FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
ALK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2016] FCA 629
Appeal from: Application for extension of time: ALK15 v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 1896 File number: NSD 996 of 2015 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 10 May 2016 Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa) Cases cited: Bloch v Bloch (1981) 180 CLR 390
Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516
Maxwell v Keun [1928] 1 KB 645
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZAPN (2015) 254 CLR 610
R vSecretary for the Home Department; Ex parte Metha [1975] 1 WLR 1087
SZRIF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 680
SZTEQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 229 FCR 497
WZAPN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 229 FCR 477
Date of hearing: 10 May 2016 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 40 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G Johnson Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice ORDERS
NSD 996 of 2015 BETWEEN: ALK15
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
10 MAY 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for an extension of time be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)RARES J:
This is an application for an extension of time of about three weeks to appeal against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court given on 10 July 2015, refusing the applicant’s application for constitutional writ relief against the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal, given on 11 March 2015, to affirm the Minister’s delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa: ALK15 v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 1896. The applicant filed the present application on 25 August 2015.
Background
The applicant was represented at all stages of his application for a protection visa in the proceedings before the delegate and the Tribunal by a representative appointed under the Immigration Assistance Scheme, as the Tribunal noted in [6] of its reasons. However, he was unrepresented at all times before the trial judge and in this Court.
The applicant arrived in Australia by boat on 1 July 2012 and applied for a protection visa on 16 November 2012. The Tribunal found that he was a goldsmith from the eastern province of Sri Lanka. He claimed that he feared persecution because he was a Tamil, and that during the civil war he had been suspected of supporting the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or LTTE. He also claimed that he had been subject to robbery and…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 629
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the application for an extension of time should be granted. The Court had to consider the applicant's reasons for the extension, the merits of the applicant's case, and whether the applicant had any prospect of success if the extension were granted. The Court also had to consider whether the extension would defeat the rights of the respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection.
The Court found that the applicant's application for an extension of time was devoid of any merit or substance. The Court noted that the Tribunal had given detailed reasons for finding the applicant's evidence not credible and that the Court could see no basis for challenging these findings. The Court also noted that the applicant had not provided any further indication of what, if anything, a lawyer might do to further prepare the case. The Court concluded that the application for an extension of time should be dismissed with costs.
The Court ordered that the application for an extension of time be dismissed and that the applicant pay the costs of the first respondent.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for an extension of time be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
He said that he was now recovered from the conditions that he suffered from at the time of the hearing before the Federal Circuit Court. He said that he wanted to, and could, concentrate on the preparation of his case. He said that he wanted an adjournment today to get a lawyer. When I asked him on what basis, given all of the time that had passed since the proceedings before his Honour, I should think that he would do anything to further prepare his case, he said that last week his brother-in-law said he would help him. He said that his brother-in-law had told him that he (the brother-in-law) had been in contact with a lawyer. The applicant gave no further indication of what, if anything, the lawyer had said, or what, if anything, was going to be done, apart from the applicant, again, repeating the assurance that if he got a lawyer, he would be able to prosecute his case. Consideration An application for an extension of time in which to file an appeal challenges a respondent's vested right to retain the benefit of the judgment from which the appeal is sought, as Brennan CJ and McHugh J explained in Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516 at 519-520 [4]; see also per Kirby J at 539-543 [66]. The Court deals with such applications in the way that each of their Honours said had been adopted by Lord Denning MR in R vSecretary for the Home Department; Ex parte Metha [1975] 1 WLR 1087 at 1091, namely:We often like to know the outline of the case. If it appears to be a case which is strong on the merits and which ought to be heard, in fairness to the parties, we may think it is proper that the case should be allowed to proceed, and we extend the time accordingly. If it appears to be a flimsy case and weak on the merits, we may not extend the time. We never go into much detail on the merits, but we do like to know something about the case before deciding whether or not to extend the time. (emphasis added) I appreciate the difficulties that the applicant, as a person for whom English is not a first language, and who is not, by profession, a lawyer, let alone a lawyer trained in the intricacies of Australian principles for judicial review, faces in seeking to challenge an administrative decision, such as that of the Tribunal, when bringing proceedings such as the present. Therefore, I have had regard not only to the only basis upon which the applicant has articulated in his affidavit in support of the extension of time he seeks, but also to whether, having read the Tribunal’s decision, anything appears that a lawyer acting for him might be able to raise for the purposes of putting forward an intelligible ground of review that could have any prospect of success. The Minister's counsel was unable to identify any such ground when I asked him. A trial judge has a substantive discretion whether to grant or refuse an adjournment. An appellate court will seldom feel justified in reviewing such a decision of a trial judge, as Wilson J said, with whom Gibbs CJ, Murphy, Aickin and Brennan JJ agreed on this point in Bloch v Bloch (1981) 180 CLR 390 at 395. Wilson J adopted the formulation of Atkin LJ in Maxwell v Keun [1928] 1 KB 645 at 653 (see 180 CLR at 395-396) as follows:I quite agree the Court of Appeal ought to be very slow indeed to interfere with the discretion of the learned judge on such a question as an adjournment of a trial, and it very seldom does do so; but, on the other hand, if it appears that the result of the order made below is to defeat the rights of the parties altogether, and to do what which the Court of Appeal is satisfied would be an injustice to one or other of the parties, then the Court has power to review such an order, and it is, to my mind, its duty to do so.