1814447 (Refugee)

[2020] AATA 909

1814447 (Refugee) [2020] AATA 909 (16 January 2020)

DECISION RECORD

DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division

CASE NUMBER:  1814447

COUNTRY OF REFERENCE:                   Egypt

MEMBER:Shahyar Roushan

DATE:16 January 2020

PLACE OF DECISION:  Sydney

DECISION:The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the following directions:

(i)that the first named applicant satisfies s.36(2)(a) of the Migration Act; and

(ii)that the other applicants satisfy s.36(2)(b)(i) of the Migration Act, on the basis of membership of the same family unit as the first named applicant.

Statement made on 16 January 2020 at 11:30am

CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – protection visa – Egypt – Federal Circuit Court remittal – religion – Coptic Christianity – membership of particular social group – business owner – relatives killed in separate incidents – various attacks and threats to family members and friends – mental health and treatment – country information – status of Coptic Christians and women – members of family unit – decision under review remitted

LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5(1), 36(2)(a), (b)(i), 65, 91R(1)(b)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 2

CASES

SZBBP v MIMIA [2005] FMCA 5

SZBQJ v MIMIA [2005] FCA 143

VBAO v MIMIA (2006) 233 CLR 1

Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant.

STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

1. This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to refuse to grant the applicants protection visas under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).

   Background

2. [The first named applicant] is a [age]-year-old Coptic Christian. She is a national of Egypt. [The applicant] arrived in Australia [in] September 2012 with her children, [the second, third and fourth named applicants]. [The fifth named applicant] arrived separately on a visitor visa [in] October 2012. All applicants applied for protection visas on 5 December 2012. On 12 December 2013, a delegate of the Minister refused their protection visa applications. 

3. The applicants applied for a review of the delegate’s decision. On 4 November 2015, a differently constituted Tribunal (the first Tribunal) affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicants protection visas. In essence, the first Tribunal did not consider the applicants’ claims to be credible and rejected their claims for protection.

4. The applicants appealed the decision to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. [In] April 2018, the Court ordered that the first Tribunal’s decision be quashed, and the application be remitted back to the Tribunal to be determined according to law. The matter is now before the currently constituted Tribunal (the Tribunal) for reconsideration.

   CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE

   Evidence before the Department

   Protection visa applications

5. According to the applications, [the applicant] was born in [Egypt]. She resided at a single address in Alexandria before coming to Australia. Her mother and father reside in Cairo. She has [a number of] [siblings], who reside at various locations in Egypt. [One sibling] is deceased.

6. [The applicant] has been married twice. She married Mr [A] in 1980 and, following his untimely death, she married her second husband, Mr [B], in August 2000. [The applicant] had seven children from her first marriage, including [the fourth applicant] and [the fifth applicant]. Of the remaining five children, Mr [C] is an Australian citizen and resides in Australia; Mr [D] lives in Cairo, Ms [E] resides in [Country 1] and Ms [F] resides in [Country 2]. [The applicant]’s son, [Mr G], died [in] May 1999. [The applicant] also has two children from her second marriage, [the second applicant] and [the third applicant].

7. In a statement provided in support of her application for a protection visa, [the applicant] made the following claims.

8. She is a Coptic Christian from Alexandria, Egypt.  She married her first husband in 1980. [Mr A] was an [Occupation 1] who operated [a] company. As part of the business, he was involved in the construction of churches and monasteries. He also helped young males and females back to the church. He received threats from Islamic groups after construction of a church was approved on a plot of land facing the building he and his family owned and resided in.

9. [In] May 1999, [the applicant], her husband and four children were returning from a religious outing when a car crashed into their bus. Three garbed men emerged from the car. They attacked and killed [the applicant]’s husband and their son, [Mr G]. The perpetrators were not identified or apprehended.

10. [Mr A]’s brother, Mr [H], also owned shares and worked for [Mr A]’s company. He was also involved in looking after his brother’s children. [In] February 2000, [the applicant]’s brother-in-law was attacked and subsequently died.

11. [The applicant] was encouraged by the church to remarry. [In] September 2001, she married [Mr B], a Coptic Christian. [Mr B] was threatened by the ‘assassins’ to become a member of their group in exchange for taking [the applicant]’s money and properties. He was afraid of getting killed, so he escaped and vanished. [The applicant] would only see him every now and then in remote places, or in the churches and monasteries.

12. In 2007, there was a fight between a Muslim man, [Mr I], who rented a shop in [the applicant]’s building, and the janitor of the building, ‘under the pretext’ of a rent dispute. Mr [I], his son, and a group of ‘garbed hoodlums’ smashed all the Coptic shops in the building, including the office of the construction company. The janitor was also injured. A number of Muslims and Christians intervened, putting an end to the incident. A reconciliation report ordered Mr [I] and his son to pay for the damage and the cost of treatment in the hospital. The same killers are still at large without punishment.

13. [The applicant]’s brother, Mr [J], managed the construction company’s financial affairs. Since becoming involved in the company, he was stopped by a group of ‘fanatics’ who tried to force him to utter two Islamic testimonies. He refused and issued a report against them. A plotter discovered that [Mr J] had promissory notes drawn up against one of the [Occupation 2s] who owed him money. He conspired with the [Occupation 2] to kill [Mr J] because he is a ‘heathen Christian.’ [In] September 2010, [Mr J] was killed and the perpetrator was arrested, despite attempts by ‘terrorist groups’ to set him and his accomplice free.

14. On one occasion, a mob attacked a church during Sunday school, posing as soda sales representatives. A child drowned during this incident. Three of [the applicant]’s children, including [the fifth applicant] and [the third applicant], were also present and fled the scene.

    Submissions

15. On 5 December 2012, [the applicant]’s then representative submitted the following documents in support of the protection visa application:

    ·Certified translation of a report conducted by the Criminal Investigations Department in Egypt, dated [September] 2010, in relation to the death of Mr [J]. The report stated that Mr [J] was found in his apartment with a number of stab wounds to his body [earlier in] September 2010. Witnesses claimed that the victim had said the killer was [an Occupation 2] named [Mr K]. The Report further states that the killer has not been apprehended and investigations are ongoing.

    ·Translation of a document (undated) issued by the Dairab Negm Summary Court for Personal Affairs, confirming the death of [Mr A] and the distribution of his estate.

    ·Certified translations of birth and Baptism certificates for all applicants.

16. On 5 April 2013, [the applicant] submitted a letter from the Bishop of the Coptic Orthodox Diocese of [Australian city]. The letter stated that [the applicant] is a Coptic Orthodox Christian who resided in Egypt for most of her life. It also stated that [the applicant] and her family have been victims of religious persecution, which was a result of [Mr A]’s involvement in building of churches in Egypt.

17. On 28 June 2013, the applicant’s then representative made a submission, reporting that [the second applicant] and [the third applicant] were threatened and harassed by two Muslim boys in Australia after revealing that they are Coptic Christians.

    The interview

18. On 5 April 2013, [the applicant] attended a protection visa interview with the Department. Where relevant, the applicant’s oral evidence to the Department is referred to in the Tribunal's analysis below.

    The delegate’s decision

19. On 12 December 2013, a delegate of the Minister refused the applications. The delegate found the applicants’ claims to lack credibility. The delegate found that there is not a real chance of persecution should [the applicant] return to Egypt now or in the foreseeable future.  The delegate did not accept that the deaths of [the applicant]’s family members were as a result of their links to the construction company or their religion, or that [the applicant] and her second husband lived apart due to threats.  As the construction company is no longer operational, there is not a real chance of [the applicant] and her children being seriously harmed.

