1919942 (Refugee)
[2023] AATA 3539
•3 August 2023
1919942 (Refugee) [2023] AATA 3539 (3 August 2023)
DECISION RECORD
DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW: Application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection XA subclass 866 Visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘the Act’)
APPLICANT’S REPRESENTATIVE: Unrepresented
CASE NUMBER: 1919942
COUNTRY OF REFERENCE: Venezuela
MEMBER:Kate Chapple
DATE:3 August 2023
PLACE OF DECISION: Brisbane
DECISION:The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Act.
Statement made on 03 August 2023 at 12:19pm
CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – protection visa – Venezuela – political opinion – anti-Venezuelan government political opinions – member of social group – people suffering from illness or disability, including mental illness – young male from low socioeconomic background – victim of identity theft – used for criminal offences – no remaining family in Venezuela – participation in protests in Australia – decision under review remittedLEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5, 36, 65
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 2CASES
AFA16 v MIBP [2018] FCA 628
Morato v MILGEA (1992) 39 FCR 401
SZTEQ v MIBP (2015) 229 FCR 497
V v MIMA [1999] 92 FCA 355
Zheng v MIMA [2000] FCA 670Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependants.
EVIDENCE BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL
Protection visa application
Protection visa application lodged 14 March 2019 and accompanying submission by the applicant’s former representative, Ramsden Lawyers, setting out the following claims:
Political Opinion
The Applicant opposes the policies and actions of the current Venezuelan government and supports democratic rule. The Applicant’s political opinion is therefore inconsistent with that held by the current government of Venezuela. In V v MIMA [1999] 92 FCA 355, it was held that holding a political opinion that is inconsistent to that held by the government of a person’s home country is sufficient to satisfy the ground that a person holds a certain political opinion.
Further, in Zheng v MIMA [2000] FCA 670 the Full Federal Court observed that:
‘… refusal to participate in a corrupt state system can also be seen as an expression or manifestation of political opinion as the refusal to participate may be imputed by the authorities to be a challenge to the machinery, authority or governance of the state’. 5 As described in more detail below, the current Venezuelan government is corrupt and the rule of law is virtually non-existent. The Applicant does not support that corruption. As the above case reveal it is enough to rely on the ground of ‘political opinion’ where the political platform of a person’s government is corrupt and that person does not support that corruption.
While the Applicant has never outwardly vocalised his political opinion, antagonised the government or demonstrated support for an opposition leader, in V v MIMA [1999] 92 FCA 355, it was held that it is not necessary to be a member of a political party or for a person’s political views to be a matter of public knowledge.[1] Rather, it is sufficient that a person holds a view which opposes instruments of the government and be persecuted for that reason.[2] As noted in point 6(a)(i) below, the Venezuelan government has targeted those it perceives as opposing it or as a threat to its authority. The Applicant is [age] years of age, male and a student of limited means. There is evidence that Venezuelan authorities and security officers have targeted persons fitting this profile as traitors. The imputed political opinion plays a substantial part in the persecution feared by the Applicant, which it is submitted constitutes persecution “for reasons of political opinion.”[3]
[1] V v MIMA (1999) 92 FCR 355, per Wilcox J at 363.
[2] Ibid, 367.
[3] Chan v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379, 416 (Gaudron J), 433 (McHugh J).
Member of a particular social group
The Applicant is also a member of a particular social group in that he suffers chronic mental illness (including, severe anxiety, stress, depression and suicidal ideations) as a result of various factors.
People suffering from an illness or disability, including mental illness, have been accepted as constituting a particular social group[4] and satisfy the requirements under section 5L of the Act, namely they:
[4] Denissenko v MIEA (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Foster J, 29 May 1996).
(i)have a characteristic which is shared by each member of the group;
(ii)share or are perceived to share the characteristic (such as mental health conditions and/or disabilities);[5]
[5] In Applicant A v MIEA (1997) 190 CLR 225, Kirby J confirmed that those who constitute a ‘group’ need not be known as members of the group, even to each other.
(iii)are distinguished from society due to the characteristic; and
(iv)common characteristic is not a fear of persecution.
The Applicant is being treated by a psychologist in Australia, who has verified that the Applicant suffers from a mental health condition and as such is a member of this particular social group.
Well-founded fear
Whether a person has a well-founded fear involves “both a subjective and objective element. There must be a state of mind - fear of being persecuted - and a basis which is well-founded - for that fear”.[6]
[6] Chan v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379, 396 (Dawson J).
Further, under section 5J(1)(b) of the Act, a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if there is a real chance of persecution for one or more of the Five Grounds. A ‘real chance’ is a substantial chance, as distinct from a remote or far-fetched possibility, however, it may be well below a 50 per cent chance.[7] To determine the degree of probability that an event will occur in the future, it is permissible to refer to past events.[8] However, it is not necessary for the Applicant to show he has personally suffered harm or been subjected to persecution in the past in order to demonstrate a well-founded fear of being persecuted.[9]
[7] Ibid, 389 (Mason CJ).
[8] MIEA v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559, 574.
[9] Abebe v The Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510, [192] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).
(a) Objective fear (Situation in Venezuela as the applicant’s Home Country)
(i) Persecution for Political Opinion
Under the presidency of Nicolas Maduro (‘Maduro’), Venezuelan authorities are responsible for wide spread violence, arbitrary and unlawful detention, brutality, corruption and human rights atrocities against those that express (or who are perceived to express)[10] any anti-government sentiment or political opposition.
[10] (Page 21 and 22)
During the course of April to July 2017, it is reported that at least 124 people were killed during incidents related to protests and demonstrations against the government.[11] It is further reported that during this period “security force personnel shot demonstrators at point-blank range with riot-control munitions, ran over demonstrators with an armoured vehicle, brutally beat people who offered no resistance and staged violent raids on apartment buildings”.[12]
[11] Ibid.
According to Human Rights Watch, approximately “5,400 people were arrested in connection with demonstrations between April and November 2017, including demonstrators, bystanders, and people taken away from their homes without warrants”.[13] The use of arbitrary and unlawful arrests and detention continues to be used as a tool to intimidate and repress political opposition or those perceived as a threat to the government.[14] Those detained are subject to serious abuses by security forces including severe beatings, the use of electric shocks, asphyxiation, and sexual abuse.[15]
[13] Ibid.
[14] (Page (iii))
[15] Ibid.
The social, political and economic circumstances of Venezuela have deteriorated so dramatically that the former United Nations Secretary-General referred to the Venezuelan situation as a humanitarian crisis because of severe shortages in food, water, health care and clothing.[16] Despite this, it is reported that Maduro refuses to accept international humanitarian aid.[17] These circumstances, have led to further protests and demonstrations against government policies,[18] that continue to be met by security forces resorting to the excessive use of force and arbitrary detentions.[19]
[16] BBC, “Venezuela envoys disputes UN chief´s humanitarian crisis remarks” at: (page 8)
[19] (page 8 and 9)
The Venezuelan government has also implemented strategies to fight ‘so-called’ criminality known as the Operations for the Liberation of the People, as well as two other security operations (‘Operations’).[20] Leaders, members of opposition parties, social activists, students, academics and human rights defenders have been targeted under these Operations, with senior authorities often publicly accusing them of terrorism, treason and other serious crimes.[21] During the course of Operations, security personnel have conducted random house raids (often in poor neighbourhoods and without judicial warrant) targeted against young men who supposedly fit the profile of so-called criminals. The Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (‘OHCHR’) reports that security personnel have used a disproportionate and unnecessary use of force, at times lethal (including opening fire at close range without justification), during the course of these raids.[22]
[20] (page (ii), (iii), 14)
[21] (page (iv).
[22] (page 17)
The above also highlights that the Applicant, being identified as a young male, student of low socioeconomic status and with no family support given his lack of relatives and family base in Venezuela is objectively at risk of the level of persecution currently ongoing with his Home Country.
(ii) Persecution of those with mental illness
(A) Overview
While the Applicant’s mental illness was not caused by the current and foreseeable ongoing crisis in Venezuela, it has been exasperated by it. The American Psychological Association, when investigating the availability of assistance for those who suffer for mental illness, reported that of those remaining in Venezuela, following a significant level of migration to other nations, there is a growing mental health crisis due to a variety of factors including, the frustration, stress, fear and despair brought on by insecurity, resource shortages and socio-political conflict in the country. In turn “the frequency and intensity of these situations is exhausting Venezuelans’ psychological resources”.[23]
[23] as per psychologist Juan Carlos Canga Linare
It has been reported that “approximately, 85 percent of psychiatric medicines are now unavailable in Venezuela. Dr Robert Lespinasse, a former president of the Venezuelan Society of Psychiatry is reported as stating that “the most elemental things are gone,”[24] when referring to the availability of required medicines and drugs to deal with and manage mental illness.
[24] Rights Watch has published that, 60 percent of routinely stocked general medicines or medical supplies were entirely or partially unavailable in the hospitals, and that a majority of medicines included in the World Health Organization’s Model List of Essential Medicines were not available in pharmacies. Under international human rights law, governments have a core obligation to ensure that these medicines are available and accessible to all without discrimination. The report published on the Human Rights Watch website, when referring to the situation in Venezuela and similar problems in countries around the world states “we have rarely seen access to essential medicines deteriorate as quickly as it has in Venezuela, except in war zones.[25]
[25] individuals suffering from mental illness in the absence of formal medical care, rely on their family members to support them. The Applicant does not have that resources available to him in Venezuela given the departure or impending departure of the majority of his family members. Those family members currently remaining are expected to depart in the immediate future and are of an age where they would be unable to provide any level of sufficient care for the Applicant. In this situation, it is reasonable to believe those individuals suffering mental illness and no access to family support would be institutionalised.
Human Rights Brief has reported that the government cannot afford to import medication from other countries. Resulting in 85 percent of psychiatric medications being unavailable in Venezuela. The Venezuelan government forbids foreign governmental and non-governmental donations of food, medication, and supplies. President Maduro refuses to recognize the country’s health crisis. The shortages have severely affected Venezuela’s state-run psychiatric facilities and the patients that do remain in state hospitals suffer from lack of food and medication, poor hygiene, and other dangerous conditions.[26]
[26] Persecution
The Applicant will either be turned away from the necessary care, taken into an institution or hospitalised, and as such would be subject to a real risk of harm due to the dangerous facilities, lack of care and/ or dangerous conditions of any available care.
It is reported that “Mental institutions have released thousands of patients because they can no longer treat them, according to physicians. The patients still being cared for now suffer in crumbling wards that can barely even feed them.” Importantly, due to the lack of funding and medical care available, “Doctors and nurses fear violent attacks and say they have little choice but to tie their patients to chairs, lock them up or strip them of their clothes to prevent suicides.” [27]
[27] above is illustrative of how, to the Applicant’s membership of this particular social group, exposes him to persecution including, deprivation of liberty and being subjected to harmful restraints.
(b) Summary
As the above demonstrates, persons that oppose, are perceived to oppose, or fit the profile of a person that opposes the current Venezuelan government’s policies are subject to persecution by government officials and security forces. Further, those suffering a mental illness are often institutionalised in facilities that lack basic necessities (including food, clean water and medication) and are subjected to cruel and inhumane treatment and a risk of significant harm by others. Having regard to the current situation in Venezuela, there is a real chance that individuals, such as the Applicant, will suffer persecution in the form of significant harm on the grounds of political opinion or owing to their membership of the social group of having a mental illness.
(c) Subjective fear
The subjective element of ‘well-founded fear’ concerns the state of mind of the Applicant and requires a consideration of whether the fear held by the Applicant is genuine. As noted earlier, the Applicant suffers severe depression, anxiety and suicidal ideation due to trauma suffered as a child. As noted in the report from the Applicant’s psychologist:
(i)the Applicant’s anxiety has been exacerbated and his suicidal thoughts have increased due to his fear of being sent back to Venezuela;
(ii)the Applicant has expressed the view that going back to Venezuela will lead to his death noting that being required to return to Venezuela “makes him see that the only solution would be death”; and
(iii)the Applicant has stated during psychological assessments that he views “suicide as the only way out if he is not allowed to stay in Australia, as going back to Venezuela would mean death anyway.”
The applicant’s suicidal thoughts are as such, subjective fear of harm which can be determined as individually, and collectively, based on the grounds of his political opinion and the state of his mental health i.e. his inclusion within this particular social group.
(d)The Applicant is a [age]-year-old male student from a low socio-economic background who opposes the current Venezuelan government’s policies. As noted above, those fitting this profile are targeted by security forces and government officials as traitors or criminals and often subjected to significant harm, including but not limited to, unlawful and arbitrary detention, inhumane and degrading treatment, unlawful execution and other human rights violations. There is therefore a substantial, as distinct from a remote chance, of the Applicant suffering persecution based on political opinion.[28]
[28] Chan v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379, 389.
Additionally, the Applicant is a member of a particular social group of people suffering a mental illness. The Applicant has reported being unable to effectively deal with normal daily tasks (including decision making and processing information) or to attend to his own basic needs (e.g. eating and sleeping). As noted earlier, owing to a general lack of medication and support services, persons in Venezuela that suffer from mental illness often have to rely on care and support from family members.
The Applicant has advised that most of his family has either left Venezuela or are in the process of fleeing to seek refuge in neighbouring countries or in the United States of America. As the Applicant has no support network in Venezuela or access to medical support or medication, there is a substantial chance the Applicant will be institutionalised on the basis of his mental condition and (for the reasons outlined above including the instances of how the mentally ill are dealt with due to the lack of funding) suffer significant harm.
