VBAS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VBAS v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2005] FCA 212

CORRIGENDUM

VBAS V MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

VID 542 of 2003

CRENNAN J
11 MARCH 2005 (CORRIGENDUM 19 APRIL 2005)
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 542 OF 2003

On appeal from the Federal Magistrate’s Court constituted by Federal Magistrate Hartnett

BETWEEN:

VBAS
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

CRENNAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 MARCH 2005

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

CORRIGENDUM

1.On page 8 of the judgment, at paragraph 17 delete ‘NAVG’ and insert ‘NAGV’ and delete ‘[2003]’ and insert [2005].

I certify that the preceding paragraph is a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Crennan.

Associate:

Dated:            19 April 2005


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VBAS v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2005] FCA 212

MIGRATION – judicial review – protection visa – whether death threats constituted serious harm for the purposes of s 91R of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Opened for Signature 28 July 1951. 189 UNTS 150. Arts 31 and 33 (entered into force 22 April 1954) (‘Refugees Convention’)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 25(1A)

Migration Act1958 (Cth), ss 36(2) and 91R
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Opened for Signature 31 January 1967. 606 UNTS 267. (entered into force 4 October 1967)

Ahwazi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1818 referred to
Avesta v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 121 referred to
Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 referred to
Hicks v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 757 referred to
House of Peace Pty Ltd v Bankstown City Council (2000) 48 NSWLR 498 referred to
Mandavi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2002) FCA 70 referred to
Milne v Attorney‑General (Tas) (1956) 95 CLR 460 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v VBAO of 2002 [2004] FCA 1495 followed
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v VBAO of 2002 [2004] FCA 1581 considered
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 referred to
NACV v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 411 referred to
NAFG v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 131 FCR 57 referred to
NAGV and NAGW of 2002 vMinister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 6 referred to
Prahastono v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 77 FCR 260 referred to
Provincial Insurance Australia Pty Ltd v Consolidated Wood Products Pty Ltd (1991) 25 NSWLR 541 referred to
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 referred to
Ruddock and Ors v Vadarlis and Ors (No. 2) (2001) 115 FCR 229

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Details
Case
[2005] FCA 212
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of VBAS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, the Federal Court of Australia was tasked with reviewing the decision of the Federal Magistrate, who had dismissed an application for a review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) affirming a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (the Minister) refusing to grant a protection visa to the appellant. The appellant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, had arrived in Australia on a subclass 420 visa and subsequently applied for a protection visa as a refugee, claiming to fear persecution from members or supporters of the United National Party due to his past involvement with the Peoples Alliance. The delegate of the Minister had refused to grant the protection visa on the basis that the appellant was not a genuine entertainer, and the Tribunal had affirmed this decision. The Federal Magistrate dismissed the appellant's application for review on the ground that there was no error of law in the Tribunal's reasons for decision.

The legal issues before the court were primarily concerned with the correct interpretation and application of s 91R of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act), which qualifies the application of Art 1A(2) of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Convention). The court was required to determine whether the Tribunal had correctly interpreted and applied s 91R, and whether the Tribunal had properly assessed the appellant's risk of persecution and the seriousness of the harm he faced. The court also needed to consider whether the Tribunal had erred in its findings on the appellant's level of political activity and whether it had failed to consider whether the modification of the appellant's behaviour in the expression of his political opinion constituted persecution.

The court's reasoning focused on the correct interpretation of s 91R, particularly s 91R(2)(a), which specifies that persecution must involve 'serious harm'. The respondent argued that 'serious harm' should be interpreted broadly, while the appellant contended that 'serious harm' should be narrowly construed. The court held that s 91R(2)(a) does not confine 'threat' to the making of oral or written threats but rather uses the term in the sense of risk, danger, hazard, or peril. The court found that the Tribunal had not erred in its interpretation and application of s 91R, and that the Tribunal's assessment of the appellant's risk of persecution and the seriousness of the harm he faced was reasonable. The court also found that the Tribunal's findings on the appellant's level of political activity were reasonably open to it on the evidence.

