DQM17 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DQM17 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 1333  

Appeal from: DQM17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2020] FCCA 2249
File number(s): NSD 996 of 2020
Judgment of: DOWNES J
Date of judgment: 26 November 2024
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of the (then) Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority affirming Minister’s decision to refuse Safe Haven Enterprise visa was dismissed – where appellant requires leave to advance new grounds of appeal – whether new grounds of appeal are without merit – leave refused – where appeal would fail in any event on the basis that grounds of appeal lack merit – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5H, 5J, 36, 473BB, 473CA, 473CC
Cases cited:

AAJ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 205

Doves v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 134

DQM17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2020] FCCA 2249

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZAPN (2015) 254 CLR 610; [2015] HCA 22

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 30
Date of hearing: 25 November 2024
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 996 of 2020
BETWEEN:

DQM17

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

DOWNES J

DATE OF ORDER:

26 NOVEMBER 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the first respondent be changed to Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.

2.The appeal be dismissed.

3.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs to be agreed or, failing agreement, to be taxed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

DOWNES J:

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of the (then) Federal Circuit Court of Australia in DQM17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2020] FCCA 2249 (primary judgment).

  2. The appellant is a Sri Lankan citizen of Tamil ethnicity who entered Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival in 2012.  He applied for a Safe Haven Enterprise (subclass 790) visa (SHEV) on 18 May 2016.  The appellant’s claims for protection are based on a fear of harm from Sri Lankan authorities due to his Tamil ethnicity, imputed links (including familial links) to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), his political involvement in Sri Lanka (including campaigning for the closure of police camps), his illegal departure from Sri Lanka, and his asylum application in Australia.

  3. On 24 November 2016, a delegate of the first respondent refused to grant the appellant a SHEV under s…

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Details
Case
[2024] FCA 1333
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of DQM17 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the appellant sought judicial review of the decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority) to affirm the delegate's decision not to grant the appellant a Safe Haven Enterprise visa. The primary judge dismissed the appellant's application for judicial review, and the appellant now appeals that decision to the court. The appellant's Notice of Appeal raises new grounds of appeal that were not presented to the primary judge, necessitating leave to argue these new grounds. The court must decide whether leave should be granted and, if so, whether the appeal should succeed.

The legal issues before the court include whether the appellant has provided an adequate explanation for failing to raise the new grounds of appeal before the primary judge and whether these new grounds have merit. The court considered factors such as the potential vindication of a just outcome and the consequences of the decision not to permit the new grounds to be advanced. Additionally, the court examined whether the new grounds raise matters that could have been met by evidence. The court also evaluated the merits of the proposed grounds of appeal, concluding that they are without merit.

The court found that the appellant did not provide an adequate explanation for not raising the new grounds of appeal before the primary judge, which weighed against granting leave. Furthermore, the court determined that the new grounds of appeal are wholly without merit. Consequently, even if leave had been granted, the appeal would have failed. The court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the first respondent's costs, to be agreed upon or, if agreement cannot be reached, to be taxed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The name of the first respondent be changed to Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.

2. The appeal be dismissed.

3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs to be agreed or, failing agreement, to be taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 27 July 2017, the Authority affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the appellant a SHEV pursuant to s 473CC(2)(a) of the Migration Act (Authority’s decision or AD). The appellant sought judicial review of the Authority’s decision. The primary judge dismissed the appellant’s judicial review application with costs on 13 August 2020. That decision is the subject of the present appeal. The appellant’s Notice of Appeal raises new (albeit similar) grounds of appeal that were not advanced by the appellant before the primary judge. For that reason, the appellant requires leave to advance these new grounds of appeal. I have proceeded on the basis that the appellant seeks that leave. For the reasons that follow, leave will not be granted and the appeal will otherwise be dismissed with costs.The appellant’s material The appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 8 September 2020 which sets out two grounds of appeal and seeks orders that (inter alia) the orders of the primary judge be set aside and the matter be remitted to the Authority to be determined in accordance with the law. The appellant did not file written submissions. For these reasons, I will treat the appellant’s Notice of Appeal as written submissions. At the hearing of this appeal the appellant made brief oral submissions, including about facts which were not raised with the Authority. However, these submissions concerned the merits of the appellant’s application for protection and did not refer to any error by the primary judge or the Authority, thereby inviting me to engage in impermissible merits review. For that reason, I do not address the appellant’s oral submissions in the reasons that follow. Leave to advance new grounds on appeal Leave to argue a ground of appeal not raised before the primary judge should only be granted if it is expedient in the interests of justice to do so. Some relevant considerations were set out in Doves v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 134 at [23] (Nicholas, Thomas and Downes JJ) as follows: (1)whether there is an adequate explanation for the failure to raise the ground below;(2)the merits of the proposed ground;(3)the “potential vindication of a just outcome” and the gravity of the consequences of the decision not to permit the ground to be advanced;(4)any prejudice to the respondent if the new ground is allowed to be advanced;(5)whether the new ground raises a matter that could have been met by evidence.(Citations omitted.) The appellant has not provided any explanation for the failure to raise those grounds of appeal below. This tells against leave being granted. Most significantly, the grounds of appeal set out in the Notice of Appeal are wholly without merit for the reasons that follow. Accordingly, even if leave had been granted, the appeal would have been dismissed for the same reasons.Ground 1 By ground 1 of the Notice of Appeal, the appellant contends: The learned trial Judge Driver erred in finding that the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority involved Jurisdictional error, as the Immigration Assessment Authority misconstrued or misapplied the words “risk of harm” and “real chance of serious harm” in the definitions of “serious harm” in Under ss 5J(4)(b) and 91R(1)(b) of the Act. His Honour thereby erred in considering the above (MIBP v WZAPN (2015) at [41-51].).(Errors original.)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established