Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia [2014] FCA 1288

Citation: Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia [2014] FCA 1288
Parties: PETER JAMES SPENCER v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA and STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES
File number: ACD 24 of 2007
Judge: MORTIMER J
Date of judgment: 27 November 2014
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Evidence – objections to admissibility – procedural fairness and fair trial – objections allowed in part
Legislation: Constitution s 51(xxxi)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 76, 78, 79, 135, 136, 190
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37M
Cases cited:

Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 295 ALR 638; [2013] HCA 7
Golden Eagle International Trading Pty Ltd v Zhang (2007) 229 CLR 498; [2007] HCA 15
Hamod v New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 375
Honeysett v The Queen (2014) 311 ALR 320; [2014] HCA 29
Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) 244 CLR 352; [2011] HCA 36
Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Ltd (2003) 130 FCR 569; [2003] FCA 933
Spencer v Commonwealth [2014] FCA 1117
SZRUR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2013) 216 FCR 445; [2013] FCAFC 146

Australian Law Reform Commission, Interim Report No 26: Evidence, Australian Government Publishing Service, Vol 1 (1985)

Date of hearing: 26 November 2014
Date of last submissions: 26 November 2014
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 62
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr R Lancaster SC with Mr C Lenehan
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

Counsel for the Second Respondent:

Solicitor for the Second Respondent:

Mr J Kirk SC with Ms A Rao

Crown Solicitor (NSW)


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

ACD 24 of 2007

BETWEEN:

PETER JAMES SPENCER
Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
First Respondent

STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MORTIMER J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 NOVEMBER 2014

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT RULES THAT:

1.Paragraphs [8]-[19] of the affidavit of Dr Alan John Moran, sworn 28 January 2014, are inadmissible.

2.The affidavits of Mr Peter James Spencer, sworn 2 October 2009 and 16 December 2013, are inadmissible.

3.The affidavit of Ms Jeanne Elizabeth Hughes, sworn 24 January 2014, is inadmissible.

4.The remainder of the respondents’ objections to evidence are not upheld.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

ACD 24 of 2007

BETWEEN:

PETER JAMES SPENCER
Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
First Respondent

STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MORTIMER J

DATE:

27 NOVEMBER 2014

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. These reasons address the objections made by the Commonwealth and the State to evidence sought to be adduced by Mr Spencer. Written objections were filed by the State on Friday 21 November 2014 and by the Commonwealth in…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 1288
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia involved the plaintiff, Mr Spencer, bringing a claim against the Commonwealth for alleged losses related to a proposed wind farm project on his land. The dispute centred around the admissibility of various pieces of evidence tendered by Mr Spencer, who appeared unrepresented. The court had to determine the validity of objections raised by the respondents regarding the relevance, nature, and admissibility of evidence presented by Mr Spencer. This included assessing whether certain evidence was speculative, conclusionary, or merely opinion-based, and whether it could be deemed prejudicial or irrelevant under the rules of evidence.

The primary legal issues the court had to address were whether the evidence provided by Mr Spencer was admissible under the rules of evidence and whether it was relevant to the claims he was pursuing. This involved scrutinising Mr Spencer’s evidence to ensure it complied with the evidentiary standards, particularly given his unrepresented status. The court had to balance the need to ensure procedural fairness with the practicalities of an unrepresented litigant presenting a complex case. It also had to consider whether the evidence, though not perfect, could still be of value in the final determination of the case, particularly if it could be challenged through cross-examination or further submissions.

The court found that some of Mr Spencer's evidence, including parts of affidavits and witness testimonies, was not admissible due to being speculative, conclusionary, or opinion-based. However, it allowed other evidence to be presented, reasoning that it would be premature to exclude potentially relevant evidence at this stage, especially given Mr Spencer’s unrepresented status. The court emphasised the importance of allowing Mr Spencer to present his case as fully as possible, while also ensuring that the evidence was subjected to appropriate scrutiny through cross-examination and submissions. This approach aimed to uphold the principles of procedural fairness and the right to a fair trial, while also managing the complexities of the case effectively.

The final orders included the exclusion of certain affidavits and testimonies from Dr Alan John Moran, Mr Peter James Spencer, and Ms Jeanne Elizabeth Hughes, as well as parts of the evidence from Mr Sackett and Mr Schuster. The court allowed other evidence to be presented, subject to the conditions mentioned, ensuring that Mr Spencer could continue to develop his case while maintaining the integrity of the evidentiary process.

Background

Background to the litigation

Mr Peter James Spencer initiated proceedings against the Commonwealth of Australia concerning a proposed wind farm on his land. The case revolves around whether Mr Spencer's land was compulsorily acquired without just terms as required by section 51(xxxi) of the Australian Constitution. The respondents, including the Commonwealth, have objected to various aspects of Mr Spencer's evidence, arguing that it is irrelevant, conclusionary, or not the best evidence. Mr Spencer, who is unrepresented, has provided affidavits and other documents in support of his claims. The court has had to consider the admissibility of this evidence in light of procedural fairness and the need for a fair trial. Mr Stavnsbo's evidence, concerning a feasibility study for the wind farm, is also central to the case and has been challenged on the ground of relevance.

