FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZTBE v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2014] FCA 1230
Citation: SZTBE v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1230 Appeal from: SZTBE v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCCA 1288 Parties: SZTBE v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL File number: NSD 690 of 2014 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 3 November 2014 Catchwords: MIGRATION – whether the Tribunal failed to consider the appellant’s claims Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Cases cited: Chen Shi Hai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 201 CLR 293 referred to
Coal and AlliedOperations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194 applied
Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 applied
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS (2013) 136 ALD 547 distinguished
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609 applied
SZTBE v Minister for Immigration Border Protection [2014] FCA 1288 referred to
VTAO v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 81 ALD 332 referred to
WZAPN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 947 distinguishedDate of hearing: 3 November 2014 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 54 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr P Reynolds Solicitor for the Appellant: Fragomen Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 690 of 2014
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: SZTBE
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
3 NOVEMBER 2014
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent's costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 690 of 2014
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: SZTBE
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE:
3 NOVEMBER 2014
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)
This is an appeal for a decision of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing the appellant’s further amended application in that Court for Constitutional writ relief: SZTBE v Minister for Immigration Border Protection [2014] FCA 1288.
Background
The appellant is a Sri Lankan Tamil who arrived in Australia in 2012. He was granted permission by the Minister to make an application for a protection visa, which he did, assisted in the end by a migration agent-solicitor who has continued to represent him throughout the subsequent processes before the Minister and Refugee Review Tribunal as well as in the proceedings in the Court below and this Court. In both of the Court proceedings, the appellant has also been represented by counsel experienced in the field, albeit…
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- Case
- [2014] FCA 1230
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether the Tribunal had correctly applied the statutory criteria under the Migration Act in considering the appellant's claims and whether the appellant's claims of significant harm had a Convention nexus. The court examined whether the Tribunal had erred in not considering specific country information provided by the appellant's migration agent-solicitor and whether the Tribunal misapplied the statutory criteria in determining the nature of the treatment or punishment the appellant might face.
The court held that the appellant's argument should be dismissed as the Tribunal had already found that his claims had no Convention nexus. The court emphasised that the substantial issues between the parties should ordinarily be settled at the trial and that the principles governing amendment of grounds of appeal in the High Court were consistent with those applied in intermediate courts of appeal. The court noted that the appellant could not argue this point on appeal as it was not pleaded or made an issue by the conduct of the parties at the trial. Consequently, the appellant's case failed at the threshold, and the appeal was dismissed. The court also ordered that the appellant pay the first respondent's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent's costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The application to amend the grounds of appeal must be considered having regard to the relevant principles that the High Court has identified on many occasions. In Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 at 7-8, Gibbs CJ, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ said: To say that an appeal is by way of rehearing does not mean that the issues and the evidence to be considered are at large. It is fundamental to the due administration of justice that the substantial issues between the parties are ordinarily settled at the trial. If it were not so the main arena for the settlement of disputes would move from the court of first instance to the appellate court, tending to reduce the proceedings in the former court to little more than a preliminary skirmish. The powers of an appellate court with respect to amendment are ordinarily to be exercised within the general framework of the issues so determined and not otherwise. In a case where, had the issue been raised in the court below, evidence could have been given which by any possibility could have prevented the point from succeeding, this Court has firmly maintained the principle that the point cannot be taken afterwards: see Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd [(1950) 81 CLR 418 at p 438]; Bloemen v The Commonwealth [(1975) 49 ALJR 219]. In O'Brien v Komesaroff [(1982) 150 CLR 310 at p 319], Mason J, in a judgment in which the other members of the Court concurred, said:“In some cases when a question of law is raised for the first time in an ultimate court of appeal, as for example upon the construction of a document, or upon facts either admitted or proved beyond controversy, it is expedient in the interests of justice that the question should be argued and decided (Connecticut Fire Insurance Co v Kavanagh [[1982] AC 473 at p 480]; Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd [(1950) 81 CLR 418 at p 438]; Green v. Sommerville [(1979) 141 CLR 594 at pp 607-608]). However, this is not such a case. The facts are not admitted nor are they beyond controversy.The consequence is that the appellants' case fails at the threshold. They cannot argue this point on appeal; it was not pleaded by them nor was it made an issue by the conduct of the parties at the trial.”In our opinion, no distinction is to be drawn in the application of these principles between an intermediate court of appeal and an ultimate court of appeal. Finally, in a recent decision of six justices of this Court (University of Wollongong v Metwally [No. 2] [(1985) 59 ALJR 481 at p 483]) the Court said:“It is elementary that a party is bound by the conduct of his case. Except in the most exceptional circumstances, it would be contrary to all principle to allow a party, after a case had been decided against him, to raise a new argument which, whether deliberately or by inadvertence, he failed to put during the hearing when he had an opportunity to do so.” (emphasis added) As their Honours said there, it is fundamental to the due administration of justice that the substantial issues between the parties be ordinarily settled at the trial.