(e) State protection or protection from another country
Venezuela is in a state of emergency and the situation applies to the entire country. There is no location for the Applicant to safely relocate to within Venezuela to avoid being persecuted. Accordingly, there is a real chance of persecution in all areas of the country.
Under the presidency of Nicolas Maduro, “institutional checks and balances essential to maintaining democracy have been dismantled” and the rule of law is virtually non-existent.[29] On 20 May 2018 Maduro was re-elected as president of Venezuela for another six-year term, in an election that was widely deemed rigged and anti-democratic. This is a strong indication that the corruption, crackdown on dissent and human rights abuses is likely to continue into the foreseeable and long-term future.[30]
The Applicant’s mother currently resides in [Country 1], where she sought refuge [in] April 2017. Further, the Applicant’s aunt is now in [Country 2] and his grandmother is also trying to seek refuge in [Country 1] to be with the Applicant’s mother. The Applicant’s father has residency in [Country 2] but is transient and is currently residing in [Country 3]. The Applicant’s father’s family have sought refuge in [Country 2] except for his grandmother who is in the process of trying to leave Venezuela for [Country 2]. These family connections do not entitle the Applicant to citizenship or residency in any other country.
Thousands of Venezuelans are fleeing the country to seek refuge across the borders because they are of the view that there is nowhere in Venezuela which is safe. The exodus of Venezuelans is starting to overwhelm neighbouring countries forcing them to also declare that they are in a state of emergency due to the influx of additional people. Neighbouring countries are now requiring that Venezuelans have valid travel documents and as a result, it is becoming increasingly difficult to seek refuge across the borders.
The Applicant issued his passport to the Venezuelan Embassy located in Australia in early 2018. At the time, we are instructed that there was a closure of the Embassy and the Applicant has since then been unable to retrieve his renewed passport, or the original version of his previous passport. Accordingly, he is unable to travel to any other country given his lack of travel documentation.
[29] BBC, “Venezuela election: Maduro wins second term amid claims of vote rigging”, at: type="1">
Letter dated 9 July 2018 from [named] Psychology reporting on the assessments, interventions and treatments relating to the applicant since February 2017.
Other departmental records:
3.1.Decision record relating to the delegate’s refusal decision.
3.2.Interview audio file.
3.3.Case file.
3.4.Internal records relating to the applicant.
Application for review
The Tribunal wrote to the applicant inviting him to attend a hearing on 13 July 2023 and to provide pre-hearing submissions.
Prior to the hearing, the applicant provided to the Tribunal confirmation that he intended to participate in the hearing without the assistance of an interpreter, and a request that the Tribunal take witness evidence from a long-term friend who “has witnessed most of my time in Australia and knows what I have been through my life back home”. The applicant did not provide any pre-hearing submissions.
The Hearing
The applicant appeared before the Tribunal at a hearing conducted in person on 13 July 2023, without the assistance of an interpreter. The applicant was unrepresented, however a support person was present throughout the hearing.
The applicant gave evidence, summarised by the Tribunal as follows:
7.1.The applicant, an only child, was born in [year] in Caracas where he lived in a small, poor town[until] he left Venezuela in 2014. He lived with his parents until age [age], when they separated. He went to live with his maternal grandmother for three years, then with his mother and new partner. The applicant’s mother worked in his grandfather’s [business], and his father was [an occupation]. They never had a lot of money, but because they were white, people assumed they were wealthy. Living in the village never felt safe.
7.2.When the applicant was [age], just before his parents separated, they had moved into a new house. Men arrived and locked him and his mother, and later his father, in the bedroom, while they uplifted everything from the house.
7.3.When the applicant was [age], someone posted a photo of him in front of his mother’s house and car on social media, then his mother got calls threatening to kidnap him. He doesn’t know who made the threats, it was probably random, but his mother organised security to protect the house and whenever they travelled anywhere.
7.4.The applicant was too young to be politically involved while in Venezuela, but he had friends who took part in protests against the government and had problems with the authorities as a result. One friend, in 2014, was confronted by police who asked him whether he wanted to be arrested or shot.
7.5.The applicant completed schooling from [age range]. On leaving school, he started studying [a course], but gave up after two months having decided that he needed to get out of Venezuela as the situation was becoming worse.
7.6.He spent a year or so getting his documents processed to come to Australia to study. He doesn’t know why he chose Australia; his gods were telling him it was the place to be.
7.7.The applicant’s mother and maternal grandmother went to [Country 1] five and a half years ago, having been granted humanitarian visas. His father moved to [Country 3] two years ago. The applicant didn’t consider moving elsewhere in South America as the situation is bad in all those countries.
7.8.The applicant came to Australia in January 2014. He planned to study [in] Australia because he was going to be financially supported by the government, however that did not eventuate, so he changed to [another course] (Cert III and IV) because it was more affordable, along with English at [a named] University. He stopped studying and his visa was cancelled in 2017.
7.9.The applicant became mentally unwell while in Australia. Thoughts about the worsening situation in Venezuela were causing him anxiety and panic attacks; he wanted to end his life. The woman who was to give evidence at the hearing (but was unable to attend due to testing positive for COVID-19) recommended that he see a psychologist at the [named] Psychology practice. She was a migration agent who he met through people he studied with. The Tribunal acknowledged the report given by the psychologist. The applicant continued seeing the psychologist until 2022. He has been managing okay since, but the delays with his case and uncertainty about his future have triggered more anxiety for him. He doesn’t know who he is, he hasn’t had the chance to be fully free.
7.10.The applicant acknowledges his delay in applying for protection and being in Australia without a visa during that time. He tried to make a decision about what to do next, but his mental health was debilitating. He eventually went to see a lawyer who advised him to apply for a protection visa. They prepared his application and a supporting submission.
7.11.While many of the applicant’s friends have fled Venezuela and sought protection in other countries, he is in touch with three friends who remain there and are involved in activities, such as protests, opposing the government. If he were there, he would be also because of the government’s violation of human rights, the low wages, poverty, poor quality of life experienced by families, and the high risk of violent crimes.
7.12.Sometime during COVID-19, 2020/2021, the police visited his paternal grandmother’s house about a person with the applicant’s name stealing cars. The applicant is trying to get a copy of the police report to send to the Tribunal. The case has not been solved. He believes his identity was stolen, and he will be on a wanted list and detained at the airport if he returns to Venezuela. The police are corrupt, so he is in danger even though he’s done nothing wrong. The applicant also believes that his maternal grandmother’s identity was stolen after she moved to [Country 1], and her name was implicated in selling [Currency 1].
7.13.The applicant has been active on social media in Venezuela and Australia expressing his views in opposition to the Maduro government.
7.14.The Carnet de la Patria or Homeland Card was introduced after the applicant left Venezuela. It was compulsory for citizens to have the card. If the applicant returned, he would not get a card because to do so would be to contribute to the government’s agenda, which he opposes. This could cause him to be denied services and detained.
7.15.Private hospitals in Venezuela are very expensive. The conditions in the public hospitals are really bad and there is no medicine for many treatments.
7.16.The applicant doesn’t want to think about what it would be like to return to Venezuela because it affects his mental health badly. He fears gun violence and police corruption. Living in Australia has been difficult as his visa does not allow him to work, so he needs to rely on his mother to send him money and his flatmate to provide accommodation. They grow their own vegetables, and cooks meals to repay people. He does not have a partner or children; his pet [dog] is very important to him.
The Tribunal agreed to the applicant submitting further evidence, including the police report and his social media profiles in Venezuela and Australia, within seven days of the hearing.
The applicant advised that the witness was unable to attend the hearing as she had tested positive for COVID-19. The Tribunal called the witness by telephone to take her evidence, however the call went to voicemail on two occasions. The Tribunal invited the applicant to provide a written statement from the witness in the seven day timeframe for submission of the other evidence referred to above.
Post-hearing submissions and evidence
The Tribunal received the following submissions and evidence from the applicant by 28 July 2023:
10.1.Written statement from the witness sent by email dated 18 July 2023:
My name is [name deleted]. I am the Managing Director of [Agency 1]. [Agency 1] is an education and migration consultancy agency.
I met [the applicant] in 2014, when he came to see me regarding his study plans and future student visa.
I have been in contact with [the applicant] since then.
I met his mother when she came to Australia in 2015 to visit him and stayed in contact with her since then.
Since [the applicant] came to Australia the political situation in Venezuela dramatically changed.
When the political situation in Venezuela changed, [the applicant] started suffering from depression, anxiety and commenced to experience panic attacks.
I was really worried about his mental health which started to deteriorate dramatically, and I suggested to him to go and see a psychologist which he did. He attended appointments with the psychologist for 6 months. Unfortunately, due to his financial situation he was not able to continue with the sessions.
There were times when he had very strong suicidal idealization thoughts. During these times, I was in constant contact with him and many times he stayed over my house.
When his mother left Australia, she asked me to look after [the applicant] as if it was my own and I have been doing that since then.
[The applicant] knows my family and my family is also aware of how [the applicant’s] mental health deteriorated as a result of living in constant fear of having to go back to Venezuela.
At one stage he was hardly eating and lost lots of weight. He looked anorexic and was unable to sleep.
Sleep disturbance is something he still suffers from due to the anxiety that his uncertain situation generates.
In 2016 his mother left Venezuela and seeked refuge in [Country 1].
When she left Venezuela she left her house, car, and business behind, as all it mattered to her was to be able to leave Venezuela when she was still in time.
In 2017, she applied for an humanitarian asylum visa in [Country 1] and her application was accepted and is already approved.
In 2018, his father left Venezuela and seeked refuge in [Country 3] where he is currently living.
The mere fact that his parents left Venezuela is enough reason for [the applicant] not to be able to go back to Venezuela as he will suffer the consequences of their departure and will be thoroughly interrogated and persecuted.
Also in 2020, his identity was stolen, and his name was used to do illegal activities. His grandmother identity was also stolen.
Without a doubt I believe [the applicant] has reasons to fear for his life if he goes back to Venezuela
10.2.Written statement from the applicant sent by email dated 19 July 2023:
On my hearing last week, I was asked to properly send you an email describing how I would feel if I had to go back home.
The mere thought of thinking about the possibility to go back home, triggers panic attacks and I become unable to eat or sleep properly.
Just the thought of the possibility of having to go back to Venezuela, make me shake all over, I get the shakes, sweaty hands and dry mouth and I feel like I am going to faint.
It also triggers suicidal idealization thoughts.
My parents are both living in other countries. Both left Venezuela due to the political situation which unfolded after I left Venezuela. My mother lives in [Country 1] and my father in [Country 3].My mother seeked refuge in [Country 1] and currently have a humanitarian asylum visa.
Since I left my identity was stolen and used to do illegal activities.
I also participated in a protest rally in [City 1, Australia] and my face appears in many photos,.
The Venezuelan government is aware of the protest and had access to all the photos, making me a target.
If I am forced to go back to Venezuela, I will be interrogated, persecuted, and detained and judged without a trial.In Venezuela they still use torture techniques when they interrogate people and many people disappear without a trace.
The fact that both my parents left Venezuela make me a target to be persecuted as well as what happened with my identity and my involvement at the [City 1, Australia] Protest Rally.
I honestly believe that I will be better off dead that having to go back to Venezuela.
[Social media] video of the anti-Venezuelan government demonstration held in [City 1, Australia] [in] 2014, and various photographs of the same demonstration in which the applicant is circled in red.
Police records in Spanish naming the applicant (extension of time granted by the Tribunal to enable English translation).
Four translated police records issued by the National Directorate for Vehicle Investigations National Division Against Vehicle Theft naming the applicant as an alleged perpetrator, citing his Venezuelan national ID number, and summoning him to present himself to the investigations body [in] May 2020 and [in] May 2020 in relation to a vehicle robbery.
Country information
The Australian Government Department of Home Affairs Common Claims for Venezuela dated 5 November 2021 provides (inter alia) that:
14.1.Political opinion
Rival Presidential claimants Nicolás Maduro and Juan Guaidó have been locked in a power struggle since Guaidó proclaimed himself acting president on 23 January 2019 amid fierce protests over economic issues.[31] The United States (US) Department of State refers to Maduro’s administration as ‘the illegitimate Maduro regime’,[32] a description ‘not intended to indicate that the United States considers such entity a government’.[33] The most significant human rights issues in Venezuela are unlawful or arbitrary killings, including extrajudicial killings by security forces including government-sponsored colectivos, torture by security forces, detention and imprisonment of activists with political aims, harsh and life-threatening prison conditions, serious problems with the independence of the judiciary, and unlawful interference with privacy.[34]
[31] ‘Pope fears ‘bloodbath’ in Venezuela’, AFP [Agence France-Presse], 28 January 2019, 20190129090848
[32] 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020 - Venezuela', Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, United States Department of State, 30 March 2021, pp.1-2 Executive Summary, et seq., 20210331125015
[33] ‘2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Venezuela’, Office of International Religious Freedom, United States Department of State, 12 May 2021, p.1 [Introduction]., 20210513110848
[34] ‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020 - Venezuela', Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, United States Department of State, 30 March 2021, p.2 Executive Summary, 20210331125015
The UN Human Rights Council, in a 27 September 2019 resolution, established an independent international fact-finding mission on Venezuela ‘to investigate extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions and torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment since 2014 with a view to ensuring full accountability for perpetrators and justice for victims’. The mission reported its findings to the Human Rights Council in September 2020 in two reports (summary and detailed).[35] It reported that in 110 cases it investigated of state repression of government opponents, the principal targets were often ‘social activists and political leaders at the forefront of protests, opposition politicians and military dissidents accused of rebellion, plotting coups or other conspiracies’.[36]
[35] ‘Report of the independent international fact-finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Advance Unedited Version’ (A/HRC/45/33), Independent international fact-finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, [United Nations] Human Rights Council, 15 September 2020, p.2 paragraphs 1 & 2, 20201102104217; 'Detailed findings of the independent international fact finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (A/HRC/45/CRP.11)', [Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,], United Nations Human Rights Council, 15 September 2020, p.2 paragraphs 1 & 3, 20200917074633
[36] ‘Report of the independent international fact-finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Advance Unedited Version’ (A/HRC/45/33), Independent international fact-finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, [United Nations] Human Rights Council, 15 September 2020, p.4 paragraph 22, 20201102104217; 'Detailed findings of the independent international fact finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (A/HRC/45/CRP.11)', [Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,], United Nations Human Rights Council, 15 September 2020, p.66 paragraph 243, 20200917074633. There are detailed studies of 19 (of the 110 investigated) cases in the full report ‘Details of the security framework and the security institutions are at 'Detailed findings of the independent international fact finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (A/HRC/45/CRP.11)', [Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,], United Nations Human Rights Council, 15 September 2020, pp.67- 196 paragraphs 246-997, 20200917074633.
