SZSYG v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZSYG v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2015] FCCA 1622
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Application seeking review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal affirming decision of delegate of Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to refuse to grant applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa – whether the Tribunal denied the applicant natural justice – consideration of WZAPN issue – no reviewable error – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.46A(2), 51A, 91R, 357A, 422B, 424, 427

BZAFM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection  [2015] FCAFC 41
Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 197 ALR 389
Kioa v West (1986) 159 CLR 550
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZAPN & Anor [2015] HCA 22
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li & Anor (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI & Anor (2009) 259 ALR 429
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12

MZYGC v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 966
Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 241 CLR 252
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152

SZTEQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 39
SZTIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 40

WAEH of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 364
WZAPN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 947
WZARV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 144 ALD 82

Applicant: SZSYG
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG 1366 of 2013
Judgment of: Judge Lloyd-Jones
Hearing date: 3 December 2014
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 19 June 2015

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: L Karp
Solicitors for the Applicant: D'Ambra Murphy Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: B O'Donnell
Solicitors for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
The Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

  1. The Application filed on 24 July 2013 be dismissed.

  2. The Applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 1366 of 2013

SZSYG

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. This is an application filed in this Court on 18 June 2013 under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the “Migration Act”) seeking judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the “Tribunal”), being RRT Case Number 1300991, a decision of Tribunal Member S. Kamand dated 20 May 2013, affirming the decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the “Minister”) to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa.

  2. The solicitors for the Minister filed on 16 July 2013, pursuant to orders of the Court made on 5 July 2013, a folder which was indexed, labelled and paginated, containing all documents which…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCCA 1622
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application for judicial review brought by SZSYG against the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs. The applicant sought to challenge the decision of the Minister to refuse to grant a protection visa. The application was heard by Lloyd-Jones J in the Federal Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the delegate of the Minister had failed to consider relevant information when assessing the applicant's claim for a protection visa. Specifically, the applicant argued that the delegate had overlooked or failed to give sufficient weight to certain evidence relating to the applicant's fear of persecution in their country of origin. The Court was required to determine if this alleged failure constituted an error of law, rendering the decision invalid.

Lloyd-Jones J reasoned that the delegate's decision-making process must demonstrate that all relevant information was considered. His Honour reviewed the delegate's reasons for decision and the evidence presented by the applicant. The Court applied the principles established in administrative law concerning the duty to consider relevant material, emphasizing that a failure to do so can lead to an unlawful decision. His Honour found that the delegate had indeed failed to adequately consider a crucial piece of evidence that was central to the applicant's claim of persecution.

Consequently, Lloyd-Jones J ordered that the Minister's decision be set aside and remitted to the Minister for redetermination according to law.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant, a Sri Lankan national of Tamil ethnicity, arrived on Christmas Island by boat on 29 May 2012. He applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa, claiming that he feared persecution if returned to Sri Lanka due to his support for the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) and his past experiences of being abducted and questioned by a paramilitary group. The delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection rejected his application on 2 January 2013. The applicant appealed to the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT), which also dismissed his application on 20 May 2013. The Tribunal found that while the applicant had experienced threats and harm prior to 2008, there were no further direct experiences of harm between 2008 and his departure from Sri Lanka in 2012. It accepted that the applicant supported the TNA but did not believe he would be at risk of harm due to this level of support. The Tribunal also found issues with a letter submitted in support of the applicant’s claims, deeming it not determinative of his claims. The applicant then applied to the Federal Circuit Court for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. The central issue in the proceedings was whether the Tribunal denied the applicant natural justice by not disclosing to him the reasons why it considered it could not make an inquiry of the author of a letter written by Mr K Selvarajah, who purported to be the Chairman of the Urban Council of Trincomalee. The applicant argued that the Tribunal’s failure to disclose its concerns about contacting Mr Selvarajah for his comment breached the requirements of procedural fairness. However, the Court found that the Tribunal was not obliged to consult the applicant on whether it would exercise its powers under s.424, as there was no such obligation under the statute and the applicant did not request such a consultation. The Court dismissed the application, holding that no jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal was apparent.

The matter before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia is an application seeking judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT). The applicant, a Sri Lankan national, was granted a Protection (Class XA) visa refusal by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, which was affirmed by the RRT. The applicant contends that the RRT failed to observe procedural fairness by not disclosing to him the reasons why it considered it could not contact the writer of a supportive letter regarding his claim for refugee status and by not making an enquiry of the writer. The matter was heard on 3 December 2014, with judgment reserved, and delivered on 19 June 2015. The Court found that no jurisdictional error was apparent and dismissed the application with costs awarded to the Minister.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Did the Tribunal deny the applicant natural justice by failing to disclose its reasons for not contacting the author of a letter from K. Selvarajah?
2. Did the Tribunal have an obligation to consult the applicant on whether to contact the writer of the letter?
3. Does s.422B of the Migration Act excuse the Tribunal from acting in a manner that is procedurally fair?
4. Was the Tribunal's decision not to contact the writer of the letter a jurisdictional error?
5. Is there an obligation to consult an applicant about whether the Tribunal will exercise its powers under s.424(1) where the applicant did not request such contact?
6. Does the failure to consider exercising powers under s.424 amount to a relevant consideration for the Tribunal's decision-making?
7. Is there a "limited" duty to inquire that applied in this case, and was it pleaded by the applicant?
8. Was the likelihood of a period of temporary detention for a reason mentioned in the Refugees Convention, of itself and without more, a threat to liberty within the meaning of s.91R(2)(a) of the Migration Act?

Held
1. The court concluded that the Tribunal did not deny the applicant natural justice by failing to disclose its reasons for not contacting the author of a letter from K. Selvarajah. The application on this issue was dismissed.
2. The court found that the Tribunal had no obligation to consult the applicant on whether to contact the writer of the letter. The application on this issue was dismissed.
3. The court held that s.422B of the Migration Act does not excuse the Tribunal from acting in a manner that is procedurally fair. The court found that the Tribunal's failure to act in a procedurally fair manner was a jurisdictional error.
4. The court concluded that the Tribunal's decision not to contact the writer of the letter was not a jurisdictional error. The application on this issue was dismissed.
5. The court held that there is no obligation to consult an applicant about whether the Tribunal will exercise its powers under s.424(1) where the applicant did not request such contact. The application on this issue was dismissed.
6. The court found that the failure to consider exercising powers under s.424 does not amount to a relevant consideration for the Tribunal's decision-making. The application on this issue was dismissed.
7. The court determined that there was no "limited" duty to inquire that applied in this case, and it was not pleaded by the applicant. The application on this issue was dismissed.
8. The court concluded that the likelihood of a period of temporary detention for a reason mentioned in the Refugees Convention, of itself and without more, is not a threat to liberty within the meaning of s.91R(2)(a) of the Migration Act. The application on this issue was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court began by examining whether the Tribunal denied the applicant natural justice by failing to disclose its reasons for not contacting the author of a letter from K. Selvarajah. The court observed that natural justice or procedural fairness required a fair decision-making process, including the disclosure of adverse material or information for comment. The Tribunal member had considered contacting Mr. Selvarajah but did not because of concerns about influences on any response and a concern of placing Mr. Selvarajah and the applicant in danger. However, the court found that the Tribunal's failure to disclose to the applicant the reasons why it considered that it could not make an enquiry of Mr. Selvarajah potentially deprived the Tribunal of a line of inquiry that could have affected the outcome of the case. The court concluded that the Tribunal's failure to put its concerns about contacting Mr. Selvarajah for his comment breached the requirements of procedural fairness.

The court then addressed whether the Tribunal had an obligation to consult the applicant on whether to contact the writer of the letter. The court noted that the Tribunal was not obliged to consult the applicant about whether the Tribunal would exercise its powers under s.424(1) where the applicant did not request such contact. The court found that there was no obligation to consult an applicant about whether the Tribunal is going to use its powers under s.424(1) in circumstances where the applicant did not ask the Tribunal to contact the letter's writer.

The court further examined whether s.422B of the Migration Act excused the Tribunal from acting in a manner that was procedurally fair. The court found that s.422B did not excuse the Tribunal from acting in a way that was procedurally fair. In those circumstances, the Tribunal's failure to advise the applicant for his comment the reasons why it did not contact Mr. Selvarajah was a breach of the requirements of procedural fairness and thus a jurisdictional error.

The court also considered whether the Tribunal's decision not to contact the writer of the letter was a jurisdictional error. The court found that the Tribunal considered whether it would use its power, but declined to (and gave reasons). The court concluded that the contention that there was no obligation to consult an applicant about whether or not the Tribunal is going to use its powers under s.424(1) could not be sustained.

The court further examined whether there was an obligation to consult an applicant about whether the Tribunal will exercise its powers under s.424(1) where the applicant did not request such contact. The court found that the contention that there was no obligation to consult an applicant about whether or not the Tribunal is going to use its powers under s.424(1) could not be sustained.

The court also considered whether the failure to consider exercising powers under s.424 amounted to a relevant consideration for the Tribunal's decision-making. The court found that the statute did not impose an implied obligation on the Tribunal to consider the exercise of its power under s.424. The court concluded that the contention that the failure to consider exercising powers under s.424 amounted to a relevant consideration for the Tribunal's decision-making could not be sustained.

The court further examined whether there was a "limited" duty to inquire that applied in this case, and whether it was pleaded by the applicant. The court found that this was not a case where the "limited" duty to inquire applied, and it was not pleaded by the applicant. The court concluded that the contention that there was a "limited" duty to inquire that applied in this case could not be sustained.

Finally, the court examined whether the likelihood of a period of temporary detention for a reason mentioned in the Refugees Convention, of itself and without more, was a threat to liberty within the meaning of s.91R(2)(a) of the Migration Act. The court found that the High Court held that the likelihood of a period of temporary detention of a person for a reason mentioned in the Refugees Convention was not, of itself and without more, a threat to liberty within the meaning of s.91R(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Tribunal's failure to disclose to the applicant the reasons why it considered that it could not make an enquiry of the author of a letter from K. Selvarajah potentially deprived the Tribunal of a line of inquiry that could have affected the outcome of the case, and that the Tribunal's failure to put its concerns about contacting Mr. Selvarajah for his comment breached the requirements of procedural fairness. The court also found that s.422B of the Migration Act did not excuse the Tribunal from acting in a way that was procedurally fair, and that the Tribunal's failure to advise the applicant for his comment the reasons why it did not contact Mr. Selvarajah was a breach of the requirements of procedural fairness and thus a jurisdictional error.