In conclusion, the court dismissed the appeal, holding that there was no error of law in the Tribunal's reasons for decision. The court found that the Tribunal had correctly interpreted and applied s 91R of the Act and that its assessment of the appellant's risk of persecution and the seriousness of the harm he faced was reasonable. The court's decision was based on a detailed analysis of the evidence and the relevant provisions of the Act and the Convention. The court's final orders were that the appeal be dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant appeals from a decision of Federal Magistrate Hartnett given on 27 June 2003 dismissing the appellant’s application for a review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) affirming a decision of a delegate of the Minister refusing to grant a protection visa. The appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Court is being exercised in this appeal pursuant to a decision of Black CJ under the provisions of s 25(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).Background to the appeal The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka of Sinhalese ethnicity. He arrived in Australia on 5 November 2001 as the holder of a subclass 420 (entertainment) visa due to expire on 30 November 2001. Shortly after the appellant’s arrival in Australia a delegate of the respondent cancelled the appellant’s visa under s 116(1)(b) of the Migration Act1958 (Cth) (‘the Act’) on the ground that the appellant was not a genuine entertainer. On 9 November 2001 the appellant lodged an application for a protection visa under the Act, as a refugee under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (‘the Convention’). He claimed to fear persecution from members or supporters of the United National Party (‘UNP’) by reason of his past involvement and support of the Peoples Alliance (‘PA’). A delegate of the Minister refused to grant a protection (Class XA) visa to the appellant on 6 December 2001 (the ‘delegate’s decision’). The appellant made an application to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision on 13 December 2001. The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision on 30 January 2002. The appellant then filed an application in the Federal Magistrate’s Court for review of the Tribunal’s decision. On 27 June 2003 her Honour Hartnett FM dismissed the appellant’s application on the ground that there was no error of law in the Tribunal’s reasons for decision. The grounds of appeal to the Federal Court The appellant filed an amended notice of appeal from the judgment of her Honour Hartnett FM on 12 November 2003 and a further amended notice of appeal on 1 November 2004. The further amended notice of appeal claims five grounds of appeal which can be summarised as follows:(1)the Federal Magistrate erred in finding that the Tribunal did not err in its interpretation and application of s 91R of the Act; (2)the Federal Magistrate erred in finding that the Tribunal properly assessed whether the appellant faced a real chance of persecution in the future; (3) the Federal Magistrate erred in holding that the Tribunal found that the abduction and assault of the appellant on 3 April 2001 was serious harm for the purposes of s 91R of the Act; (4) the Federal Magistrate erred in finding that the Tribunal made findings on the appellant’s level of political activity which were reasonably open to it on the evidence (there were nine such grounds under this heading); and(5) (without reference to the Federal Magistrate) the Tribunal erred in failing to consider whether the modification of the appellant’s behaviour in the expression of his political opinion after the death threats he received and his abduction constituted persecution for the purposes of the Convention.The first ground of appeal, which raised the issue of the correct interpretation of s 91R(2)(a) of the Act, generated the most argument.The Tribunal’s decision