The mission reported:
The Mission has reasonable grounds to believe that most of the violations and crimes documented in this report were committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack directed against a civilian population, with knowledge of the attack, pursuant to or in furtherance of two distinct State policies: Firstly, there was a policy to silence, discourage and quash opposition to the Government of President Maduro, including by targeting individuals who, through various means, demonstrated their disagreement with the Government, or were perceived as being against the Government, as well as their relatives and friends who were targeted for being associated with them. Secondly, there was a policy to combat crime, including by eliminating individuals perceived as “criminals” through extrajudicial execution.
… The Mission has reasonable grounds to believe that both the President and the Ministers of People’s Power for Interior Relations, Justice and Peace and for Defence, ordered or contributed to the commission of the crimes documented in this report, and having the effective ability to do so, failed to take preventive and repressive measures. …[37]
[37] ‘Report of the independent international fact-finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Advance Unedited Version’ (A/HRC/45/33), Independent international fact-finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, [United Nations] Human Rights Council, 15 September 2020, pp.18 & 19 paragraphs 160 & 164, 20201102104217. This is expanded upon at 'Detailed findings of the independent international fact finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (A/HRC/45/CRP.11)', [Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,], United Nations Human Rights Council, 15 September 2020, pp.398-402 paragraphs 2086-2105, 20200917074633.
14.2.Other political opponents of the government
Widespread politically-motivated detentions occur in Venezuela. The Maduro government’s legitimacy is questioned by broad sectors of society.[38] According to FP, more than 12,800 people were arrested from 2014 (in a January 2019 report) in connection with anti-government protests;[39] and at least 15,045 people were detained for political reasons between January 2014 and May 2019; the majority in the context of demonstrations.[40] FP verified 15,688 arrests for political purposes in 2014-2020, 1745 of them of women.[41] 8900 had been conditionally released as of November 2019, but remained subject to criminal prosecution.[42] After over a year of stonewalling AN,[43] on 30 March 2017 TSJ annulled AN’s constitutional functions, threatened to abolish parliamentary immunity, and assumed significant control over social, economic, legal, civil, and military policies. The TSJ action triggered large-scale street spring and summer protests. Security forces and colectivos used force, at times excessively, against protesters. Credible NGOs reported indiscriminate household raids, arbitrary arrests and use of torture, to deter protest. The government arrested thousands and tried hundreds of civilians in military tribunals.[44] It is estimated that 133 people were killed, 4000 were injured, and more than 5000 were arbitrarily detained during the April-July 2017 protests, IACHR reported in December 2017.[45] FP reported 5462 protest-related cases of arbitrary detention from April to December 2017.[46] Human Rights Watch reported that while no massive demonstrations occurred in 2018, security forces continued to repress spontaneous protests and carried out targeted arbitrary arrests of opponents or perceived opponents.[47] FP reported that 570 people were arbitrarily detained from August 2017 to April 2018 in the District Capital and 20 states.[48] FP reported 498 cases of arbitrary detention in 2018 to 15 November.[49]
[38] 'Religious Freedom in the World. Report 2021. Venezuela', Aid to the Church in Need (ACN), [20 April 2021,] p.[3], 20210423083901
[39] ‘Report: Military officers, relatives tortured in Venezuela’, Associated Press (AP), Lugo L A, 9 January 2019, 20200204083232. It has been contrastingly stated ‘From 1 January 2014 to 15 July 2020, the NGO Foro Penal registered 3,479 cases of politically motivated detention of which 902 (26 per cent) were selective detentions (with the remainder taking place in the context of protests).’: ‘Report of the independent international fact-finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Advance Unedited Version’ (A/HRC/45/33), Independent international fact-finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, [United Nations] Human Rights Council, 15 September 2020, p.4 paragraph 25, 20201102104217; 'Detailed findings of the independent international fact finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (A/HRC/45/CRP.11)', [Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,], United Nations Human Rights Council, 15 September 2020, p.67 paragraph 246, 20200917074633.
[40] Human rights situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of Human rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela‘ (A/HRC/41/18), [United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,] United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, 5 July 2019, p.8 paragraphs 41, 20190708154125
[41] ‘Women Victims of Political Repression in Venezuela. Year 2020’, Foro Penal, [23 February 2021,] p.4, 20210604094142
[42] 'World Report 2020. Events of 2019', Human Rights Watch (HRW), 14 January 2020, pp.626-627, 20200115082903, which states ‘The Penal Forum counts more than 15,000 people arrested since 2014 in connection with protests, including demonstrators, bystanders, and people taken from their homes without warrants.’
[43] ‘Freedom in the World 2018. Venezuela Profile’, Freedom House, Accessed 2 February 2018, p.[3] & [2], NGED867A64
[44] ’Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017. Venezuela’, United States Department of State. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, pp.1-2, Executive Summary, 20 April 2018, OGD95BE927489
[45] ‘Democratic Institutions, the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Venezuela. Country Report’, Inter-American Commission On Human Rights, on OAS Organization of American States website, 31 December 2017, p.110 paragraph 193 (detailed at pp.128-141 paragraphs 237-256), CISEDB50AD9024
[46] ‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 - Venezuela’, United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 13 March 2019, p.10 Section 1.d, 20190314114120
[47] ‘Human Rights Watch World Report 2019’, Human Rights Watch, 17 January 2019, p.647, 20190118091502.
[48] ‘Human Rights Violations in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela: a downward spiral with no end in sight. Report by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’, [United Nations. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,] June 2018 [document created 21/6/2018], p.23, CIS7B839411554
[49] ‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 - Venezuela’, United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 13 March 2019, p.10 Section 1.d, 20190314114120
A UN human rights spokesman said more than 850 people were detained between 21 and 26 January, including 696 on 23 January, including children;[50] Amnesty International said more than 900 people were detained during protests in the five days, 770 of them in a single day.[51] According to FP, 527 people were detained for political motives in 2018 and 2019 from January to May 2019,[52] 2169 people were arbitrarily detained from January to 31 August 2019,[53] and by October 2019 2182 people had been arbitrarily detained.[54] FP reported that 793 people were arbitrarily deprived of their liberty at 31 May 2019,[55] at which date, since January 2014, 1437 people had been released unconditionally, 8598 had been conditionally released and were facing lengthy criminal proceedings, and 793 remained arbitrarily deprived of their liberty.
[50] ’More than 40 dead, 850 detained in Venezuela violence, U.N. says’, Reuters, 29 January 2019, 20190130141714
[51] ‘Human Rights in the Americas. 2019 Annual Report’ (AMR 01/1353/2020), Amnesty International, 2019 [sic for 27 February 2020], p.87, 20200228095304
[52] Human rights situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of Human rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela‘ (A/HRC/41/18), [United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,] United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, 5 July 2019, p.8 paragraphs 41, 20190708154125
[53] ‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2019 - Venezuela’, United States Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 11 March 2020, p.9 Section 1.e, 20200312111107
[54] ‘Human Rights in the Americas. 2019 Annual Report’ (AMR 01/1353/2020), Amnesty International, 2019 [sic for 27 February 2020], p.87, 20200228095304
[55] Human rights situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of Human rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela‘ (A/HRC/41/18), [United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,] United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, 5 July 2019, p.8 paragraphs 41, 20190708154125
Others had been released without having been brought before a judge.[56] On 16 and 21 November 2019, national protests organised by opposition members, students and government supporters were met by the deployment of considerable security forces who prevented some protestors from gathering and made more than 20 arrests. A month later at least five of these people (in Lara state) were still detained.[57] The independent international fact-finding mission in September 2020 reported that, in cases it investigated of repression of government opponents, the State’s principal targets commonly included ‘social activists and political leaders at the forefront of protests’.[58] FP reported 413 ‘politically motivated’ arbitrary arrests at October 2020; these increased following the declaration of a state of emergency in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020.[59] The fact-finding mission in March 2021 reported that, since its September 2020 report, civil society organisations had recorded over 100 cases of detentions in protests.[60]
[56] Human rights situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of Human rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela‘ (A/HRC/41/18), [United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,] United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, 5 July 2019, p.8 paragraphs 41, 20190708154125
[57] ‘Venezuela: High Commissioner Bachelet details plans for new human rights assistance’, Bachelet M, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 18 December 2019, 20191219135917
[58] Commissioner for Human Rights, 18 December 2019, 20191219135917 77 ‘Report of the independent international fact-finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Advance Unedited Version’ (A/HRC/45/33), Independent international fact-finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, [United Nations] Human Rights Council, 15 September 2020, p.4 paragraph 22, 20201102104217; 'Detailed findings of the independent international fact finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (A/HRC/45/CRP.11)', [Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,], United Nations Human Rights Council, 15 September 2020, p.66 paragraph 243, 20200917074633. There are detailed studies of 19 (of the 110 investigated) cases in the full report ‘Details of the security framework and the security institutions are at 'Detailed findings of the independent international fact finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (A/HRC/45/CRP.11)', [Independent International Fact[58]Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,], United Nations Human Rights Council, 15 September 2020, pp.68- 196 paragraphs 248-997, 20200917074633.
[59] 'Amnesty International Report 2020/21. The State of the World’s Human Rights’, Amnesty International, 6 April 2021, pp.390- 395 ‘Venezuela’ at 390, 20210407093348
[60] ‘Statement by Marta Valiñas, Chairperson of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, at the 46th session of the Human Rights Council’, Valiñas M, United Nations Human Rights Council, 10 March 2021, 20210519113109
Politically-motivated detentions without a warrant occur in Venezuela. Amnesty International reported in April 2017 that politically-motivated detentions had taken place without a warrant under broad Criminal Code provisions such as “treason against the fatherland,” “terrorism or theft of military effects” and “rebellion”, which entail heavy sentences for which pre-trial detention is common.[61] A commentator claimed in January 2020 that ‘They’re accused of terrorism, financing terrorism and manufacturing explosives’, but ‘are basically behind bars for protesting against Maduro’.[62]
[61] 'Silenced by Force. Politically-Motivated Arbitrary Detentions in Venezuela', Amnesty International, 26 April 2017, p.12, CISEDB50AD8611
[62] 'How The Maduro Regime Uses Political Prisoners', Sarmiento M, Caracas Chronicles, 22 January 2020, 20200219145320
The Venezuelan authorities hold hundreds of political prisoners. Freedom House reported that the number of political prisoners increased from 103 at end 2016 to over 600 in July 2017, and that most of the 600 were released later in the year.[63] FP reported 317 political prisoners held at 19 November 2017 (down from 620 at 31 July 2017).[64] Opposition politicians and human rights NGOs attributed the reduction largely to the significant decrease in large-scale protest following the July 2017 ANC elections.[65] Latin American Herald Tribune news website reported in May 2018 338 political prisoners in Venezuela according to FP and the Organization of American States (OAS).[66] After UNHCHR Bachelet demanded the release of political prisoners in July 2019, 300 people were freed to September; as were prisoners accused of aggression, fraud, and homicide.[67] FP reported 388 political prisoners at 30 December 2019,[68] and 351 political prisoners at 30 December 2020[69] and 26 female political prisoners at 31 December 2020, including two military officials; 12 of them were under house arrest and 14 in detention centres, including three military facilities.[70] On 31 August 2020 the government announced the conditional “pardon” of 110 political prisoners, rescindable if they “return[ed] to any act of terrorism, violence, or coup mongering”, as determined by the authorities. According to FP only 50 were in custody; 23 had been released and 37 were AN deputies in exile, in foreign embassy asylum in Caracas, or facing prosecution. Since most were not convicted or even charged, their matters were dismissed rather than pardoned.[71]
[63] ‘Freedom in the World 2018. Venezuela Profile’, Freedom House, Accessed 2 February 2018, pp.[8]-[9], NGED867A64
[64] ‘Democratic Institutions, the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Venezuela. Country Report’, Inter-American Commission On Human Rights, on OAS Organization of American States website, 31 December 2017, p.95 paragraph 165, CISEDB50AD9024
[65] ‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 - Venezuela’, United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 13 March 2019, p.10 Section 1.d, 20190314114120
[66] ‘After Fraudulent Election, Venezuela President Sworn in Before Illegitimate Constituent Assembly’, Latin American Herald Tribune, 24 May 2018, CXBB8A1DA28011
[67] 'How The Maduro Regime Uses Political Prisoners', Sarmiento M, Caracas Chronicles, 22 January 2020, 20200219145320
[68] 'Venezuelan Photojournalist Released After 16 Months in Military Prison', Cobus P, Voice of America (VOA), 7 January 2020, 20200109081302; 'How The Maduro Regime Uses Political Prisoners', Sarmiento M, Caracas Chronicles, 22 January 2020, 20200219145320. FP ‘considered that 388 people were imprisoned for political reasons, including 18 women and 370 men’ in 2019: ‘Human Rights in the Americas. 2019 Annual Report’ (AMR 01/1353/2020), Amnesty International, 2019 [sic for 27 February 2020], p.87, 20200228095304. FP in November 2019 reported ‘nearly 400’ political prisoners: 'World Report 2020. Events of 2019', Human Rights Watch (HRW), 14 January 2020, p.626, 20200115082903; 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020 - Venezuela', Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, United States Department of State, 30 March 2021, p.13 Section 1.e, 20210331125015
[69] ‘Freedom in the World 2021 - Venezuela', Freedom House, 3 March 2021, section B1, 20210304160658; 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020 - Venezuela', Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, United States Department of State, 30 March 2021, p.13 Section 1.e, 20210331125015. Cf. ‘As of September 30, prisons and intelligence headquarters held 348 political prisoners, according to the Penal Forum’: 'World Report 2021. Events of 2020', Human Rights Watch, 13 January 2021, pp.732-742 ‘Venezuela’ at 733, 20210114072851
[70] ‘Women Victims of Political Repression in Venezuela. Year 2020’, Foro Penal, [23 February 2021,] p.3, 20210604094142
[71] 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020 - Venezuela', Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, United States Department of State, 30 March 2021, pp.13-14 Section 1.e, 20210331125015. Cf. 'World Report 2021. Events of 2020', Human Rights Watch, 13 January 2021, pp.732-742 ‘Venezuela’ at 733, 20210114072851
The independent international fact-finding mission in March 2021 reported that since its September 2020 report, according to civil society organisations 70-odd political prisoners had been released from detention with non-custodial measures.[72] A mid-2021 European Union report noted that ‘persecution of political opponents’ continued in 2020, FP reporting a ‘steady’ 350 to 400 political prisoners.[73]
[72] ‘Statement by Marta Valiñas, Chairperson of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, at the 46th session of the Human Rights Council’, Valiñas M, United Nations Human Rights Council, 10 March 2021, 20210519113109
[73] ‘EU Annual Report On Human Rights And Democracy In The World 2020 Country Updates’, [European Union,] [21 June 2021,] on European External Action Service (EEAS) website, p.304, 20210827094726
Venezuelan authorities arbitrarily detain people for extended periods without criminal charges.[74] The US Department of State reported of the year 2017 and since that authorities arbitrarily detained people, including foreign citizens, for extended periods without criminal charges; and that FP and other local NGOs had noted at least 2000 open cases of arbitrary detention, yet authorities rarely granted detainees formal means to present petitions, and delayed proceedings challenging detentions, stretching trials for years.[75] Amnesty International reported in February 2020 that there were frequent reports of enforced disappearances in which authorities confirmed that people had been detained, but families and lawyers were unable to discover their fate or whereabouts.[76] FP reported 281 cases of arbitrary detention from 1 January to 31 July 2020.[77]
[74] 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2019 - Venezuela', Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, United States Department of State, 11 March 2020, p.8 Section 1.d, 20200312111107; 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020 - Venezuela', Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, United States Department of State, 30 March 2021, p.9 Section 1.d, 20210331125015
[75] ‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 - Venezuela’, United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 13 March 2019, pp.7 & 10 Section 1.d, 20190314114120; 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2019 - Venezuela', Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, United States Department of State, 11 March 2020, p.8 Section 1.d, 20200312111107; 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020 - Venezuela', Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, United States Department of State, 30 March 2021, p.9 Section 1.d, 20210331125015
[76] ‘Human Rights in the Americas. 2019 Annual Report’ (AMR 01/1353/2020), Amnesty International, 2019 [sic for 27 February 2020], p.87, 20200228095304
[77] ‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020 - Venezuela', Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, United States Department of State, 30 March 2021, p.10 Section 1.c, 20210331125015
Venezuelan authorities have disregarded judicial release warrants. Amnesty International reported in February 2020 that judicial release warrants were frequently disregarded.[78] In December 2017, 44 people arbitrarily detained for what local NGOs considered to have been political reasons were released with alternative restrictions on their freedom.[79] In January 2020 FP said that not certifying political prisoner lists allows authorities to announce the “release” of people who are no longer detained, inflating reported release sizes.[80] On 6 January 2020 the National Roundtable for Peaceful Dialogue - of the ruling PSUV, a number of minority opposition parties (the others refused to take part), and civil leaders including the Catholic Church - announced the release of 14 jailed opposition figures. The majority had been arrested during the 2014 and 2017 anti-government street protests.[81] However, three were members of the Alirio Cara Cortá criminal gang, imprisoned in June 2019 for extortion and kidnapping, Human rights activist Marino Alvarado said the regime had taken the opportunity to release common criminals with political prisoners.[82]
[78] ‘Human Rights in the Americas. 2019 Annual Report’ (AMR 01/1353/2020), Amnesty International, 2019 [sic for 27 February 2020], p.87, 20200228095304
[79] ‘Amnesty International Report 2017-18’, Amnesty International, 22 February 2018, pp.393-397 ‘Venezuela’ at pp.394-395, NGED867A612
[80] 'How The Maduro Regime Uses Political Prisoners', Sarmiento M, Caracas Chronicles, 22 January 2020, 20200219145320
[81] 'Venezuelan Government and Opposition Fraction Announce Release of 14 ‘Political Prisoners’', Dobson P, Venezuelanalysis.com, 6 January 2020, 20200109101625
[82] 'How The Maduro Regime Uses Political Prisoners', Sarmiento M, Caracas Chronicles, 22 January 2020, 20200219145320
UNHCHR Bachelet stated in September 2019 that the authorities had released 83 people (probably since July), including those whose detention was considered to be arbitrary by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, but other people whose cases had been pointed out by her Office were still in detention, and Judge Afiuni and journalist Braulio Jatar had obtained only conditional releases.[83] In the last quarter of 2019, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) documented, and submitted for consideration to the inter-institutional Coordination Committee, 118 cases of detained people which it requested to be urgently addressed due to health reasons, judicial delays, non-execution of judicial release orders, and/or continued detention despite completion of their sentences.[84] The independent international fact-finding mission in March 2021 reported that criminal proceedings were ongoing in over two-thirds of the 110 cases of arbitrary detention against political and military dissidents that it investigated for its September 2020 report.[85]
[83] 'Oral Update on the Human Rights Situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela', Bachelet M, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 9 September 2019, 20190910132410
[84] ‘Venezuela: High Commissioner Bachelet details plans for new human rights assistance’, Bachelet M, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 18 December 2019, 20191219135917
[85] ‘Statement by Marta Valiñas, Chairperson of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, at the 46th session of the Human Rights Council’, Valiñas M, United Nations Human Rights Council, 10 March 2021, 20210519113109
Venezuelan authorities have subjected political detainees and prisoners to mistreatment, going as far as torture. The director of the Fundación para el Debido Proceso (Foundation for Due Process), Jackeline Sandoval de Guevara, stated in January 2020 that, though no prisoners are guaranteed due process, common criminals receive better treatment than political prisoners, who are subjected to ill-treatment including torture, both in common and military prisons.[86]
[86] 'How The Maduro Regime Uses Political Prisoners', Sarmiento M, Caracas Chronicles, 22 January 2020, 20200219145320
The independent international fact-finding mission reported in September 2020 that it had investigated 33 cases in which it found reasonable grounds to believe that SEBIN ‘arbitrarily arrested, detained and/or tortured or ill-treated people for political motives’,[87] and 77 cases in which DGCIM ‘arrested, detained and tortured current and former military officials and civilians associated with them’.[88] Cases it reviewed suggested that DGCIM agents’ levels of violence increased markedly from 2017.[89]
[87] ‘Report of the independent international fact-finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Advance Unedited Version’ (A/HRC/45/33), Independent international fact-finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, [United Nations] Human Rights Council, 15 September 2020, p.6 paragraph 38, 20201102104217; 'Detailed findings of the independent international fact finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (A/HRC/45/CRP.11)', [Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,], United Nations Human Rights Council, 15 September 2020, p.75 paragraph 265, 20200917074633. There are detailed studies of 13 (of the 33 investigated) cases in ‘Details of the security framework and the security institutions are at ‘Report of the independent international fact-finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Advance Unedited Version’ (A/HRC/45/33), Independent international fact[87]finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, [United Nations] Human Rights Council, 15 September 2020, pp.6-7 paragraphs 37-54, 20201102104217; and 'Detailed findings of the independent international fact finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (A/HRC/45/CRP.11)', [Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,], United Nations Human Rights Council, 15 September 2020, pp.75-83 paragraphs 265-305, 20200917074633
[88] ‘Report of the independent international fact-finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Advance Unedited Version’ (A/HRC/45/33), Independent international fact-finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, [United Nations] Human Rights Council, 15 September 2020, p.7 paragraph 56, 20201102104217; 'Detailed findings of the independent international fact finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (A/HRC/45/CRP.11)', [Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,], United Nations Human Rights Council, 15 September 2020, p.83 paragraph 306, 20200917074633. There are detailed studies of 8 (of the 77 investigated) cases in ‘Details of the security framework and the security institutions are at ‘Report of the independent international fact-finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Advance Unedited Version’ (A/HRC/45/33), Independent international fact-finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, [United Nations] Human Rights Council, 15 September 2020, pp7-8 paragraphs 55-70, 20201102104217; and 'Detailed findings of the independent international fact finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (A/HRC/45/CRP.11)', [Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,], United Nations Human Rights Council, 15 September 2020, pp.83-90 paragraphs 306-347, 20200917074633.
[89] ‘Report of the independent international fact-finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Advance Unedited Version’ (A/HRC/45/33), Independent international fact-finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, [United Nations] Human Rights Council, 15 September 2020, p.8 paragraph 64, 20201102104217.
