SZUXN v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZUXN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2015] FCCA 1268
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Review of Refugee Review Tribunal decision – refusal of a protection visa – applicant claiming ethnic, political and particular social group persecution in Sri Lanka – applicant not believed – Tribunal making adverse credibility findings based upon the failure of the applicant to articulate his claims comprehensively immediately on arrival in Australia – Tribunal decision unreasonable.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36, 65, 91R, 424A

Applicants in V722 of 2000 vMinister for Immigration [2002] FCA 1059
Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue  v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576
DZACW v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2013] FMCA 46
Minister for Immigration v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1
Minister for Immigration v SZMDS & Anor (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration v Wu Shan Liang & Ors (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323
Re Minister for Immigration; Ex parte Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex Parte Aala [2000] HCA 57; (2000) 204 CLR 82
Saeed v Minister for Immigration (2010) 241 CLR 252; [2010] HCA 23

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration (2006) 228 CLR 152; [2006] HCA 63
SZOOR v Minister for Immigration (2012) 202 FCR 1
SZQOF v Minister For Immigration & Anor [2012] FMCA 261
SZRDWv Minister for Immigration [2012] FCA 1262; (2012) 134 ALD 290
SZRHL v Minister for Immigration [2013] FCA 1093
SZTBW v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCA 1277
SZTFS v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 100
SZUFV & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 564
VAAD v Minister for Immigration [2005] FCAFC 117

Applicant: SZUXN
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG 2260 of 2014
Judgment of: Judge Driver
Hearing date: 14 May 2015
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 26 June 2015

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr P Bodisco
Solicitors for the Applicant: Westside Legal
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms B Anniwell
Solicitors for the Respondents: Mills Oakley Lawyers

ORDERS

  1. A writ of certiorari shall issue removing the record of the Refugee Review Tribunal decision made on 14 July 2014 into this Court for the purpose of quashing it.

  2. A writ of mandamus shall issue requiring the Refugee Review Tribunal to redetermine the review application before it according to law.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 2260 of 2014

SZUXN

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction and background

  1. This is an application to review a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (Tribunal).  The decision was made on 14 July 2014.  The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicant a protection visa. 

  2. The following statement of background facts is derived from the submissions…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCCA 1268
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an appeal from a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) refusing to grant the applicant a protection visa. The applicant, who claimed to have faced persecution in Sri Lanka based on ethnic, political, and particular social group grounds, argued that the RRT's adverse credibility findings were unreasonable. The court was asked to review the RRT's decision.

The central legal issue before the court was the standard of "legal unreasonableness" as it applies to administrative decision-making, particularly in the context of reviewing decisions of the Refugee Review Tribunal. The court was required to determine how to ascertain legal unreasonableness, considering whether it arises from an underlying jurisdictional error or can be an outcome-focused assessment of the decision's justification and intelligibility. A further question was whether, when reasons are provided, a reviewing court is confined to those reasons when assessing legal reasonableness.

The court referred to guidance from *Minister for Immigration v Singh*, which explained that legal unreasonableness can be identified either through an underlying jurisdictional error or as an outcome that is arbitrary, capricious, or lacks common sense. The court noted that where reasons are given for a decision, the focus of review for legal unreasonableness should be on those reasons to understand the decision-maker's justification. The court indicated that it is not for the reviewing court to substitute its own judgment for that of the decision-maker. In this case, the court found that the RRT's adverse credibility findings, based on the applicant's failure to articulate his claims comprehensively immediately upon arrival, were unreasonable.

The court ordered that a writ of certiorari issue to quash the RRT's decision of 14 July 2014. Additionally, a writ of mandamus was ordered, requiring the RRT to redetermine the applicant's review application according to law.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. A writ of certiorari shall issue removing the record of the Refugee Review Tribunal decision made on 14 July 2014 into this Court for the purpose of quashing it.

