SZUFV v Minister for Immigration
[2015] FCCA 564
•29 April 2015
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZUFV & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2015] FCCA 564 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Review of Refugee Review Tribunal decision – refusal of protection visas – applicants claiming religious persecution in Iran – applicants not believed – whether the Tribunal erred in testing the applicants’ faith or otherwise fell into error considered – no jurisdictional error. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36, 91R, 414, 424A, 424AA, 425 |
| Dang v Minister for Immigration [1999] FCA 38 Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24 Minister for Immigration v Applicant A125 of 2003 [2007] FCAFC 162 Minister for Immigration v Jia Legeng [2001] 205 CLR 507 Minister for Immigration v SZLSP (2010) 187 FCR 362 Minister for Immigration v SZMDS & Anor (2010) 240 CLR 611 Minister for Immigration v MZYHS (2011) 119 ALD 534 NADH v Minister for Immigration [2004] 214 ALR 264 Re Minister for Immigration; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 74 ALJR 405 Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H (2001) 75 ALJR 982 SZBEL v Minister for Immigration (2006) 228 CLR 152 SZBYR v Minister for Immigration [2007] 235 ALR 609 SZIMM v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2008] FMCA 34 SZJUB v Minister for Immigration [2007] FCA 1486 SZRUI v Minister for Immigration [2013] FCAFC 80 SZSSC v Minister for Immigration & Anor (2014) 142 ALD 150 SZTGU v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCA 859 |
| First Applicant: | SZUFV |
| Second Applicant: | SZUFW |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 1084 of 2014 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Driver |
| Hearing date: | 13 March 2015 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 29 April 2015 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr J Williams |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr J Kay-Hoyle |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Clayton Utz |
ORDERS
The further amended application filed on 9 March 2015 is dismissed.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 1084 of 2014
| SZUFV |
First Applicant
SZUFW
Second Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction and background
This is an application to review a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (Tribunal). The decision was made on 17 March 2014. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicants protection visas.
There are two applicants who are a husband and wife. The following statement of background facts concerning the protection claims of the applicants and the decision of the Tribunal on them is derived from the submissions of the parties.
The applicants are citizens of Iran. They arrived in Australia on 24 October 2012 on visitor visas. On 16 January 2013, they both applied for protection visas. The Minister’s Delegate refused those applications on 23 August 2013 on the basis that Australia did not owe protection obligations to the applicants pursuant to s.36(2) and s.36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act).
On 9 September 2013, the applicants applied to the Tribunal for review of the Delegate's decision.[1] On 27 February 2014, the first applicant appeared at a hearing before the Tribunal to give evidence; the second applicant did not appear due to ill-health but the first applicant informed the Tribunal that their claims were the same.[2]
[1] Court Book (CB) 145.
[2] [12] at CB 240.
The applicants provided statutory declarations with their visa applications.[3] In addition, the applicants provided some documentation, including a certificate of baptism for the first applicant.[4] On 4 March 2014, after the hearing, the Tribunal sent the applicants a letter pursuant to s.424A of the Migration Act, asking for their comments or responses to certain information (424A letter).[5] The first applicant provided a further statutory declaration in response.[6] The applicants’ daughter-in-law provided some further documentation relating to her visit to Iran which formed an element of the applicants’ claims.[7] The applicants did not make any written submissions to the Tribunal or provide any further evidence.
[3] CB 90-110.
[4] CB 111-118.
[5] CB 220-221.
[6] CB 223-224.
[7] CB 225-234.
Applicants’ claims
In essence, the applicants made identical claims for protection. The substance of their claims was that prior to their departure from Iran they had problems with the Iranian security authorities as a result of the conversion of their children (two of whom lived in Australia, one of whom lived in the UK) to Christianity. In addition, the applicants claimed that they had been identified as non-practising Muslims who were not devout. The applicants claimed that they had attempted to negotiate with the authorities but that the authorities insisted that they and their children return to Iran and swear undertakings to faithfully follow Islam. The applicants claimed that since they had been living in Australia they had become attracted to and started to practise Christianity.