14.3.Economic conditions
Most households in Venezuela are in income poverty, and unable to meet the cost of a basic food basket. Venezuela's 2017 GDP per capita has been variously estimated, including at USD 6850.10,[90] USD 12,400[91] and USD 13,800.[92] While the official national unemployment rate in 2017 was 8.1 per cent,[93] others estimated it to be 26.4 per cent.[94] The July 2020 National Survey on Living Conditions (ENCOVI) reported that 96 per cent of households in Venezuela were in income poverty and 79 per cent in extreme income poverty and unable to purchase the basic food basket.[95]
ENCOVI, a study by three Venezuelan universities, had found that in 2017 poverty affected 87 per cent of the population and extreme poverty 61.2 per cent (extreme poverty had affected 23.6 per cent in 2014).[96] In September 2019 the minimum salary equated to USD 2 per month, in comparison with USD 7 in June, affecting the ability to purchase basic foods, medicine, and other essential goods. A family needed the equivalent of 41 minimum monthly salaries to cover the basic food basket. The de facto dollarisation in various sectors of the economy exacerbated inequalities.[97] The Centre for Documentation and Social Analysis of the Venezuelan Federation of Teachers (CENDAS-FVM) reported in August 2020 that the basic family food basket cost was the equivalent of 184 minimum monthly salaries.[98] By an August 2020 survey of 420 families, a family of five needed the equivalent of 116 minimum monthly salaries to cover the basic food basket, and 73 per cent of the families did not have enough food.[99]
By the 2020-2021 ENCOVI, based on February to April 2021 questionnaires by 17,402 families in 14,000 households in 21 of the 23 states, released on 29 September 2021, 94.5 per cent of Venezuelans live in poverty, a figure unmatched elsewhere in the region, and 76.6 per cent live in extreme poverty, up from 67.7 per cent the previous year. The report attributed the increase both to the COVID-19 pandemic and to chronic fuel shortages, a major obstacle to employment.[100] The 2020-2021 ENCOVI report estimated that GDP contracted 74 per cent from 2014 to 2020.[101]
14.4.Welfare and social services
The government responded to mid-2016 shortages, particularly of food, which led to rioting and looting in a number of cities, by replacing a large part of the retail food distribution network with Local Supply and Production Committees (Comités Locales de Abastecimiento y Producción[102](CLAPs), using both the military and political organisations affiliated to the PSUV. The private sector was legally obliged to sell 50 per cent of its production to the government for distribution through this network. The scheme reduced the number and length of queues, a frequent trigger for riots, and enabled the government to use food as a political weapon, favouring its supporters and the politically docile.[103] The Documentation and Analysis Centre for Workers reported that in December 2017 the basket of consumer goods for a family of five, which is used to define the consumer price index, was 60 times the minimum wage, representing a 2123 per cent increase since November 2016. The government failed to acknowledge the worsening food shortage caused by the economic and social crises. In its Global Report on Food Crises 2017, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization stated that it lacked reliable official data on Venezuela and that the deepening of the critical economic situation could lead to a greater absence of consumer goods such as food and medical supplies.[104] According to Reuters news agency in 2018, life in Venezuela’s poor barrios (neighbourhoods) ‘revolves around the CLAP boxes’, received, according to the government, by six million families: ‘Stamped with the faces of Maduro and Chavez, the CLAP boxes usually contain rice, pasta, grains, cooking oil, powdered milk, canned tuna and other basic goods. Recipients pay 25,000 bolivars per box, or about [US]$0.12 at the black market rate. That is a godsend in a country where the minimum monthly wage is less than $2 at that rate - and would be swallowed up by two boxes of eggs or a small tin of powdered milk.’ Recipients told Reuters the boxes often arrived half-full and only every few months, and even more sporadically outside of the capital Caracas.[105] Amnesty International stated that food distribution systems, such as CLAP’s, in 2020 ‘continued to fail to meet nutritional needs and operated according to politically discriminatory criteria’.[106]
President Maduro introduced the Carnet de la Patria (Homeland Card,[107] or Fatherland Card[108]) on 29 December 2016 as an electronic card which would initially serve to ration and distribute the food sold by the CLAP system and social missions [[109]].[110] There was immediate adverse reaction that the government was preparing to increase social control and retaliation against dissent.[111] Opposition political leaders said the card was a means to collect information to limit political activism.[112] The Carnet de la Patria program became by 2020 the Sistema Patria (Fatherland System,[113] or Homeland System[114]) web platform through which Venezuelans could register personal and family data to receive social benefits.[115] Citizens registered with the platform have received bonus public salaries, extra state benefits and priority COVID-19 vaccinations.[116] Freedom House reported in October 2020 that, in ‘the absence of personal data protection legislation, the destination, storage, and ultimate purpose of the government’s collection of information remains unknown’.[117] Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs cited a February 2020 ‘confidential source’ saying that while they did not know ‘to what extent’ voting behaviour could be assessed by using the Homeland Card, ‘people who have voted for the opposition have been threatened and have experienced difficulties in obtaining social services’.[118]
14.5.State protection
Venezuela is formally a multiparty constitutional republic, but for over a decade political power has been concentrated in a single party with an increasingly authoritarian executive exercising significant control over the legislative, judicial, citizens’, and electoral branches of government.[119]
…No independent government institutions remain to check executive power.[120] The government stripped power from the opposition-led legislature and represses dissent through often-violent crackdowns on street protests, jailing opponents and, in violation of international law, prosecuting more than 840 civilians in military courts.[121] The outgoing PSUV-controlled legislature in late 2015 ‘stacked’ the TSJ with its own appointees, and the ANC subsequently installed over a dozen regime loyalists on the TSJ. High courts generally do not rule against the government.[122] Supreme Court members have publicly rejected the separation of powers principle and have pledged to advance the government’s political agenda, and the Court has consistently upheld abusive practices.[123] In the World Justice Project (WJP) Rule of Law Index 2017–2018, based on surveys of households and experts, Venezuela (in which 1000 respondents were surveyed in 2016) ranked 113th of 113 countries.[124]
[90] ‘The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela [fact sheet]’, Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), [December 2017], [‘updated biannually; June and December’] [document created 14/12/2017], CISEDB50AD8623
[91] '[The World Factbook.] Venezuela', [United States.] Central Intelligence Agency, 'Page last updated on May 08, 2018', at heading ‘Economy:: VENEZUELA’, CIS7B839411036
[92] ‘Freedom in the World 2018. Venezuela Profile’, Freedom House, Accessed 2 February 2018, p.[1], NGED867A64
[93] ‘Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modelled ILO estimate)’ n.d., The World Bank, Accessed 29 May 2017, CISEDB50AD4306
[94] '[The World Factbook.] Venezuela', [United States.] Central Intelligence Agency, 'Page last updated on May 08, 2018', at heading ‘Economy:: VENEZUELA’, CIS7B839411036
[95] Amnesty International Report 2020/21. The State of the World’s Human Rights’, Amnesty International, 6 April 2021, pp.390-395 ‘Venezuela’ at 394, 20210407093348; ‘Venezuela: Human rights lose whilst impunity prevails: Amnesty International submission for the UN Universal Periodic Review, 40th session of the UPR working group, January 2022' (AMR 53/4488/2021), Amnesty International, 21 July 2021, p.10 including footnotes 37 & 38, 20210729080757
[96] ‘Human Rights Violations in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela: a downward spiral with no end in sight. Report by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights', Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), June 2018 [document created 21/6/2018], p.3, CIS7B839411554. Stated as 61 per cent in ‘A Double-Edged Sword. Protection Risks Facing Venezuelan Children During the COVID-19 Pandemic’, World Vision, 2020 [released 28 October 2020], pp.11 & 10, 20201104071650.
[97] ‘Oral Update on the Human Rights Situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela’, Bachelet M, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 9 September 2019, 20190910132410
[98] 'Amnesty International Report 2020/21. The State of the World’s Human Rights’, Amnesty International, 6 April 2021, pp.390-395 ‘Venezuela’ at 394, 20210407093348; ‘Venezuela: Human rights lose whilst impunity prevails: Amnesty International submission for the UN Universal Periodic Review, 40th session of the UPR working group, January 2022' (AMR 53/4488/2021), Amnesty International, 21 July 2021, p.10 including footnote 35 & p.37 at recommendation 133.223, 20210729080757
[99] ‘A Double-Edged Sword. Protection Risks Facing Venezuelan Children During the COVID-19 Pandemic’, World Vision, 2020 [released 28 October 2020], pp.13 & 10, 20201104071650. Cf. ‘World Vision, a global Christian humanitarian organization, conducted a survey of 420 households in Caracas and the neighboring state of Miranda in August 2020 to determine how the pandemic had affected the risks faced by children. Respondents were those aged 30 and over, of which 71% were women. "The problems that put children at greater risk during the pandemic are associated with food shortages, increased child labor (...) domestic violence and neglect," World Vision said in the study, which was released in November.’: 'Pandemic's hard realities worsen Venezuelan child labor crisis', Ramirez C E & Sequera V, Reuters, Thomson Reuters Foundation, 10 May 2021, 20210519091004
[100] ‘Extreme poverty in Venezuela rises to 76.6% - study’, Reuters, 30 September 2021, 20211027113203; ‘Encovi 2021: Venezuela Is The Poorest Country in Latin America’, Soto N, Caracas Chronicles, 30 September 2021, 20211027115322; ‘Venezuela crisis: Three in four in extreme poverty, study says’, BBC News, 30 September 2021, 20211027124240; ‘AMERICA/VENEZUELA - National survey (ENCOVI): poverty at the highest levels, employment decreases, only 5% of emigrants return’, Agenzia Fides, 1 October 2021, 20211027123245
[101] ‘Venezuela crisis: Three in four in extreme poverty, study says’, BBC News, 30 September 2021, 20211027124240
[102] ‘For poor Venezuelans, a box of food may sway vote for Maduro’, Andreina Aponte & Ana Isabel Martinez, Reuters, 12 March 2018, CXBB8A1DA34199
[103] ‘Watch List 2017‘, International Crisis Group (Brussels: Special Report Nº3, 24 February 2017), p.35, on Refworld website, CISEDB50AD378
[104] ‘Amnesty International Report 2017-18’, Amnesty International, 22 February 2018, pp.393-397 ‘Venezuela’ at p.397, NGED867A612
[105] ‘For poor Venezuelans, a box of food may sway vote for Maduro’, Andreina Aponte & Ana Isabel Martinez, Reuters, 12 March 2018, CXBB8A1DA34199
[106] March 2018, CXBB8A1DA34199 239 'Amnesty International Report 2020/21. The State of the World’s Human Rights’, Amnesty International, 6 April 2021, pp.390-395 ‘Venezuela’ at 394, 20210407093348
[107] ‘More than 16 Million Venezuelans Enrolled in the Carnet de la Patria System’, RNV (Radio Nacional de Venezuela), 2 November 2017, now only accessible on Internet Archive Wayback Machine website, captured 21 February 2018, CXC90406621214; ‘Freedom on the Net 2017 - Venezuela’, Freedom House, 14 November 2017, p.20, NG2A465F5210; ‘Transparency International denounces “Venezuelan apartheid”’, MercoPress, 17 March 2018, CXBB8A1DA26569; ‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Venezuela’, United States Department of State. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 20 April 2018, p.27 Section 3, OGD95BE927489; ‘President Maduro's Likely Re-election in Breadline Venezuela’, Gunson P, International Crisis Group, 17 May 2018, CIS7B839411363.
[108] ‘With low turnout, Venezuela’s election will create what opponents call ‘puppet congress’’, Washington Post, The, 31 July 2017, CXC90406611372; ‘Venezuela's Maduro re-elected amid outcry over vote’, Reuters, 20 May 2018, CXBB8A1DA27642; ‘Poor Venezuelans crowd pro-Maduro stations in hope of vote 'prize'’, Luc Cohen & Francisco Aguilar, Reuters, 21 May 2018, CXBB8A1DA27653; 'Venezuela. Humanitarian crisis. Thematic report - 23 May 2018', ACAPS, 23 May 2018, pp.3 & 8, CIS7B839411184; ‘Maduro's tweeters, activists cash in on Venezuela election win’, Berwick A, Reuters, 26 May 2018, CXBB8A1DA34198.
[109] ‘Carnet de la Patria ha otorgado protección social a más de 250.000 familias venezolanas [Carnet de la Patria has granted social protection to more than 250,000 Venezuelan families]’, AVN [Agencia Venezolana de Noticias], Gobierno del Estado Bolivariano de Yaracuy [Government of the Bolivarian State of Yaracuy], 16 May 2017, CXC90406621223 (Google Translate translation ore%2F14885-Carnet-de-la-Patria-ha-otorgado-proteccin-social-a-ms-de-250000-familias-venezolanas%20)
[110] ‘“Carnet de la patria”: el nuevo racionamiento de comida en Venezuela [“Homeland card”: the new food rationing in Venezuela]’, Avendaño O, Panam Post, 29 December 2016, CIS38A80129134 (Google Translate translation ‘Carnet de la Patria. El apartheid revolucionario’ [Homeland Card. Revolutionary apartheid], Transparencia Venezuela [Transparency Venezuela], undated [2018], [document created 15 March 2018], p.5, CIS7B839419024; ‘Special Report: How ZTE helps Venezuela create China-style social control’, Berwick A, Reuters, 15 November 2018, 20211028102358.
[111] ‘“Carnet de la patria”: el nuevo racionamiento de comida en Venezuela [“Homeland card”: the new food rationing in Venezuela]’, Avendaño O, Panam Post, 29 December 2016, CIS38A80129134 (Google Translate translation ‘Freedom on the Net 2017 - Venezuela’, Freedom House, 14 November 2017, p.20, NG2A465F5210; the reference in footnote ‘147 Yoerli Viloria Diario de Los Andes, “El Carnet de la Patria pone en peligro la privacidad” [The Homeland Card endangers privacy] January 29, 2017, is not accessible
[113] 'Freedom on the Net 2020. Venezuela', Freedom House, [14 October 2020], p.[26] section C5, 20201105094017
[114] '‘Sistema Patria’: a new digital tool for social control in Venezuela', Singer F, El Pais, 24 April 2021, 20210603091407
[115] 'Freedom on the Net 2020. Venezuela', Freedom House, [14 October 2020], p.[27] section C5, 20201105094017
[116] '‘Sistema Patria’: a new digital tool for social control in Venezuela', Singer F, El Pais, 24 April 2021, 20210603091407
[117] 'Freedom on the Net 2020. Venezuela', Freedom House, [14 October 2020], pp.[27] & [26] section C5, 20201105094017
[118] 'General Country of Origin Information Report Venezuela (June 2020)', Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 June 2020, p.36 including footnote 323, 20200806083533
[119] 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2019 - Venezuela', Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, United States Department of State, 11 March 2020, p.1 Executive Summary, 20200312111107; 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020 - Venezuela', Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, United States Department of State, 30 March 2021, p.1 Executive Summary, 20210331125015
[120] 'World Report 2020. Events of 2019', Human Rights Watch (HRW), 14 January 2020, pp.625 & 627, 20200115082903. Regarding the judiciary see also ‘Report of the independent international fact-finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Advance Unedited Version’ (A/HRC/45/33), Independent international fact-finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, [United Nations] Human Rights Council, 15 September 2020, p.3 paragraph 17, 20201102104217; 'Detailed findings of the independent international fact finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (A/HRC/45/CRP.11)', [Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,], United Nations Human Rights Council, 15 September 2020, p.39-43 paragraphs 148-165, 20200917074633; and 'World Report 2021. Events of 2020', Human Rights Watch, 13 January 2021, pp.732-742 ‘Venezuela’ at 736, 20210114072851.
[121] 'World Report 2020. Events of 2019', Human Rights Watch (HRW), 14 January 2020, pp.625 & 627, 20200115082903; ‘Human Rights Watch World Report 2019’, Human Rights Watch, 17 January 2019, pp.645 & 649, 20190118091502.
[122] 'Freedom in the World 2019 - Venezuela', Freedom House, 5 February 2019, sections ‘Overview’ & F1, 20190218085724. See also 'Freedom in the World 2020 – Venezuela', Freedom House, 4 March 2020, sections ‘Overview’ (p.[2]) & F1 (p.[17]), 20200305095111
[123] 'World Report 2020. Events of 2019', Human Rights Watch (HRW), 14 January 2020, p.629, 20200115082903; 'World Report 2021. Events of 2020', Human Rights Watch, 13 January 2021, pp.732-742 ‘Venezuela’ at 736, 20210114072851 308 ‘World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2017-2018’, World Justice Project, 31 January 2018, pp.151, 163, 3, 29 & 31, CIS7B83941372
[124] 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2019 - Venezuela', Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, United States Department of State, 11 March 2020, p.1 Executive Summary, 20200312111107; 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020 - Venezuela', Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, United States Department of State, 30 March 2021, p.1 Executive Summary, 20210331125015
The US Department of State 2022 Country reports on Human Rights Practices: Venezuela provides (inter alia) that:
15.1.There were numerous reports that the Maduro regime committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. Although the regime did not release statistics on extrajudicial killings, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) reported that national, state, and municipal police entities, as well as the armed forces and regime-supported colectivos, carried out hundreds of such killings during the year.