2. A writ of mandamus shall issue requiring the Refugee Review Tribunal to redetermine the review application before it according to law.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Guidance on how to interpret Minister for Immigration v Li[61] and the concept of legal unreasonableness was provided by the Full Federal Court in Minister for Immigration v Singh[62] where their Honours Allsop CJ, Robertson and Mortimer JJ stated at [44]-[48]:In order to understand how the standard of legal unreasonableness is to be ascertained, it is important to see where the concept fits in terms of the Court's supervisory powers over executive or administrative decision-making. In Li, the judgments identify two different contexts in which the concept is employed. Legal unreasonableness can be a conclusion reached by a supervising court after the identification of an underlying jurisdictional error in the decision-making process: 297 ALR 225; [2013] HCA 18 at [27]- [28] per French CJ, at [72] per Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ; cf Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611; [2010] HCA 16 at [39] per Gummow A-CJ and Kiefel J. However, legal unreasonableness can also be outcome focused, without necessarily identifying another underlying jurisdictional error. The latter occurs in what French CJ (in Li 297 ALR 225; [2013] HCA 18 at [28]) calls “an area of decisional freedom”: it has the character of a choice that is arbitrary, capricious or without “common sense”. See also the plurality at [66] referring to an area within which a decision-maker has a genuinely free discretion. The plurality in Li described this as an inference to be drawn because the court cannot identify how the decision was arrived at. In those circumstances, the exercise of power is seen by the supervising court as lacking “an evident and intelligible justification”. Gageler J also uses language suggestive of review for legal unreasonableness being concerned with an examination by the supervising court of the outcome of the exercise of power (in Li 297 ALR 225; [2013] HCA 18 at [105]):“It is, of course, true that, as a measure in fact of time, space, quantity and conduct, reasonableness is a concept deeply rooted in the common law: and so, in such cases, is the power of a court to say whether a particular decision of that fact is or is not within the bounds of reason”: Giris Pty Ltd v FCT [1969] HCA 5; (1969) 119 CLR 365 at 383-384; [1969] HCA 5. Review by a court of the reasonableness of a decision made by another repository of power “is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process” but also with “whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law”: Dunsmuir v New Brunswick [2008] 1 SCR 190 at 220-221 [47].In circumstances where no reasons for the exercise of power, or for a decision, are produced, all a supervising court can do is focus on the outcome of the exercise of power in the factual context presented, and assess, for itself, its justification or intelligibility bearing in mind that it is for the repository of the power, and not for the court, to exercise the power but to do so according to law. This was the position in, for example, Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1949] HCA 26; (1949) 78 CLR 353: see at 359-360. Where there are reasons, and especially where a discretion is being reviewed, the court is able to follow the reasoning process of the decision-maker through and identify the divergence, or the factors, in the reasons said to make the decision legally unreasonable.There is then the question whether in assessing a contention of legal reasonableness, the court on review is confined to the reasons given by the decision-maker, where there are reasons. Certainly in Li the approach taken by the High Court was to examine the reasons, and justification, given by the Tribunal. In the present appeal, some of the justifications put forward by the Minister for the Tribunal's refusal of the adjournment were not matters mentioned by the Tribunal in its reasons, such as the submission that the first respondent could have sat the IELTS tests up to two years before his visa application, the use by the first respondent of the word “hope” in his letter asking for an adjournment, the absence of reasons advanced by the first respondent as to why the first mark for his 1 December 2012 test was incorrect, the inferences that might be drawn from the first respondent's failure to obtain the requisite marks in several previous tests and the absence of factors outside the first respondent's control (by comparison with the facts in Li). None of these matters was relied on by the Tribunal in its reasons.This question highlights the distinctions made between reasonableness review which concentrates on the outcome of the exercise of power, and reasonableness review which concentrates on an examination of the reasoning process by which the decision-maker arrived at the exercise of power. Although it is not necessary for the purposes of this appeal to resolve the question whether those should be seen as two different kinds of review and what might flow from that, we are inclined to the opinion that, where there are reasons for the exercise of a power, it is those reasons to which a supervising court should look in order to understand why the power was exercised as it was. The “intelligible justification” must lie within the reasons the decision-maker gave for the exercise of the power - at least, when a discretionary power is involved. That is because it is the decision-maker in whom Parliament has reposed the choice, and it is the explanation given by the decision-maker for why the choice was made as it was which should inform review by a supervising court. It is not, as in House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499, on an appeal from an exercise of a judicial discretion, for the court to re-exercise the discretion. If a supervising court goes outside the reasons given by a decision-maker for another justification for the exercise of power, that court might then be seen to be placing itself in the position of the repository of the power and therefore acting impermissibly. Where there are reasons, either the reasons given by the decision-maker demonstrate a justification or they do not. It would, we think, be a rare case where the reasons demonstrate a justification but the ultimate exercise of the power would be seen to be legally unreasonable.The standard of legal reasonableness will apply across a range of statutory powers, but the indicia of legal unreasonableness will need to be found in the scope, subject and purpose of the particular statutory provisions in issue in any given case. As we have said, unlike some other grounds for review of the exercise of power, the reasoning process in review for legal unreasonableness will inevitably be fact dependent. That is not to diminish the importance of the supervising court maintaining an approach which does not involve the substitution of its own judgment for that of the decision-maker. Rather, it is to recognise that any analysis which involves concepts such as “intelligible justification” must involve scrutiny of the factual circumstances in which the power comes to be exercised. (emphasis added)[61] (2013) 249 CLR 332 (Li)[62] [2014] FCAFC 1

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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