FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WZAPN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 947
Citation: WZAPN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 947 Appeal from: WZAPN v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2013] FMCA 6 Parties: WZAPN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and GRAHAM BARTER IN HIS CAPACITY AS INDEPENDENT MERITS REVIEWER File number: WAD 380 of 2013 Judge: NORTH J Date of judgment: 3 September 2014 Corrigendum: 5 November 2014 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for extension of time within which to file an appeal from a judgment of the Federal Magistrates Court affirming reviewer’s recommendation not to grant the applicant a protection visa – applicant is an undocumented Faili Kurd from Iran – reviewer found that the applicant had a genuine fear of arbitrary detention and denial of basic rights by the Basij, and that there was a real chance this treatment would occur – reviewer found that treatment did not constitute serious harm and was not for a Convention reason – s 91R(1)(b) and (2)(a) – whether second respondent erred in asking whether the harm suffered by the applicant was ‘sufficiently serious’ to constitute serious harm pursuant to the Act – whether procedural unfairness in finding that detention was pursuant to a law or policy of general application, and that such law or policy was appropriate and adapted in the manner referred to in Applicant S v MIMA (2004) 217 CLR 387 Legislation: Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) s 3
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 91RConvention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 1967Cases cited: Applicant A (1997) 190 CLR 225
Applicant S v MIMA (2004) 217 CLR 387
Attorney-General (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide (2013) 249 CLR 1
Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379
Chen Shi Hai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 201 CLR 293
Commissioner for ACT Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Haji Ibrahim (2000) 204 CLR 1
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v VBAO (2006) 233 CLR 1
Monis v Queen (2013) 249 CLR 92Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward [1993] 2 SCR 689
Chan v. Canada [1995] 3 SCR 593
Fornah v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] 1 AC 412
HJ (Iran) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] 1 AC 596
Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1998] 1 SCR 982
Refugee Appeal No 74655/03 [2005] NZAR 60
RT (Zimbabwe) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] 1 AC 152A Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law (A W Sijthoff, 1966) vol 1
Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (3rd ed, Oxford University Press,…
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- Case
- [2014] FCA 947
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the reviewer did indeed err in his application of the law. The reviewer failed to adequately address whether the conduct of the Basij was appropriate and adapted to achieving a legitimate national objective of Iran, which is a critical aspect of procedural fairness. By not alerting the applicant to the relevant information or identifying the potential issue, the reviewer denied the applicant a fair hearing. Furthermore, the court concluded that the reviewer's approach to determining whether the harm suffered by the applicant was sufficiently serious was incorrect. The court held that serious harm, as intended by the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, is constituted by a threat to life or liberty without reference to the severity of the consequences.
In light of these findings, the court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Federal Magistrates Court, and granted the applicant leave to amend his notice of appeal and to adduce further evidence. The court also ordered the Minister to pay the applicant’s costs of the appeal, with the possibility for the Minister to apply to vary this order within a specified timeframe.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The time for the applicant to file a notice of appeal from the orders of the Federal Magistrates Court made on 31 January 2013 is extended until 9 May 2014.
2. Leave is granted to the applicant to amend the draft notice of appeal by adding paragraph 3 of the proposed amended draft notice of appeal filed on 30 May 2014, and the application to amend is otherwise dismissed.
3. Leave is granted to the applicant to adduce further evidence on appeal being the material contained in annexure SLW-4 to the affidavit of Sarah Louise Watson sworn 30 May 2014.
AND THE COURT DECLARES THAT:
4. In recommending to the first respondent that the applicant was not a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 1951, as amended by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees 1967, the second respondent made jurisdictional errors identified in the reasons for judgment delivered this day, namely, by failing to apply the correct test to determine whether the applicant was at risk of serious harm within the meaning of s 91R(1)(b) and (2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), and by failing to accord the applicant procedural fairness in the consideration whether s 91R(1)(a) of the said Act applied in this case.
AND THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS:
5. The appeal is allowed.
6. The orders of the Federal Magistrates Court made on 31 January 2013 are set aside.
7. The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the appeal.
8. Leave is granted to the first respondent to apply in writing by 8 September 2014 to vary paragraph 7 of this order.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Greater assistance is obtained from reference to academic texts which synthesise the international jurisprudence, and generally support the view that threats to life and freedom on Convention grounds will always be persecution: A Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law (A W Sijthoff, 1966) vol 1 p 193; J C Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (Butterworths, 1991) p 113 n 118; J C Hathaway and M Foster, The Law of Refugee Status (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, 2014) p 239; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, 2007) p 92. Consideration The starting point for the consideration of the proper approach to the construction of s 91R(2) is the text of the subsection. It is immediately obvious that s 91R(2)(a) is structured differently from the other paragraphs in s 91R(2). In each of the other paragraphs the harm is described by reference to a qualitative factor. Thus, physical harassment, physical ill-treatment and economic hardship each must be significant. Economic hardship, denial of access to basic services and the denial of a capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind must each threaten the person’s capacity to subsist. These paragraphs are in contrast to s 91R(2)(a), in which no qualitative element of the harm is stipulated. The first respondent’s reliance on the statement by Gummow J in VBAO that each of the paragraphs in s 91R(2) take their colour from the phrase ‘serious harm’ articulated in subs (1)(b) is misplaced. That statement relates to the observation that paras (a) – (f) should be considered together, and to his Honour’s observations that, like the instances in paras (b) – (f), the threat to life or liberty in (a) ought to be of comparable gravity, in the sense of being more than a possibility. The conclusion from the language and structure of s 91R(2) is that serious harm in s 91R(1)(b) is constituted by a threat to life or liberty, without reference to the severity of the consequences to life or liberty. The conclusion to be drawn from the language of the section is confirmed by other considerations. In construing s 91R, the construction which accords with Australia’s obligations under the Convention should be favoured: see Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273 at 287; [1995] HCA 20 at [26], per Mason CJ and Deane J. This principle is reflected in the statement in the Revised Explanatory Memorandum that s 91R(1)(b) and (2)(a) are intended to reflect the meaning of serious harm as an element of persecution referred to in the Convention. What then is the meaning of serious harm accepted by the parties to the Convention? The meaning of persecution in the Convention is not defined. However, it is accepted that persecution requires serious harm, or ‘serious violations of human rights’: see United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, (January 1992, reissued December 2011) (the Handbook), at [51]. The Handbook further states at [51] that:From Article 33 of the 1951 Convention [the obligation of non-refoulement], it may be inferred that a threat to life or freedom on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group is always persecution.