In September the UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) on Venezuela noted, for the third consecutive year, concern regarding, “killings consistent with previously documented patterns of extrajudicial executions and other violations in the context of security operations in low-income, urban neighborhoods in various parts of the country.”
The FFM report stated “real and perceived dissidents and opponents” of the Maduro regime increasingly included individuals and organizations that documented, reported, or attempted to address human rights or social and economic problems in the country. The FFM concluded that it had reasonable grounds to believe Maduro and other high-level members of the regime used security agencies such as the Directorate General of Military Counterintelligence (DGCIM) and Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN) to suppress dissent through actions that included extrajudicial killings.
15.2.In September the FFM released a third report focused on crimes against humanity committed through structures and individuals in the regime’s intelligence services, specifically DGCIM and SEBIN, as part of a systematic plan to repress opposition to the regime. The report noted the violent acts were not committed arbitrarily but rather were part of a system orchestrated and executed by the Maduro regime to repress dissidents. The FFM documented that SEBIN played a fundamental role in the detention of opponents, including politicians, human rights defenders, and protesters. Most prisoners were taken to El Helicoide (SEBIN) and Boleita (DGCIM) torture detention facilities, but there were several detention centers around the country. The report detailed that torture was a systematic procedure in both El Helicoide and Boleita. The FFM documented 122 cases of victims subjected to torture, sexual violence, and other inhuman punishment by DGCIM agents beginning in 2014. At SEBIN, it documented 51 cases of torture or inhuman treatment. The FFM reported DGCIM and SEBIN recruited low-level officers who were young and poor, with low levels of education, and who often had alcohol or drug dependencies. The FFM noted the vulnerable state of these low-level officials made them easier to manipulate through a system of rewards or punishments.
15.3.Most prison conditions were harsh and life threatening due to gross overcrowding, food shortages, inadequate sanitary conditions and medical care, systemic violence, and poor infrastructure.
15.4.The constitution prohibits the arrest or detention of an individual without a judicial order and provides for the accused to remain free while being tried, but judges and prosecutors often disregarded these provisions. NGOs such as Foro Penal, the Committee for the Families of Victims of February – March 1989, the Institute for Press and Society, Espacio Publico, and PROVEA noted at least 2,000 open cases of arbitrary detentions; however, the Maduro regime rarely granted detainees the right to challenge the lawfulness of their detentions in court, even though the right to do so is stipulated by law. The regime arbitrarily detained individuals, including foreign citizens, for extended periods without criminal charges.
15.5.NGOs reported the lack of independence of the judiciary impeded the normal functioning of investigations and judicial processes and highlighted the fragility of norms and procedures.
Amnesty International reported regime-aligned individuals often interfered in cases of politically motivated arbitrary detentions, which were prosecuted by ordinary courts. A common practice among courts was to charge persons targeted by the regime with conspiracy or treason. Special courts with jurisdiction over terrorism frequently silenced dissidents.
15.6.The Maduro regime used the judiciary to intimidate and prosecute individuals critical of regime policies or actions. As of November 28, Foro Penal reported 277 political prisoners in regime custody.
Foro Penal data reported between January 2014 and November 2022 showed that 15,777 persons were arrested for political reasons and 875 civilians were unconstitutionally prosecuted before a military criminal jurisdiction. Foro Penal recorded more than 9,400 persons remained subject to arbitrary criminal proceedings for politically motivated precautionary measures. The regime routinely held political prisoners in SEBIN installations, the Ramo Verde military prison, or in DGCIM headquarters in Boleita, Caracas.
15.7.The constitution provides for the inviolability of the home and personal privacy, but the Maduro regime generally failed to respect these prohibitions. In many cases, particularly regarding the political opposition, regime-aligned individuals interfered in personal communications. NGOs reported their offices were subject to arbitrary raids and having their websites or social media profiles blocked.
State surveillance remained rampant, including through the assistance of telecom regulator the National Telecommunications Commission (CONATEL) and state-run telecommunications provider CANTV. Technical attacks against media outlets appeared to be linked to the armed forces.
The People’s Republic of China, through its telecommunications corporation Zhongxing Telecommunication Equipment Corporation, continued to provide the Maduro regime with technology to monitor citizens’ social, political, and economic behavior through an identity card called carnet de la patria (homeland card). To force citizens to comply, the regime made it obligatory to present the card to obtain social services, including pensions, medicine, food baskets, subsidized fuel, and in some instances COVID vaccinations. Citizens essentially had no choice other than to obtain and use the card despite the known tracking methods. Chinese companies such as Huawei and the China National Electronics Import-Export Company also supported, financially and technologically, these surveillance methods.
On June 22, Spanish telecommunication company Telefonica revealed the Maduro regime increased requests to listen in on telephone conversations of citizens. According to Telefonica, the regime increased its requests from 234,932 in 2017 to 861,004 in 2021. Telefonica is required by law to comply with requests made by the regime. The Public Ministry, CICPC, and SEBIN are among the institutions able to request a telephone interception.
15.8.NGOs identified threats and intimidation to social networks users for publishing content critical of the regime on Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp. The online media monitor ProBox noted the regime used bots, trolls, and cyborgs (a hybrid account in which a human periodically takes over a bot account) to flood social media platforms such as Twitter with proregime information and control online communications. ProBox estimated that more than 60 percent of proregime messages on Twitter appeared to originate from bots. In March, ProBox denounced the purported national assembly for discussing the development of a project to regulate social media and digital content. ProBox also reported on the inauguration of the International University of Communications, which regime media described as a “communication training platform,” but ProBox warned could be a means to train others in disinformation tactics.
According to VE sin Filtro (Venezuela without Filters), an internet monitoring project sponsored by internet freedom watchdog Venezuela Inteligente, the regime practice of blocking websites combined with precarious internet connections and interruptions in electricity service made normal browsing exceedingly difficult and contributed to the online media censorship that had grown exponentially since 2014.
Regime-controlled intelligence agencies, which lacked independent oversight, conducted surveillance for political purposes. Courts relied on evidence obtained from anonymous patriotas cooperantes (cooperating patriots) to harass perceived opponents of the Maduro regime, and senior regime-aligned individuals used personal information gathered by patriotas cooperantes to intimidate regime critics and human rights defenders. Users were arrested and criminally accused of actions such as tweeting information publicly available on webpages.
15.9.Opposition political parties and PSUV dissidents operated in a restrictive atmosphere characterized by intimidation, the threat of prosecution or administrative sanction on questionable charges, and very limited mainstream media access.
15.10.NGOs reported that public-sector employees faced discrimination and harassment for their political beliefs or activities. In 2021, the ILO expressed deep concern regarding the large number of reported instances of acts of discrimination at work, harassment, and dismissal of employees on the basis of political opinion, as inconsistent with the country’s obligations under ILO conventions on discrimination. In July, the NGO Fordisi, which worked with teachers’ unions, reported that 2,153 teachers in Carabobo, 700 in Guarico, 141 in Portuguesa, and six in Caracas stopped receiving a salary, a move activists said came in retaliation for speaking out against the regime’s labor practices.
The Human Rights Watch World Report 2023, Venezuela: Events of 2022, provides (inter alia) that:
16.1.In November 2021, the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor Karim Khan opened an investigation into possible crimes against humanity in Venezuela. In 2020, the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) had found sufficient grounds to believe crimes against humanity have been committed as part of a state policy to repress opponents.
The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which has a presence in Venezuela, lost access in 2022 to detention centers where political prisoners are held.
Judicial authorities have participated or been complicit in the abuses, serving as a mechanism of repression.
Venezuela faces a severe humanitarian emergency, with millions unable to access adequate health care and nutrition.
Authorities harass and persecute journalists, human rights defenders, and civil society organizations. Persistent concerns include brutal policing practices, lack of protection for Indigenous people, and poor prison conditions.
An exodus of some 7.1 million Venezuelans represents one of the largest migration crises in the world.
A 2022 report by a European Union electoral observation mission laid out concrete recommendations to pave the way to free and fair elections. Negotiations, that were stalled since October 2021, resumed in November.
16.2.Persecution of Political Opponents, Arrests, and Torture
The government has jailed political opponents and disqualified them from running for office. As of October, the Penal Forum, a network of pro-bono defense lawyers, reported 245 political prisoners.
At least 114 political prisoners have spent more than three years in pretrial detention, despite time limits included in a recent Criminal Code reform. Approximately 875 of the 15,770 civilians arbitrarily arrested from 2014 through June 2022 have been prosecuted in military courts, the Penal Forum reported.
While some detainees have been released or transferred from Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN) facilities to prisons, new critics have been subject to arbitrary detention.
OHCHR continued receiving complaints of torture, ill-treatment, and incommunicado detentions in 2022.
Security forces and colectivos—pro-government armed groups—have repeatedly attacked demonstrations since 2014, including with violent raids, brutal beatings and point-blank range shootings.
According to official sources consulted by OHCHR, the Attorney General’s Office recorded 235 complaints of human rights violations involving deprivation of liberty, from May 2021 through April 2022, including 20 in terrorism-related charges.
OHCHR and the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detentions, reported persistent challenges to ensuring the rights to liberty and fair trials. There are also delays in implementing judicial release orders.
In September, the UN FFM reported that crimes committed by intelligence services, on orders of high-level authorities, including Nicolás Maduro, were part of a deliberate policy to repress government opponents. The mission again described these as crimes against humanity.
16.3.Alleged Extrajudicial Killings
Agents of the Special Action Forces (FAES) and other police and military units have killed and tortured with impunity in low-income communities, including during security raids called “Operations To Liberate the People.”
Between 2016 and 2019, security forces alleged “resistance to authority” in more than 19,000 killings. Evidence showed many were extrajudicial killings. OHCHR documented continuing patterns of such killings in marginalized neighborhoods but reported a significant reduction in number in 2022.
16.4.Judicial Independence, Impunity for Abuses
The judiciary stopped functioning as an independent branch of government in 2004.
There has been no meaningful justice for crimes committed with knowledge or acquiescence of high-level authorities.
Judicial authorities have been complicit in abuses, the FFM reported in 2021, including by issuing retrospective warrants for illegal arrests, ordering pre-trial detention routinely, upholding detentions based on flimsy evidence, and failing to protect victims of torture.
Venezuela’s National Assembly, controlled by supporters of Nicolás Maduro, revised the Organic Law of the Supreme Court of Justice in January, requiring an entirely new Supreme Court, which plays a critical role in appointing and removing lower court judges, of 20 justices—down from 32. The selection process, was not independent. Although Venezuela’s constitution allows only one 12-year term, justices who had failed to act as a check on executive power were reappointed for longer.
The Johns Hopkins Center for Humanitarian Health Venezuela Health Profile dated October 2021 provides (inter alia) that:
…the health system has limited to no capacity to care for patients with severe mental health disorders, and patients with previously well-controlled conditions have tragically deteriorated in the absence of critical medications. A 2016 New York Times article documented dire conditions in six psychiatric wards in Venezuela where patients lacked food, water, cleaning supplies, and essential medications such as antipsychotics and anxiolytics. In one instance, an unmedicated patient, bit the nose off another patient. Clinical staff ration medications and resort to restraints or solitary confinement to control psychotic patients, and suicide attempts within the hospital are common. According to the Washington Post, in one of the main psychiatric facilities (El Peñon), 14 patients have died since 2016 due lack of access to medications. The World Federation for Mental Health has declared a mental health crisis in Venezuela which requires urgent implementation of community-based interventions.
Bulletin of the World Health Organisation online article dated 1 August 2022 and titled, “Venezuela: out of the headlines but still in crisis” provides (inter alia) that:
The Venezuelan political and economic crisis threatens the citizens’ health, though assessing its full impact is difficult due to lack of information. Available evidence shows a health system near collapse and the reversal of several decades of health gains. High levels of inflation and generalized poverty underscore the difficulties of maintaining health and adequate nutrition amidst the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and rising global food insecurity. …
Mental health is another major concern, as levels of anxiety and depression have increased and the crisis has curtailed mental health service capacity. However, the health system has limited to no capacity to care for patients with severe mental health disorders. Medication shortages have caused the deterioration of patients with previously well-controlled conditions, prompting The World Federation for Mental Health to declare a mental health crisis in the country.
A HumVenezuela online report dated 10 May 2023 provides (inter alia) that:
Fabiana Santamaría, legislator of the Legislative Council of the state of Mérida, warned that the mental health of Venezuelans is in crisis and is not being properly attended, because there are only 48 public psychiatric centers in the country and most of them do not have resources, lack personnel and the facilities are deteriorated.
“There is no national public policy on mental health and there is no uniformity or continuity in prevention policies. We see that different initiatives are being carried out without coordination and that is worrying because in the end mental health is as or more important than physical health,” he said on the program Háblame Bajito on Radio Fe y Alegría Noticias.
The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada report dated 5 January 2018 provides (inter alia) that:
Treatment by Authorities
In correspondence with the Research Directorate, the coordinator of the international research team "Voice of the Venezuelan Diaspora" (La voz de la diaspora venezolana), whose research focuses on the Venezuelan diaspora [1], explained that failed refugee claimants who return to Venezuela may face, among other things, the following consequences: not being able to find employment, having their passport cancelled or being imprisoned [translation] "without a regular trial, since the judicial system is subordinate to the executive power" (La voz de la diaspora venezolana 19 Dec. 2017). According to the same source, a person who opposes the government [translation] "runs the risk of being imprisoned and even disappearing" (La voz de la diaspora venezolana 19 Dec. 2017).
