SZTEQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZTEQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 39

Citation: SZTEQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 39
Appeal from: SZTEQ v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 2387
Parties: SZTEQ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 1044 of 2014
Judges: ROBERTSON, GRIFFITHS AND MORTIMER JJ
Date of judgment: 24 March 2015
Corrigendum: 2 April 2015
Catchwords: MIGRATION – whether Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) applied the wrong test pursuant to s 91R(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – s 91R(2)(a) stated as an instance of serious harm, in relation to whether persecution involved serious harm to the person, a threat to the person’s life or liberty – whether by undertaking a qualitative assessment of the nature and degree of the harm experienced by the appellant when in detention in Sri Lanka on remand for illegal departure, the Tribunal failed to apply the correct test pursuant to s 91R(2)(a) and thereby fell into jurisdictional error – whether WZAPN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 947 (WZAPN) correctly decided
Held: appeal dismissed – WZAPN wrongly decided
Legislation:

Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 91R
Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No 6) 2001 (Cth)

The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951, as amended by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967 Arts 1A, 31, 33

Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast) [2011] OJ L337/16

Cases cited:

Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue [2009] HCA 41; (2009) 239 CLR 27
Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 71; (2003) 216 CLR 473
Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1997] HCA 4; (1997) 190 CLR 225

Canada (Attorney General) v Ward [1993] 2 SCR 689
Chan v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1995] 3 SCR 593
Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1989] HCA 62; (1989) 169 CLR 379

Chen Shi Hai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] HCA 19; (2000) 201 CLR 293
Cheung v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1993] 2 F.C. 314 (CA)
Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Agalianos [1955] HCA 27; (1955) 92 CLR 390
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd [2012] HCA 55; (2012) 250 CLR 503
Goldie v Commonwealth (No 2) [2004] FCA 156; (2004) 81 ALD 422
Gomez-Zuluaga v Attorney General of the United States 527 F. 3d 350 (3rd Cir 2008)

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Details
Case
[2015] FCAFC 39
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In SZTEQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant challenged the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) that she did not meet the definition of a refugee under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The central issue before the court was whether the Tribunal correctly applied the legal test for determining "serious harm" under section 91R(2)(a) of the Migration Act when assessing the appellant's claim. The appellant argued that the Tribunal had conducted a qualitative assessment of the harm she experienced during her detention in Sri Lanka, rather than applying the correct test which focuses on whether the persecution involved a threat to her life or liberty.

The court held that the Tribunal did not fall into jurisdictional error by applying the wrong test. It determined that the appellant's reliance on the comments in the case of Goldie was misplaced because those comments related to wrongful and unlawful detention, which is distinct from the context of assessing refugee claims. The court also noted that the decision in WZAPN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, upon which the appellant relied, was wrongly decided. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal and held that the Tribunal's decision was correct.

In summary, the court rejected the appellant's argument that the Tribunal applied the wrong test for determining "serious harm." The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal, as agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

