FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AAJ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 205
Appeal from: AAJ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 2297 File number: NSD 1797 of 2017 Judge: PERRY J Date of judgment: 5 March 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether Tribunal decision was legally unreasonable – where failure to disclose certificate made under s 438 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where disclosure of s 438 certificate could not possibly have affected the outcome – whether interpreter interpreted in a language the appellant could understand – appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 438, 424AA, 424A
Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth)
Cases cited: BEG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 198
Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BJN16 [2017] FCAFC 197
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CQZ15 [2017] FCAFC 194
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39; (2009) 83 ALJR 1123
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo [1997] HCA 22; (1997) 191 CLR 559
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam [1999] FCA 719; (1999) 93 FCR 220
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323
MZAFZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1081
Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 50; (2015) 258 CLR 173
Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; (2003) 77 ALJR 1165
Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 34 ALD 347
Date of hearing: 20 February 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 35 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondents: Mr N Swan Solicitor for the Respondents: Mills Oakley ORDERS
NSD 1797 of 2017 BETWEEN: AAJ17
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
PERRY J
DATE OF ORDER:
5 MARCH 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is dismissed.
2.Costs are reserved.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
PERRY J:
1 INTRODUCTION
[1]
2 BACKGROUND
[6]
2.1 The application for a visa and the delegate’s decision
[6]
2.2 The decision of the Tribunal
[8]
2.3 The decision of the Federal Circuit Court
[10]
3 CONSIDERATION
[13]
3.1 The limited function of a court on judicial review and on the appeal
[13]
3.2 The issues
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 205
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the court were whether the AAT's decision was legally unreasonable due to the non-disclosure of a section 438 certificate and whether the appellant was provided with an interpreter in a language she could understand. The court had to determine if these errors amounted to jurisdictional errors that could justify the setting aside or quashing of the AAT’s decision. Additionally, the court needed to consider the limited scope of judicial review, which does not allow for the correction of factual errors or the grant of a visa but focuses on the legality of the AAT’s decision.
The court found that the non-disclosure of the section 438 certificate did not impact the outcome of the AAT’s decision, as there was no evidence that the AAT relied on the certificate. Furthermore, the court accepted that the appellant was assisted by a Cantonese interpreter, albeit not a Malaysian Cantonese speaker, and that she could understand the interpreter. The court concluded that there was no breach of procedural fairness or other procedural error on this ground. The reference to a Mandarin interpreter in the AAT’s reasons was deemed an error. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal and reserved costs, noting that the Minister might not be ordered to pay the costs associated with the AAT’s error regarding the interpreter’s accreditation.
In summary, the appeal was dismissed, and the court upheld the AAT’s decision as legally sound, affirming the limited scope of judicial review in such cases.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. Costs are reserved.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Finally, the primary judge noted that the Minister in accordance with his duty as a model litigant, had drawn the Court’s attention to the issue of the s 438 certificate. However, his Honour held that there was nothing to indicate that the Tribunal acted on the certificate or had taken it into account. The primary judge was satisfied that, to the extent that there was a failure to disclose the certificate, it could not have given rise to any practical injustice and impacted on the outcome of the Tribunal’s decision.3. CONSIDERATION3.1 The limited function of a court on judicial review and on the appeal It is important to explain at the outset the limited circumstances in which the FCC may find an error on a judicial review application which would justify the Court setting aside or quashing the Tribunal’s decision. The jurisdiction of the FCC is confined to deciding whether the Tribunal’s decision was made lawfully under the Act, that is, whether the Tribunal’s decision is invalid by reason of a jurisdictional error. This Court in turn must decide whether the FCC wrongly decided that there was no jurisdictional error. The Tribunal would make a jurisdictional error if, for example, it misunderstood the criteria by which the appellant’s visa application must be assessed under the Act, the Tribunal’s decision was illogical or irrational, or if the Tribunal failed to hear and determine the appellant’s application in accordance with the requirements of procedural fairness: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323 at [82] (McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ); Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179 (the Court). However, neither the Federal Court nor the FCC has jurisdiction to grant the appellant a visa, to consider whether she satisfies the criteria for the grant of a protection visa, or to correct mistaken findings of fact by the Tribunal: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam [1999] FCA 719; (1999) 93 FCR 220 at [65] (Sackville J), [146] (Kenny J); Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; (2003) 77 ALJR 1165 at [114] (Kirby J). As for example, French CJ, Bell, Keane and Gordon JJ explained in Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 50; (2015) 258 CLR 173 at 184-185:23 It is necessary to make some preliminary observations in relation to the constraints within which the plaintiff’s challenge to the validity of the Delegate’s decision fall to be determined. The constraints are aspects of the scope of judicial review of administrative action, which is confined to the legality of the Delegate’s decision. In particular, judicial review is concerned with whether the Delegate’s decision was one which he was authorised to make; it is not:“an appellate procedure enabling either a general review of the… decision… or a substitution of the… decision which the… court thinks should have been made.” [quoting Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 175.]