SZTIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

Link copied
Case Copied 76 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZTIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 40

Citation: SZTIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 40
Appeal from: SZTIB v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 1324
Parties: SZTIB v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 662 of 2014
Judges: ROBERTSON, GRIFFITHS AND MORTIMER JJ
Date of judgment: 24 March 2015
Corrigendum: 2 April 2015
Catchwords: MIGRATION – whether Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) applied the wrong test pursuant to s 91R(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – s 91R(2)(a) stated as an instance of serious harm, in relation to whether persecution involved serious harm to the person, a threat to the person’s life or liberty – whether by undertaking a qualitative assessment of the nature and degree of the harm experienced by the appellant when in detention in Sri Lanka on remand for illegal departure, the Tribunal failed to apply the correct test pursuant to s 91R(2)(a) and thereby fell into jurisdictional error – whether WZAPN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 947 (WZAPN) correctly decided
Held: appeal dismissed – WZAPN wrongly decided
Legislation:

Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 91R
Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No 6) 2001 (Cth)

The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951, as amended by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967 Arts 1A, 31, 33

Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast) [2011] OJ L337/16

Cases cited:

Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue [2009] HCA 41; (2009) 239 CLR 27
Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 71; (2003) 216 CLR 473
Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1997] HCA 4; (1997) 190 CLR 225

Canada (Attorney General) v Ward [1993] 2 SCR 689
Chan v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1995] 3 SCR 593
Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1989] HCA 62; (1989) 169 CLR 379

Chen Shi Hai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] HCA 19; (2000) 201 CLR 293
Cheung v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1993] 2 F.C. 314 (CA)
Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Agalianos [1955] HCA 27; (1955) 92 CLR 390
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd [2012] HCA 55; (2012) 250 CLR 503
Goldie v Commonwealth (No 2) [2004] FCA 156; (2004) 81 ALD 422
Gomez-Zuluaga v Attorney General of the United States 527 F. 3d 350 (3rd Cir 2008)

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read SZTIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2015] FCAFC 40
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SZTIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved the appellant, SZTIB, appealing against a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal). The Tribunal had determined that the appellant did not meet the criteria for refugee status under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The primary issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had applied the correct legal test under section 91R(2)(a) of the Act in assessing whether the appellant's detention in Sri Lanka constituted "serious harm" as a form of persecution. The appellant argued that the Tribunal had erred by conducting a qualitative assessment of the harm experienced, rather than applying a specific threshold of seriousness. This argument hinged on the interpretation of the relevant legislative provisions and the applicability of a previous case, WZAPN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection.

The court considered the nature of "serious harm" as defined in section 91R(1) of the Act, which includes threats to life or liberty. The court noted that Australian law recognises circumstances in which deprivation of liberty can be justified. The court also examined the appellant's reliance on the comments made by French J in the case of Goldie, which dealt with wrongful detention under the Migration Act. The court found that the comments in Goldie, while uncontroversial regarding the impact of wrongful arrest and imprisonment, were not applicable to the appellant's situation as they pertained to unlawful detention. Furthermore, the court considered the principles established in Chan, which set a high threshold for establishing persecution under the Convention. The court held that the Tribunal's approach to assessing whether the appellant's detention constituted "serious harm" was not erroneous. The Tribunal's qualitative assessment was not inconsistent with the statutory provisions, and the court found no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision.

The court ultimately dismissed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal had correctly applied the statutory test for determining whether the appellant's detention constituted "serious harm" and persecution. The decision in WZAPN was deemed to be wrongly decided to the extent that it suggested a different approach to the qualitative assessment of harm. The court ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant pay the costs of the appeal as agreed or assessed, in accordance with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

