HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GLEESON CJ
GUMMOW, KIRBY, CALLINAN AND HEYDON JJVBAO APPELLANT
AND
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND
MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS
AFFAIRS & ANOR RESPONDENTSVBAO v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs
[2006] HCA 60
14 December 2006
M81/2006ORDER
Appeal dismissed with costs.
On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia
Representation
R M Niall with C G Fairfield for the appellant (instructed by Arnold Bloch Leibler)
P J Hanks QC with C J Horan for the first respondent (instructed by Clayton Utz)
Submitting appearance for the second respondent
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
GLEESON CJ AND KIRBY J. Depending upon context, the word "threat" can mean a communication of an intention to harm, or it can mean a likelihood of harm. The word has other meanings as well, but those are the two possibilities of present relevance. Where the word has the second of the two meanings mentioned, a communication of an intention to harm might be some evidence of a likelihood of harm, but, if there is an issue about the matter of threat, the question to be decided concerns the existence of the likelihood of harm.
The immediate context of present relevance is s 91R of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act"). The wider context is the whole Act and the provisions of the Refugees Convention referred to in s 91R. In deciding whether a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if sent or returned to a particular place, and whether, on that account, the person is entitled to a protection visa, the decision-maker is directed by s 91R that Art 1A(2) of the Convention does not apply in relation to persecution unless the persecution involves serious harm to the person. Section 91R(2)(a) gives, as an instance of serious harm, a threat to the person's life or liberty. The serious harm in question, by hypothesis, is future harm. Elsewhere in sub-s (2) of s 91R, the word "threatens" appears three times in a context where, clearly, it bears the second of the two meanings mentioned earlier.
Both the immediate and the wider context make it plain that, in s 91R(2)(a), "threat" is used in the second sense. A past communication of an intention to harm a person may, or may not, be some evidence that there is a likelihood of future harm to the person's life or liberty, but the question for the decision-maker is whether there is such a likelihood. The decision-maker is required to consider future persecution that involves serious harm, and one instance of such serious harm is a threat to life or liberty. The decision-maker is to decide the risk of future harm, not the risk of future communications. This accords with the view of s 91R(2)(a) that was taken by Marshall J in the present case, and by Crennan J in VBAS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural…
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- Case
- [2006] HCA 60
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether the phrase "threat to the person's life or liberty" referred to the likelihood of death or deprivation of liberty, or merely the communication of an intention to kill or deprive of liberty. Consequently, the court had to decide whether the mere expression of an intention to cause harm was sufficient to constitute "serious harm" under the Act, and whether the Refugee Review Tribunal had made findings of fact favourable to the appellant that would trigger the operation of section 91R.
The court reasoned that a "threat" in this context implies a communication of an intention to inflict harm, rather than the actual infliction of harm or a high probability of its infliction. The judges held that the expression of an intention to kill or to deprive of liberty, even if not immediately actionable or likely to be carried out, could constitute a threat to life or liberty. Therefore, such an expression could amount to "serious harm" for the purposes of section 91R. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: GLEESON CJ, KIRBY J, GUMMOW J, CALLINAN AND HEYDON JJ