SZWAT v Minister for Immigration

[2016] FCCA 1933

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZWAT v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2016] FCCA 1933

Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Review of decision by Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether Administrative Appeals Tribunal’s decision affected by jurisdictional error – whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal failed to assess a claim made by the applicant – whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal misconstrued s.91R of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal failed to consider the applicant’s membership of a particular social group – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed.

Legislation:
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s.39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36, 91R
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), r.44.12

Cases Cited:
NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10
VWFW v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 29
Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 75 ALD 630
Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 451
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo & Anor (1997) 191 CLR 559
Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155 at
Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 34 ALD 347
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407
Kopalapillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 86 FCR 547
WZAPN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 947
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZAPN [2015] HCA 22

Applicant: SZWAT

First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

File Number: SYG 208 of 2015

Judgment of: Judge Emmett

Hearing date: 27 July 2016

Date of Last Submission: 27 July 2016

Delivered at: Sydney

Delivered on: 27 July 2016

REPRESENTATION

The applicant appeared in person with the assistance of a Tamil interpreter.

Solicitor for the Respondents: Mr Leonard Leerdam
(DLA Piper Australia)

FEDERAL CIRCUIT
COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 208 of 2015

SZWAT

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

EX TEMPORE

1. This is an application pursuant to s.39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and Pt.8, Div.2 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal dated 2 January 2015 and handed down on 5 January 2015 (“the Tribunal”).

2. The applicant claims to be a citizen of Sri Lanka, of Tamil ethnicity, who fears harm from the government, the Criminal Investigation Unit (“the CID”) and the police in Sri Lanka.

3. The background of this matter, including the applicant’s claims and the Tribunal’s decision, are accurately summarised in the first respondent’s written submissions, as follows:

   “Background

   2. The applicant is a male citizen of Sri Lanka.  He arrived in Australia on 25 July 2012. 

   3. The applicant applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa on 7 November 2012. His claims were set out in a statement accompanying the application and submissions from his authorised recipient. 

   3.1 The applicant claimed to fear harm in Sri Lanka from the Sri Lankan government, the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), and the police, because he was a young Tamil male from Batticaloa and suspected of having links with the LTTE. 

   3.2 The applicant claimed that his father was killed in Batticaloa in 1990 when there was fighting between the Singhalese and Tamils in Batticaloa. He claimed that, on a number of occasions, the CID would come to his home and torture him, and would subsequently take him to the police station where he also suffered physical harm. The applicant claimed that this was for reason that he was a Tamil and suspected of being part of the LTTE. 

   3.3 The applicant claimed that he moved to Chilaw following this, where he experienced further problems with the police and the local Singhalese people, for being Tamil. He claimed that he returned to Batticaloa when the civil war finished in 2011, that he was stopped and questioned by police at checkpoints, and taken to an army base on three occasions. The applicant also claimed to fear harm in Sri Lanka for reason that he left Sri Lanka in an unauthorised manner, and had sought asylum in Australia.

   4. The application was refused by a delegate of the first respondent, on 29 July 2013. The delegate accepted that the applicant was of Tamil ethnicity, he had resided in the Batticaloa District in Sri Lanka, he had previously experienced harassment and detention in Sri Lanka, and he left Sri Lanka unlawfully. However, the delegate did not accept there was a real chance that the applicant would be subject to serious harm amounting to persecution due to his imputed political opinion, having departed Sri Lanka unlawfully, and/or having sought asylum in the West.  The delegate also found that there were not substantial grounds for believing that there was a real risk the applicant would suffer significant harm upon return to Sri Lanka.

   5. The applicant applied to the RRT for review of the delegate's decision on 5 August 2013. The applicant raised further written claims in an additional statement received by the RRT on 11 December 2014. Specifically, the statement raised an additional claim that, on 18 July 2012, the applicant's wife was raped by two army officers, that the applicant had beaten those two individuals and that, as a result, he was taken by four army officers and abused.

   6. The applicant gave oral evidence and presented arguments on the issues arising in relation to the review, at a hearing before the RRT on 16 December 2014. Oral evidence was also received from the applicant's wife at hearing. On 22 December 2014, the RRT received post hearing submissions from the applicant's representative. 

   7. The RRT made its decision on 2 January 2015, affirming the decision not to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa.  

   The RRT's decision

   8. The RRT accepted that the applicant's father was killed in 1990 in the circumstances which the applicant claimed (see [12]).  However, the RRT was not satisfied that the applicant would be suspected of being sympathetic to the LTTE arising from his father's death in 1990 (see [14]). The RRT relied on country information in so finding. 

