SZTBW v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZTBW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1277

Citation: SZTBW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1277
Appeal from: SZTBW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCCA 1809
Parties: SZTWB v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 903 of 2014
Judge: PERRY J
Date of judgment: 25 November 2014
Catchwords:

MIGRATION –Whether Tribunal applied the wrong test under s 91R(2)(a) – Where unchallenged independent basis to sustain Tribunal’s decision

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Where application for leave to amend notice of appeal to argue new ground on appeal – Where proposed ground of appeal has no merit

Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 65, 91R
Cases cited:

Iyer v Minister for Immigration and Cultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1788
Snedden (aka Vasiljkovic) v Minister for Justice of the Commonwealth (2013) 306 ALR 452
SZOOR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 202 FCR 1
SZSPT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] 1245
SZSRU v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1252
SZSXY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1183
SZTBE v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1230
SZTBW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCCA 1809
VBAO v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 233 CLR 1
VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158
WZAPN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2014] FCA 947

Date of hearing: 24 November 2014
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 22
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr P Bodisco
Solicitor for the Appellant: Ms M Byers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly

Solicitor for the First Respondent:

Counsel for the Second Respondent:

DLA Piper

The second respondent filed a submitting notice


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 903 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZTWB
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRY J

DATE OF ORDER:

24 NOVEMBER 2014

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to amend the Notice of Appeal is dismissed.

2.The appellant’s application to adjourn the hearing of the appeal is dismissed.

3.The appeal is dismissed.

4.The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or otherwise assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 903 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZTWB
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRY J

DATE:

25 NOVEMBER 2014

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1.               INTRODUCTION

  1. The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka.  He…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 1277
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SZTBW v Minister for Immigration involved the appellant, a Sri Lankan national of Hindu faith and Tamil ethnicity, who had arrived in Australia without a visa. He sought a protection visa, claiming to fear harm from the authorities in Sri Lanka due to his ethnicity and political opinion. The Tribunal rejected his claims, and the Court below dismissed his application for review. The appellant sought leave to amend the notice of appeal, arguing that the Court below erred in its interpretation of "serious harm" under s 91R(2)(a) of the Migration Act. The court held that the proposed new ground lacked any reasonable prospects of success, as it was inconsistent with the reasoning of North J in WZAPN, which postdates the decision below. Furthermore, the court found that the Tribunal's decision was valid even if the appellant were to succeed on the proposed new ground of appeal. The court dismissed the application for leave to amend the notice of appeal, the application to adjourn the hearing, and the appeal itself, ordering the appellant to pay the costs of the first respondent.

The primary legal issue in this case was whether the Court below erred in its interpretation of "serious harm" under s 91R(2)(a) of the Migration Act. The appellant argued that the Court below failed to hold that the Tribunal applied the wrong test and/or asked itself the wrong question in determining what constitutes "serious harm." He contended that the Tribunal erred in engaging in a qualitative assessment of the circumstances of his detention, rather than assessing whether the process of being questioned and investigated at the airport and remanded into custody would amount to a deprivation of his liberty. The court found that the proposed new ground lacked any reasonable prospects of success, as it was inconsistent with the reasoning of North J in WZAPN. Furthermore, the court found that the Tribunal's decision was valid even if the appellant were to succeed on the proposed new ground of appeal, as there was an unchallenged independent basis to sustain the Tribunal's decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to amend the Notice of Appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant’s application to adjourn the hearing of the appeal is dismissed.

3. The appeal is dismissed.

4. The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or otherwise assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

At the hearing on 24 November 2014, I refused leave to amend the notice of appeal. In essence, as I explain below, even if the appellant were to succeed on the proposed new ground of appeal, the validity of the Tribunal’s decision would be sustained by an independent ground not challenged by the appellant. As such, the appeal must be dismissed irrespective of the correctness of the decision in WZAPN. Accordingly, I also refused the application to adjourn the hearing of the appeal and dismissed the appeal. I expand upon my reasons below2. BACKGROUND2.1 The appellant’s claims The appellant claims to be a citizen of Sri Lanka of Hindu faith and Tamil ethnicity. He first arrived in Australia on or about 17 May 2012 without a visa, having departed illegally from Sri Lanka without a passport. He claimed to fear harm from the authorities in Sri Lanka due to his Tamil ethnicity, imputed political opinion by reason of his purported involvement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (the LTTE), and his membership of a particular social group of “failed asylum seekers”.2.2 The Tribunal’s decision The appellant applied for a protection visa on 22 August 2012. Section 36(2) of the Act relevantly provides that a criterion for the grant of a protection visa under s 65 is that an applicant is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied that Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol. Article 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention relevantly defines a refugee as a person who:owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country… Section 91R of the Act expands on the notion of persecution and “serious harm”, relevantly providing that:(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, Article 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol does not apply in relation to persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in that Article unless: (a)that reason is the essential and significant reason, or those reasons are the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and (b)the persecution involves serious harm to the person; and (c)the persecution involves systematic and discriminatory conduct. (2)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (1)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph: (a)a threat to the person's life or liberty...(emphasis in original) A delegate of the Minister (delegate) refused the appellant’s application for a protection visa on 9 October 2012 pursuant to s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). The appellant sought review of the delegate’s decision by the Tribunal. The appellant had three hearings before the Tribunal and gave evidence on each occasion. In the course of the hearings, the Tribunal explored his claims with him in some detail and gave him the opportunity to respond to its concerns about his evidence and country information.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

After considering all of his claims, the Tribunal concluded that the appellant did not satisfy the conditions for the grant of a protection visa under s 36(2)(a) of the Act. Nor was the Tribunal satisfied that the appellant was a person in respect of whom Australia otherwise owed protection obligations and thereby satisfied the alternative criteria for a protection visa under s 36(2)(aa).2.3 The decision of the Court below The appellant’s application for review of the Tribunal’s decision to the Court below was dismissed on the ground that the appellant had failed to establish that the Tribunal’s decision was tainted by jurisdictional error (at [70]). The appellant raised two grounds of review, both of which challenged the Tribunal’s rejection of the appellant’s alternative claim to meet the complementary protection criteria for the grant of a protection visa under s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. In contrast to the proposed ground of appeal, no challenge was made below to the Tribunal’s decision insofar as it rejected the appellant’s claim for a protection visa under s 36(2)(a) of the Act on the ground that he was a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention. 3. CONSIDERATION In my view, the application for leave to amend the notice of appeal must be refused for the reason that the proposed new ground lacks any reasonable prospects of success. In this regard, I would not necessarily have regarded as determinative the fact that the proposed ground had not been agitated before the primary judge given among other matters that it seeks to apply the reasoning of Justice North in the decision of WZAPN which postdates the decision below. The Court has a discretion to allow a party to advance a ground of appeal not advanced at first instance where the point has merit and it is in the interests of justice to do so: Iyer v Minister for Immigration and Cultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1788; VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158. However the lack of merit in the proposed ground here is determinative. The sole ground of appeal in the proposed Amended Notice of Appeal contends that the Court below erred in failing to hold that the Tribunal applied the wrong test and/or asked itself the wrong question, in determining what constitutes “serious harm” as defined in s 91R(2)(a) for the purposes of 91R(1)(b). The appellant submitted that in determining whether he risked being subjected to “serious harm”, the Tribunal erred in engaging in a qualitative assessment of the circumstances of the appellant’s detention, rather than assessing whether the process of being questioned and investigated at the airport and remanded into custody (however brief) would amount to a deprivation of the appellant’s liberty. It was submitted that this approach is inconsistent with the reasoning of North J in WZAPN at [30] and [45]. In that case his Honour found that on a proper construction of s 91R, “serious harm” is constituted by a “threat to the person’s life or liberty” without reference to the severity of the consequences to life or liberty. His Honour therefore found that the reviewer erred by making a qualitative assessment of the nature and degree of the harm experienced by the applicant when asking whether the threat to the applicant’s liberty was sufficiently significant. North J also found that the reviewer had denied the applicant procedural fairness in concluding that the applicant did not suffer persecution because the detention was pursuant to a law of general application: WZAPN at [46], [54] – [75].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant’s application for review of the Tribunal’s decision to the Court below was dismissed on the ground that the appellant had failed to establish that the Tribunal’s decision was tainted by jurisdictional error (at [70]). The appellant raised two grounds of review, both of which challenged the Tribunal’s rejection of the appellant’s alternative claim to meet the complementary protection criteria for the grant of a protection visa under s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. In contrast to the proposed ground of appeal, no challenge was made below to the Tribunal’s decision insofar as it rejected the appellant’s claim for a protection visa under s 36(2)(a) of the Act on the ground that he was a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention. 3. CONSIDERATION In my view, the application for leave to amend the notice of appeal must be refused for the reason that the proposed new ground lacks any reasonable prospects of success. In this regard, I would not necessarily have regarded as determinative the fact that the proposed ground had not been agitated before the primary judge given among other matters that it seeks to apply the reasoning of Justice North in the decision of WZAPN which postdates the decision below. The Court has a discretion to allow a party to advance a ground of appeal not advanced at first instance where the point has merit and it is in the interests of justice to do so: Iyer v Minister for Immigration and Cultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1788; VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158. However the lack of merit in the proposed ground here is determinative. The sole ground of appeal in the proposed Amended Notice of Appeal contends that the Court below erred in failing to hold that the Tribunal applied the wrong test and/or asked itself the wrong question, in determining what constitutes “serious harm” as defined in s 91R(2)(a) for the purposes of 91R(1)(b). The appellant submitted that in determining whether he risked being subjected to “serious harm”, the Tribunal erred in engaging in a qualitative assessment of the circumstances of the appellant’s detention, rather than assessing whether the process of being questioned and investigated at the airport and remanded into custody (however brief) would amount to a deprivation of the appellant’s liberty. It was submitted that this approach is inconsistent with the reasoning of North J in WZAPN at [30] and [45]. In that case his Honour found that on a proper construction of s 91R, “serious harm” is constituted by a “threat to the person’s life or liberty” without reference to the severity of the consequences to life or liberty. His Honour therefore found that the reviewer erred by making a qualitative assessment of the nature and degree of the harm experienced by the applicant when asking whether the threat to the applicant’s liberty was sufficiently significant. North J also found that the reviewer had denied the applicant procedural fairness in concluding that the applicant did not suffer persecution because the detention was pursuant to a law of general application: WZAPN at [46], [54] – [75].