    Evidence before the first Tribunal

    Pre-hearing submissions

20. On 30 December 2013, the applicants applied for a review of the delegate’s decision.

21. In support of the application for review, [the applicant]’s then representative provided the following statutory declarations:

    a.Statutory declaration by [the applicant], dated 18 August 2014, essentially restating her claims to the Department and providing certain additional details.

    b.Statutory declaration by [the applicant]’s son, Mr [C], dated 18 August 2014. Mr [C] essentially supported his mother’s claims. He also claimed that he had received threats that he would be killed or imprisoned if he did not convert to Islam. From 2002, the police turned up at his house to arrest him for crimes he did not commit. He paid bribes to have the matters withdrawn or settled. He was prevented from applying for a [position] because he was not Muslim. His mother has been deeply affected by the death of her first husband, child, brother, and brother-in-law, her unhappy second marriage and the constant threats against her and her family.

    c.Statutory declaration by [the fifth applicant], dated 18 August 2014, essentially restating [the applicant]’s claims. She also made the following additional claims:

    ·In August 2010 she was at a church camp with two of her sisters. The church was attacked by Muslims who came to deliver [products]. The church people hid them and told the assailants that the [A] children had gone home when asked their whereabouts. One person was killed during this incident. Afterwards, [Mr B] had informed them they did this to force [the applicant] to convert. 

    ·[In] September 2011, a group of Muslims attacked their building and destroyed everything. Her mother was attacked and injured, resulting in a hospital admission.

    ·[In] March 2012, she was approached by three veiled women as she was leaving Church. She was told to convert to Islam and wear the hijab. She refused and was attacked. The women fled the scene.

    ·During her studies at [University], the atmosphere was ‘threatening’. She would only attend important lectures and leave as soon as the lecture was finished. If she was in a lecture theatre during Muslim prayer time, the doors would be locked and she could not leave.

    ·[In] June 2012, while being driven to University, she and the driver were attacked by Muslim extremists and subsequently hospitalised.

    ·[In] April 2012, she visited her sister, [Ms F], in [Country 2]. She consulted a [Country 2] lawyer who suggested the best option was for her to obtain a student visa. Her sister helped her apply to [a] University to [study]. She returned to Egypt to study [Country 2’s language]. She was then told by the [Country 2] Embassy that her student visa could not be processed because her [Country 2] language skills were too poor.

    d.Statutory Declaration by [the fourth applicant], dated 20 August 2014, essentially restating his mother’s claims regarding his father and uncle being killed by Muslim extremists. He also claimed that he did not have a normal school life. Whilst other Coptic children walked to school, he was driven by private car. He was never allowed to visit friends. Nobody wanted to associate with his family because of the attention they received from Muslims. [In] May 2012, his best friend, [Mr L], was shot by Muslim men who came to his friend’s house looking for him. He was too scared to be interviewed by police about this, and did not return to university afterwards. [Mr C]’s friend, [Mr M], who is [an Occupation 3], obtained a copy of the police report of this incident.

22. The applicant’s then representative, also submitted the following documents:

    a.Copy and translation of a preliminary medical report, dated [June] 2012, in relation to injuries sustained by [the fifth applicant].

    b.Copy and translation of a Police Investigation Report in relation to a complaint by [the fifth applicant], dated [June] 2012.

    c.Police Investigation results, dated [December] 2011.

    d.Copy and translation of a Police Investigation Report in relation to a complaint by [the fifth applicant], dated [March] 2012.

    e.Preliminary medical report of injuries sustained by [the applicant], dated [December] 2011.

    f.Copy and translation of a letter of support from Bishop [N] of the Coptic Orthodox Patriarchate, dated [May] 2014.

    g.Translation of a decision by the Ministry of Justice in Egypt, dated [June] 2014, essentially stating that [the applicant] had been charged with [two offences]. According to the document, [the applicant] was sentenced in absentia to imprisonment for seven years with labour.

    h.Copy and translation of a police report, dated [May] 2012, in relation to the incident involving Mr [L]. According to the report, Mr [L] had told police that his assailants had asked for [the fourth applicant] because they had problems with his family a while ago.

    i.Copy and translation of a police report, dated [May] 2012, stating that the police had visited [the fourth applicant]’s to interview him in relation to the incident involving Mr [L], but he was not home.

    j.Copy and translation of a letter, dated [May] 2012, stating a medical report was received, indicating that Mr [L] was attacked by anonymous people. He arrived at hospital with leg injuries caused by a bullet shot.

    k.News articles and reports in relation to religious freedom and the situation of Coptic Christians in Egypt.

23. A submission from [the applicant]’s migration agent, dated 24 October 2014, demonstrating the close relationship of [Mr A] with high ranking members of the Coptic Church. This includes:

    a.Copy and translation of a report in relation to the incident which led to the death of [Mr A].

    b.Copy and translation of [Mr A]’s death certificate.

    c.Copy and translation of a newspaper advertisement by the family in relation to [Mr A]’s death.

    d.Copy and translation of a tribute published in the newspaper.

    e.Copies of various photographs of the family with descriptions on the back. These include photographs of [Mr A] with Bishop [O], [the applicant] and her children.

    First Tribunal’s hearings

24. The applicants appeared before the first Tribunal to give oral evidence on 26 August 2014 (the first hearing) and 30 October 2014 (the second hearing). At both hearings, they were assisted by interpreters in the Arabic languages. They were also represented by their registered migration agent. Where relevant, the applicants’ evidence to the first Tribunal is referred to below.

    Post-hearing Submissions

25. On 18 November 2014, the applicants’ representative submitted a number of news articles and report in relation to the situation of Coptic Christians in Egypt. The representative also submitted copies of the various charges and infringement notices issued against Mr [C], in order to highlight the ‘ease at which false charges can be brought against people.’

26. On 3 December 2014, the applicant’s representative submitted a letter from the Coptic Archbishop of [Australian city], containing country information in relation to the current political situation in Egypt and its potential impact on the applicants as Coptic Orthodox Christians. The representative also submitted news articles in relation to the activities of ISIS in Egypt.

    The first Tribunal’s decision

27. On 4 November 2015, the Tribunal affirmed the Delegate’s decision to refuse the protection visa applications.

    Evidence before the present Tribunal

    The directions hearing

28. The applicants attended a ‘directions’ hearing on 17 April 2019. The hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Arabic and English languages. The applicant’s newly appointed representative, Mr [P], also attended the hearing. At the directions hearing, the Tribunal explained to the applicants the issues arising in the review before the Tribunal and the nature of the additional evidence that may be of use in addressing these issues. The Tribunal noted that it continues to share the same concerns raised by the first Tribunal at the previous hearings, which formed the basis of the first Tribunal's decision.

    Submission

29. On 27 May 2019, Mr [P] made a detailed submission, responding to the issues raised by the first Tribunal in its decision of 4 November 2015. Under the cover of the submission, Mr [P] provided a statutory declaration by [the applicant], dated 24 May 2019, and country information in support of the applicants’ claims. More specifically, this information related to the situation for Coptic Egyptians generally, the situation for Coptic Egyptians in Alexandria, situation for women and Coptic women in Egypt, and wealthy Coptic Christians in Egypt. Mr [P] also submitted the following documents:

    a.Report by the first applicant’s consultant Psychiatrist, Dr [Q], dated [May] 2019.

    b.Letter from Bishop [N] dated 7 January 2018, supporting the applicants’ protection claims.

    c.Letter from Father [R] of the Coptic Orthodox Diocese of [Australian city] and affiliated Regions, dated [May] 2019, stating that the applicants and [Mr A] were well known to Bishop [N] and the Coptic Orthodox Church in Egypt.

    d.Medical certificate from [a] Medical Centre, dated [May] 2019, stating that the first applicant has suffered chronic low back pain since [November] 2014.

    e.Annotated Google Maps image depicting [the applicant]’s last residential address in Alexandria, Egypt.

    f.Tribute published in a newspaper regarding the passing of Mr [A] and his son [Mr G], with English translations.

    g.Tribute published in a newspaper by Bishop [N] and Bishop [S] regarding the passing of Mr [A], with English translation.

    h.Annotated photographic evidence depicting Mr [A] in multiple settings, including with Bishop [N], and on a family holiday with the applicants.

    i.Two videos depicting the location and surrounds of the first applicants’ last residential address in Alexandria, Egypt. In the submission, the representative stated that the video footage was taken from the rooftop of her home. The surrounds include her church and the nearby [Mosque].

    The third hearing

30. The applicants appeared before the Tribunal on 5 June 2019 to give evidence and present arguments (the third hearing). The hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Arabic and English languages. Where relevant, the applicants’ oral evidence to the Tribunal is referred to below.

    The relevant law

1. The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s.36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s.36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, the applicant is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.

2. Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (together, the Refugees Convention, or the Convention).