More specifically, it was claimed that:
a)while in Iran the applicants considered themselves to be non-practising Muslims;
b)from October 2011 to April 2012, their UK-based son visited the applicants in Iran together with his wife, a Polish citizen who was a practising Roman Catholic living in the UK. The couple travelled in Iran and the applicants accompanied them for two weeks;
c)the applicants’ neighbours were suspicious of their son for marrying a foreign woman and seeing the couple together;
d)following their son’s visit, local people started to notice the applicants’ lack of interest in Islam (the applicants had “since the Islamic revolution” not attended the local mosque or Friday prayers) and the applicants started to experience harassment from their neighbours, some of whom threw rocks, called them names or sprayed graffiti on their house;
e)on 23 June 2012, the applicants’ house was searched by the Iranian security authorities. During that search an English Bible, brought to the applicants’ home by their daughter-in-law, was found in their son’s room;[8]
f)following the search, the second applicant was taken away and questioned by the security authorities. He was detained for six hours, during which he was interrogated and mistreated and asked questions about his children in Australia and the UK;[9]
g)during the search, the authorities took the applicants’ passports, birth certificates and national identity cards. With the assistance of one of the second applicant’s younger brothers (who was a former member of the security police), the applicants bribed someone to facilitate the return of their passports. The bribes were paid with the assistance of the applicants’ daughter who lived in Abu Dhabi. Upon securing the return of their passports (but not the other documentation that was taken) the applicants left Iran for Abu Dhabi;[10]
h)upon their arrival in Australia, they made attempts to deal with the Iranian authorities through the second applicant’s brother. They were told that the authorities considered that they had committed an intolerable religious offence and that they had reports that the applicants’ children were spreading Christianity amongst Iranians outside Iran. They were told that in order to resolve the matter they, along with their children, would be required to repent and return to Iran and sign a declaration to follow Islam faithfully. If they did not do this, the authorities would not release the applicants’ other documentation;
i)the applicants started to attend Hillsong church services with their children. They professed to be happy about a religion that was based on “peace, tolerance and forgiveness” rather than “cruelty, revenge and intolerance”. The second applicant provided a certificate showing that she had had “water baptism” along with other certificates relating to her grandchildren.
[8] The first applicant was away visiting a sick relative at the time.
[9] The second applicant did not provide any details of what occurred during the interrogation as he stated that he “preferred not speak about the details of the unauthorized home search”. The second applicant did not, in fact, give any further evidence about this.
[10] The applicants stated that they had flown to Abu Dhabi because it was the first available flight (all the flights to Australia being full) and they considered it to be safer to wait in Abu Dhabi to catch a flight to Sydney.
The first applicant elaborated upon the applicants’ claims during the hearing before the Tribunal.[11] After the hearing, the Tribunal identified two issues about which the applicants provided further evidence and their daughter-in-law provided documentation about:
a)a visit by the applicants to Saudi Arabia which the applicants claimed that they had undertaken as a shopping trip (which they stated was a common thing for Iranians to do); and
b)the daughter-in-law’s visit to Iran: she gave evidence (in a letter to the Tribunal) that she had brought a pocket size book of collected sentences from the Bible. She claimed that she had neglected to take the book with her when she left on her travels around Iran with her partner (the applicants’ son). She also provided documentation (in the form of a council tax bill, a letter to her doctor and a tenancy agreement) concerning her relationship with the applicants’ son.
[11] A summary of the further evidence given by the second applicant is set out at [10]-[28] of the Tribunal’s decision at CB 240-242.
The applicants claimed to fear persecution or harm if they returned to Iran as they would be arrested, detained and punished because of their children’s conversion to Christianity.
Tribunal’s decision
The Tribunal did not accept the applicants’ claims. The Tribunal made extensive credibility findings about the applicants and concluded that their story had been fabricated in order to secure a protection visa. In simple terms, they were not believed. The Tribunal’s rejection of the claims fell into three broad areas.
Conversion of the children to Christianity
The Tribunal did not accept that all of the applicants' children had converted to Christianity.[12] There was no evidence that the UK-based son had converted. No information was given in relation to their Australian-based son, but in any event he retained his Shi'a given name. One daughter was baptised on a date after the applicants had left Iran. The Tribunal accepted that the second daughter, whose religious status was unknown, might have converted to Christianity on a date when the applicants were still in Iran.
[12] at [35].