The information in the following paragraph was provided in a telephone interview with the Research Directorate by an assistant professor at La Trobe University in Melbourne, Australia, whose research centres on law and politics in Venezuela:
The treatment of failed refugee claimants who return to the country depends on the situation of the claimant: why did they leave the country, what was their role or occupation, and what was the nature of the conflict with the government. For example, a lawyer or judge who leaves Venezuela because they "are literally on the wrong side of the regime" could face difficulties upon their return, such as being monitored. If the failed refugee claimant was charged with a crime before leaving Venezuela, that would be a more obvious "scenario of problems." In the case of a person who worked for the government but not in a politically sensitive area, they might not be monitored when they return, but they might not be able to find a job in the same sector or within the government (assistant professor 13 Dec. 2017).
The coordinator stated that [translation] "the government only hires people allied to the government and does everything possible to expel workers who criticize or disagree with the government from public organizations" by using "various mechanisms and lists," of which "the most known" are the Tascón and Maisanta lists (La voz de la diaspora venezolana 19 Dec. 2017). According to the same source, a person who is not a [translation] "friend" of the government cannot integrate into the public sector (La voz de la diaspora venezolana 19 Dec. 2017).
Access to Services
According to sources, there are no government assistance programs for the reintegration of failed refugee claimants (La voz de la diaspora venezolana 19 Dec. 2017; assistant professor 13 Dec. 2017). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, an operations and movements coordinator from the IOM in Bogotá indicated that, to his knowledge, the government does not have any specific programs to assist repatriated persons, but Venezuelans can apply for social programs and benefits (operations and movements coordinator 28 Dec. 2017). According to the assistant professor, not having the documents required can affect a repatriated person's ability to access government services (assistant professor 13 Dec. 2017). According to the same source, it is very difficult to obtain a passport from abroad, and the national identity card (cédula), which is required "for everything," including obtaining a passport, is available only in Venezuela (assistant professor 13 Dec. 2017). Similarly, the coordinator from La voz de la diaspora venezolana indicated that the government does not allow Venezuelans in the diaspora to obtain identity documents, including national identity cards and passports (La voz de la diaspora venezolana 19 Dec. 2017). According to the website of the Embassy of Venezuela in Canada, a Venezuelan citizen cannot obtain a cédula from abroad (Venezuela n.d.). According to sources, it is very difficult for Venezuelans to obtain passports, including because of a lack of necessary materials (assistant professor 13 Dec. 2017; Bloomberg 8 Mar. 2017; PanAm Post 11 Oct. 2017). Without providing further details, the assistant professor stated that it is "a big hassle" for a repatriated person to acquire a new identity card (assistant professor 13 Dec. 2017).
According to sources, there is a new card called the "national card" (carnet de la patria), which manages access to certain social and government services (assistant professor 13 Dec. 2017; Perfil 7 Jan. 2017), including food and basic necessities (Perfil 7 Jan. 2017). According to the assistant professor, if a person living abroad does not have that card, it may be difficult for them to access those services when they return (assistant professor 13 Dec. 2017). According to the coordinator of La voz de la diaspora venezolana, the national card is used to control food rations and has become necessary [translation] "for everything" (La voz de la diaspora venezolana 19 Dec. 2017). The same source indicated that it is part of a [translation] "relatively stringent social control system" and is used "to facilitate access to all services for friends of the government and to prevent access for opponents" (La voz de la diaspora venezolana 19 Dec. 2017).
According to the operations and movements coordinator, no NGO offers assistance programs for repatriated persons (operations and movements coordinator 28 Dec. 2017).
Caracas Chronicles, an independent news and analysis organisation in Venezuela, published the following online article on 15 June 2021:
In Venezuela, we’re used to giving away our ID number and even showing our identity card in all kinds of situations, which makes us vulnerable to thieves and the regime.
When food shortages hit Venezuela hard, food was regulated according to national identity numbers. When Venezuela ran out of gasoline, it was rationed by national identity numbers. Now, when Venezuelans need to be vaccinated against COVID-19, vaccines are regulated by the government according to national identity numbers.
As soon as Venezuelans turn nine years old, they become eligible to register with the National Migration and Immigration Service, or SAIME, which assigns them a unique, sequential number, and hands them a laminated paper card featuring their name, date of birth, marital status, a color photo and the number itself. It’s the omnipresent cédula de identidad.
This number is similar to the one used to get social services and insurance, or pay your taxes in other countries. Common examples are the Social Security Number in the U.S. and the Social Insurance Number in Canada, but while the USA and Canada expressly warn against carrying the card on your person, in Venezuela you’re essentially forced to.
This card must be carried around at all times. You must hand it over when the police ask for it, you must give out the number when you register to vote, when you get vaccinated, when you go to the doctor, when you request your passport, when you register in school, when you open a bank account, when you buy milk… Venezuela’s national identity number is tied to everything a citizen does in their life, which makes it an extremely dangerous tool in the hands of the State. They can legally know every public service you’ve ever used, every job you’ve ever had and everything you’ve ever bought.
This power in the hands of any government is dangerous, but in the hands of an ideologically determined government that wishes to stamp out any and all opposition, is catastrophic.
A Number to Follow You
Venezuela’s Constitution and Law on Identification don’t say that citizens must register and get their numbers. Instead, it offers up the idea as a person’s “right to their identity”. The obligation to carry it around and use it for everything you do doesn’t come from a single source, rather, it comes from many different laws and regulations covering diverse aspects of civil life which force you to either hand the card over physically or give out your ID number. We’ll get to those.
A lot of what we can find online about the history of our cédula is dedicated to the fact that the first Venezuelan to register was a president, or blog posts about how you can renew your expired card. Some outlets also talk about how the presence of mass immigration after World War II was a contributing factor to the decision of creating a national ID system. But there’s surprisingly little about the origins of the system that one can find online.
They can legally know every public service you’ve ever used, every job you’ve ever had and everything you’ve ever bought. This power in the hands of any government is dangerous, but in the hands of an ideologically determined government that wishes to stamp out any and all opposition, is catastrophic.
The Correo del Orinoco, a state-owned newspaper, helpfully provides some more insight into how the idea was crafted. What’s interesting about this particular piece is that it openly admits that the system’s original intent was one of control, by establishing an easier method of registering and identifying alleged and convicted criminals all the way back in the 1930s. This works effectively to this day; the Law on Identification states that the card itself is a person’s main form of ID, and the Code on Criminal Procedure gives police services the responsibility and right to properly identify those they detain or people they have reason to believe may be involved in a crime.
There’s the risk of authorities having the potential to track any individual they wish to follow, not just track their social benefits record. This is achieved by integrating the national identity number into other areas of everyday life. Perhaps the greatest unexpected threat comes from the number’s integration into Venezuela’s tax system. Putting aside the many ways the government can track a company’s activities, their ability to track individuals is quite impressive and, as we’re about to see, terrifying.
Whenever you wish to buy something in Venezuela you must give out your ID number. This is because when businesses and certain types of individuals register sales they must issue a receipt that features the number. This isn’t merely for the practical reasons of the customer being able to ensure that a certain receipt is in fact theirs, but because Venezuela has pushed for the use of so-called “fiscal machines” which are, in reality, just online electronic cash registers. These online registers were meant to make tracking value-added tax easier, and therefore they’re equipped with data transmitters that allow them to send all information on all transactions back to the tax authority’s Centralized Electronic Sales System. Meaning that, whenever they wish, the tax authority can simply take a look at a single person’s transactions for any given period of time.
Imagine that power, the ability to know every purchase you’ve made in a day, a week, a month. They also get to see what was purchased, at what time and where.
Venezuela’s tax authority didn’t have to develop this technology itself, nor does it supply businesses with online registers. They pre-approve registers that businesses must buy like those developed and produced by the Korean company Bixolon. The data transmitters can be acquired separately to update older registers, or they can come with the registers or receipt printers themselves. The push to get shops and stores to adopt this technology and to keep the registers up-to-date hasn’t stopped either, even if the shops can’t quite afford it.
For those in other countries who might think this is unique to Venezuela, it’s important to keep in mind that the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has been pushing for this sort of approach to taxation for years now. The OECD doesn’t even consider the risks of what they’re doing in documents such as the one linked here, their only concern is on making sure they can tax effectively. But the biggest difference between them and Venezuela is that the members of the OECD have some safeguards to make the tracking of citizen’s movements harder. Countries like the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom have long and proud democratic traditions, they have solid institutions and respect the principle of the separation of power (more or less). The US doesn’t even have a national, centralized ID system.
While the approach may not be a unique one, the dangers that Venezuelans face are, when compared to the OECD member states. With Venezuela’s democratic institutions being as weak as they are, there is no real guarantee that this information is kept safe. Who’s to say who gets to look at this? Does the police have access? Does the Executive Branch? Do notoriously dangerous and criminal police forces like the Fuerzas de Acciones Especiales, or FAES, have access? Legal texts are uncomfortably silent, making this an authoritarian’s dream.
A Code Too Easy to Crack
There’s still more to worry about here though. Think of the number on our ID cards itself. It’s just a sequential number. If you can count then you can correctly come up with a valid ID number. A potential criminal could just use someone else’s ID number when making purchases they don’t wish to have tracked, which could only lead to the State chasing after innocent individuals. Stealing someone’s identity is incredibly easy then, not only because the number lacks any sort of validation method, but also because everyone asks for it. People in Venezuela just give the number out, out loud, because they’re required to provide it all the time. Criminals need only follow their victims into a store and listen to them at checkout.
Now that vaccines are being distributed according to ID numbers, a lot of people face a serious risk of identity theft, not to mention that they have to supply the government with updated versions of their street address, phone numbers, email address, and current job. Let’s say someone signs up to get their vaccine and, for some reason or other, is denied by the system. Well, they can just try again by inputting someone else’s ID number. When they show up to get their shot, they can just say the ID number they used to register, if they’re asked to show the card, they could just bring a fake one with them. Since the number and cards have no validation method, they are scarily easy to make fakes of. But let’s take this case of identity theft a little further.
The ID number and surrounding integrated systems have become so common to Venezuelans, that many may not even recognize the system as the threat that it truly is in the hands of the current or future governments.
If someone who wishes to evade government authorities can guess a valid ID number, they can use the tax authority’s website to look up that person’s tax number. With it, you get their full name. Once they have someone’s full name, that info can be used to make a fake ID card. But a card wouldn’t be enough to evade authorities if they’re driving a car, but thanks to the ID system our hypothetical criminal can solve that too. With an ID number, you can probably get someone’s birth date off of a website like Dateas or their social media. Once someone has that information they can now use the National Transportation Institute’s website to look up info on their driver’s license such as its current status, date of issue and renewal date. Enough information to make a fake one.
Armed with these new ID documents, a person could evade authorities and even end up committing traffic violations that would be registered as the identity theft victim’s fault, and not the offender’s. Furthermore, a potential criminal could find out even more information about their victim. For example, if the National Electoral Council’s online registry is properly up-to-date, a criminal could know someone’s voting center, thus narrowing down where their victim may live, and if their victim is an employee then they could use the Venezuelan Social Security Institute’s website to find out where they work. If that registry’s been updated recently, they could even find out if their victim quit their job and when they did so. If all of this information is so easily available to the public, think of how much power the government really has.
The number’s use and dangers don’t stop there either. If you wanted fuel during Venezuela’s gasoline shortages you had to register with the Sistema Patria, which lets the government know which cars every person is currently driving, whether they fueled up and where they did so (this system also collects fingerprints). A politician of the opposition or a journalist that the government wishes to imprison can thus be easily found without much trouble. The government will already know where they work, what cars they drive and even if they’ve recently had to stop for gas. With gas stations now featuring members of the National Guard watching over fuel supply, detaining anyone is incredibly easy.
All this combines to, through the use of a single unprotected number, provide the government with far too much information and power over its people.
Many Venezuelans currently understand their government to be an oppressive regime. A dictatorship with no concern for what’s legal, nor any care for the freedom or the lives of the citizens they are legally bound to protect. But the ID number and surrounding integrated systems have become so common to Venezuelans, so much a part of their regular day-to-day life since its inception in 1942 that many may not even recognize the system as the threat that it truly is in the hands of the current or future governments.
The Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade “do not travel” travel advice overview for Venezuela updated to 6 June 2023 provides (inter alia) that:
Common violent crime includes murder, armed robbery, drive-by shootings, sexual assault and carjackings. Criminals are often armed. Avoid walking in isolated areas, especially at night. Terrorist groups and criminal gangs are active along Venezuela's borders with Colombia, Brazil and Guyana.
Kidnapping is a serious threat. The risk is higher along airport routes and in border regions. Only use official taxis organised through your hotel. Avoid kidnapping hotspots.
Venezuela's political situation is volatile. Demonstrations and protests are common and can turn violent. If you're in an affected area, leave if it's safe to do so.
Shortages of basic goods can result in long line-ups at stores. This can lead to fighting, looting and theft. Be ready to change travel plans. Keep extra supplies of food, water, medicines and other necessities.
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
In considering the applicant’s claims and evidence, the Tribunal has taken account of the:
23.1.Migration and Refugee Division Guidelines on Vulnerable Persons.
23.2.Migration and Refugee Division Guidelines on the Assessment of Credibility.
23.3.Department of Home Affairs ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’.