3. Australia is a party to the Refugees Convention and generally speaking, has protection obligations in respect of people who are refugees as defined in Article 1 of the Convention. Article 1A(2) relevantly defines a refugee as any person who:

   owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

4. If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of a protection visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s.36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’).

5. In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s.499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs (the Department), and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.

   ANALYSIS, REASONS AND FINDINGS

6. For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the decision under review should be remitted for reconsideration.

   [The applicant]

7. In its detailed reasons and consideration of [the applicant]’s claims, the first Tribunal raised numerous concerns in relation to the credibility of her evidence and ultimately rejected many of her claims. These legitimate concerns, as seen through the evidentiary perspective of the first Tribunal, were all initially shared by the present Tribunal. However, after considering the whole of the evidence, whilst the Tribunal continues to share some of these concerns, for the reasons set out below, it has formed a different view as to the credibility of [the applicant]’s evidence.

8. Since applying for her protection visa in December 2012, [the applicant] has provided a number of written statements and statutory declarations in support of her claims. She has also provided lengthy oral evidence to the delegate, at two separate hearings before the first Tribunal and at a further hearing before the presently constituted Tribunal. On each occasion she was asked to recount and explain numerous incidents, which she claims to have experienced over a number of years. On each occasion, [the applicant] consistently referred to the same incidents. What has given rise to concerns in relation to her account of these incidents is essentially twofold: apparent implausible or vague explanations for why these incidents occurred or who was responsible; and certain elements or features of some of her claims apparently changing or evolving over time. Whilst these characteristics may suggest that aspects of [the applicant]’s evidence are unreliable, the Tribunal did not form the view that she has been untruthful or dishonest. Nor did the Tribunal form the view that she has been inclined to fabricate claims.

9. At the third hearing, [the applicant] struck the Tribunal as highly anxious, timid, vulnerable and somewhat naïve. This presentation appeared to be consistent with the manner of her presentation at previous hearings in so far as it could be gleaned from the relevant audio recordings. In recounting her experiences and delivering her evidence, the Tribunal formed a strong impression that [the applicant] genuinely believed her assumptions, theories and inferences regarding certain incidents or events to be unquestionably true. And, at times, she genuinely struggled to understand what was being put to her by the Tribunal in terms of implausibilities or other problematic aspects of her evidence.

   [Mr A]’s death

10. [Mr A] and his untimely death appear to be firmly embedded at the core of [the applicant]’s claims, shaping her perspective of many of her experiences and those of her children. The Tribunal accepts, on the basis of the evidence provided, that [Mr A] was an [Occupation 1] and the founder of [a company]. The Tribunal accepts that Mr [A] was a well-known member of the Coptic community in Alexandria and had a close relationship with a number of prominent figures within the Coptic Church hierarchy. The Tribunal accepts that he may have obtained permits and assisted in the building of ‘social service buildings’, which may have turned into unofficial churches. The Tribunal accepts that he had given donations and gifts and assisted in the restoration of monasteries. The Tribunal is also prepared to accept that, as a respected member of the Coptic community, [Mr A] may have been called upon at times to speak to and dissuade local young Coptic Christians perceived to be at risk of converting.

11. [The applicant]’s claims are essentially built on her husband’s profile and activities, by attributing incidents of claimed harm experienced by her, her children and other family members over a period of 13 years to largely unidentified Muslims who were motivated by their enmity towards [Mr A]. Whilst [the applicant] genuinely believes this to be the case, the Tribunal does not share her conviction.

12. [The applicant] claimed that [Mr A] had received threats from Islamists and Islamic groups. The Tribunal is prepared to accept that [Mr A]’s profile and activities may have attracted some opposition and threats from local Muslims. The evidence provided suggests that [Mr A]’s activities and his close association with the Coptic Church had spanned over a number of years. Nevertheless, according to [the applicant]’s evidence, until his death, these threats were never acted upon and [Mr A] and members of his family had not been harmed in any other way. [The applicant] claimed that the death of her husband was a consequence of the threats being materialised. The evidence before the Tribunal, however, does not support this contention.

13. The circumstances of [Mr A]’s death were tragic. According to [the applicant]’s evidence, in May 1999, the family were traveling on a bus, following a visit to [a] monastery in [Town]. Another vehicle crashed into the bus and the bus rolled. [The applicant] lost consciousness and woke up in the hospital. Other people who were on the bus told her later that three garbed men boarded the bus and killed [the applicant]’s husband and their son, [Mr G]. The perpetrators were not identified or apprehended. [The applicant] claimed that the accident was deliberately staged in order to kill [Mr A]. Whilst the Tribunal accepts that both [Mr A] and [Mr G] had died after the bus overturned, it does not accept that their deaths were the result of a deliberately staged crash by Islamists designed to kill [Mr A]. As it was put to [the applicant], such an elaborate and complex scheme to murder Mrs [A] appears far-fetched and fanciful. The Tribunal does not accept [the applicant]’s explanations that Islamists had not attempted to harm [Mr A] as he carried out his business and church activities on a daily basis in Alexandria because he was always accompanied by two security guards. More importantly, as noted by the first Tribunal, had a well-known member of the Coptic community faced such an attack by Islamists, it would be reasonable to expect there would have been some mention of this in reports or Coptic Christian sources. Indeed, the documentary evidence provided in relation to the deaths does not support, even tentatively, [the applicant]’s inferences. For example, a copy of a statement by two individuals who sighted the police report on the incident refers to the bus hitting a car that stopped across the road and is devoid of any references suggesting the deaths were the result of an attack by Islamists. The Tribunal does not accept that general lack of reporting of incidents involving Coptic Christians or that the internet was not in such widespread use at that time constitute satisfactory explanations.

14. The Tribunal does not accept that the deaths of [Mr A] and [Mr G] were caused by unidentified Islamists who objected to his activities.

    [Mr H]

15. Similarly, [the applicant] was firmly of the view that [Mr A]’s brother, [Mr H], was attacked and killed because he owned shares in and took over the running of [Mr A]’s company following his death. In her evidence to the first Tribunal, she stated that [Mr H] offered money and building materials to the church and Islamists were afraid that maybe [Mr H] would continue his brother’s job. However, throughout the process no persuasive evidence was provided that [Mr H] was killed by Islamists and for the reasons offered by [the applicant]. At the third hearing, the Tribunal questioned [the applicant] in relation to the circumstances of [Mr H]’s death. She stated that he was in his car and ‘the same Muslim fanatics’ stopped his car and beat him. When asked how she knew this, she said they had called and threatened him. When it was put to her that she has submitted no other evidence, including news or police reports to suggest that [Mr H] was killed by Islamists, she said the incident happened in 2000, social media was not available at that time and newspapers did not publish incidents involving Christian victims. In relation to the absence of a police report, she stated that the police treated it as ‘common procedure’. When asked if this was her assumption, she said ‘yes.’ There was no other evidence before the Tribunal in relation to the circumstances of [Mr H]’s death. Whilst the Tribunal accepts that [Mr H] died in February 2000, the Tribunal does not accept that [Mr H] was killed by Islamists or that his death was related to his role in [the company] or because he was a prominent Coptic businessman.

    [Mr J]

16. In contrast to the previous two incidents, the documentary evidence submitted indicated that [the applicant]’s brother, [Mr J], had been murdered at his home in Cairo by a particular individual in September 2010. This documentary evidence was not consistent with [the applicant]’s firmly held view that Islamists had conspired to kill him because he was managing [the company]’s financial affairs and they saw him as a ‘heathen Christian.’ This evidence, which the Tribunal accepts, indicates that [Mr J] was killed [in] September 2010 in his Cairo home by his [Occupation 2] with whom he had a financial dispute. In her evidence to the Tribunal, [the applicant] was unable to explain how exactly she had reached the conclusion that Islamists had conspired with the [Occupation 2], who owed [Mr J] money, to murder him. Whilst she acknowledged that there was a financial dimension to the dispute, she insisted that the murder was a plot hatched by Islamists. The Tribunal considers [the applicant]’s claims in relation to the circumstances of her brother’s murder to be far-fetched and a product of her own beliefs. The Tribunal does not accept that [Mr J]’s tragic death was connected with his role in [the company], his membership of [Mr A]’s family or because he refused to convert to Islam. The Tribunal does not accept that Islamists or [Mr A]’s enemies conspired with the [Occupation 2] to kill [Mr J].