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

CRENNAN J
The appellant filed an amended notice of appeal from the judgment of her Honour Hartnett FM on 12 November 2003 and a further amended notice of appeal on 1 November 2004. The further amended notice of appeal claims five grounds of appeal which can be summarised as follows:(1)the Federal Magistrate erred in finding that the Tribunal did not err in its interpretation and application of s 91R of the Act; (2)the Federal Magistrate erred in finding that the Tribunal properly assessed whether the appellant faced a real chance of persecution in the future; (3) the Federal Magistrate erred in holding that the Tribunal found that the abduction and assault of the appellant on 3 April 2001 was serious harm for the purposes of s 91R of the Act; (4) the Federal Magistrate erred in finding that the Tribunal made findings on the appellant’s level of political activity which were reasonably open to it on the evidence (there were nine such grounds under this heading); and(5) (without reference to the Federal Magistrate) the Tribunal erred in failing to consider whether the modification of the appellant’s behaviour in the expression of his political opinion after the death threats he received and his abduction constituted persecution for the purposes of the Convention.The first ground of appeal, which raised the issue of the correct interpretation of s 91R(2)(a) of the Act, generated the most argument.The Tribunal’s decision The country information before the Tribunal indicated that on 10 October 2000 the PA which is a left wing coalition of several parties, won government in Sri Lanka but lost power at the election held in December 2001 when the UNP won government. The country information also indicated that whilst Sri Lanka is a democracy the conduct of elections is marred by violence and accusations of electoral fraud. Apparently the main political groups, the UNP and the PA, accuse each other of political thuggery. The evidence before the Tribunal was that the appellant became involved in the PA in 1996 and had been a local party youth leader in his area. According to the Tribunal’s reasons for decision, the appellant gave evidence that he did not become active in the party until 1998. The appellant claimed that he had been involved on behalf of the PA in a number of election campaigns but mainly the October 2000 national election. The appellant gave evidence that as a consequence of his involvement in the PA he had received threatening phone calls and received threats in person at home and at his office. The appellant also claimed that following the October 2000 election the frequency of the threats intensified and he received phone calls containing death threats three or four times a day. The appellant also gave evidence that in April 2001 he was physically assaulted after being taken somewhere in a jeep and detained for about an hour by UNP supporters. He claimed that as a result of the assault he suffered a broken elbow and spent six days in hospital, but was subsequently able to attend work with his injured arm. He said he did not report the assault to the authorities because he feared his parents would have been harmed had he done so. He also said he ceased political activities on behalf of the PA after this event and fears the PA may do him some harm as a result because the PA would assume that he had moved across to support the UNP.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: CRENNAN J

The respondent’s counsel contended that s 91R of the Act operated to qualify Art 1A(2) of the Convention. Thus it was now necessary to establish a well‑founded fear of ‘persecution’ within the meaning of Art 1A(2) and also necessary to establish that such persecution involves ‘serious harm’. Art 1A(2) of the Convention and ss 91R(1)(b) and (2) operating together require an applicant to have a well‑founded fear of persecution involving serious harm. In essence, it was then contended that in s 91R(2)(a) the legislature uses the term ‘threat’ in the sense of risk, danger, hazard or peril and was not intending to confine ‘threat’ to the making of oral or written threats. That submission then relied on a number of contextual points, and authorities, in support of the proposition that whether particular circumstances amount to ‘persecution’ within the meaning of the Convention and/or ‘serious harm’ within the meaning of s 91R, is a question of fact and degree. The applicant’s response to this submission was that the construction of s 91R advanced on behalf of the respondent impermissibly conflated the question of whether conduct involves serious harm and whether the fear of persecution is well‑founded.Consideration The criteria for the grant of a protection visa are set out under s 36(2) of the Act: an applicant must be a person to whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Convention as amended by the Protocol; that is, a person who is a ‘refugee’ as defined in Art 1A(2) of the Convention: NAVG and NAGW of 2002 vMinister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] HCA 6 at [33]; see also NAFG v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 131 FCR 57 at [4]. An element of the definition is that the person has a ‘well‑founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.’ However, the protection obligations owed to a refugee are those provided for in the Act. Section 91R, added in 2001, qualifies the application of Art 1A(2) of the Convention. Art 1A(2) does not apply in relation to persecution unless (among other things) the persecution involves ‘serious harm’ to the person (s 91R(1)(b)). The submission for the respondent is correct: whilst it remains necessary to establish a well‑founded fear of ‘persecution’ within the meaning of Art 1A(2) of the Convention, is it now also necessary to establish that such persecution involves ‘serious harm’ to the relevant person. Subsections 91R(1)(b) and (2) do not replace the test of ‘persecution’ with a test of ‘serious harm’; rather, those provisions require an applicant to have a well‑founded fear of persecution involving serious harm. The first instance of ‘serious harm’ set out in s 91R(2)(a) – ‘a threat to the person’s life or liberty’ – does not mean that every death threat or threat of imprisonment made against an applicant will fall within that paragraph and necessarily constitute ‘serious harm’.