Even in that case, the Tribunal did not accept that it was known by anyone in Iran that any conversions had taken place.[13] There was no evidence that this information was available to people in Iran.[14] Even if the information was available, the Tribunal did not accept that this would raise their neighbours' or the authorities' interest.[15] There was no evidence to support the notion that Iranian authorities or locals would impute apostasy to the parents of people who had converted to Christianity overseas.[16] The claim that local authorities wished their children, Australia citizens, to return to Iran or attend the Iranian embassy to declare their commitment to Islam lacked credibility.[17]
[13] at [35].
[14] at [36].
[15] at [35].
[16] at [37].
[17] at [37].
Adverse attention from the Iranian authorities
The Tribunal did not accept that the applicants' son and daughter‑in‑law visited Iran for six months from late 2011 to April 2012. It did not accept that the authorities searched the applicants' house or that a bible was found or that identity documents were seized.[18]
[18] at [38].
The Tribunal found the applicants' account of the visit by their daughter‑in‑law and the bible that was left in their home to be implausible.[19] This followed the Tribunal's questioning of the first applicant as to how the book came to be there and why it was left there, apparently forgotten.[20] The Tribunal was not satisfied with the first applicants' responses.[21] The second applicant did not provide a response on this point in reply to the Tribunal's letter to him that followed the hearing.
[19] at [38].
[20] at [17]-[18] and [24].
[21] at [43]-[45].
The Tribunal considered the evidence relating to the marriage of the applicants' son to an “English” woman, and their subsequent visit to Iran during 2011-2012. The Tribunal found that there was no evidence to support these claimed facts.[22] The Tribunal had regard to the daughter-in-law's letter and its attachments, and gave reasons for concluding that these documents did not support the applicants' case.[23]
[22] at [39]-[41].
[23] at [39]-[40].
The Tribunal referred to country information that supported a finding that it is permissible for a Muslim man to marry a Christian woman. This information was put to the first applicant at the Tribunal hearing.[24] The Tribunal did not accept the first applicant's response to this information.[25]
[24] at [15].
[25] at [42].
The applicants’ conversion to Christianity
The Tribunal did not accept that the applicants were non‑practising Muslims prior to 2012.[26] The Tribunal preferred the first applicant's evidence at the hearing, that the pair had undertaken religious travels in 1997 and 2009, to her later denial.[27]
[26] at [48].
[27] at [49].
The Tribunal did not accept the first applicant's evidence at the hearing that she was developing a genuine interest in Christianity and was learning about Christianity from her daughter.[28] This finding was based in part on the first applicant's oral evidence that she would be unable to answer questions about Christianity, if asked.[29] There was an absence of supporting evidence for the applicants' religious claim. The Tribunal noted that no one from the Hillsong church had provided evidence about the applicants or letters of support and the first applicant’s baptism was undertaken without preparation and two weeks after the applicants lodged their protection visa applications. [30]
[28] at [50].
[29] at [50].
[30] at [53].
The Tribunal found that the first applicant's baptism and church attendance was for the purpose of strengthening her protection visa application.[31]
[31] at [51].
The applicants submitted photographs of themselves inside and outside the Hillsong church but the Tribunal did not give these photographs any weight in establishing the genuineness of their interest in Christianity.[32]
[32] at [52].
The judicial review application
These proceedings began with a judicial review application filed on 22 April 2014. That application has been amended several times since. On 13 February 2015 I granted the applicants leave to rely upon a then proposed further amended application save for the deletion of a ground which purported to rely upon s.116 of the Constitution. I granted leave for the applicants to alter that ground to one based upon the decision of the Full Federal Court in SZOCT v Minister for Immigration[33] and other cases referred to in argument. The further amended application in that form was filed on 9 March 2015. The further amended application traverses the history of the matter and contains numerous submissions. Relevantly, the further amended application contains the following grounds:
[33] [2010] FCAFC 159.
…
Ground 1: Natural Justice - The Fair Hearing Rule
27.The Second Respondent breached the rules of natural justice and procedural fairness in connection with the making of the decision by violating the fair hearing rule.
Particulars
(a)No Prior Warning of Adverse Credibility Finding in violation of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 425(1)
28.The second respondent failed to accord the applicant natural justice and procedural fairness as the second respondent based its decision upon a series of adverse credibility findings, particularized at [7]-[26], (a)-(m) above, which rejected out of hand, almost all of the applicant's claims on the basis of credibility, without giving the applicant adequate opportunity to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues relating to the decision under review, in violation of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 425(1).
(b) No Opportunity to produce information and no invitation given orally by the Second defendant whilst the applicant was appearing in violation of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 424AA(a)(b)
29.The second respondent failed to accord the applicant natural justice and procedural fairness in violation of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 424AA as the second respondent:
a.did not give the applicant clear particulars of information that the second respondent considered was the reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision;
b.did not ensure the applicant understood why the information was relevant;
c.did not invite the applicant to comment or respond to the information;
d.did not advise the applicant that they may seek additional time to comment or respond to the information;
e.did not adjourn the review so that the applicant has additional time to comment on or respond to the information.
Particulars
(i) The Illness of the Applicants
a)The Second Respondent refused to grant the First and Second Applicants an adjournment due to illness.
b)Although the First Applicant appeared, she was heavily affected by anxiety and depression and associated medication, which affected her memory and ability to give evidence.
c)The Second Applicant was unable to appear at the Tribunal hearing due to illness.
d)The applicants provided doctors certificates, yet the second respondent did not accept them.
(ii) Adverse Credibility Issues
a)The second respondent raised 13 credibility issues regarding the applicants' evidence during the hearing of 27 February 2014.
b)However, he did not formally give clear particulars, did not ensure the applicant understood why the information was relevant, did not invite the applicant to comment or respond to all 13 adverse credibility issues, did not advise the applicant that they may seek additional time to comment, and did not adjourn the review so that the applicants had additional time to comment or respond.
(iii) The Demeanor of the Tribunal Member
a)The Tribunal member was rude towards the applicant.
b)The Tribunal member often interrupted her and did not let her finish her sentences.
c)The Tribunal member constantly challenged the truthfulness of her claims.
(c)Failure to seek information, in violation of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) , s 424
30.In conducting the review, the second respondent may get any information that it considers relevant. However, if the second respondent gets such information, the second respondent must have regard to that information in making the decision on the review.
31.The second respondent did not invite, either orally (including by telephone) or in writing, a person to give information.
Particulars
32.On 4 March 2014, after the conclusion of the hearing, the second respondent invited by writing the applicants to give further information on or before 18 March 2014.
33.In that letter, the Tribunal Officer, invited the applicants to provide further information in regard to two issues, they being:
a)The claim by the applicants that their trips to Saudi Arabia and Syria respectively were for 'umra' and 'ziyarat'.
b)The claim by the applicants that their son and defacto had visited Iran for six months from late 2011 until April 2012, that the authorities had raided the applicant's house, found a bible, confiscated documents, or detained the second named applicant.
34.The Tribunal Officer, did not invite the applicants to provide further information regarding the remaining 12 adverse credibility issues raised by the Tribunal Member at the hearing on 27 February 2014.
35.On 11 March 2014, the migration agent for the applicants forwarded the response to the written request by Tribunal Officer.
36.The Tribunal Officer, Beverley Cooke, gave the applicants until 18 March 2014 to respond. Yet the second respondent handed down the decision on 17 March 2014.
37.By way of that decision record, the second respondent rejected at [38] the claims by the applicants regarding the visit by their son and his defacto, dismissed at [48] the claims by the applicants regarding their trips to Saudi Arabia and Syria, and proceeded to make a further 12 adverse credibility findings, for which the applicants had no written notice.
(d)Failure to Review the Decision in violation of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 414
38.The second respondent failed to properly review the decision as it did not accord the applicant natural justice and procedural fairness which in effect deprived the applicant of a fair hearing and the right to give evidence and present arguments in violation of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 414.
Ground 2: Natural Justice - The Bias Rule
39.The second respondent made a series of adverse findings regarding the credibility of the applicant, particularized at [7]-[26], (a)-(m) above, rejecting out of hand, almost all of the applicant's claims, on the basis of credibility, which constituted a reasonable apprehension of bias.
Ground 3: Error of Law - Misapplication of law or failure to ask the correct question
48.The second respondent has erred by, misinterpreting, misunderstanding or misapplying the applicable law, or has otherwise failed to ask the correct question.