23.4.Relevant country information set out in this decision record.
In particular, the Tribunal notes the following credibility guidelines:
24.1.[8] The process of determining whether an applicant meets a visa criterion, including whether an applicant is a person who meets the definition of a refugee, often requires the tribunal to decide whether it accepts certain evidence and how much weight to give to that evidence. This process may involve assessing the credibility of an applicant or other persons and documentary evidence.
24.2.[36] The period of time that has elapsed between an applicant’s arrival in Australia and the time when he or she claims protection may be considered when assessing the genuineness or extent of an applicant’s subjective fear[125] of persecution or significant harm.
24.3.[37] A delay in applying for protection should not be the sole reason for doubting an applicant’s claims. There should be other reasons to support a finding that an applicant’s claims are not credible.[126] The significance of delay will depend upon the particular circumstances surrounding the delay and the reasons given for the delay.
[125] Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) ALD 346 per Heerey J at 349.
[126] Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) ALD 346; Anandaraj Subramanian v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Carr J, 10 March 1998; Makouei v MIMA, unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Wilcox J, 6 February 1998, at 6.
The Tribunal considers the applicant’s oral and written evidence truthful and credible overall, and accepts his account of his life in Venezuela and Australia.
The Tribunal notes the incidents the applicant described in his evidence of being locked within his family home while it was ransacked and of a threatened kidnapping. The Tribunal considers it is likely these incidents were random criminal acts, and not targeted at the applicant or his family for any particular reason.
There is no evidence before the Tribunal of the applicant having been targeted and/or harmed when he lived in Venezuela.
The Tribunal notes the applicant’s evidence that he was not politically active when he lived in Venezuela.
The Tribunal considers it is unlikely the applicant’s political opinions would have been known to the Venezuelan authorities when he lived in Venezuela.
The Tribunal accepts that as the applicant has matured he has developed stronger political opinions in opposition to the Venezuelan government.
The Tribunal considers the applicant’s participation in the anti-Venezuelan government demonstration in [City 1, Australia] in [2014] evidence of his stronger political opinions, and not conduct engaged in by the applicant for the sole purpose of strengthening his claims for protection.[127]
[127] s 5J(6) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
The Tribunal notes the applicant’s anti-Venezuelan government political opinion claim is a sur place claim based on his participation in the anti-Venezuelan government demonstration in [City 1, Australia] in [2014].
The Tribunal notes it has been recognised that a person may become a refugee sur place as a result of voluntarily participating in activities which would give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution in his or her country of origin. The types of activity which might be engaged in by persons outside their countries of origin including actions undertaken out of genuine political motives.[128]
[128] Guide to Refugee Law (updated as at November 2022) at pages 3-16 to 3-22.
The Tribunal notes the applicant appeared in a [social media] video and photographs of the anti-Venezuelan government demonstration in [City 1, Australia] in [2014].
The Tribunal notes from its own inquiries that there were similar demonstrations held around the same time in [other Australian cities] which attracted widespread media attention.
The Tribunal considers it is possible the video and photographs in which the applicant appeared have come to the attention of the Venezuelan authorities and, as a result, it is possible the applicant has since become a person of adverse interest to the Venezuelan authorities for his anti-Venezuelan government political opinions.
The Tribunal notes the applicant did not provide evidence of his social media activity in Venezuela and Australia.
There is no evidence before the Tribunal that the applicant has participated in any other anti-Venezuelan government protests or activities during his time in Australia.
The Tribunal considers that if the applicant returns to Venezuela, it is likely he would participate in anti-Venezuelan government protests or activities.
The Tribunal considers the witness’s written statement credible.
The Tribunal accepts the letter from [named] Psychology as evidence of the applicant’s anxiety and depression with suicidal ideations between February 2017 and 9 July 2018 relating to his fear of being returned to Venezuela.
The Tribunal notes the applicant first came to Australia in January 2014 to study, however his related student visa was ultimately cancelled in March 2017. The Tribunal further notes that it was another two years before the applicant applied for protection.
The Tribunal considers the applicant’s delay in applying for protection is attributable to his mental health problems relating to his fear of being returned to Venezuela, and not a reason to doubt his claims for protection.
The Tribunal considers it is likely the applicant has ongoing mental health problems relating to his fear of being returned to Venezuela.
The Tribunal considers the police records genuine and accepts the translated police records as reliable evidence of their contents.
The Tribunal notes the accused’s name and national identity number appearing in the police records accord with the applicant’s name and national identity number.
The Tribunal notes the police records do not disclose the date or circumstances of the alleged crime (vehicle robbery).
The Tribunal notes the police records summon a person with the applicant’s name and national identity number to present himself to the investigations body in relation to the alleged crime [in] May 2020 and again [in] May 2020, being more than six years after the applicant left Venezuela.
The Tribunal considers the applicant’s name and national identity number have been used to create a fake identity card for an unknown individual in Venezuela and that individual is associated with the alleged crime.
The Tribunal considers the applicant a victim of identity theft committed in Venezuela sometime after the applicant left Venezuela and later applied for protection in Australia, and sometime before [May] 2020.
The Tribunal notes the applicant’s identity theft claim is a sur place claim based on the likely timing of the identity theft.
The Tribunal notes that people outside their countries of origin may become refugees due to changes in circumstances in their home countries or as a result of their own actions.[129]
[129] Guide to Refugee Law (updated as at November 2022) at pages 3-16 to 3-22.
The Tribunal considers it is possible the applicant’s identity has been misused for other currently unknown purposes in Venezuela to the applicant’s detriment.
The Tribunal notes that Venezuelans are at serious risk of identity theft and its consequences are documented in the country information.
The Tribunal notes that a national identity number in the hands of the Venezuelan police/authorities gives the police/authorities access to the details of every service, benefit, transaction, registration and employment engaged in or undertaken by the holder of the national identity number.
The Tribunal considers it is likely, in the context of the alleged crime, the Venezuelan police/authorities accessed such information relating to the applicant when he lived in Venezuela, and any other such information relating to the perpetrator of the identity theft.
The Tribunal considers it is unlikely the applicant would have the capacity to prove to Venezuelan police/authorities that he is the legal owner of the stolen national identity number and that he is not the perpetrator of the identity theft.
The Tribunal notes the phrase ‘particular social group’ should be given a broad interpretation, however, the category was not intended to provide a general safety net or ‘catch all’ to cover any form of persecution.[130] In Morato v MILGEA Lockhart J said:
The interpretation of the expression “particular social group” calls for no narrow definition, since it is an expression designed to accommodate a wide variety of groups of various descriptions in many countries of the world which, human behaviour being as it is, will necessarily change from time to time. The expression is a flexible one intended to apply whenever persecution is found directed at a group or section of a society that is not necessarily persecuted for racial, religious, national or political reasons. ...
In my opinion for a person to be a member of a “particular social group” within the meaning of the Convention and Protocol what is required is that he or she belongs to or is identified with a recognizable or cognizable group within a society that shares some interest or experience in common. I do not think it wise, necessary or desirable to further define the expression.[131]
[130]Applicant A v MIEA (1997) 190 CLR 225 at 241, 260.
[131]Morato v MILGEA (1992) 39 FCR 401 at 416.
The Tribunal considers that victims of identity theft in Venezuela make up a particular social group and the applicant is a member of that particular social group.
The Tribunal notes the Venezuela country information reports extensively on significant and widespread human rights violations, repression of political dissent and freedom of expression, arbitrary detention, torture and mistreatment, enforced disappearances, inhumane detention conditions, excessive force, extra-judicial executions, impunity, unfair trials, severe food insecurity, and lack of access to adequate healthcare.
The Tribunal considers that if the applicant returns to Venezuela, he could face questioning, by the Venezuelan police/authorities about the alleged crime and any other possible alleged offences committed or activities undertaken using the applicant’s identity, and, in the course of that, questioning about the reasons for his departure from and return to Venezuela and his political opinions and activities, including his participation in the anti-Venezuelan government demonstration in [City 1, Australia]. Following questioning, the Tribunal considers the applicant could face monitoring, arrest and arbitrary detention for an extended period without criminal charges, mistreatment or torture while in detention and/or enforced disappearance.
The Tribunal considers that the applicant’s status as a returned asylum seeker and/or participant in an anti-Venezuelan government demonstration while in Australia does not, of itself, put him at risk of targeting and harm by the Venezuelan police/authorities, however when considered in the context of the fact of the identity theft and its consequences to the applicant, such status increases the applicant’s vulnerability to targeting and harm.
The Tribunal considers that if the applicant returns to Venezuela, having had his identity stolen for known and unknown purposes, it is unlikely the applicant would have the capacity to prove his real identity to the Venezuelan police/authorities and to defend any accusations or charges made against him. For the same reason, the Tribunal also considers it is unlikely the applicant would have the capacity to access employment, services, social security, and other necessities of life.
The Tribunal notes that in AFA16 v MIBP [2018] FCA 628 the Court accepted the appellant’s proposition that in assessing the seriousness of harm, it is necessary to have regard to personal attributes such as age and frailty as well as personal vulnerabilities: at [35]. It found that this proposition was consistent with the observations of the Full Federal Court in SZTEQ v MIBP (2015) 229 FCR 497 at [153], where it was emphasised that an evaluation of ‘serious harm’ will be a question of fact and degree, often complicated and quite specific to the individual concerned.
The Tribunal considers that the applicant’s ongoing mental health problems relating to his fear of being returned to Venezuela, and the limited to no capacity of the Venezuelan health system to care for patients with serious mental health disorders are likely to increase the seriousness of the targeting and harm to the applicant.
The Tribunal considers that if the applicant returns to Venezuela, there would be no effective protection available to him from the Venezuelan authorities as they would be the perpetrators of the targeting and harm, and it is likely no legal protection or judicial review would be available to the applicant. Further, the Tribunal notes the applicant has no family members remaining in Venezuela to provide him protection or support, and there is no evidence before the Tribunal to suggest that the applicant would be less exposed to targeting and harm in a particular part or parts of Venezuela.
The Tribunal considers the applicant would be unable to modify his behaviour to avoid being targeted and harmed by the Venezuelan authorities as his vulnerability to targeting and harm arises from past events and circumstances and his anti-Venezuelan government political opinions that he is likely to make known if he returns to Venezuela.
Application of law
The issue in this case is whether the applicant meets the refugee criterion, and if not, whether he is entitled to complementary protection. Attachment A sets out the applicable law.
The Tribunal finds that:
69.1.The applicant is a citizen of Venezuela and non-citizen in Australia.
69.2.The applicant fears being persecuted in Venezuela for the essential and significant reason of being a member of a particular social group: victims of identity theft in Venezuela, such fears heightened by his status as a returned asylum seeker and holder of anti-Venezuelan government political opinions, and his ongoing mental health problems.
69.3.There is a real chance that, if the applicant returns to Venezuela, he would be persecuted for that reason.
69.4.The persecution would involve serious harm.
69.5.The real chance of persecution relates to all areas of Venezuela.
69.6.There are no effective protection measures available to the applicant in Venezuela.
69.7.The applicant could not take reasonable steps to modify his behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in Venezuela.
69.8.The applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution as defined in s 5J of the Act.
69.9.The applicant is outside Venezuela, his country of nationality, and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of Venezuela.
69.10.The applicant is a refugee as defined by s 5H(1)(a) of the Act.
CONCLUSION
The Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a) of the Act.
DECISION
The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Act.
Kate Chapple
MemberATTACHMENT A
Summary of applicable law
The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.
A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s 5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s 5H(1)(b).
Under s 5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss 5J(2)-(6) and ss 5K-LA.
If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss 36(2A) and (2B).
Relevant extracts from Migration Act 1958
5 (1) Interpretation
cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:
(a) severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or
(b) pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;
but does not include an act or omission:
(c) that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(d) arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:
(a) that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(b) that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:
(a) for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or
(b) for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or
(c) for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or
(d) for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or
(e) for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;
but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
receiving country, in relation to a non-citizen, means:
(a) a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or
(b) if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.
5H Meaning of refugee
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person is:
(a) in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or
(b) in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.
Note: For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.
5J Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:
(a) the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and
(b) there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(c) the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.
Note: For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.
(2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.
Note: For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.
(3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:
(a) conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or
(b) conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or
(c) without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:
(i)alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith;
(ii)conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;
(iii)alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;
(iv)conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;
(v)enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;
(vi)alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.
(4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):
(a) that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and
(b) the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and
(c) the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.
(5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:
(a) a threat to the person’s life or liberty;
(b) significant physical harassment of the person;
(c) significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;
(d) significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(e) denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(f) denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.
(6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.
5K Membership of a particular social group consisting of family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:
(a) disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and
(b) disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:
(i)the first person has ever experienced; or
(ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;
where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.
Note: Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.
5L Membership of a particular social group other than family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:
(a) a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and
(b) the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and
(c) any of the following apply:
(i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;
(ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;
(iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and
(d) the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.
5LA Effective protection measures
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:
(a) protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:
(i)the relevant State; or
(ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and
(b) the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.
(2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:
(a) the person can access the protection; and
(b) the protection is durable; and
(c) in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.
36 Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act
(2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:
(a) a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or
(aa) a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b) a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or
(c) a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.
(2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:
(a) the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or
(b) the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or
(c) the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or
(d) the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or
(e) the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.
(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:
(a) it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b) the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(c) the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.
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Citations1919942 (Refugee) [2023] AATA 3539
Cases Citing This Decision0
Cases Cited11
Statutory Material Cited0
Zheng v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 670AGA16 v MIBP [2018] FCA 628Zheng v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 670