AAJ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AAJ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 205

Appeal from: AAJ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 2297
File number: NSD 1797 of 2017
Judge: PERRY J
Date of judgment: 5 March 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether Tribunal decision was legally unreasonable – where failure to disclose certificate made under s 438 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where disclosure of s 438 certificate could not possibly have affected the outcome – whether interpreter interpreted in a language the appellant could understand – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 438, 424AA, 424A

Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth)

Cases cited:

BEG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 198

Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163

DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BJN16 [2017] FCAFC 197

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CQZ15 [2017] FCAFC 194

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39; (2009) 83 ALJR 1123

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo [1997] HCA 22; (1997) 191 CLR 559

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam [1999] FCA 719; (1999) 93 FCR 220

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323

MZAFZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1081

Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 50; (2015) 258 CLR 173

Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; (2003) 77 ALJR 1165

Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 34 ALD 347

Date of hearing: 20 February 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 35
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr N Swan
Solicitor for the Respondents: Mills Oakley

ORDERS

NSD 1797 of 2017
BETWEEN:

AAJ17

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRY J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 MARCH 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.Costs are reserved.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

PERRY J:

1         INTRODUCTION

[1]

2         BACKGROUND

[6]

2.1      The application for a visa and the delegate’s decision

[6]

2.2      The decision of the Tribunal

[8]

2.3      The decision of the Federal Circuit Court

[10]

3         CONSIDERATION

[13]

3.1      The limited function of a court on judicial review and on the appeal

[13]

3.2      The issues

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 205
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in the case of AAJ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involves the appellant, a pseudonymous applicant for a protection visa, challenging the decision of the Federal Circuit Court (FCC) which dismissed her application for judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The appellant argued that the AAT's decision was legally unreasonable due to procedural errors, including the failure to disclose a certificate under section 438 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and the alleged misidentification of the language interpreter used during her hearing.

The central legal issues before the court were whether the AAT's decision was legally unreasonable due to the non-disclosure of a section 438 certificate and whether the appellant was provided with an interpreter in a language she could understand. The court had to determine if these errors amounted to jurisdictional errors that could justify the setting aside or quashing of the AAT’s decision. Additionally, the court needed to consider the limited scope of judicial review, which does not allow for the correction of factual errors or the grant of a visa but focuses on the legality of the AAT’s decision.

The court found that the non-disclosure of the section 438 certificate did not impact the outcome of the AAT’s decision, as there was no evidence that the AAT relied on the certificate. Furthermore, the court accepted that the appellant was assisted by a Cantonese interpreter, albeit not a Malaysian Cantonese speaker, and that she could understand the interpreter. The court concluded that there was no breach of procedural fairness or other procedural error on this ground. The reference to a Mandarin interpreter in the AAT’s reasons was deemed an error. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal and reserved costs, noting that the Minister might not be ordered to pay the costs associated with the AAT’s error regarding the interpreter’s accreditation.

In summary, the appeal was dismissed, and the court upheld the AAT’s decision as legally sound, affirming the limited scope of judicial review in such cases.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. Costs are reserved.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below, the appeal must be dismissed.2. BACKGROUND2.1 The application for a visa and the delegate’s decision The appellant applied for a protection visa on 30 June 2016. She claimed to fear harm from a criminal gang who allegedly targeted her and her family for a number of illegal reasons. The appellant’s claims may be summarised broadly as follows (bearing in mind that the appeal concerns an applicant for a protection visa whose identity is protected by a pseudonym and that there is a corresponding need to avoid potentially identifying details). (1)In mid-2006, the appellant’s husband received threats of violence and lodged a police report.(2)Her husband was abducted in 2008 but was released on payment of a ransom.(3)In late 2008, a man threatened to cause problems at her husband’s business claiming that he had been overcharged.(4)In mid-2009 a number of Chinese men demanded that a debt be paid by her husband’s business. Her husband disputed this debt.(5)In 2009, one of her staff members received a call from a “hired gangster” who stated that he had been engaged to destroy the business. He threatened to hurt the appellant’s family and demanded payment from them.(6)In early 2010, the appellant and her children were harassed by gangsters. The appellant’s husband, who had been in Australia, returned to Malaysia as a result. However, he also began to be harassed by the gangsters and had to hide from them.(7)Owing to his fear, the appellant’s husband travelled to Australia and applied for a student visa. He subsequently applied in April 2014 for a protection visa.(8)The appellant, however, decided to stay and hide in Malaysia so that she could care for her mother and because her children wanted to continue with their studies. However she was subsequently threatened in mid-2010 by a number of Chinese men.(9)Gangsters and loan sharks twice threatened to kidnap the appellant’s children.(10)The appellant and her children began to hide in various locations to avoid the gangsters and loan sharks. Her children also changed schools and only attended school on certain days due to a fear of harm. (11)The appellant travelled to Australia but returned to Malaysia on a number of occasions between 2013 and 2015 because she was caring for her ill mother who had remained in Malaysia. On 28 July 2016, the delegate refused to grant the appellant a protection visa. The delegate found that the appellant’s fear of harm had no link to any of the reasons provided for in s 5J(1)(a) of the Act (that is, race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion) and that the appellant was therefore not a “refugee” as defined in s 5H. As a consequence, the delegate found that the criterion for a protection visa in s 36(2)(a) of the Act (the Refugee Criterion) was not satisfied. Nor, the delegate found, was the appellant entitled to complementary protection under s 36(2)(aa) of the Act on the ground that the delegate was satisfied that the Malaysian authorities can provide a sufficient level of protection to remove the perceived risk of harm. 2.2 The decision of the Tribunal