Particulars
(a) The Applicant's Conversion to Christianity
49.At [50] of the Decision Record, the second respondent did not accept that 'the applicant had any interest in Christianity prior to coming to Australia, nor that she has any interest in the religion here other than in an attempt to establish a refugee profile.'
50.At [50], the second respondent did 'accept that the applicant has limited education and hence cannot access written information easily,' the applicant made 'no real effort to learn about her new religion.
51.At [51] of the Decision Record, the second respondent found that 'the first-named applicant's baptism and their church attendance has been deliberate and targeted.'
52.At [52] of the Decision Record, the second respondent found that 'the first-named applicant's actions do not indicate any desire to learn about the new religion that she has adopted, and there do not appear to be any substantive links with the church community other than attending the church with her daughter.'
53.At [55] of the Decision Record, the second respondent found that '[b]ecause I do not accept that the first-named applicant has genuinely converted to Christianity, has or would seek to practice or promote Christianity in Iran, or that anyone in Iran is or was aware, or is likely to become aware that they have any interest in Christianity through attending church or her baptism or that some of her children have converted,
54.The second respondent did not 'accept that she was learning about Christianity by listening to her daughter read to her from the bible or attending church,' observing that '[i]t is reasonable to expect that someone who is serious about embracing a new religion would take instruction from someone qualified to impart knowledge about it.' The second respondent did not lend the photographs of the applicants inside and outside the Hillsong church no weight in determining the veracity of their interest in Christianity.'
55.For the following reasons, the second respondent has erred by, misinterpreting, misunderstanding or misapplying the applicable law, or has otherwise failed to ask the correct question, that being whether there is a real risk that first applicant may suffer serious harm under the refugee criterion or significant harm under the complementary criterion due to the conversion of the first applicant to Christianity if the first applicant was to be returned to the Iran, where apostasy carries the death sentence, and not whether or not whether the first applicant was a legitimate or genuine Christian.
56.First, the second respondent erred by impermissibly applying a flawed and subjective definition of what is or is not a genuine Christian on the first applicant.
57.Second, the second respondent impermissibly imposed religious observance on the first applicant.
58.Third, the second respondent impermissibly prohibited the free exercise of the thought, conscience, religion or belief of the first applicant.
59.Fourth, the second respondent erred by examining, testing, inspecting, scrutinizing and ultimately denying the first applicant's thought, conscience, religion or belief.
60.Fifth, it was impermissible for the second respondent to explore the first applicant's level of knowledge and understanding of the religion, as this interfered with the thought, conscience, religion or belief of the first applicant.
61.Sixth, it was not permissible for the second respondent to evaluate the applicant's answers against probative material which evinces the doctrines of the religion, as this interfered with the thought, conscience, religion, belief of the first applicant.
62.Seventh, there was not a sufficiently disclosed rational basis for concluding that the elements of which the first applicant was ignorant were elements that an adherent to the religion might reasonably be expected to know.
63.Eighth, the decision by the second respondent was affected by jurisdictional error as it revealed a sufficient lack of rational or logical connection between the tribunal's assessment of the first applicant's credit and the material upon which it relied to make that assessment.
64.Ninth, the second respondent has not been ordained and does not have any formal religious authority, training, knowledge, expertise or experience to apply a test or definition of religion on the first applicant and erred.
65.Tenth, the right to the free exercise of thought, conscience and religion is expressed in the opinio juris of international law, including the international bill of rights inter alia and is widely accepted as a principle of customary international law, which has been adopted and incorporated by the common law of Australia.
(b) Section 91R(3)
66.The second respondent has erred by, misinterpreting, misunderstanding or misapplying the applicable law, or has otherwise failed to ask the correct question by considering the conduct of the applicant outside of Australia when applying section 91R(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
67.At [51], the second respondent advised the applicants during the interview and in the s 424A letter, s 91R(3) requires the second respondent to disregard this conduct in determining whether the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of converting if the second respondent found that it was carried out for the sole purpose of strengthening one's refugee claim.
The Children's Conversion to Christianity
68.At [35] of the Decision Record, the second respondent did 'not accept that all of the applicants' children have converted to Christianity,
The Applicants' Christianity in Iran
69.At [50], the second respondent did not accept that 'the applicant had any interest in Christianity prior to coming to Australia, nor that she has any interest in the religion here other than in an attempt to establish a refugee profile.'
