HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
FRENCH CJ,
KIEFEL, BELL, GAGELER AND KEANE JJMatter No M17/2015
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER
PROTECTION APPELLANTAND
WZAPN & ANOR RESPONDENTS
Matter No P10/2015
WZARV APPELLANT
AND
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER
PROTECTION & ANOR RESPONDENTSMinister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZAPN
WZARV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection[2015] HCA 22
17 June 2015
M17/2015 & P10/2015
ORDER
Matter No M17/2015
1.Appeal allowed.
2.Set aside the declaration of the Federal Court of Australia made on 3 September 2014.
3.Set aside orders 5 and 6 of the orders of the Federal Court of Australia made on 3 September 2014 and, in their place, order that:
(a)order 2 of the orders of the Federal Magistrates Court made on 31 January 2013 be set aside; and
(b)the appeal be otherwise dismissed.
4.The appellant is to pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal to this Court.
Matter No P10/2015
Appeal dismissed with costs.
On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia
Representation
S P Donaghue QC with L T Brown for the appellant in M17/2015 and the first respondent in P10/2015 (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
S E J Prince with P W Bodisco for the appellant in P10/2015 (instructed by Rasan T Selliah & Associates)
R M Niall QC with A F Solomon-Bridge for the first respondent in M17/2015 (instructed by Maddocks)
Submitting appearances for the second respondent in both matters
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
Migration – Refugee status – Section 91R(1)(b) of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) provides persecution must involve "serious harm to the person" – Section 91R(2)(a) lists "threat to the person's life or liberty" as instance of serious harm – Where person faces period or periods of temporary detention – Whether that constitutes "threat to liberty" amounting to serious harm, without qualification as to severity of threat.
Migration – Refugee status – Section 91R(1)(a) of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) requires Refugees Convention reason to be "essential and significant reason" for persecution – Where Federal Court held there was failure to accord procedural fairness to claimant – Whether independent merits reviewer failed to draw claimant's attention to relevant issue or information – Whether no fair opportunity to address argument that could materially affect assessment.
Words and phrases – "persecution", "serious harm", "threat to life or liberty".
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 91R(1)(a), 91R(1)(b), 91R(2)(a).
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) as amended by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (1967), Art 1A(2).
FRENCH CJ, KIEFEL, BELL AND KEANE JJ. In each of these two appeals from single Justices of the Federal Court of Australia, which were heard together, the claimant for a protection visa contends that he is a refugee from persecution in the country of his nationality or former habitual residence. Each will be referred to as a "claimant" in these…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZAPN and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2015] HCA 22
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the High Court included whether a "threat to liberty" under section 91R(2)(a) of the *Migration Act* automatically amounted to "serious harm" without requiring an assessment of the severity or duration of the threat. Additionally, the court had to determine whether an independent merits reviewer had failed to provide a claimant with a fair opportunity to address an argument that could materially affect the assessment of their refugee claim, thereby breaching procedural fairness. This also involved considering whether the reason for persecution was an "essential and significant reason" as required by section 91R(1)(a).
The High Court reasoned that the concept of "serious harm" under section 91R(2)(a) requires a qualitative judgment, involving an assessment of the likelihood and gravity of the apprehended harm. It held that a threat to liberty, while potentially constituting serious harm, does not do so automatically and without qualification as to its severity. The court found that the periods of detention and abuse experienced by the claimant did not, on the facts, amount to a catastrophic loss of liberty or autonomy, and therefore did not meet the threshold for serious harm. Regarding the procedural fairness issue, the court concluded that even if there had been a breach, it would not have altered the ultimate outcome of the refugee status assessment, as the claimant's circumstances did not meet the definition of serious harm.
In Matter No M17/2015, the appeal was allowed, the Federal Court's declaration and orders were set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Federal Magistrates Court with specific directions, ultimately dismissing the appeal to that court. In Matter No P10/2015, the appeal was dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Matter No M17/2015
1. Appeal allowed.
2. Set aside the declaration of the Federal Court of Australia made on 3 September 2014.
3. Set aside orders 5 and 6 of the orders of the Federal Court of Australia made on 3 September 2014 and, in their place, order that:
(a) order 2 of the orders of the Federal Magistrates Court made on 31 January 2013 be set aside; and
(b) the appeal be otherwise dismissed.
4. The appellant is to pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal to this Court.
Matter No P10/2015
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: FRENCH CJ, KIEFEL, BELL AND KEANE JJ, GAGELER J
It is convenient to deal with the other arguments advanced on behalf of the claimants in relation to s 91R(2)(a) by reference to considerations of text and context.Textual considerations It has already been noted that each of the conditions in s 91R(1) requires the making of a qualitative judgment. The application of s 91R(2)(a) for the purposes of s 91R(1)(b) also requires a qualitative judgment, involving the assessment of matters of fact and degree. In VBAO v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs[23], Gleeson CJ and Kirby J explained that "threat" in s 91R(2)(a) of the Act refers to "likelihood of harm" so that "[t]he decision‑maker is required to consider future persecution that involves serious harm, and one instance of such serious harm is a threat to life or liberty. The decision‑maker is to decide the risk of future harm". Because not all risks involve the same degree of likelihood or the same level of apprehended harm, the task of the decision‑maker under s 91R(2)(a) involves making an assessment of the risk of future harm to a person. In that assessment, the decision‑maker may be required to balance the likelihood of harm to the person against the gravity of the feared harm to the person should likelihood become fact. [23](2006) 233 CLR 1 at 4‑5 [1]‑[3]. The claimants argued that the text of s 91R(2)(a) indicates that no such evaluative exercise is required because a threat to liberty is to be regarded, of itself and without more, as an instance of serious harm. WZAPN argued that "threat to liberty" means the risk of a loss of liberty. Further, it was said that the collocation in s 91R(2)(a) of a threat to liberty and a threat to life is an indication that the risk of a loss of liberty is serious harm because it is placed on the same level of seriousness of harm as a threat of the loss of life. These contentions do not advance the claimants' position. The claimants' argument speaks of a loss of liberty as meaning any intrusion upon a person's freedom, but to say that s 91R(2)(a) speaks of a risk of the loss of liberty is also apt to evoke a contrast between the loss of liberty in a comprehensive sense and a temporary diminution in the enjoyment of some aspect of liberty. In addition, to say that s 91R(2)(a) places a threat of a loss of a person's liberty on the same level of serious harm as a threat to a person's life is to offer encouragement to the conclusion that the risk in each case is of a comprehensive and catastrophic loss: the loss of human life in one case, and the loss of liberty in the sense of the independent human autonomy that makes life worth living in the other. That conclusion would be fatal to the case advanced by the claimants because on no view could the harassment that each fears be characterised as a loss of liberty in the sense of a catastrophic destruction of his autonomy as a human being. But it is not necessary to accept that conclusion in order to reject these aspects of the claimants' argument. In particular, it is not necessary to conclude that a loss of liberty for the purposes of s 91R(2)(a) is the catastrophic loss of all, or substantially all, of those aspects of free human agency which may collectively be referred to as liberty. If it is accepted that the reference to loss of liberty in s 91R(2)(a) is not to a catastrophic loss of all the aspects of human autonomy but to a loss of some such aspect, as the claimants urge, then it is also necessary to accept that some losses of liberty have more serious consequences for the person affected than others.