    [Mr B]

17. In her submissions to the Department, [the applicant] claimed that she was in a committed spousal relationship with [Mr B] and that, even after he left Alexandria, she would occasionally see him in remote places such as in a church or monastery. She claimed that the same people who killed [Mr A] offered [Mr B] a ‘dirty bargain’ to be a member and ‘chief’ of their group in exchange for taking [the applicant]’s money and properties. She claimed that [Mr B] left Alexandria as a result of this pressure, as well as Muslim extremists attempting to convert him to Islam. The evidence given by [the applicant] and her children to the first Tribunal, however, indicates that she and [Mr B] did not get along and frequently had disputes about money. [The applicant] also claimed [Mr B] was threatened with death if he did not convince her and her children to convert to Islam. At the third hearing, [the applicant] did not provide a persuasive reason as to why her account regarding [Mr B] had changed. She explained, however, that [Mr B] was ‘materialistic’ and had married her because he was after her money. There were many issues and they always argued over money. He was approached by Islamists because they knew he was weak and materialistic. They wanted him to pressure her to convert to Islam so that he could have all her money. He was assigned by them as the leader of their group. They told him if he did not do what they wanted him to do, he would face harm. At the end, he decided to leave.

18. [The applicant]’s account of [Mr B]’s highly implausible experiences appear to have been based, at least partly, on what she had been told by [Mr B]. At the third hearing, [the applicant] was unable to provide any further specific details regarding the Islamists who had targeted [Mr B] in this fashion. Nor was she able to provide any persuasive explanation as to why [Mr B] had not faced any harm by the group despite not converting to Islam and failing to convert her. Nor did she offer a satisfactory explanation as to why Islamists or fanatical Muslims would ask a Coptic Christian and member of a family they have been targeting to join them and be their leader, even if he converted. The Tribunal finds all of [the applicant]’s claims regarding [Mr B] and his perceived communication, encounters or collusions with Islamists or any Islamic group unreliable, far-fetched and fanciful. The Tribunal does not accept any of her claims in this regard. The Tribunal finds that [the applicant] and [Mr B] had a very unhappy marriage and that disputes over finances had significantly contributed to the deterioration of the marriage. The Tribunal is of the view that [Mr B] had exploited [the applicant]’s vulnerability and naivety, fuelling her perpetual paranoia of Islamists who were out to get her and her family.

    Sunday school

19. Another claim made by [the applicant] concerned an attack on a Sunday school in August 2010. In her written evidence to the Department, [the applicant] claimed that a mob attacked a church during Sunday school, posing as [product] sales representatives. A child drowned during this incident. Three of [the applicant]’s children, including [the fifth applicant] and [the third applicant], were also present and fled the scene. [The applicant] did not claim that her children had been specifically targeted during this incident. Before the first Tribunal, however, she claimed for the first time that the attack was specifically orchestrated to target her children. She claimed that, upon seeing her daughters go to a Sunday school on a church bus, Muslim men followed the bus and brought a small truck to disguise themselves as [product] sellers, in order to attack her daughters. When they entered the compound they started to attack everyone, including the children and priests. They asked about [Mr A]’s children, but the church workers locked the girls inside for their safety until she was able to send a driver to retrieve them. They wanted to kidnap [the third applicant] and because many people were in the camp, a girl drowned.

20. At the third hearing, in addition to the changes in her evidence, it was put to [the applicant] that her claims regarding this incident appear to be highly implausible and far-fetched. In response, she stated that her children were always accompanied by a driver or guard. ‘They’ tried to kidnap the children many times, but they failed because the children screamed and the guard protected them. She reiterated the account of the incident provided to the first Tribunal. She added that the assailants thought a little girl was [the third applicant] and when they went for her, she fell in the pool and drowned. [The applicant], however, did not provide a satisfactory explanation for her evolving evidence. In particular, it is inexplicable as to why she had not disclosed to the Department that her children had been specifically targeted. Further, the Tribunal remains concerned and considers it highly implausible that Muslims from the local mosque would hatch such an elaborate and complex plot, impromptu, in order to target the children in this fashion when they all resided in a building across the road from the local mosque. The Tribunal does not accept that these presumed attackers were ordinarily deterred by screams or the presence of a single guard or a driver, but on this occasion they were undeterred by the presence of a large number of other children, priests and church workers, who were all screaming in fear, at a Church Sunday school.

21. At the third hearing, the Tribunal sought clarification from [the fifth applicant], who had been present during the incident. [The fifth applicant] told the Tribunal that those who had attacked the Sunday school were after [the third applicant], because [Mr B] had not followed their instructions. As it was put to her, according to her mother’s evidence, [Mr B] had departed Alexandria in 2005 as a result of the pressure being put on him by Islamists. [The fifth applicant] was unable to satisfactorily explain why these Islamists would want to kidnap [the third applicant] at a Sunday school for [Mr B]’s failure to follow their wishes five years earlier. Nor was she able to offer any explanation as to why, instead of locating [Mr B] over a period of five years, such an elaborate plan was hatched to kidnap [the third applicant].

22. The Tribunal considers the accounts of the 2010 incident provided by [the applicant] and [the fifth applicant] to be far-fetched and highly implausible. The Tribunal does not accept that Muslim men disguised as [product] sellers had attacked a Sunday school, intending to harm any of [the applicant]’s daughters or, more specifically, to kidnap [the third applicant]. The Tribunal is not persuaded that the incident was religiously motivated. The Tribunal does not accept that the drowning of a child was caused by these men. Nevertheless, consistently with its observations above, the Tribunal is of the view that, rather than having presented a deliberately false account, [the applicant] genuinely believes her conspiracy-laced narrative of this incident.

    [Mr C]

23. [The applicant] made claims, supported by [Mr C]’s evidence that, when he was still in Egypt, [Mr C] was frequently threatened to convert to Islam by the same people who had targeted his father. He was also arrested on false charges and had further false charges made against him after he moved to Australia. Given that [Mr A]’s alleged killers had never been identified, it is difficult to accept that [Mr C] was frequently threatened to convert to Islam by the same people. In view of the Tribunal's findings above, the Tribunal does not accept that [Mr C], or any of [the applicant]’s other children were threatened to convert as claimed in this manner. The evidence given by [the applicant] and [Mr C] also suggests that the claimed incidents in which [Mr C] was arrested on false charges were orchestrated by the same Muslims, motivated by their hatred of [Mr A], who used their connections with the local council to report him for [a business-related matter]. At the third hearing, [Mr C] told the Tribunal that the offences were related to [two business-related matters]. He was studying and was not involved in his father’s business at that time. He was asked why these individuals had targeted him through such an elaborate and specific scheme, when it appears that they had consistently used threats and violence against other family members. He responded that it was very difficult for anyone to physically assault him. He was very careful in his movements and did not give anyone a chance to harm him. Nevertheless, he acknowledged that he regularly travelled to university to attend to his studies over a number of years. The applicants provided to the first Tribunal several copies of infringement notices issued to [Mr C] between 2002 and 2004. The Tribunal, however, does not accept that the allegations made and the charges against [Mr C] were falsely made because of his relationship to his father. The Tribunal is prepared to accept that [Mr C] had faced some discrimination at university for the reason of his Coptic Christian faith. However, the Tribunal does not accept that he was falsely charged, arrested and taken to court. The Tribunal does not accept that false charges were made against his after he left Egypt or that his [Occupation 3] friend, [Mr M], had to bribe police to get rid of such charges.

1. The evidence before the Tribunal suggests that, before the first Tribunal hearing, [Mr C] had asked his purported friend, [Mr M], about any developments and he had found a court order against [the applicant] for [offences]. [Mr C] had informed his mother of the existence of the document only shortly before the hearing because he was worried about her state of health.