   9. Based on country information, the RRT accepted it was plausible that the applicant was detained, physically harmed, and questioned, on seven occasions, for reason of him being a young Tamil male from Batticaloa, prior to the end of the civil war in May 2009 (see [17], [55]). However, the RRT accepted that the applicant was only detained for short periods and released after questioning, and was satisfied that the applicant was released as neither he nor his family were seriously suspected of LTTE engagement or support (see [17], [55]).

   10. On the basis of country information, the RRT accepted that the applicant and his family were discriminated against in Chilaw. However, without more, the RRT was not satisfied that this constituted serious or significant harm (see [20]).

   11. The RRT was not satisfied that a Tamil male with the applicant's profile would come to the adverse attention of the Sri Lankan authorities, or anyone else, for reason of being detained on three occasions in 2011 and 2012 (see [24], [55]).  The RRT relied on country information in so finding.

   12. The RRT did not believe the applicant in respect of the claimed incident of 18 July 2012, which was only raised with the RRT on 10 December 2014 (see [25]-[37]).   

   13. The RRT was not satisfied that the applicant faced a real chance of persecution upon return to Sri Lanka arising from the applicant's claim of ‘pervasive discrimination’ (see [40]).

   14. The RRT was satisfied that the limited interest in the applicant by the Sri Lankan authorities after the cessation of hostilities in May 2009 was a clear indication that the applicant was not suspected of LTTE engagement or support (see [44]-[45], [56]).  As such, the RRT was not satisfied that the applicant had a real chance of suffering serious harm in Sri Lanka as a suspected LTTE supporter (see [46]).

   15. In respect of the applicant's claim to fear harm on the basis that he would be suspected of being part of the overseas Tamil diaspora, the RRT found that the applicant did not have a political or other profile which would bring him to the adverse attention of the Sri Lankan authorities (or anyone else) such that he faced a real chance of harm (see [49], [57]).

   16. The RRT accepted that the applicant departed Sri Lanka illegally (see [58]). However, it was not satisfied that the applicant would be subject to any custodial sentence in Sri Lanka (including for having exited unlawfully) (see [63]).

   17. In respect of the applicant's claim that he would be tortured as a young, Tamil male, and failed asylum seeker with limited education and no profession, the RRT found that the applicant's profile did not give rise to a real chance of persecution (see [64]-[69]).

   18. The RRT considered the applicant’s claims which it had accepted, cumulatively, and found that the applicant was not a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations (see [70]).  

   19. The RRT went on to consider the applicant's claims against the complementary protection criterion. It did not accept that there were substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Sri Lanka, there was a real risk the applicant would suffer significant harm (see [72]-[82]). 

The proceeding before this Court

1. The applicant was unrepresented before this Court this morning although had the assistance of a Tamil interpreter. 

2. The applicant attended a directions hearing before a Registrar of this Court on 19 February 2015. On that occasion, the matter was set down for hearing pursuant to r.44.12 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) on 20 March 2015. On 20 March 2015, the matter was set down by me for final hearing on 13 April 2016, which was subsequently rescheduled to today.

3. At both the directions hearing on 19 February 2015 and the hearing before me on 20 March 2015, the applicant was given leave to file and serve an Amended Application, any further evidence by way of affidavit, and submissions in support. On each of those occasions, the applicant was represented by Mr Ashok Kumar of counsel.

4. On 17 March 2015, an Amended Application and submissions in support were filed by Mr Kumar.

5. In June 2015, Mr Kumar informed the first respondent’s solicitor that he was no longer representing the applicant. However, there was no formal communication to the Court or document filed by Mr Kumar to that effect.  On 10 March 2016, the applicant filed a Notice of Address for Service in Australia. On that form, it was clear that he no longer had legal representation. 

6. At the outset of the hearing, the applicant sought an adjournment of today’s hearing in order to have a further opportunity to obtain legal advice. That application was opposed by the solicitor for the first respondent on the basis that the applicant has had sufficient time to obtain any legal representation that he wished. In support of the adjournment application, the applicant tendered a medical report dated 31 March 2016 and addressed to the first respondent, relating to the applicant’s chronic mental illness, post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, depression and rectal bleeding.

7. However, the applicant did not provide any updated medical evidence to the Court this morning regarding any inability on his part to attend Court and represent himself today.

8. Having regard to the substantial period of time that the applicant has had to seek further legal advice, his application for an adjournment was refused.

