SZTBE v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZTBE v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

[2014] FCA 1230

Citation: SZTBE v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1230
Appeal from: SZTBE v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCCA 1288
Parties: SZTBE v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 690 of 2014
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 3 November 2014
Catchwords: MIGRATION – whether the Tribunal failed to consider the appellant’s claims
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited: Chen Shi Hai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 201 CLR 293 referred to
Coal and AlliedOperations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194 applied
Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 applied
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS (2013) 136 ALD 547 distinguished
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609 applied
SZTBE v Minister for Immigration Border Protection [2014] FCA 1288 referred to
VTAO v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 81 ALD 332 referred to
WZAPN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 947 distinguished
Date of hearing: 3 November 2014
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 54
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr P Reynolds
Solicitor for the Appellant: Fragomen
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 690 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZTBE
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

3 NOVEMBER 2014

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent's costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 690 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZTBE
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE:

3 NOVEMBER 2014

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

  1. This is an appeal for a decision of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing the appellant’s further amended application in that Court for Constitutional writ relief:  SZTBE v Minister for Immigration Border Protection [2014] FCA 1288.

    Background

  2. The appellant is a Sri Lankan Tamil who arrived in Australia in 2012.  He was granted permission by the Minister to make an application for a protection visa, which he did, assisted in the end by a migration agent-solicitor who has continued to represent him throughout the subsequent processes before the Minister and Refugee Review Tribunal as well as in the proceedings in the Court below and this Court.  In both of the Court proceedings, the appellant has also been represented by counsel experienced in the field, albeit…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 1230
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SZTBE v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved a Sri Lankan Tamil appellant who had arrived in Australia in 2012 and sought protection visa. He was represented by a migration agent-solicitor and counsel in various proceedings before the Minister, the Refugee Review Tribunal, the Federal Circuit Court, and the High Court. The appellant's appeal in the Federal Court was dismissed, and he sought further relief in the High Court by amending his grounds of appeal to argue that the Tribunal had failed to consider his claims of significant harm under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appellant's primary contention was that the Tribunal had misapplied the statutory criteria in assessing whether he would suffer cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment if returned to Sri Lanka.

The legal issues before the court included whether the Tribunal had correctly applied the statutory criteria under the Migration Act in considering the appellant's claims and whether the appellant's claims of significant harm had a Convention nexus. The court examined whether the Tribunal had erred in not considering specific country information provided by the appellant's migration agent-solicitor and whether the Tribunal misapplied the statutory criteria in determining the nature of the treatment or punishment the appellant might face.