The case came before the court with various objections to the admissibility of evidence from both Mr Spencer and the respondents. The court has had to rule on these objections while balancing the need for procedural fairness and ensuring a fair trial for Mr Spencer, who is unrepresented. The court has considered submissions from both parties and has made rulings on the admissibility of specific evidence. Key procedural steps include the filing of affidavits, the submission of objections, and the court's rulings on these objections. The matter is ongoing, with the final determination of Mr Spencer's claims pending further evidence and argument.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The respondents have both stated in their opening submissions that there are aspects of Mr Spencer’s case which remain undeveloped, or imprecise. I agree with that assessment. Given that he is unrepresented, that situation is not likely to change until final submissions, where he will be required to draw the threads together to put his case on the facts and the law. In a case of this size and complexity, in my opinion it is unrealistic to expect an unrepresented litigant to do much more than this. That reality means that upholding relevance objections too readily at the start of the case may risk depriving Mr Spencer of evidence which, ultimately, may turn out to be relevant.THE “ASSERTION”, “CONCLUSION” OR “NOT THE BEST EVIDENCE” OBJECTIONS Many of these objections relate to Mr Spencer’s evidence. Consistently with the approach I have explained in these reasons, I consider these matters are best dealt with in terms of weight where Mr Spencer’s evidence in chief is concerned. If his affidavit contains commentary on documents which are tendered in evidence, then this will be treated as a submission. If there could have been better, more direct evidence given than that proffered, this may affect the weight the Court may ultimately place on such evidence, or may be a reason to reject that evidence. Similarly, where there is allegedly conclusionary evidence (for example, Mr Spencer’s evidence in his 6 June 2014 affidavit at [28] that “[o]ver $500,000 was spent on this project”), the risk Mr Spencer takes with evidence at such a level of generality is that it will not be persuasive.THE OPINION STATEMENTS These objections fall into two categories. There are objections to much of Mr Spencer’s own evidence. As the respondents have correctly accepted, it may be more appropriate to treat that evidence as more in the nature of a submission by Mr Spencer. Further, in terms of what evidence I might be satisfied Mr Spencer is capable of giving by way of opinion, on the basis of his experience (see s 79 and Honeysett v The Queen (2014) 311 ALR 320; [2014] HCA 29 at [20]-[25]), or because his own state of mind or perception is relevant (see s 78) are not matters I am prepared to entirely discount at this stage. Again, the absence of a proper contradictor to these objections in terms of legal argument means I should take a cautious approach. If, as the evidence progresses, for example in cross-examination, or re-examination, it becomes clear that Mr Spencer is straying too far into the territory prohibited by s 76, then rulings can be made at that time. The second category of objection relates to witnesses other than Mr Spencer. Where the evidence appears to be in the nature of supportive views that Mr Spencer is seeking to adduce to bolster his own contentions, I have upheld the objection where it is clear there could not be any legal relevance in a witness expressing those views — for example, Ms Jeanne Hughes. In contrast, I am less certain at the moment about evidence from witnesses such as Mr John Williams.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Mr Stavnsbo’s evidence concerns a feasibility study he prepared for Mr Spencer about a proposal for a wind farm on Mr Spencer’s land. His evidence concerns that report and his opinions about the income Mr Spencer might have derived from a wind farm, had he been able to clear sufficient land to build it. The only challenge to this evidence is on the ground of relevance. Mr Spencer maintains the wind farm project did not go ahead only because he could not clear his land. The respondents contend Mr Spencer has no private cause of action for compensation or damages known to law even if he succeeds on his s 51(xxxi) arguments. That is a matter for final determination. Prior to that, Mr Spencer should be entitled to lead evidence of the loss he claims to have suffered, where the alleged infirmities of the evidence in other respects can be dealt with by cross-examination and submission.CONCLUSION Paragraphs [8]-[19] of the affidavit of Dr Alan John Moran, sworn 28 January 2014, the affidavits of Mr Peter James Spencer, sworn 2 October 2009 and 16 December 2013, and the affidavit of Ms Jeanne Elizabeth Hughes, sworn 24 January 2014, are inadmissible. Subject to what I have said regarding Mr Sackett and Mr Schuster above, the remainder of the respondents’ objections are not upheld.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court considered the admissibility of various affidavits and evidence presented in the case, taking into account the complexity of the case and the unrepresented status of Mr Spencer. The court held that while some objections to admissibility were valid, others were not upheld to ensure that Mr Spencer, as an unrepresented litigant, did not lose potentially relevant evidence. The court noted that objections relating to assertions, conclusions, or not the best evidence should be treated as matters of weight rather than outright inadmissibility. Opinion statements from Mr Spencer and other witnesses were considered on a case-by-case basis, with some objections upheld and others overruled. Regarding Mr Stavnsbo's evidence on the feasibility study, the court ruled that the evidence should be admitted despite challenges to its relevance, as the matter of relevance was for final determination, and the evidence could be challenged through cross-examination and submissions. The court's approach demonstrated a need for procedural fairness and a fair trial, particularly for unrepresented litigants, by allowing potentially relevant evidence to be presented while still upholding the integrity of the legal process. This case may set a precedent for how courts balance the rights of unrepresented litigants with the need to maintain the relevance and quality of evidence presented in complex cases.