9. I explained to the applicant that the role of this Court is very different to that of the Tribunal, and that it is not for this Court to reconsider his claims and reach different findings or conclusions. I also explained to the applicant that the only issue before this Court is whether or not the decision of the Tribunal was made according to law. I explained to the applicant that this Court has no power to interfere with the decision of the Tribunal, unless the Court is satisfied that the decision of the Tribunal is affected by a mistake going to its jurisdiction. I further explained to the applicant that disagreement with the findings and conclusions of the Tribunal rarely, by itself, establishes such a mistake.

10. The applicant confirmed that he continued to rely on the grounds of the Amended Application and the written submissions filed on his behalf by Mr Kumar on 17 March 2015. The grounds of the Amended Application are as follows:

    “Ground 1

    1. The Tribunal fell into error when it asked the wrong questions regarding detention/failed to assess the applicant’s claim of detention; failed to deal with a claim and/or made finding without evidence.

    Particulars

    1.1 The Applicant claimed that he was mistreated when he was detained (CB 70 at [14]) post-2009

    1.2 The Tribunal accepted that such detention was random (CB 215 at [24]) which is not supported by the evidence;

    1.3 The Tribunal did not deal with the Applicant's claim of persecution/ill-treatment such as working at the base as a result of such ‘random’ detentions / whether such forced tasks amounted to persecution and constructively failed to exercise it jurisdiction;

    1.4 The Tribunal accepted that the Applicant left Sri Lanka illegally

    1.5 The Tribunal thereby committed jurisdictional error.

    Ground 2

    Particulars

    2. The Tribunal fell into error when it failed to assess the Applicant’s claim of detention for illegal departure/or misconstrued s91R of the Act.

    2.1 The Tribunal did not deal with the Applicant’s claim of detention upon return to Sri Lanka for Applicant’s illegal departure;

    2.2 The Tribunal accepted that the Applicant left Sri Lanka illegally.

    2.3 The Tribunal addressed the claim of harassment not made by the Applicant.

    2.4 The Tribunal thereby committed jurisdictional error.

    Ground 3

    Particulars

    3. The Tribunal erred when it failed to consider the Applicant’s membership of particular social group.

    3.1 The Applicant had claimed through agents [sic] submissions to consider membership of social group of Young Tamil men in Sri Lanka; and / or Young Tamil men suspected of having links with the LTTE (CB 35).

    3.2 The Applicant claimed to be from a particular area.”

11. Each of the grounds was then interpreted for the applicant and he was invited to say whatever he wished in support of each of the grounds and in support of the application generally.

Ground 1

1. In support of Ground 1, the applicant restated his concerns about returning to Sri Lanka.

2. Ground 1 appears to make two assertions. The first assertion appears to be that the Tribunal’s finding that the applicant’s detention in Sri Lanka was “random” was not supported by the evidence.

3. The solicitor for the first respondent directed the Court’s attention to the following paragraph of the Tribunal’s decision record:

   “24. At any rate, none of the country information I have considered has satisfied me a Tamil male with the applicant's profile (ie someone who was never seriously suspected of LTTE engagement and who never had any LTTE engagement), would come to the adverse attention of the Sri Lankan authorities (or anyone else), for reason of being detained on three occasions in 2011/2012. The Tribunal is satisfied the limited interest in the applicant (ie his three brief detentions after returning to Batticoloa in 2011), arose as part of the random monitoring and then registration of Tamils generally, and not due to any interest in the applicant personally.”

4. That paragraph contained a footnote that referred to country information titled ‘UK Home Office 2012, Sri Lanka Operational Guidance Note’. It is well-established that the country information to which the Tribunal has regard and the weight it gives that information is a matter for the Tribunal (see NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10, and VWFW v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 29).

5. In the circumstances, the first allegation in Ground 1 that the Tribunal’s satisfaction that such detention was “random” is not made out. 

6. Ground 1 also asserts that the Tribunal did not deal with the applicant’s “claim of persecution, ill treatment, such as working at the base, as a result of such random detentions and whether such forced tasks amounted to persecution”.  In support, the applicant stated that the Tribunal did not deal with what would happen to him if he was to return to Sri Lanka.

7. In the applicant’s statement accompanying his protection visa application, the applicant made the following claim about being taken to “the base”:

   “14. We soon realised that things had not improved for Tamils in Batticaloa despite the end of the conflict. In Batticaloa there are both military and police checkpoints. At these checkpoints if you are Tamil you are stopped and questioned. Even if there are no checkpoints the police or army will stop you and question you. I have to show my ID card and give my address. They say they do not believe me and take me to their base. They are all Singhalese. I am kept there all day. They ask me to work, clean for them in the base without any pay. This happened 3 times. I was not tortured like when I was younger but I was so frightened because of how I had been treated before.”