The court held that the appellant's argument should be dismissed as the Tribunal had already found that his claims had no Convention nexus. The court emphasised that the substantial issues between the parties should ordinarily be settled at the trial and that the principles governing amendment of grounds of appeal in the High Court were consistent with those applied in intermediate courts of appeal. The court noted that the appellant could not argue this point on appeal as it was not pleaded or made an issue by the conduct of the parties at the trial. Consequently, the appellant's case failed at the threshold, and the appeal was dismissed. The court also ordered that the appellant pay the first respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent's costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal for a decision of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing the appellant’s further amended application in that Court for Constitutional writ relief: SZTBE v Minister for Immigration Border Protection [2014] FCA 1288.Background The appellant is a Sri Lankan Tamil who arrived in Australia in 2012. He was granted permission by the Minister to make an application for a protection visa, which he did, assisted in the end by a migration agent-solicitor who has continued to represent him throughout the subsequent processes before the Minister and Refugee Review Tribunal as well as in the proceedings in the Court below and this Court. In both of the Court proceedings, the appellant has also been represented by counsel experienced in the field, albeit that he changed counsel before the appeal. Although the appellant made a plethora of claims for protection, the further amended application in the Court below raised only two grounds. Those grounds were confined to issues arising under s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), namely that Australia owed him only “complementary protection” obligations. He accepted below that he had no basis to challenge the Tribunal’s rejection of his many claims to be a refugee. Nonetheless, he contended that the Tribunal had made two particular errors in its consideration of his claims. He argued that the Tribunal had substantial grounds, when standing in the Minister’s shoes, for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of his being removed from Australia to Sri Lanka, there was a real risk that he would suffer “significant harm” as defined in s 36(2A)(d) and (e), namely, that he would be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment or, as he sought to add on appeal, that he would be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment. In the Court below, the grounds of the appellant’s application, as ultimately refined, contended that the Tribunal had, first, failed to consider specific country information in his migration agent-solicitor’s written submission to it as to the conditions that he might face were he to be incarcerated, even on remand, on his return to Sri Lanka, and secondly, misapplied the statutory criterion in s 36(2A)(d) as to whether he would suffer cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment because he could be subjected to, what he contended the country information showed, very degrading or appalling conditions in prison.The legislative scheme Relevantly, the Act provided the following definitions in s 5(1):Covenant means the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a copy of the English text of which is set out in Schedule 2 to the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986.cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:(a)severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or(b)pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;but does not include an act or omission:(c) that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or(d)arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:(a) that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or(b)that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.significant harm means harm of a kind mentioned in subsection 36(2A).torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:(a)for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or(b)for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or(c) for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or(d) for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or(e)for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In my opinion, this argument should be dismissed. No useful result could ensue because the Tribunal had already found that the appellant’s claims had no Convention nexus: SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609 at 618-619 [28]-[29] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ.Conclusion For these reasons, the appeal fails.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The application to amend the grounds of appeal must be considered having regard to the relevant principles that the High Court has identified on many occasions. In Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 at 7-8, Gibbs CJ, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ said: To say that an appeal is by way of rehearing does not mean that the issues and the evidence to be considered are at large. It is fundamental to the due administration of justice that the substantial issues between the parties are ordinarily settled at the trial. If it were not so the main arena for the settlement of disputes would move from the court of first instance to the appellate court, tending to reduce the proceedings in the former court to little more than a preliminary skirmish. The powers of an appellate court with respect to amendment are ordinarily to be exercised within the general framework of the issues so determined and not otherwise. In a case where, had the issue been raised in the court below, evidence could have been given which by any possibility could have prevented the point from succeeding, this Court has firmly maintained the principle that the point cannot be taken afterwards: see Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd [(1950) 81 CLR 418 at p 438]; Bloemen v The Commonwealth [(1975) 49 ALJR 219]. In O'Brien v Komesaroff [(1982) 150 CLR 310 at p 319], Mason J, in a judgment in which the other members of the Court concurred, said:“In some cases when a question of law is raised for the first time in an ultimate court of appeal, as for example upon the construction of a document, or upon facts either admitted or proved beyond controversy, it is expedient in the interests of justice that the question should be argued and decided (Connecticut Fire Insurance Co v Kavanagh [[1982] AC 473 at p 480]; Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd [(1950) 81 CLR 418 at p 438]; Green v. Sommerville [(1979) 141 CLR 594 at pp 607-608]). However, this is not such a case. The facts are not admitted nor are they beyond controversy.The consequence is that the appellants' case fails at the threshold. They cannot argue this point on appeal; it was not pleaded by them nor was it made an issue by the conduct of the parties at the trial.”In our opinion, no distinction is to be drawn in the application of these principles between an intermediate court of appeal and an ultimate court of appeal. Finally, in a recent decision of six justices of this Court (University of Wollongong v Metwally [No. 2] [(1985) 59 ALJR 481 at p 483]) the Court said:“It is elementary that a party is bound by the conduct of his case. Except in the most exceptional circumstances, it would be contrary to all principle to allow a party, after a case had been decided against him, to raise a new argument which, whether deliberately or by inadvertence, he failed to put during the hearing when he had an opportunity to do so.” (emphasis added) As their Honours said there, it is fundamental to the due administration of justice that the substantial issues between the parties be ordinarily settled at the trial.