FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZTBW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1277
Citation: SZTBW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1277 Appeal from: SZTBW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCCA 1809 Parties: SZTWB v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL File number: NSD 903 of 2014 Judge: PERRY J Date of judgment: 25 November 2014 Catchwords: MIGRATION –Whether Tribunal applied the wrong test under s 91R(2)(a) – Where unchallenged independent basis to sustain Tribunal’s decision
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Where application for leave to amend notice of appeal to argue new ground on appeal – Where proposed ground of appeal has no merit
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 65, 91R Cases cited: Iyer v Minister for Immigration and Cultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1788
Snedden (aka Vasiljkovic) v Minister for Justice of the Commonwealth (2013) 306 ALR 452
SZOOR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 202 FCR 1
SZSPT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] 1245
SZSRU v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1252
SZSXY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1183
SZTBE v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1230
SZTBW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCCA 1809
VBAO v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 233 CLR 1
VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158
WZAPN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2014] FCA 947Date of hearing: 24 November 2014 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 22 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr P Bodisco Solicitor for the Appellant: Ms M Byers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly Solicitor for the First Respondent:
Counsel for the Second Respondent:
DLA Piper
The second respondent filed a submitting notice
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 903 of 2014
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: SZTWB
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
PERRY J
DATE OF ORDER:
24 NOVEMBER 2014
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for leave to amend the Notice of Appeal is dismissed.
2.The appellant’s application to adjourn the hearing of the appeal is dismissed.
3.The appeal is dismissed.
4.The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or otherwise assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 903 of 2014
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: SZTWB
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
PERRY J
DATE:
25 NOVEMBER 2014
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
1. INTRODUCTION
The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka. He…
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- Case
- [2014] FCA 1277
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue in this case was whether the Court below erred in its interpretation of "serious harm" under s 91R(2)(a) of the Migration Act. The appellant argued that the Court below failed to hold that the Tribunal applied the wrong test and/or asked itself the wrong question in determining what constitutes "serious harm." He contended that the Tribunal erred in engaging in a qualitative assessment of the circumstances of his detention, rather than assessing whether the process of being questioned and investigated at the airport and remanded into custody would amount to a deprivation of his liberty. The court found that the proposed new ground lacked any reasonable prospects of success, as it was inconsistent with the reasoning of North J in WZAPN. Furthermore, the court found that the Tribunal's decision was valid even if the appellant were to succeed on the proposed new ground of appeal, as there was an unchallenged independent basis to sustain the Tribunal's decision.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave to amend the Notice of Appeal is dismissed.
2. The appellant’s application to adjourn the hearing of the appeal is dismissed.
3. The appeal is dismissed.
4. The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or otherwise assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant’s application for review of the Tribunal’s decision to the Court below was dismissed on the ground that the appellant had failed to establish that the Tribunal’s decision was tainted by jurisdictional error (at [70]). The appellant raised two grounds of review, both of which challenged the Tribunal’s rejection of the appellant’s alternative claim to meet the complementary protection criteria for the grant of a protection visa under s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. In contrast to the proposed ground of appeal, no challenge was made below to the Tribunal’s decision insofar as it rejected the appellant’s claim for a protection visa under s 36(2)(a) of the Act on the ground that he was a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention. 3. CONSIDERATION In my view, the application for leave to amend the notice of appeal must be refused for the reason that the proposed new ground lacks any reasonable prospects of success. In this regard, I would not necessarily have regarded as determinative the fact that the proposed ground had not been agitated before the primary judge given among other matters that it seeks to apply the reasoning of Justice North in the decision of WZAPN which postdates the decision below. The Court has a discretion to allow a party to advance a ground of appeal not advanced at first instance where the point has merit and it is in the interests of justice to do so: Iyer v Minister for Immigration and Cultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1788; VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158. However the lack of merit in the proposed ground here is determinative. The sole ground of appeal in the proposed Amended Notice of Appeal contends that the Court below erred in failing to hold that the Tribunal applied the wrong test and/or asked itself the wrong question, in determining what constitutes “serious harm” as defined in s 91R(2)(a) for the purposes of 91R(1)(b). The appellant submitted that in determining whether he risked being subjected to “serious harm”, the Tribunal erred in engaging in a qualitative assessment of the circumstances of the appellant’s detention, rather than assessing whether the process of being questioned and investigated at the airport and remanded into custody (however brief) would amount to a deprivation of the appellant’s liberty. It was submitted that this approach is inconsistent with the reasoning of North J in WZAPN at [30] and [45]. In that case his Honour found that on a proper construction of s 91R, “serious harm” is constituted by a “threat to the person’s life or liberty” without reference to the severity of the consequences to life or liberty. His Honour therefore found that the reviewer erred by making a qualitative assessment of the nature and degree of the harm experienced by the applicant when asking whether the threat to the applicant’s liberty was sufficiently significant. North J also found that the reviewer had denied the applicant procedural fairness in concluding that the applicant did not suffer persecution because the detention was pursuant to a law of general application: WZAPN at [46], [54] – [75].