   (Errors in original).

8. In its decision record, the Tribunal referred specifically to those claims.  The Tribunal accepted that the applicant had been detained and released unharmed on three occasions between 2011 and his departure from Sri Lanka in 2012.

9. Ground 1 at Particular 1.3 asserts that the Tribunal did not deal with the applicant’s claim that being forced to undertake tasks at the army base amounted to persecution. The first respondent conceded that the Tribunal did not make a specific finding in relation to that claim. However, the first respondent submitted that it was unnecessary for the Tribunal to make a finding on that particular matter, in circumstances where it was subsumed in the Tribunal’s findings of greater generality (see Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 75 ALD 630 at [47] per French, Sackville and Hely JJ) (“WAEE”).

10. Whilst the Tribunal does not appear to have made a specific finding in respect of that claim, at paragraph 44 of its decision record, the Tribunal found that the applicant was not suspected of LTTE engagement or support. Additionally, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant had a real chance of suffering serious harm in Sri Lanka as a suspected LTTE supporter. Paragraph 44 of the Tribunal’s decision record is as follows:

    “44. The applicant's agent said “once a pro-LTTE imputation has been levelled against an individual in Sri Lanka, the consequences can be dire.” However, even based on his own admission, neither the applicant nor any close family member had ever been associated with, or a supporter of, the LTTE. At any rate, the Tribunal is satisfied the limited interest (as elaborated at [17] & [24] herein) in the applicant by the Sri Lanka authorities/army after the cessation of hostilities in May 2009 is a clear indication he is not suspected of LTTE engagement or support. The applicant also conceded that after the war, neither he nor any family member was placed in any rehabilitation (or other) camp – and the Tribunal believes this to be clear evidence of the lack of any interest in him. Neither does the applicant have a profile in Australia (based on his claimed activities), that would suggest he may be banned on return.”

1. The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant was of adverse interest to the authorities in Sri Lanka. The Tribunal concluded that the applicant was not at a real risk of serious or significant harm if he returned to Sri Lanka as required under s.36(2)(a) and s.36(2)(aa) of the Act.

2. It is well-established that the Tribunal is not required to refer to every single piece of evidence that an applicant may provide (WAEE at [46] per French, Sackville and Hely JJ). In my view, a fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision record suggests that the issue of whether the applicant was made to work at the army base, and the consequences of that, were subsumed in findings of greater generality in accordance with the principles referred to in WAEE. 

3. In any event, it is well-established that the Tribunal is not required to accept uncritically any and all claims made by an applicant (see Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 451 per Beaumont J; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo & Anor (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 596 Kirby J; Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155 at 169-70 per Wilcox J). Nor does the Tribunal have to possess rebutting evidence before holding that a particular assertion was not made out (see Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 34 ALD 347 at 348 per Heerey J).

4. The Tribunal’s findings were open to it on the evidence and material before it, and for the reasons it gave, including its adverse credibility findings. Credibility findings are a matter par excellence for the Tribunal (see Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 at [67] per McHugh J). A credit finding is sound if it was “open to [the Tribunal] on the material, was based on rational grounds and was arrived at on consideration of matters that were logically probative of the issue of credibility” (see Kopalapillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 86 FCR 547).

5. Accordingly, Ground 1 is not made out.

Ground 2

1. Ground 2 asserts that the Tribunal misconstrued s.91R of the Act. Ground 2 further asserts that the Tribunal failed to deal with the applicant’s claim of being subjected to detention upon return to Sri Lanka after his illegal departure.

2. Mr Kumar’s written submissions, filed on 17 March 2015, in respect of Ground 2 relied on WZAPN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 947 (“WZAPN”). However, in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZAPN [2015] HCA 22 the High Court of Australia rejected the principles espoused by North J in WZAPN and found at paragraph [71] that detention does not automatically give rise to ‘serious harm’ and that a qualitative assessment is required:

   “71. It is persecution, involving serious harm inflicted by the violation of fundamental rights and freedoms, from which the Convention and s.91R of the Act are concerned to provide asylum. Both the Convention and s.91R of the Act embody an approach which is concerned with the effects of actions upon persons in terms of harm to them. That approach is not engaged automatically upon the demonstration of any breach, or apprehended breach, of human rights in their country of nationality or former habitual residence.”