2. The Tribunal shares the first Tribunal's significant concerns regarding this document. The document refers to [the applicant]’s marriage to [Mr B] as having taken place [in] August 2000. This is the same marriage date set out in [the applicant]’s original statement to the Department, which she subsequently claimed to be incorrect. The Tribunal accepts [the applicant]’s oral evidence to the Department and at review that the correct date of her marriage to [Mr B] is [September] 2001. However, the fact that the exact same incorrect date for [the applicant]’s marriage to [Mr B] is reflected in an official Egyptian public prosecution decision, dated [June] 2014, raises serious concerns in relation to the reliability of the documents. It was essentially explained that that the applicants’ previous [Occupation 3] had given the wrong date to someone in Egypt in order to obtain the document. This appears inconsistent with the claim that [Mr M] had discovered the existence of this document upon doing checks shortly before the first hearing.

3. At the third hearing, the Tribunal discussed its concerns with [the applicant] and [Mr C]. Both reiterated that the applicants’ previous migration agent had given the wrong date to [Mr M], who then produced the document. It is unclear why the [June] 2014 decision purportedly issued by the Ministry of Justice in Egypt was in anyway contingent upon a marriage date being provided to a lawyer in Egypt by the applicants’ previous migration agent in Australia. The Tribunal also found [Mr C] to be persistently vague and evasive when questioned about his relationship with [Mr M], details in relation to [Mr M]’s employment and his communication with him. No further documents or evidence that the authorities are pursuing [the applicant] in connection with the purported decision was submitted to the Tribunal. The Tribunal has serious doubts in relation to the genuineness of the document and does not place any weight on its contents. The Tribunal does not accept that [the applicant] has been charged or convicted in relation to any offences in Egypt.

   Mobs

4. [The applicant] also referred to two incidents which occurred at her residential building in Alexandria. The first incident occurred in 2007 and involved a skirmish between a Muslim renting a shop ([Mr I]) and their building janitor under the pretext of rent payments. [Mr I], his son and a group of hoodlums started smashing all Coptic shops in the building including the construction company office, injuring the janitor. The incident finished after the intervention of other members of the community. The second incident occurred in December 2011, when, following Friday prayers, a mob attacked her building and the [company] office, injuring her and destroying property. According to the relevant police report submitted, the mob had attacked and looted all the shops. Whilst the Tribunal is prepared to accept that these incidents had taken place and may have had a religious dimension, it is not persuaded, contrary to [the applicant]’s firm beliefs, that she was specifically targeted for the reason of her membership of her first husband’s family or her involvement with his company. The Tribunal finds that the first incident was the result of a specific and unrelated event, being a monetary dispute between [Mr I] and the building’s janitor. The second incident appears to have occurred during the multi-stage elections for the first post-Mubarak parliament, resulting in the Muslim Brotherhood winning nearly half the seats.[1] The Tribunal finds this incident to be attributable to local Muslims targeting Christian properties in the area in the context of the volatility of the political situation and heightened sectarian tensions at that particular period of time.

   Future harm

   [1] See ‘A timeline of key events in Egypt since the 2011 uprising’, The Associated Press, 25 March 2018,

5. The Tribunal has rejected [the applicant]’s claims that she and members of her family were targeted for harm due to their relationship with [Mr A] or because of his involvement with the church and his business, including assisting in building and renovating Coptic churches and monasteries. The Tribunal does not accept that she would face a real chance or a real risk of harm in the future due to her relationship with her husband. In reaching this view, the Tribunal has taken into account [the applicant]’s failure throughout the process to identify or refer to any particular individual or group being responsible for the various events and experiences she has attributed to those opposed to him. Rather, she has referred, interchangeably, to fanatics, extremists, Salafists, terrorists, Muslim men, bearded men, garbed men, people in the mosque, etc, who all presumably formed a single entity with a common motive that, over a significant period of time, was ceaselessly intent on harming or converting her and her family through a variety of disparate means. Before the first Tribunal, after being pressed, she referred to three generic names. However, the remainder of her evidence was devoid of any persuasive details to link any of these individuals to any particular event. The Tribunal does not accept [the applicant]’s assumptions to be factual or reliable.

6. Nevertheless, the Tribunal has found that [the applicant] genuinely believes her assumptions and inferences regarding [Mr A] and his link to her experiences and those of her family members in Egypt. The Tribunal has been left with no doubt that the tragic deaths of [Mr A] and [Mr G] in her presence have had an unimaginable and grievous effect on [the applicant]. The resulting emotional and psychological wounds have been lasting. These wounds were torn open and further deepened with the death of [Mr H] and the violent murder of [Mr J]. [The applicant] had formed an unshakable conviction that the deaths of her husband and her child were caused by ‘fanatics’ who objected to [Mr A]’s activities. This conviction informed every other subsequent incident and experience. This conviction had also caused [the applicant] to be extremely fearful. The Tribunal also considers it reasonable to expect that [the applicant]’s assumptions and convictions had profoundly influenced her children’s views as they grew up in her grieving household. For example, [the fifth applicant] and [the fourth applicant] were [age] and [age] old respectively when their father died.

7. The Tribunal has carefully considered the psychiatric evidence submitted by Mr [P]. This evidence consists of two letters by Dr [Q], [a psychiatrist] at [a] Hospital, dated [May] 2019 and [June] 2019. In his letters, Dr [Q] diagnosed [the applicant] with an adjustment disorder with depressed and anxious mood, accompanied by features of post-traumatic stress disorder. He further stated that [the applicant]’s disorder has its origins in her exposure to stress and her symptoms are characterised by anxiety, flashbacks, nightmares and a generalised increase in her level of stress and anxiety. Dr [Q] noted that [the applicant]’s return to Egypt would ‘almost certainly’ result in a deterioration of her mental health ‘given that she would be insecure both in her-day-to-day matters and with regards to the future and the memories of the trauma would almost certainly be stronger.’ The Tribunal accepts this evidence.

8. The Tribunal has considered whether [the applicant] would face harm in Egypt because of her religion, as well as other reasons.

9. DFAT’s most recent report on Egypt provides the following general information in relation to Coptic Christians:

   Christianity was established in Egypt in the first century and is one of the oldest centres of Christianity in the world. Although there are twelve officially recognised Christian denominations in Egypt (four Orthodox, seven Catholic and one Protestant), the vast majority of Christians in Egypt are members of the Coptic Orthodox Church. All those belonging to recognised Christian denominations are identified as Christian on their national ID cards. While Christians reside throughout the country, they are particularly concentrated in Upper Egypt (the southern part of Egypt) and in major cities such as Cairo and Alexandria. Suburbs in Cairo and other cities and some villages are sometimes regarded or described as ‘Christian areas’, but few are exclusively Christian (or Muslim). Egyptian Christians are politically and socio-economically diverse: they hold varied professions; range from the very poor to the very rich; and have attained a range of education levels.

   3.32 Christians generally dress similarly to Muslim Egyptians. In urban areas, however, Christian women are more likely than Muslim women to leave their hair uncovered. Christian women living in rural or conservative areas are more likely to cover their hair, but generally do not wear the Islamic hijab. Christians tend to have identifiable names. Some Christians tattoo small crosses on the inside of their wrists or between their thumb and forefinger as a mark of their identity, often following visits to monasteries or holy sites. Not all Christians have these tattoos and it is not a mandatory religious practice.

   3.33 There are no legal barriers to prevent Christians from being visible in public life, and a number of Christians have become prominent and influential in Egyptian politics and business. DFAT understands that the percentage of Christians in the Egyptian civil service is broadly representative of the religious breakdown of the population. However, Christians tend to be under-represented in senior civil servant roles, and in the upper ranks of the military and security services. It is very rare for Christians to be appointed as presidents, deans or vice-deans in public universities. While anti-discriminatory laws and legal protections exist, these are not always enforced fairly and Christians may experience some discrimination, particularly in rural areas.

10. With regard to the 2011 Egyptian Revolution and its aftermath, DFAT stated:

    2.38 Egypt experienced a major decline in law and order in the wake of the 2011 Revolution. A sizeable increase in violent crime, civil unrest and terrorist attacks at this time affected all Egyptians. There was a significant growth in communal violence, which impacted particularly on the Christian community.

