular social group. The detail of the claimant's treatment was summarised by the IMR:"The Basij were based in a mosque and had places for interrogation within the village, where he had been taken as much as 30 to 40 times for periods in excess of 2 hours; once for 48 hours and often for 12 hours; he was released after bribes were paid by Iranian citizen friends. He might be detained daily, weekly or monthly.Whilst he has never been physically assaulted, he has been questioned interminably about his lack of identity and the fate of his parents; he has been shouted at, sworn at and called a 'bitch', which he finds particularly offensive. He was given no food or water. He was taken by car and made to walk back. This could be by either the police or the Basiji." On 10 August 2011, the IMR recommended that the claimant not be recognised as a person to whom Australia owes protection obligations under the Convention. The IMR did not accept that the claimant faced serious harm should he return to Iran. The IMR found that:"[T]here is a real chance that the claimant will be questioned periodically, and probably detained for short periods when he fails to produce identification, in the reasonably foreseeable future should he return to Iran, but having regard to the guidance provided by s 91R(2)(a), (b) and/or (c), I do not accept that the frequency or length of detention, or the treatment he will receive whilst in detention will involve serious harm within the meaning of the Act."

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH CJ, KIEFEL, BELL AND KEANE JJ GAGELER J
It is persecution, involving serious harm inflicted by the violation of fundamental rights and freedoms, from which the Convention and s 91R of the Act are concerned to provide asylum. Both the Convention and s 91R of the Act embody an approach which is concerned with the effects of actions upon persons in terms of harm to them. That approach is not engaged automatically upon the demonstration of any breach, or apprehended breach, of human rights in their country of nationality or former habitual residence. Is the IMR's decision in WZAPN vitiated by a breach of procedural fairness? As noted above, the IMR concluded that WZAPN did not qualify for refugee status on the alternative basis that his circumstances did not meet the requirement in s 91R(1)(a). It was argued that North J was correct to hold that the IMR's finding that the harm apprehended by WZAPN was not persecution for a Convention reason is vitiated by a want of procedural fairness. The question that arises immediately is whether there is any utility in this argument. The conclusion that North J erred in his view of s 91R(2)(a) means that the claimant's application for refugee status was bound to fail however the s 91R(1)(a) issue might be resolved. In other words, even if the procedural fairness ground of the challenge to the IMR's decision were upheld, the claimant would nevertheless fail to establish his claim to refugee status[55]. [55]WZAPN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 947 at [53]. WZAPN sought to meet this difficulty by arguing that the want of procedural fairness about which he complains infected the IMR's conclusion on the serious harm issue. It was also said that acceptance of his contentions on this aspect of the case would have utility in that it would serve to sustain the declaration made by North J as to the failure of the IMR to accord the claimant procedural fairness. These arguments are not compelling. North J set aside the IMR's conclusion in relation to s 91R(1)(a) on the basis of his Honour's understanding of the following passage in the reasons of the IMR:"Furthermore, even if I accepted the questioning, detention and abuse there is a real chance the claimant will be subjected to, is sufficiently significant to amount to serious harm (which I do not); I am not satisfied it will be for the essential and significant reason of a convention ground.Country information indicates that State and de‑facto authorities such as the Basij will stop and question people indiscriminately. Detention will follow if the person stopped is suspected of being involved in any illegal or immoral activity or otherwise presents some threat to State security.The inability to provide identification papers will attract further enquiries, but I do not consider such questioning and detention as described by the claimant to be persecutory, as I do not consider it to be discriminatory for a Convention reason. Even if people without identification papers could be regarded as a particular social group (which I do not accept), I do not consider such questioning and detention to be inappropriate in the sense discussed by the High Court in Applicant S v MIMA[56]."[56](2004) 217 CLR 387; [2004] HCA 25.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FRENCH CJ, KIEFEL, BELL AND KEANE JJ, GAGELER J

It is convenient to deal with the other arguments advanced on behalf of the claimants in relation to s 91R(2)(a) by reference to considerations of text and context.Textual considerations It has already been noted that each of the conditions in s 91R(1) requires the making of a qualitative judgment. The application of s 91R(2)(a) for the purposes of s 91R(1)(b) also requires a qualitative judgment, involving the assessment of matters of fact and degree. In VBAO v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs[23], Gleeson CJ and Kirby J explained that "threat" in s 91R(2)(a) of the Act refers to "likelihood of harm" so that "[t]he decision‑maker is required to consider future persecution that involves serious harm, and one instance of such serious harm is a threat to life or liberty. The decision‑maker is to decide the risk of future harm". Because not all risks involve the same degree of likelihood or the same level of apprehended harm, the task of the decision‑maker under s 91R(2)(a) involves making an assessment of the risk of future harm to a person. In that assessment, the decision‑maker may be required to balance the likelihood of harm to the person against the gravity of the feared harm to the person should likelihood become fact. [23](2006) 233 CLR 1 at 4‑5 [1]‑[3]. The claimants argued that the text of s 91R(2)(a) indicates that no such evaluative exercise is required because a threat to liberty is to be regarded, of itself and without more, as an instance of serious harm. WZAPN argued that "threat to liberty" means the risk of a loss of liberty. Further, it was said that the collocation in s 91R(2)(a) of a threat to liberty and a threat to life is an indication that the risk of a loss of liberty is serious harm because it is placed on the same level of seriousness of harm as a threat of the loss of life. These contentions do not advance the claimants' position. The claimants' argument speaks of a loss of liberty as meaning any intrusion upon a person's freedom, but to say that s 91R(2)(a) speaks of a risk of the loss of liberty is also apt to evoke a contrast between the loss of liberty in a comprehensive sense and a temporary diminution in the enjoyment of some aspect of liberty. In addition, to say that s 91R(2)(a) places a threat of a loss of a person's liberty on the same level of serious harm as a threat to a person's life is to offer encouragement to the conclusion that the risk in each case is of a comprehensive and catastrophic loss: the loss of human life in one case, and the loss of liberty in the sense of the independent human autonomy that makes life worth living in the other. That conclusion would be fatal to the case advanced by the claimants because on no view could the harassment that each fears be characterised as a loss of liberty in the sense of a catastrophic destruction of his autonomy as a human being. But it is not necessary to accept that conclusion in order to reject these aspects of the claimants' argument. In particular, it is not necessary to conclude that a loss of liberty for the purposes of s 91R(2)(a) is the catastrophic loss of all, or substantially all, of those aspects of free human agency which may collectively be referred to as liberty. If it is accepted that the reference to loss of liberty in s 91R(2)(a) is not to a catastrophic loss of all the aspects of human autonomy but to a loss of some such aspect, as the claimants urge, then it is also necessary to accept that some losses of liberty have more serious consequences for the person affected than others.