FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VBAS v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2005] FCA 212CORRIGENDUM
VBAS V MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
VID 542 of 2003
CRENNAN J
11 MARCH 2005 (CORRIGENDUM 19 APRIL 2005)
MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VID 542 OF 2003
On appeal from the Federal Magistrate’s Court constituted by Federal Magistrate Hartnett
BETWEEN:
VBAS
APPELLANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
CRENNAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
11 MARCH 2005
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
CORRIGENDUM
1.On page 8 of the judgment, at paragraph 17 delete ‘NAVG’ and insert ‘NAGV’ and delete ‘[2003]’ and insert [2005].
I certify that the preceding paragraph is a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Crennan.
Associate:
Dated: 19 April 2005
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VBAS v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2005] FCA 212MIGRATION – judicial review – protection visa – whether death threats constituted serious harm for the purposes of s 91R of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Opened for Signature 28 July 1951. 189 UNTS 150. Arts 31 and 33 (entered into force 22 April 1954) (‘Refugees Convention’)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 25(1A)
Migration Act1958 (Cth), ss 36(2) and 91R
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Opened for Signature 31 January 1967. 606 UNTS 267. (entered into force 4 October 1967)Ahwazi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1818 referred to
Avesta v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 121 referred to
Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 referred to
Hicks v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 757 referred to
House of Peace Pty Ltd v Bankstown City Council (2000) 48 NSWLR 498 referred to
Mandavi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2002) FCA 70 referred to
Milne v Attorney‑General (Tas) (1956) 95 CLR 460 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v VBAO of 2002 [2004] FCA 1495 followed
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v VBAO of 2002 [2004] FCA 1581 considered
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 referred to
NACV v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 411 referred to
NAFG v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 131 FCR 57 referred to
NAGV and NAGW of 2002 vMinister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 6 referred to
Prahastono v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 77 FCR 260 referred to
Provincial Insurance Australia Pty Ltd v Consolidated Wood Products Pty Ltd (1991) 25 NSWLR 541 referred to
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 referred to
Ruddock and Ors v Vadarlis and Ors (No. 2) (2001) 115 FCR 229
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- Case
- [2005] FCA 212
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were primarily concerned with the correct interpretation and application of s 91R of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act), which qualifies the application of Art 1A(2) of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Convention). The court was required to determine whether the Tribunal had correctly interpreted and applied s 91R, and whether the Tribunal had properly assessed the appellant's risk of persecution and the seriousness of the harm he faced. The court also needed to consider whether the Tribunal had erred in its findings on the appellant's level of political activity and whether it had failed to consider whether the modification of the appellant's behaviour in the expression of his political opinion constituted persecution.
The court's reasoning focused on the correct interpretation of s 91R, particularly s 91R(2)(a), which specifies that persecution must involve 'serious harm'. The respondent argued that 'serious harm' should be interpreted broadly, while the appellant contended that 'serious harm' should be narrowly construed. The court held that s 91R(2)(a) does not confine 'threat' to the making of oral or written threats but rather uses the term in the sense of risk, danger, hazard, or peril. The court found that the Tribunal had not erred in its interpretation and application of s 91R, and that the Tribunal's assessment of the appellant's risk of persecution and the seriousness of the harm he faced was reasonable. The court also found that the Tribunal's findings on the appellant's level of political activity were reasonably open to it on the evidence.
In conclusion, the court dismissed the appeal, holding that there was no error of law in the Tribunal's reasons for decision. The court found that the Tribunal had correctly interpreted and applied s 91R of the Act and that its assessment of the appellant's risk of persecution and the seriousness of the harm he faced was reasonable. The court's decision was based on a detailed analysis of the evidence and the relevant provisions of the Act and the Convention. The court's final orders were that the appeal be dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: CRENNAN J
The respondent’s counsel contended that s 91R of the Act operated to qualify Art 1A(2) of the Convention. Thus it was now necessary to establish a well‑founded fear of ‘persecution’ within the meaning of Art 1A(2) and also necessary to establish that such persecution involves ‘serious harm’. Art 1A(2) of the Convention and ss 91R(1)(b) and (2) operating together require an applicant to have a well‑founded fear of persecution involving serious harm. In essence, it was then contended that in s 91R(2)(a) the legislature uses the term ‘threat’ in the sense of risk, danger, hazard or peril and was not intending to confine ‘threat’ to the making of oral or written threats. That submission then relied on a number of contextual points, and authorities, in support of the proposition that whether particular circumstances amount to ‘persecution’ within the meaning of the Convention and/or ‘serious harm’ within the meaning of s 91R, is a question of fact and degree. The applicant’s response to this submission was that the construction of s 91R advanced on behalf of the respondent impermissibly conflated the question of whether conduct involves serious harm and whether the fear of persecution is well‑founded.Consideration The criteria for the grant of a protection visa are set out under s 36(2) of the Act: an applicant must be a person to whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Convention as amended by the Protocol; that is, a person who is a ‘refugee’ as defined in Art 1A(2) of the Convention: NAVG and NAGW of 2002 vMinister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] HCA 6 at [33]; see also NAFG v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 131 FCR 57 at [4]. An element of the definition is that the person has a ‘well‑founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.’ However, the protection obligations owed to a refugee are those provided for in the Act. Section 91R, added in 2001, qualifies the application of Art 1A(2) of the Convention. Art 1A(2) does not apply in relation to persecution unless (among other things) the persecution involves ‘serious harm’ to the person (s 91R(1)(b)). The submission for the respondent is correct: whilst it remains necessary to establish a well‑founded fear of ‘persecution’ within the meaning of Art 1A(2) of the Convention, is it now also necessary to establish that such persecution involves ‘serious harm’ to the relevant person. Subsections 91R(1)(b) and (2) do not replace the test of ‘persecution’ with a test of ‘serious harm’; rather, those provisions require an applicant to have a well‑founded fear of persecution involving serious harm. The first instance of ‘serious harm’ set out in s 91R(2)(a) – ‘a threat to the person’s life or liberty’ – does not mean that every death threat or threat of imprisonment made against an applicant will fall within that paragraph and necessarily constitute ‘serious harm’.