BZAFM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BZAFM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 41

Citation: BZAFM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 41
Appeal from: BZAFM v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 1961
Parties: BZAFM v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: QUD 537 of 2014
Judges: ROBERTSON, GRIFFITHS AND MORTIMER JJ
Date of judgment: 24 March 2015
Corrigendum: 2 April 2015
Catchwords: MIGRATION – whether Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) applied the wrong test pursuant to s 91R(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – s 91R(2)(a) stated as an instance of serious harm, in relation to whether persecution involved serious harm to the person, a threat to the person’s life or liberty – whether by undertaking a qualitative assessment of the nature and degree of the harm experienced by the appellant when in detention in Sri Lanka on remand for illegal departure, the Tribunal failed to apply the correct test pursuant to s 91R(2)(a) and thereby fell into jurisdictional error – whether WZAPN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 947 (WZAPN) correctly decided
Held: appeal dismissed – WZAPN wrongly decided
Legislation:

Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 91R
Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No 6) 2001 (Cth)

The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951, as amended by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967 Arts 1A, 31, 33

Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast) [2011] OJ L337/16

Cases cited:

Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue [2009] HCA 41; (2009) 239 CLR 27
Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 71; (2003) 216 CLR 473
Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1997] HCA 4; (1997) 190 CLR 225

Canada (Attorney General) v Ward [1993] 2 SCR 689
Chan v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1995] 3 SCR 593
Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1989] HCA 62; (1989) 169 CLR 379

Chen Shi Hai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] HCA 19; (2000) 201 CLR 293
Cheung v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1993] 2 F.C. 314 (CA)
Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Agalianos [1955] HCA 27; (1955) 92 CLR 390
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd [2012] HCA 55; (2012) 250 CLR 503
Goldie v Commonwealth (No 2) [2004] FCA 156; (2004) 81 ALD 422
Gomez-Zuluaga v Attorney General of the United States 527 F. 3d 350 (3rd Cir 2008)

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Details
Case
[2015] FCAFC 41
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of BZAFM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant challenged the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) which had found that the appellant did not satisfy the requirements for a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The central legal issue was whether the Tribunal had applied the correct test when assessing whether the appellant's detention in Sri Lanka constituted "serious harm" for the purposes of a refugee claim. Specifically, the Court examined whether the Tribunal had erred by conducting a qualitative assessment of the harm experienced by the appellant, and if this amounted to a misapplication of s 91R(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

The Court found that the Tribunal had not misapplied the test in s 91R(2)(a) and that the decision in WZAPN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 947 was incorrect. The Court held that the assessment of whether harm is "serious" for the purposes of the Convention definition of a refugee is inherently a question of fact and degree. The Court emphasised that not every deprivation of liberty constitutes "serious harm" and that the Tribunal's qualitative assessment was not contrary to the statutory requirements. The Court further clarified that s 91R(2)(a) allows for such an assessment to determine if the harm is of a sufficient degree to be considered "serious". Therefore, the Tribunal's decision did not fall into jurisdictional error.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal. This decision underscores the importance of a nuanced approach to statutory interpretation, particularly in the context of refugee law, where the specific circumstances of each case must be carefully considered.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Decision

Reasons for decision

NYU J
In our view, it is unnecessary for the purposes of this appeal to choose between the competing academic approaches to the analysis of what kind of conduct may constitute “being persecuted” for the purposes of Art 1A. Whether or not the preferable analysis is to measure it against human rights norms, the point of referring to this approach in some detail here is to put beyond doubt that, on any view, the evaluation of whether what a person claims to fear is “serious harm” will be a question of fact and degree, often complicated and quite specific to the individual concerned, and involving consideration of domestic and international justifications for interference with, and limits placed on, the enjoyment of human rights in a particular country of nationality. CONCLUSION For the above reasons, and with great respect to North J, we do not consider that WZAPN correctly decided the construction of s 91R(2)(a). In our opinion, s 91R(2)(a) should not be construed as meaning that any deprivation of liberty constitutes serious harm for the purposes of s 91R(1)(b) and Art 1A(2). As the above analysis has sought to show, even if there was no error in his Honour’s examination of ss 91R(1) and (2) and the Convention concept of persecution by reference to “international human rights standards” (see his Honour’s reasons at [43]), an issue which need not be determined in this appeal, contrary to his Honour’s reasoning, neither those standards, nor the jurisprudence and commentary about those standards in refugee decision-making supports the proposition that any deprivation of liberty must constitute serious harm for the purpose of the Convention. In our opinion, the Tribunal did not misconstrue s 91R(2)(a) or ask itself the wrong question. As to the Minister’s reliance on what was said by Hayne J in SZWAU, we do not consider that that case assists in determining this appeal. The passages relied on reflect the particular facts in SZWAU, which were different from those here. In the present appeal, the identification of the social group relied on by the appellant and accepted by the Tribunal of “failed asylum seekers from a Western country” was not contested by the Minister. In this appeal, we do not find it necessary to decide the alternative argument by the Minister that the appellant cannot overcome the findings of fact which would mean that neither s 91R(1)(a) or (c) was satisfied: see the submission at [24]-[26] above. The appeal should be dismissed, with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: NYU J

The Minister further submitted that, once it was accepted that “persecution” for the purposes of Article 1A(2) involved evaluation by the Tribunal of whether the relevant harm was “serious harm”, the appeal must fail. The Minister emphasised that the Tribunal made a clear finding at [242]-[243] of its reasons that it was not satisfied that being questioned on arrival at the airport, and detained for a few days in possibly cramped and unsanitary conditions while on remand awaiting a bail hearing, could reasonably be seen as constituting “serious harm”.CONSIDERATION As this appeal was argued, the appellant’s submission was that any threat to his liberty involves serious harm to him within s 91R(1)(b). Thus, the appellant submitted, the Tribunal’s finding at [230] and [242], that there was a possibility of the appellant being held briefly on remand in poor conditions before being brought before a magistrate, sufficed to establish that serious harm for the purposes of s 91R(1)(b). As we have said above, the appellant expressly accepted he then needed to satisfy the remainder of s 91R(1), especially s 91R(1)(c). In the appellant’s submission, any detention or imprisonment for any period of time constituted serious harm and, if done for a Convention reason, would give rise to persecution unless the detention or imprisonment was authorised by a law of general application which was not applied discriminatorily. As particularised, the jurisdictional error was said to be “undergoing a qualitative assessment of the nature and degree of the harm experienced by the appellant when being questioned and investigations by the authorities at the airport and detention on remand for illegal departure”. Those submissions should be rejected. In our opinion, on its proper construction, s 91R does not forbid a qualitative assessment of claimed detention or imprisonment with a view to establishing whether or not it rises to the level of “serious harm” so as to constitute persecution, if the detention or imprisonment is for a Convention reason and the other aspects of s 91R are satisfied. Approach to construction of s 91R In accordance with the contemporary approach to statutory construction, legislative provisions such as s 91R of the Migration Act should be construed having regard to the text, considered in their context. As Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ stated in Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue [2009] HCA 41; (2009) 239 CLR 27 at [47] (citations omitted):This Court has stated on many occasions that the task of statutory construction must begin with a consideration of the text itself. Historical considerations and extrinsic materials cannot be relied on to displace the clear meaning of the text. The language which has actually been employed in the text of legislation is the surest guide to legislative intention. The meaning of the text may require consideration of the context, which includes the general purpose and policy of a provision, in particular the mischief it is seeking to remedy.