NYU J
Goldie was a case dealing with false imprisonment, occasioned by wrongful detention under the Migration Act. As is plain from the opening words of this paragraph, French J was dealing with deprivation of liberty which was not, to use the language of the human rights instruments, “on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established by law”. That is not to say, of course, that had the deprivation of liberty suffered by Mr Goldie been suffered by an asylum seeker in her or his country of nationality it would necessarily meet the definition of “serious harm” in s 91R(1). Rather, it is to make the point that Australian law, alike with the domestic laws of other state parties to the Convention, recognises that there are circumstances in which deprivation of liberty is justifiable. In our view, the appellant’s reliance on the comments of French J in Goldie is misplaced. His Honour’s comments that arrest and imprisonment “involve a grave interference with the rights of the individual coupled with humiliation which is both private and public” are uncontroversial, but it is important to note that those comments were directed to an arrest and imprisonment which were wrongful and unlawful. Australian decisions about the concept of persecution Chan was relied on by the appellant. Mr Chan was a citizen of the People’s Republic of China and a member of a faction of the Red Guards which lost the struggle for control of that organization in his local area. Members of the faction, including Mr Chan, were questioned by police. Mr Chan was detained by police for two weeks. His name was later publically released on a list in his local area as someone who was opposed to the policies and ideas of the Chinese state. He was assessed as “anti-revolutionary” and exiled by a Local People’s Committee to another area. He attempted to escape on three occasions and was recaptured, receiving increasingly long periods of detention on each occasion. He was warned that any further escape attempts would result in two years’ detention. He then successfully escaped, stowed away on a ship bound for Australia and sought refugee status here. His application was refused, a refusal upheld by the Full Federal Court but not by the High Court. The case raised the question of the meaning of the concept of “being persecuted” in the Convention. The following summary of the relevant principles by a different US Court of Appeals in Vasili v Holder 732 F. 3d 83 (1st Cir 2013) confirms that the US approach has not relevantly changed post 2001: An individual seeking asylum faces a “daunting task” in establishing subjection to past persecution… To meet this standard, “the discriminatory experiences must have reached a fairly high threshold of seriousness as well as [occurred with] some regularity and frequency”… Infrequent beatings, threats or periodic detention, we have said, do not rise to the level of persecution, and the nature and extent of an applicant’s injuries are relevant to the ultimate determination… Thus, “persecution” requires “more than mere discomfiture, unpleasantness, harassment, or unfair treatment” and “implies some connection to government action or inaction”. (Citations omitted.)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: NYU J

Finally, ground 4, which alleged a breach of s 424A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Migration Act), was rejected because the information in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade report which was the subject of this complaint was characterised as general information and not specifically about the appellant: therefore, it fell within the exceptions in s 424A(3) of the Migration Act.THE PRESENT APPEAL As pressed by the appellant, the part abandoned in the course of oral submissions being struck through, the ground of appeal to this Court is:His Honour fell into jurisdictional error by not finding that the Tribunal applied the wrong test pursuant to sections 91R(2)(a) and 36(2A)(e) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).ParticularsBy undergoing a qualitative assessment of the nature and degree of the harm experienced by the appellant when being questioned and investigations by the authorities at the airport and detention on remand for illegal departure, the reviewer failed to apply the correct tests pursuant to sections 91R(2)(a) and 36(2A)(e) and thereby fell into jurisdictional error: WZAPN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Another [2014] FCA 947. This ground is poorly expressed. The issue is not whether the Federal Circuit Court judge fell into jurisdictional error but rather is whether his Honour erred in not finding that the Tribunal had fallen into jurisdictional error by not applying the test approved in WZAPN. Similarly, the reference in the particulars should be to the Tribunal rather than the reviewer. Both parties conducted the appeal on these bases. By consent order made on 12 November 2014, the appellant was granted leave to appeal. It seems that this order was directed to the appellant’s application for an extension of time filed on 13 October 2014. In any event, the notice of appeal was filed on 16 December 2014 and no procedural objection has been taken to it by the Minister. Neither did the Minister object to the amendment to the notice of appeal or raise any issue as to the ground in that notice not having been raised before the primary judge.APPLICABLE PROVISIONS Section 91R took the following form (having been inserted into the Migration Act by the Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No 6) 2001 (Cth), which took effect from 27 September 2001):91R Persecution(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, Article 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol does not apply in relation to persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in that Article unless:(a)that reason is the essential and significant reason, or those reasons are the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and(b) the persecution involves serious harm to the person; and(c) the persecution involves systematic and discriminatory conduct.(2)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (1)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:(a) a threat to the person’s life or liberty;(b) significant physical harassment of the person;(c) significant physical ill-treatment of the person;(d)significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;(e)denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;(f)denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.(3)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person:(a)in determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of being persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in Article 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol;disregard any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia unless:(b)the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee within the meaning of the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol.