SZSRU v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZSRU v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1252

Citation: SZSRU v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1252
Appeal from: SZSRU v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 1549
Parties: SZSRU v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 809 of 2014
Judge: KATZMANN J
Date of judgment: 21 November 2014
Catchwords: MIGRATION – protection visa – whether primary judge erred in finding that Refugee Review Tribunal addressed all of the appellant’s claims – whether primary judge erred in finding that the tribunal applied the correct standard of proof – whether primary judge erred by making a factual assumption – whether Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQPA (2012) 133 ALD 292 distinguishable – whether tribunal applied incorrect test for “serious harm” under s 91R(2)(a) of Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1)(d)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 46A, 65, 91R, 476
Cases cited: Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQPA (2012) 133 ALD 292; [2012] FCA 1025
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB (2013) 210 FCR 505
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476
SZQPA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FMCA 123
SZSHK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2013) 138 ALD 26; [2013] FCAFC 125
WZAPN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 947
WZAQR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2013) 138 ALD 17; [2013] FCAFC 122
Date of hearing: 5 November 2014
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 71
Counsel for the Appellant: Leave granted for Mr Sweeney to appear for the appellant
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice
Solicitor for the Respondents: Minter Ellison

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 809 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZSRU
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

KATZMANN J

DATE OF ORDER:

21 NOVEMBER 2014

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 809 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZSRU
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 1252
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SZSRU v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, a Sri Lankan national, appealed against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court to dismiss his application for judicial review of a delegate's decision to refuse his application for a protection visa. The appellant argued that the tribunal had failed to consider all his claims, applied the wrong standard of proof, and misapplied the test for "serious harm" under the Migration Act. The primary judge found in favour of the Minister, and the appellant appealed to the Federal Court.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the tribunal had addressed all of the appellant's claims, applied the correct standard of proof, and correctly applied the test for "serious harm." The appellant argued that the tribunal had failed to consider his claims regarding imputed LTTE links due to his father's imputed LTTE links, and had applied an incorrect standard of proof when assessing his claim to fear persecution based on his membership of a particular social group of failed Tamil asylum seekers. The appellant further argued that the tribunal had misapplied the test for "serious harm" by focusing on the likely outcome of detention and interrogation on return to Sri Lanka, rather than the process of interrogation and the risk of suffering serious harm.

The court found that the tribunal had indeed addressed all of the appellant's claims, and did not err in applying the correct standard of proof. The tribunal had rejected the appellant's claim that he would be imputed with LTTE links due to his father's imputed LTTE links and had found that there was a remote chance that the appellant would be persecuted by reason of his membership of a particular social group of failed Tamil asylum seekers. The court held that the tribunal had correctly applied the principles for determining whether an applicant had a "well-founded fear of being persecuted" for a Convention reason, and had engaged in the required reasonable speculation. The court also found that the tribunal had not misapplied the test for "serious harm" as it had rejected the appellant's claim that he would be harmed as a result of his imputed LTTE links.

The appeal was dismissed with costs, and no orders were made.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In any event, I do not accept that the tribunal was required to consider, in the context of complementary protection, the risk that the appellant would be imputed with LTTE links because of his father’s imputed LTTE links. As the Full Court held in NABE at [55]:Where the Tribunal fails to make a finding on “a substantial, clearly articulated argument relying upon established facts” that failure can amount to a failure to accord procedural fairness and a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction: Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 77 ALJR 1088 at [24] per Gummow and Callinan JJ, Hayne J agreeing at [95]. Although not expressly so identified in that case, the constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction may be seen as a failure to carry out the review required by the Act. (Emphasis added.) In this case, the tribunal (at [173] and [175]) had found that the appellant would not be imputed with LTTE links, even though his father had been imputed with such links. Thus, there were no established facts that might support a claim (if any) that the appellant faced a real risk of significant harm as an individual who might be imputed with LTTE links because his father had been imputed with such links. Moreover, a finding for the purposes of the refugee criterion that that a visa applicant has not been, or would not be, harmed may plainly be relevant to a claim for complementary protection based on fear of the same alleged harm: cf. SZSHK at [32]. The finding the tribunal made in considering the refugee claim to the effect that the appellant would not be imputed with a political opinion as an LTTE supporter and harmed as a result is decisive on this question. As for the appellant’s submission that the tribunal did not consider the risk of harm to him as a person who might be imputed with LTTE links because of his past involvement with the TMVP, no such claim was expressly put (either orally or in writing) to either the delegate or the tribunal. Nor did such a claim arise squarely on any of the materials before the tribunal. The appellant’s claims about his past involvement with the TMVP, both before the delegate and the tribunal, focused on the harm that he feared would befall him because he had failed to cooperate with the TMVP. Beyond his claim to fear persecution as a member of the particular social group of failed Tamil asylum seekers (which, as I have observed, was considered by the tribunal) the appellant did not suggest that he feared harm as a person who might be imputed with links to the LTTE, whether because of his father’s imputed political opinion, because of the appellant’s links to the TMVP, or for any other reason. Contrary to the appellant’s submissions, no such claim was expressly put and it does not arise on the materials before the tribunal. The primary judge was therefore correct to conclude that the tribunal did not fail to consider all of the appellant’s claims. Did the primary judge err in holding that the tribunal did not apply the wrong standard of proof?

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The appellant submitted that the tribunal applied the balance of probabilities as the standard of proof when assessing the appellant’s claim to fear persecution by reason of his membership of a particular social group of failed Tamil asylum seekers. The submission was based on what the tribunal said at [176] of its decision record: While it may be that failed Tamil asylum seekers or single male Tamil failed asylum seekers who left Sri Lanka unlawfully are particular social groups in Convention terms, and while I accept with concern the evidence UNHCR (2012) that there is limited or no monitoring of returnees to Sri Lanka after they have returned to their home towns, there is too little reliable evidence that individuals are persecuted because of their membership of either particular social group to enable me to be satisfied that they are. In the present case, the chance is remote that the applicant will be persecuted for reason of his membership of either of the above particular social groups. (Emphasis added.) The argument was that the tribunal’s statement that it had “too little reliable evidence that individuals are persecuted” demonstrated that it had failed to ask itself the question: “What if I am wrong?”. Asking this question was said to be required by the decisions in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 (“Guo”), Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 (“Wu Shan Liang”) and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220 (“Rajalingam”). The appellant relied on the reasons of Kirby J in Wu Shan Liang at 293: [T]he decision-maker must not, by a process of factual findings on particular elements of the material which is provided, foreclose reasonable speculation upon the chances of persecution emerging from a consideration of the whole of the material. Evaluation of chance, as required by Chan cannot be reduced to scientific precision. That is why it is necessary, notwithstanding particular findings, for the decision-maker in the end to return to the question: “What if I am wrong”? Otherwise, by eliminating facts on the way to the final conclusion, based upon what seems “likely” or “entitled to greater weight”, the decision-maker may be left with nothing upon which to conduct the speculation necessary to the evaluation of the facts taken as a whole, in so far as they are said to give rise to a “real chance” of persecution.(Footnotes omitted.) In Rajalingam, Sackville J (with whom North J agreed) held at [63]:Although the “What if I am wrong?” terminology has gained currency, I think, with respect, that it is more accurate to see the requirement discussed in Wu Shan Liang and Guo as simply an aspect of the obligation to apply correctly the principles for determining whether an applicant has a “well-founded fear of being persecuted” for a Convention reason. The reasonable speculation in which the decision-maker must engage may require him or her to take account of the chance that past events might have occurred, even though the decision-maker thinks that they probably did not. In the language of s 476(1)(e) of the Migration Act, a failure to do so may constitute “an error involving an incorrect interpretation of the applicable law or an incorrect application of the law to the facts as found”.

Decision

Reasons for decision

A delegate of the Minister decided that the appellant’s claims were implausible and refused his application. The appellant sought a review of that decision in the tribunal but the tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision. The appellant then applied to the Federal Circuit Court for judicial review but the Circuit Court dismissed his application. This is an appeal from that decision. The tribunal’s decision The tribunal accepted that the appellant was a Sri Lankan national and an ethnic Tamil and also that he was a student in Batticaloa and a member of the student union. The tribunal also accepted that the appellant may have participated in pro-TMVP protests under pressure, that the TMVP is prepared to use violence to achieve its aims and that its targets are other Tamils whom it perceives to be its opponents. Moreover, the tribunal accepted that he had left Sri Lanka illegally and that there are penalties (including imprisonment for up to five years) under Sri Lankan law for doing so. But the tribunal was not satisfied that he was secretary of his college student union, that he was a target of TMVP violence, pressure or threats after the TMVP lost the election in 2010, or that he had gone into hiding. The tribunal found he was of “no ongoing adverse interest to the TMVP” at the time he left Sri Lanka. It also rejected the appellant’s claim that he would be imputed with a political opinion as an LTTE supporter. It found that the appellant had never been imputed with LTTE links in the past and, indeed, had a record of assisting a party in Batticaloa that targeted ex-supporters of the LTTE. The tribunal accepted the possibility that failed Tamil asylum seekers or single male Tamil failed asylum seekers who left Sri Lanka unlawfully are particular social groups within the meaning of the Convention, but found that there was a remote chance that the appellant would be persecuted by reason of his membership of either of those groups. The tribunal also accepted that there were substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the appellant being removed from Australia to Sri Lanka, there was a real risk that the appellant would be imprisoned for up to three nights and that the circumstances of his detention would likely be disturbing and very unpleasant. But it was not satisfied that this would amount to significant harm within the meaning of the Act. Accordingly, the tribunal was not satisfied that the appellant was a person in respect of whom Australia had protection obligations under the Refugees Convention or otherwise. The application in the Federal Circuit Court In the Federal Circuit Court the appellant, who then had legal representation, contended that the tribunal had committed jurisdictional error in four respects: (1)by failing to deal with his claim that, as his father had been suspected of LTTE links, there was a risk that links to the LTTE might be imputed to the appellant; (2)by failing to consider whether there was a real risk of significant harm in the foreseeable future as a result of his father’s imputed support for the LTTE; (3)by applying a balance of probabilities test (rather than a real chance of harm test) to determine his claim to fear harm as a member of “particular social groups”, without properly evaluating the evidence; and (4)by failing to consider whether the appellant’s father’s suspected links to the LTTE would be imputed to the appellant and by focussing on the likely outcome of possible detention and interrogation on return to Sri Lanka, rather than on the process of interrogation and the risk the appellant might suffer serious harm.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established