    …

    3.34 Most Christians viewed the post-2011 Revolution ascendency of the Muslim Brotherhood with considerable apprehension. They regarded the Morsi government’s removal and the restoration of general law and order as a cause for relief, and strongly supported the ascendency of Sisi to the presidency. Many Christians and representatives of other minority faiths report that while things could always improve, they generally consider themselves better protected under President Sisi than previous Egyptian leaders. Christian religious authorities have consistently expressed appreciation for Sisi’s public messaging which has called upon Egyptians to place national unity above religious differences, and for his personal example: in 2015, Sisi became the first Egyptian head of state to attend Christmas mass at the St. Mark’s Cathedral in Cairo and has attended every year since. Sisi has actively engaged with the Christian community, declaring days of national mourning or calling personally on Pope Tawadros to express his condolences following terrorist attacks against Christians …. Local sources report that Christians generally remain strong supporters of Sisi, although (like other Egyptians) their initial enthusiasm has waned due to the lack of economic improvement and ongoing social difficulties in Egypt.

    …

    3.36 DFAT assesses that Christians face a moderate risk of discrimination that is more likely to be societal than official in nature, and is likely to vary considerably according to geographic location. Christians, particularly in rural areas, may face difficulty in obtaining justice through legal means …. Despite the lack of any official policy of discrimination, Christians remain less likely than Muslims to be able to achieve senior positions in institutions such as the civil service, military and security services, and universities.[2]

    [2] DFAT, DFAT Country Information Report Egypt, 17 June 2019.

11. In relation to recent terrorist attacks on Christians and communal violence in Egypt, DFAT provided the following information:

    3.21 In December 2016, a suicide bomber targeted a church service at a chapel adjoining St Mark’s Cathedral in Cairo, killing 29 and injuring 49. Following the previously mentioned February 2017 attacks in el Arish, IS claimed responsibility for two major attacks against Palm Sunday church services on 9 April 2017. The first attack occurred at a service in Tanta, killing 27 people and injuring over 70. The second attack occurred at a cathedral in Alexandria. At least 16 people were killed and 66 people were injured in the Alexandria attack: Pope Tawadros was saying mass at the cathedral at the time, but escaped unharmed. In May 2017 in Minya, a gunman opened fire on a bus and killed 29 people who refused to renounce their faith. In November 2018, militants ambushed three buses carrying Christian pilgrims to a remote desert monastery south of Cairo, killing seven and wounding 19. In addition to these attacks, security services have reportedly thwarted a number of attempted attacks.

    3.22 Most communal incidents in Egypt take the form of vandalism and destruction of property. The large-scale anti-Christian violence that occurred in 2011 and 2013 notwithstanding (see Security Situation), high-profile incidents in which people are killed or churches attacked are not a frequent occurrence.

    3.23 A general breakdown in law and order nationwide occurred in the years following the 2011 Revolution, peaking in the period leading up to and immediately following the July 2013 military intervention, and again in the aftermath of the August 2013 dispersals of pro-Morsi protests in Cairo. On these occasions, Muslim Brotherhood members and supporters attacked Christian targets across the country, including churches, schools, and private property. [3]

    …

    326 DFAT assesses that while Egyptian authorities are generally committed to preventing communal violence, this commitment may vary between individuals and locations. Occasional violent incidents of communal violence are likely to continue to occur, especially in Upper Egypt and in Minya in particular. Most cases are likely to be the result of small-scale localised disputes that take on a religious dimension.

    [3] Ibid.

12. The Tribunal has also considered the country information provided by the applicants in support of their claims throughout the process. The Tribunal accepts that terrorist acts have been perpetrated by extremist groups who target the Christian community in Egypt. The Tribunal finds, however, that the attacks although targeted are sporadic and isolated in nature. The Tribunal also notes that the Sisi government has shown significant support for the Coptic community in the face of these attacks.[4] Reports confirm that the Coptic Orthodox Church has expressed confidence in the efforts of the Egyptian state in protecting Copts against sectarian violence. For example, in March 2017, the Coptic Pope said that Copts face problems but they are minor and should be dealt with case by case.[5] He said that the state is doing its best to secure churches, and that he could ask no more of the government in this regard.[6] The Tribunal accepts that Islamic State in Egypt is increasingly targeting Coptic Christians particularly in far-off Upper Egypt. The Tribunal is not however satisfied that all Coptic Christians are at risk of being targeted by Muslims or the authorities in Egypt. The Tribunal finds that the current government is attempting to improve the security situation for Copts living in Egypt. The Tribunal finds that Coptic Christians, without more, do not face a real chance or a real risk of facing serious or significant harm in Egypt at the hands of terrorist organisations or as a consequence of sectarian violence. There is no persuasive evidence before the Tribunal that would suggest that Coptic Christians are denied the right to practise their religion by Egyptian law or government practice.

    [4] See ‘Are Copts at risk because of their Sisi support?’, The New Arab, 14 March 2017, CXC9040663760; 2015 Report on International Religious Freedom – Egypt’, US Department of State, 10 August 2016, p.1, OGD95BE926698; Analysis: Egyptians see failed security in church attacks’, CNN, 09 April 2017, CXC9040665529; and ‘Egypt govt to compensate victims of Minya attack on Coptic Christians’, Ahram Online, 27 May 2017, CXC9040668195.

    [5] ‘Coptic Pope Tawadros II attempts to reassure Egyptians after attacks on North Sinai Christians’, Ahram Online, 28 March 2017, CXC904066474

    [6] ‘Coptic Pope Tawadros II attempts to reassure Egyptians after attacks on North Sinai Christians’, Ahram Online, 28 March 2017, CXC904066474

13. The Tribunal, however, has taken [the applicant]’s particular circumstances into account in making its assessment. The Tribunal accepts that she and her children resided in a building in Alexandria that was in a very close proximity to a mosque. [The applicant] appears to have genuinely felt vulnerable, viewing the mosque and all those attending the mosque as a threat to her safety. The Tribunal is prepared to accept that [the applicant] was subjected to harassment and acts of discrimination, including verbal abuse and taunts due to her Christian faith on a reasonably regular basis in her neighbourhood. The Tribunal has accepted [the applicant]’s account of the two incidents in 2007 and 2011. Whilst the Tribunal has rejected that she was specifically targeted, the Tribunal accepts that there may have been a religious dimension to these incidents, which had made [the applicant] very fearful. The Tribunal further accepts that the 2011 Revolution and the Muslim Brotherhood’s ascension to power had further exacerbated [the applicant]’s extreme fears. Notwithstanding its findings above, the Tribunal is mindful of DFAT’s assessment that occasional violent incidents of communal violence are likely to continue to occur in Egypt. The Tribunal further accepts that Alexandria has a conservative Salafist presence[7] and that there have been incidents of violence against Copts in that city in the past. The Tribunal finds that if [the applicant] were to return to Egypt, she will continue to reside in the building she owns and resided in before her departure. The Tribunal has accepted Dr [Q]’s evidence and considers [the applicant] to be psychologically vulnerable. The Tribunal is of the view that the likely psychological pressure brought to bear upon the applicant through any harassment or discrimination by means of verbal abuse or violence, albeit occasional or sporadic, cannot be discounted.[8]  

    [7] Al Jazeera ‘Egypt’s Salafi surprise’, 14 January 2013, See, for example, SZBQJ v MIMIA [2005] FCA 143 (Tamberlin J, 28 February 2005); SZBBP v MIMIA [2005] FMCA 5 (Driver FM, 18 January 2005); and VBAO v MIMIA (2006) 233 CLR 1.

14. Having regard to [the applicant]’s particular circumstances, the Tribunal is satisfied that, if she were to return to Egypt, there is a real chance that she would be subjected to the harassment and discrimination she has been subjected to in the past. The Tribunal is satisfied that, in view of [the applicant]’s vulnerability, this discrimination would be at an oppressive level to the extent that would amount to persecution within the meaning of s.91R(1)(b) of the Act. The Tribunal is satisfied that the essential and significant reason for the persecution feared is the applicant’s religion. On the basis of the evidence before it, the Tribunal is not satisfied that State protection is available to the applicant in Egypt. In view of her circumstances, including her psychological and physical health, the Tribunal is not satisfied that [the applicant] would be able avoid the harm she fears by internally relocating within Egypt. The Tribunal, therefore, is satisfied that she has a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. The Tribunal is satisfied that [the applicant] is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention. Therefore the applicant satisfies the criterion set out in s.36(2)(a).