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

At the directions hearing, the Minister sought and was granted leave to reopen in order to rely upon the affidavit of Arielle Bianca Zinn, solicitor, affirmed on 27 February 2018. In her affidavit, Ms Zinn deposed to inquiries made by her confirming that the interpreter who attended the Tribunal hearing was in fact accredited in Cantonese for translating and interpreting. The appellant confirmed that Ms Zinn’s affidavit had been sight-translated for her before the directions hearing, and that she did not dispute Ms Zinn’s evidence or wish to call further evidence. The appellant also confirmed that she had been assisted by a Cantonese interpreter at the Tribunal hearing and that, while the interpreter was not Malaysian Cantonese, the appellant could understand her. In those circumstances, I am satisfied that a NAATI accredited Level 3 Cantonese interpreter assisted the appellant at the Tribunal hearing and therefore that there was no breach of procedural fairness or other breach on this ground. The reference to a Mandarin interpreter in the Tribunal’s reasons was apparently an error.4. CONCLUSION For these reasons, the appeal must be dismissed. As the respondent has successfully defended the appeal on all grounds, it is appropriate to make an order that the appellant pay the respondent’s legal costs of the appeal as agreed or assessed, subject to one caveat. The caveat is that, subject to affording the Minister an opportunity to be heard, it is my preliminary view that there should be no order as to the costs occasioned by and incidental to the Tribunal’s error in referring to the interpreter as accredited in Mandarin.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Finally, the primary judge noted that the Minister in accordance with his duty as a model litigant, had drawn the Court’s attention to the issue of the s 438 certificate. However, his Honour held that there was nothing to indicate that the Tribunal acted on the certificate or had taken it into account. The primary judge was satisfied that, to the extent that there was a failure to disclose the certificate, it could not have given rise to any practical injustice and impacted on the outcome of the Tribunal’s decision.3. CONSIDERATION3.1 The limited function of a court on judicial review and on the appeal It is important to explain at the outset the limited circumstances in which the FCC may find an error on a judicial review application which would justify the Court setting aside or quashing the Tribunal’s decision. The jurisdiction of the FCC is confined to deciding whether the Tribunal’s decision was made lawfully under the Act, that is, whether the Tribunal’s decision is invalid by reason of a jurisdictional error. This Court in turn must decide whether the FCC wrongly decided that there was no jurisdictional error. The Tribunal would make a jurisdictional error if, for example, it misunderstood the criteria by which the appellant’s visa application must be assessed under the Act, the Tribunal’s decision was illogical or irrational, or if the Tribunal failed to hear and determine the appellant’s application in accordance with the requirements of procedural fairness: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323 at [82] (McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ); Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179 (the Court). However, neither the Federal Court nor the FCC has jurisdiction to grant the appellant a visa, to consider whether she satisfies the criteria for the grant of a protection visa, or to correct mistaken findings of fact by the Tribunal: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam [1999] FCA 719; (1999) 93 FCR 220 at [65] (Sackville J), [146] (Kenny J); Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; (2003) 77 ALJR 1165 at [114] (Kirby J). As for example, French CJ, Bell, Keane and Gordon JJ explained in Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 50; (2015) 258 CLR 173 at 184-185:23 It is necessary to make some preliminary observations in relation to the constraints within which the plaintiff’s challenge to the validity of the Delegate’s decision fall to be determined. The constraints are aspects of the scope of judicial review of administrative action, which is confined to the legality of the Delegate’s decision. In particular, judicial review is concerned with whether the Delegate’s decision was one which he was authorised to make; it is not:“an appellate procedure enabling either a general review of the… decision… or a substitution of the… decision which the… court thinks should have been made.” [quoting Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 175.]