NYU J
Goldie was a case dealing with false imprisonment, occasioned by wrongful detention under the Migration Act. As is plain from the opening words of this paragraph, French J was dealing with deprivation of liberty which was not, to use the language of the human rights instruments, “on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established by law”. That is not to say, of course, that had the deprivation of liberty suffered by Mr Goldie been suffered by an asylum seeker in her or his country of nationality it would necessarily meet the definition of “serious harm” in s 91R(1). Rather, it is to make the point that Australian law, alike with the domestic laws of other state parties to the Convention, recognises that there are circumstances in which deprivation of liberty is justifiable. In our view, the appellant’s reliance on the comments of French J in Goldie is misplaced. His Honour’s comments that arrest and imprisonment “involve a grave interference with the rights of the individual coupled with humiliation which is both private and public” are uncontroversial, but it is important to note that those comments were directed to an arrest and imprisonment which were wrongful and unlawful. Australian decisions about the concept of persecution Chan was relied on by the appellant. Mr Chan was a citizen of the People’s Republic of China and a member of a faction of the Red Guards which lost the struggle for control of that organization in his local area. Members of the faction, including Mr Chan, were questioned by police. Mr Chan was detained by police for two weeks. His name was later publically released on a list in his local area as someone who was opposed to the policies and ideas of the Chinese state. He was assessed as “anti-revolutionary” and exiled by a Local People’s Committee to another area. He attempted to escape on three occasions and was recaptured, receiving increasingly long periods of detention on each occasion. He was warned that any further escape attempts would result in two years’ detention. He then successfully escaped, stowed away on a ship bound for Australia and sought refugee status here. His application was refused, a refusal upheld by the Full Federal Court but not by the High Court. The case raised the question of the meaning of the concept of “being persecuted” in the Convention. The following summary of the relevant principles by a different US Court of Appeals in Vasili v Holder 732 F. 3d 83 (1st Cir 2013) confirms that the US approach has not relevantly changed post 2001: An individual seeking asylum faces a “daunting task” in establishing subjection to past persecution… To meet this standard, “the discriminatory experiences must have reached a fairly high threshold of seriousness as well as [occurred with] some regularity and frequency”… Infrequent beatings, threats or periodic detention, we have said, do not rise to the level of persecution, and the nature and extent of an applicant’s injuries are relevant to the ultimate determination… Thus, “persecution” requires “more than mere discomfiture, unpleasantness, harassment, or unfair treatment” and “implies some connection to government action or inaction”. (Citations omitted.)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: NYU J

The Minister further submitted that, once it was accepted that “persecution” for the purposes of Article 1A(2) involved evaluation by the Tribunal of whether the relevant harm was “serious harm”, the appeal must fail. The Minister emphasised that the Tribunal made a clear finding at [242]-[243] of its reasons that it was not satisfied that being questioned on arrival at the airport, detained for a few days in possibly cramped and unsanitary conditions while on remand awaiting a bail hearing could reasonably be seen as constituting “serious harm”.CONSIDERATION As this appeal was argued, the appellant’s submission was that any threat to his liberty involves serious harm to him within s 91R(1)(b). Thus, the appellant submitted, the Tribunal’s finding at [35] and [37] that the possibility of the appellant being held briefly on remand in poor conditions before being brought before a magistrate sufficed to establish that serious harm for the purposes of s 91R(1)(b). As we have said above, the appellant expressly accepted he then needed to satisfy the remainder of s 91R(1), especially s 91R(1)(c). In the appellant’s submission, any detention or imprisonment for any period of time constituted serious harm and, if done for a Convention reason, would give rise to persecution unless the detention or imprisonment was authorised by a law of general application which was not applied discriminatorily. As particularised, the jurisdictional error was said to be “undergoing a qualitative assessment of the nature and degree of the harm experienced by the appellant when being questioned and investigations by the authorities at the airport and detention on remand for illegal departure”. Those submissions should be rejected. In our opinion, on its proper construction, s 91R does not forbid a qualitative assessment of claimed detention or imprisonment with a view to establishing whether or not it rises to the level of “serious harm” so as to constitute persecution, if the detention or imprisonment is for a Convention reason and the other aspects of s 91R are satisfied. Approach to construction of s 91R In accordance with the contemporary approach to statutory construction, legislative provisions such as s 91R of the Act should be construed having regard to the text, considered in their context. As Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ stated in Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue [2009] HCA 41; (2009) 239 CLR 27 at [47] (citations omitted):This Court has stated on many occasions that the task of statutory construction must begin with a consideration of the text itself. Historical considerations and extrinsic materials cannot be relied on to displace the clear meaning of the text. The language which has actually been employed in the text of legislation is the surest guide to legislative intention. The meaning of the text may require consideration of the context, which includes the general purpose and policy of a provision, in particular the mischief it is seeking to remedy.