    [The fifth applicant]

1. In her evidence, [the fifth applicant] referred to some specific incidents in 2010, March 2012 and June 2012, which she attributed to Islamists targeting her for being [Mr A]’s daughter. She also made more general claims, stating that she was subjected to discrimination and was always threatened with death, kidnapping and other harm.  

2. With regard to the incident in June 2012, she claimed that she was attacked by Muslim extremists whilst being driven to the university. At the third hearing, she stated that she was accompanied by a guard but he could not do anything to save her. When it was put to her that she had never previously mentioned that she had been accompanied by a guard, she said she had forgotten and that it was easy to forget some things. She was asked how she knew this was not just a random incident at a time of heightened tensions. She said this was not the only incident, but she could not obtain a police report in relation to the others. Whilst the Tribunal accepts that the vehicle [the fifth applicant] was travelling on was attacked by a mob on that day, the Tribunal is not persuaded that [the fifth applicant] was specifically targeted.

3. In relation to the March 2012 incident, she claimed that she was approached by three veiled women as she was leaving the church. She was told to convert to Islam and wear the hijab. The women beat her, swore at her and tried to cut her hair. At the third hearing, she reiterated that she had been singled out and targeted because of her relationship with her father. The Tribunal has already made findings in relation to the August 2010 incident, rejecting the claim that [the applicant]’s daughter had been specifically targeted. The Tribunal has also rejected the claims made by [the applicant] and [Mr C] that [Mr A]’s death and all claimed incidents occurring following his death were attributable to his profile, his business or church activities. Whilst the Tribunal accepts that [the fifth applicant] might have had a random encounter with a small group of Muslim women who had verbally abused her for the reason of her Christian faith at a time of high political and sectarian tensions in Egypt,[9] it does not accept that she had been singled out because she was her father’s daughter. Nor does the Tribunal accept that she was told to convert to Islam.

   [9] See, for example, DFAT, DFAT Country Information Report - Egypt, 28 January 2014, referring to

4. The Tribunal accepts that [the fifth applicant] attended the [Subject 2] faculty of [a] University, where the majority of students and academic staff are Muslims. The Tribunal is also prepared to accept that the Quran was recited and discussed in situations where she had felt that she had no option but to listen or participate. The Tribunal appreciates that this, together with adverse comments being made against Christians, had made her feel uneasy and apprehensive. It does not accept, however, that her experiences at university amount to serious or significant harm.

5. Finally, whilst the Tribunal is prepared to accept that [the fifth applicant], from time to time, was exposed to verbal abuse and low level discrimination in her locality and at university, heightened at times by unfolding political events, the Tribunal does not accept her claims that she was always threatened with death, kidnapping and other harm, including during her time at university. In her evidence throughout the process, she has provided no other meaningful details regarding these claimed incidents. The specific incidents she has referred to consistently in her claims have been addressed by the Tribunal.

6. The Tribunal has rejected the claims that [the fifth applicant] was targeted for harm due to her relationship with her father in the past and does not accept that there is a real chance or a real risk that she would be targeted in the foreseeable future for this reason. 

7. The Tribunal has considered the claim that the applicants are at risk of harm due to their membership of the particular social group of ‘wealthy Coptic Christians in Egypt’. However, there was no persuasive evidence in any of the sources consulted by the Tribunal to suggest that this is the case. The Tribunal has considered the news reports provided by the applicants, particularly the two news reports referred to by Mr [P] in his submission of 27 May 2019. Whilst these articles indicate that some Muslims in Egypt perceive Copts to be wealthy or a ‘favoured class’, there was no other recent information to suggest that Coptic Christians are targeted for harm for this reason. The Tribunal notes that previously the applicants had submitted one Christian news article referring to the targeting of Christians for kidnapping because of their perceived wealth. However, that article, which predates the first hearing, refers to incidents in poor rural areas in Upper Egypt where historically Christians have been more vulnerable to acts of violence.[10]

   [10] See DFAT, ibid, and DFAT, n 2, above.

8. The Tribunal appreciates that the majority of Egyptian women, regardless of religion or socio-economic status, face societal discrimination ‘in that long-standing traditional values and gender roles continue to restrict their participation in the community and the workforce.[11] The Tribunal accepts that [the fifth applicant] may encounter some sexual harassment if she were to return to Egypt. The Tribunal, however, does not accept on the evidence and based on her particular circumstances that there is a real chance or a real risk that she will face harassment at a level that would constitute serious or significant harm. Nor does the Tribunal accept that there is a real chance or a real risk that she will face kidnapping or face gender-based violence, including sexual assault. Whilst the Tribunal is prepared to accept that [the fifth applicant] may be exposed to religious based verbal abuse and low level discrimination from time to time, it does not accept that this amounts to serious or significant harm. The Tribunal does not accept that if she returned to Egypt, she will face a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm for the reason of, or reasons arising from her religion as a Coptic Christian or profile as a wealthy Coptic Christian woman.

   [11] DFAT, n 2, above

9. The Tribunal, therefore, is not satisfied that [the fifth applicant] has a well-founded fear of persecution in Egypt for a Convention reason.

10. The Tribunal has considered whether [the fifth applicant] meets the complementary protection criterion in s.36(2)(aa).

11. Having considered [the fifth applicant]’s claims and circumstances, the Tribunal is not satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of [the fifth applicant] being removed from Australia to Egypt, there is a real risk that she will be subjected to any form of harm that would be the result of an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on her for the reasons specified in paragraphs (a)-(e) of the definition of torture in s.5(1). The Tribunal is not satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that she will suffer harm from the authorities that would involve the infliction of severe pain or suffering, either physical or mental, such as to meet the definition of cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment in s.5(1). Nor is it satisfied that it has substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that she will suffer such harm as to meet the definition of degrading treatment or punishment in s.5(1) which refers to an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable. The Tribunal is not satisfied that it has substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that she will suffer arbitrary deprivation of her life or the death penalty. The Tribunal is not satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of [the fifth applicant] being removed from Australia to Egypt, there is a real risk that she will be subjected to significant harm.

    [The fourth applicant]

12. In his evidence, [the fourth applicant] claimed that, on [May] 2012, his friend, [Mr L], was shot by Muslim men who went to his friend’s house looking for him. At the third hearing, he explained that [Mr L] was his only friend and they visited each other very often. In May 2012, he wanted to go to a monastery to spend time by himself. He asked [Mr L] to accompany him, but [Mr L] was unable to do so. When he returned from the monastery, he was informed that [Mr L] had been shot by a fanatical group who had gone to [Mr L]’s house asking for [the fourth applicant]. During this incident, [Mr L] was shot in the leg. In support of his evidence, [the fourth applicant] submitted a purported police investigation report. According to the report, [Mr L] had told the police that armed bearded men ‘raided’ his home, asking for [the fourth applicant].  They had also threatened to kill [Mr L] on the next occasion if he did not tell them where [the fourth applicant] was hiding.

13. The Tribunal put to [the fourth applicant] at the hearing that, based on his evidence, it would be reasonable to assume that the group had a fair knowledge of his circumstances and that he visited [Mr L]. Indeed, according to [the applicant]’s evidence, the Muslims who intended to harm the family were continuously monitoring the family. He was asked why the group had come looking for him on the only occasion that he had decided to go a monastery instead of [Mr L]’s house and not on any other occasion. He said he did not know and that perhaps it was a coincidence that they had visited [Mr L]’s house when he was not there. When pressed, he said he has asked himself the same question and one of the conclusions he had reached was that they wanted to emotionally harm him by shooting [Mr L]. He was asked why would the group design such an elaborate plan and go to such a lengths in order to emotionally harm him. He responded that the group has its own mindset. Perhaps they wanted to frighten him to put pressure on him because they wanted to convert the family to Islam. The Tribunal has serious concerns in relation to the reliability of these claims. Moreover, [the fourth applicant] continued to reside at his home address until his departure from Egypt in December 2012. It is inexplicable as to why the group, who appear to have acted with such ferocity and resolve on [May] 2012, had made no other attempts to locate and harm him. The Tribunal considers [the fourth applicant]’s claims in this regard far-fetched and highly implausible. Whilst the purported police investigation appears to corroborate [the fourth applicant]’s claim that these people were looking for him, in the light of the concerns highlighted by the Tribunal, it is devoid of any meaningful information as to why the group were looking for [the fourth applicant] on that occasion. The Tribunal does not accept a group of Muslim fanatics had shot [Mr L] because they were looking for [the fourth applicant] for religiously motivated reasons or because of his relationship with his father. The Tribunal does not accept that [the fourth applicant] was ever targeted for harm due to his relationship with his father in the past and does not accept that there is a real chance or a real risk that he would be targeted in the foreseeable future for this reason. 