3. The Tribunal’s decision record makes clear that it considered in some detail the consequences the applicant may face upon return to Sri Lanka as a result of his illegal departure. Based on the country information before it, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant would receive any custodial sentence in Sri Lanka for having departed the country illegally. Further, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant’s situation would be exacerbated on return to Sri Lanka based on the claims accepted by the Tribunal.  A summary of those relevant findings made by the Tribunal is as follows:

   “53. The Tribunal makes the following findings:

   • The Tribunal accepts the applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka. Therefore, the Tribunal is satisfied that Sri Lanka is the applicant's country of reference for the purposes of assessing his refugee protection claims, and his receiving country for the purposes of assessing his complementary protection claims.

   • Based on the evidence presently before it, the Tribunal also accepts the applicant does not have statutory effective protection in a safe third country.

   • The Tribunal accepts the applicant's father was killed in shelling in 1990.

   • The Tribunal does not accept the father's death caused the applicant or his family, to be imputed as having assisted the LTTE.

   • The Tribunal accepts that none of the applicant's family have ever been engaged with, or associated with, the LTTE.

   • The Tribunal accepts the applicant was detained, physically banned, and questioned on 7 occasions, for reason of his. being a young Tamil male from Batticaloa (prior to the war ending in May 2009).

   • The Tribunal accepts the applicant was detained, and released unbanned, on three occasions between 2011 and his departure from Sri Lanka in mid-2012.

   • The Tribunal is satisfied that neither the applicant nor his family was seriously suspected of LTTE engagement or support.

   • The Tribunal accepts neither the applicant, nor his family, were placed in any kind of rehabilitation (or other) camp after the end of the civil war in May 2009.

   • The Tribunal does not accept the new claims relating to the 18 July 2012 incident. The Tribunal is satisfied these claims are false.”

4. Based on the evidence before it, the Tribunal was not satisfied that, even if the applicant was subjected to a brief period in detention, any harm suffered by the applicant would be for a Convention related reason. The Tribunal noted that none of the evidence before it suggested that detainees were harmed for Convention related reasons in Sri Lanka.

5. Accordingly, Ground 2 is not made out.

Ground 3

1. Ground 3 asserts that the Tribunal failed to consider the applicant’s membership of a particular social group, being the “young Tamil men in Sri Lanka and/or young Tamil men suspected of having links with the LTTE”. 

2. However, as is clear from paragraph 53 of the Tribunal’s decision record cited above, the Tribunal made findings that neither the applicant nor any of his close family members had ever been associated with, or supported the LTTE. Moreover, the Tribunal found that the applicant did not have a profile in Australia which would suggest that he may be harmed for any perceived LTTE support or association if he was to return to Sri Lanka. 

3. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant had a real chance of suffering serious harm in Sri Lanka as a suspected LTTE supporter.

4. Moreover, The Tribunal’s findings regarding the applicant’s claim to fear harm as a member of the abovementioned social group is subsumed in the Tribunal’s finding of greater generality that the applicant is not at risk in Sri Lanka for any perceived association or support of the LTTE (see WAEE at [47] per French, Sackville and Hely JJ).

5. To the extent that Ground 3 refers the applicant’s claim to be from the Batticaloa area in Sri Lanka, the Tribunal’s decision record makes clear that it was well aware that the applicant was from that area. 

6. Otherwise, Ground 3 is not made out. 

Conclusion

1. The applicant made no other claim before this Court capable of being understood as an allegation of jurisdictional error. Further, no other error going to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is apparent from the Tribunal’s decision record or the conduct of its review. 

2. In the circumstances, a fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision record makes clear that the Tribunal understood the claims being made by the applicant; explored those claims with the applicant at a hearing; and, had regard to all material provided in support. The Tribunal put to the applicant matters of concern it had about his evidence and noted the applicant’s responses. The Tribunal identified with particularity the country information upon which it relied and discussed that information with the applicant at the hearing. 

3. The Tribunal made findings based on the evidence and material before it. Those findings of fact were open to the Tribunal on the evidence and material before it and for the reasons it gave. A fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision record makes clear that the Tribunal reached conclusions based on the findings made by it and to which it applied the correct law.

4. In the circumstances, the Tribunal complied with its obligations under the statutory regime in the making of its decision, including the conduct of its review.

5. The Tribunal’s decision is not affected by jurisdictional error and is therefore a privative clause decision. Accordingly, pursuant to s.474 of the Act, this Court has no jurisdiction to interfere.

6. The proceeding before this Court should be dismissed with costs.

I certify that the preceding forty-six (46) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Emmett

Date:  5 August 2016