14. [The fourth applicant] claimed before the first Tribunal that he would need to undergo compulsory military service if he is absent for a prolonged period of time from university and that in the army he will be exposed to racist views and sent to places of danger because he is a Christian. At the third hearing, he told the Tribunal that the point he intended to convey was that he was concerned because he had failed to return to Egypt. In his case, he had a temporary exemption when he departed Egypt. He said he was not concerned about military service. Rather, he is concerned that he will be asked why he had not returned to Egypt. If the authorities find out that he has applied for protection, they would perceive him as having damaged Egypt’s reputation and they may wish to make an example of out of him by sending him to remote and harsh places for his military service.

15. The country information before the Tribunal does not support these claims. According to DFAT:

    5.39 Egypt accepts involuntary returnees. Egyptian officials generally pay little regard to failed asylum seekers upon their return to the country, although it is possible that some individuals will be questioned upon entry, or will have their entry delayed. Many thousands of Egyptians enter and leave the country every day. Egyptians who out-stay their work or tourist visas in other countries are regularly returned to Egypt with no attention paid to them by authorities. DFAT is not aware of failed asylum seekers being reported by airport authorities to the Ministry of the Interior or any of the security services beyond the normal processes for returning Egyptian nationals.[12]

    [12] DFAT, n 2, above.

16. On the basis of this information, the Tribunal does not accept that there is a real chance or a real risk of [the fourth applicant] facing serious or significant harm by the authorities, including military authorities, as a result of making an application for a protection visa in Australia.[13]

    [13] DFAT, DFAT Thematic Report - Egyptian Copts, 24 November 2015.

17. In an earlier report, DFAT noted that there are anecdotal accounts that some Copts have reported facing societal discrimination whilst undertaking their military service, such as being given more menial tasks or fewer privileges such as leave. The Tribunal has found no other information in the sources consulted to suggest that Coptic Christians performing their military service face mistreatment for the reason of their religion. The Tribunal is prepared to accept that if [the fourth applicant] were required to undergo his military service, he may face some discrimination in the form of being given menial tasks and fewer privileges or being exposed to verbal abuse. The Tribunal, however, does not accept that any discrimination [the fourth applicant] may face while undergoing his military service would constitute serious harm or significant harm. The Tribunal therefore does not accept that there is a real chance or a real risk that [the fourth applicant] would face serious or significant harm if he were required to undergo military service.

18. The Tribunal is prepared to accept that [the fourth applicant] has experienced some discrimination, such as verbal abuse growing up as a Coptic man in Egypt. The Tribunal, however, does not accept that this treatment amounts to serious or significant harm.  On the basis of the evidence before it, including the country information referred to above, the Tribunal does not accept that [the fourth applicant] faces a real chance or a real risk of serious or significant harm for the reason of, or for reasons arising from, his Coptic Christian faith or his perceived profile as a wealthy Coptic Christian.

19. The Tribunal, therefore, is not satisfied that [the fourth applicant] has a well-founded fear of persecution in Egypt for a Convention reason.

20. With regard to the complementary protection criterion in s.36(2)(aa), the Tribunal is not satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of [the fourth applicant] being removed from Australia to Egypt, there is a real risk that he will be subjected to any form of harm that would be the result of an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on him for the reasons specified in paragraphs (a)-(e) of the definition of torture in s.5(1). The Tribunal is not satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that he will suffer harm from the authorities that would involve the infliction of severe pain or suffering, either physical or mental, such as to meet the definition of cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment in s.5(1). Nor is it satisfied that it has substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that he will suffer such harm as to meet the definition of degrading treatment or punishment in s.5(1) which refers to an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable. The Tribunal is not satisfied that it has substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that he will suffer arbitrary deprivation of his life or the death penalty. The Tribunal is not satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of [the fourth applicant] being removed from Australia to Egypt, there is a real risk that he will be subjected to significant harm.

    [The second applicant] and [the third applicant]

21. [The second applicant] and [the third applicant] applied for protection visas by relying on their membership of their mother’s family unit. They have not made their own specific claims for protection. The Tribunal, however, has considered the claims made on their behalf or arising on the face of the evidence.

22. As discussed earlier, [the applicant] and [the fifth applicant] claimed that those responsible for the 2010 incident at the Sunday school had intended to kidnap [the third applicant]. The Tribunal has rejected this claim and does not accept that she was targeted for harm during that incident or at any other time.

23. The Tribunal has also rejected the claims that [the applicant], her children and other members of the family were targeted for harm in the past due to their relationship with [Mr A]. The Tribunal does not accept that there is a real chance or a real risk that [the second applicant] and [the third applicant] would be targeted in the foreseeable future for this reason.

24. For the reasons discussed in relation to [the fifth applicant] and [the fourth applicant], the Tribunal does not accept, on the evidence before it and based on their particular circumstances, that there is a real chance or a real risk that [the third applicant] will face sexual harassment at a level that would constitute serious or significant harm. The Tribunal does not accept that there is a real chance or a real risk that [the third applicant] will face kidnapping or face gender-based violence, including sexual assault. The Tribunal does not accept that if she returned to Egypt, she will face a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm for the reason of, or reasons arising from her profile as a Coptic Christian woman. Whilst the Tribunal is prepared to accept that [the second applicant] and [the third applicant] may experience religious based verbal abuse and low level discrimination from time to time, it does not accept that this amounts to serious or significant harm. The Tribunal does not accept that if they returned to Egypt, they will face a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm for the reason of, or reasons arising from their Coptic Christian faith or profile as a wealthy Coptic Christians.

25. The Tribunal is not satisfied that [the second applicant] and [the third applicant] have a well-founded fear of persecution in Egypt for a Convention reason. The Tribunal is not satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to Egypt, there is a real risk that they will be subjected to any form of harm that would be the result of an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on him for the reasons specified in paragraphs (a)-(e) of the definition of torture in s.5(1). The Tribunal is not satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that they will suffer harm from the authorities that would involve the infliction of severe pain or suffering, either physical or mental, such as to meet the definition of cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment in s.5(1). Nor is it satisfied that it has substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that they will suffer such harm as to meet the definition of degrading treatment or punishment in s.5(1) which refers to an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable. The Tribunal is not satisfied that it has substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that they will suffer arbitrary deprivation of their life or the death penalty. The Tribunal is not satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of [the second applicant] and [the third applicant] being removed from Australia to Egypt, there is a real risk that they will be subjected to significant harm.

    Conclusions

1. For the reasons given above the Tribunal is satisfied that the first named applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations. Therefore the first named applicant satisfies the criterion set out in s.36(2)(a).

2. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the other applicants are persons in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations for the purposes of s.36(2)(a) or (aa). However, the Tribunal is satisfied that they are members of the same family unit as the first named applicant for the purposes of s.36(2)(b)(i). As such, the fate of their application depends on the outcome of the first named applicant’s application. It follows that the other applicants will be entitled to a protection visa provided the criterion in s.36(2)(b)(ii) and the remaining criteria for the visa are met.

   DECISION

3. The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the following directions:

   (i)that the first named applicant satisfies s.36(2)(a) of the Migration Act; and

   (ii)that the other applicants satisfy s.36(2)(b)(i) of the Migration Act, on the basis of membership of the same family unit as the first named applicant.

   Shahyar Roushan
   Senior Member

   
   
   

a general deterioration in law and order throughout Egypt after the January 2011 revolution, which resulted in an increase in violent crime, including against Copts. This period saw an increase in beatings, harassment, stealing, extortion and kidnappings of Copts (though also of Muslims), mainly in Upper Egypt.