The Applicant's Christianity in Australia with regard to the Complementary Criterion
70.At [55], the second respondent took issue with the complementary criterion did not 'accept that the first-named applicant has genuinely converted to Christianity, has or would seek to practice or promote Christianity in Iran, or that anyone in Iran is or was aware, or is likely to become aware that they have any interest in Christianity through attending church or her baptism or that some of her children have converted, or that their house was raided by the authorities in Iran and a bible found and their ID card taken,' he second respondent was 'not satisfied that there are any substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that the applicants will suffer significant harm.'
71.Section 91R(3) only permits the second respondent to 'disregard any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia'. In light of the plain language of 91R(3), it is the conduct of the applicant in Australia that engages section 91R(3), not the conduct of the applicant in another country, nor the conduct of third persons and it only applies to the refugee criterion and not the complimentary criterion.
72.The second respondent erred by:
a)considering the religious conduct of the applicant in Iran;
b)considering the religious conduct of the children of applicants' in Iran;
c)by finding the first applicant had not genuinely converted to Christianity in Australia;
d)did not expressly distinguish the application of section 91R(3) to the refugee criterion from the complementary criterion and thereby conflated section 91R(3) to both the refugee criterion and the complementary criterion
Ground 4: No Evidence
73.There was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the series of adverse credibility findings by the second respondent, particularized at [7]-[26], (a)-(m) above, which rejected out of hand, almost all of the applicant's claims on the basis of credibility or the second respondent relied on facts, which did not exist.
Particulars
(a) The First Applicant's Conversion to Christianity
74.At [50] of the Decision Record, the second respondent did not accept that 'the applicant had any interest in Christianity prior to coming to Australia, nor that she has any interest in the religion here other than in an attempt to establish a refugee profile.' There was evidence before the Tribunal establishing the interest of the applicant's in Christianity in Iran and there was no evidence to establish this finding except the disbelief of the second respondent.
75.At [50], the second respondent found the applicant made 'no real effort to learn about her new religion.' There was evidence before the second respondent that the first applicant had attended church, had been baptized, was learning about the Christian faith through her children and grandchildren and there was no evidence to establish this finding except the disbelief of the second respondent.
76.At [51], the second respondent found that 'the first-named applicant's baptism and their church attendance has been deliberate and targeted.' There was evidence before the second respondent that the baptism and church attendance by the first applicant was genuine and there was no evidence establishing the finding except the disbelief of the second respondent.
77.At [52], the second respondent found that 'the first-named applicant's actions do not indicate any desire to learn about the new religion that she has adopted, and there do not appear to be any substantive links with the church community other than attending the church with her daughter.' There was evidence before the second respondent that the first applicant did desire to learn about the new religion and there was no evidence establishing the finding except the disbelief of the second respondent.
78.At [55], the second respondent did not 'accept that the first-named applicant has genuinely converted to Christianity.' There was evidence before the second respondent that the conversion was genuine and there was no evidence establishing the finding except the disbelief of the second respondent.
79.In summary, there was no evidence before the second respondent that the first applicant had not converted to Christianity. This required more than just disbelief. It required logical and probative evidence that the first applicant had not attended church, had not been baptised, had not genuinely converted, as opposed the mere speculation and disbelief of the second respondent.
80.Alternatively, there was no logical or probative connection between the conversion of the first applicant to Christianity and the finding by the second respondent that the conversion of the applicant to Christianity was not genuine.
81.The individual and cumulative adverse credibility findings were without foundation and as such constituted an error of law by the second respondent.
Ground 5: Relevant Considerations
82.The second respondent failed to take into account relevant considerations, particularized at [7]- [27], (a)-(o) above, in the exercise of power
Particulars
83.There were in total 14 adverse credibility findings made by the second respondent. The individual and cumulative effect of those findings meant that the second respondent did not take into account the claims and evidence of the applicant, constituting jurisdictional error.
Ground 6: Unreasonableness
84. For the reasons particularized at [7]-[26], (a)-(m) above, the second respondent exercise power in a manner that is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised the power. Alternatively, the second respondent reasoned illogically or irrationally and the findings lack evident or intelligible justification.
I received into evidence the court book filed on 18 June 2014. I also received the affidavit of Nicole Maree Mackay made on 12 February 2015 to which is annexed a transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal. I received as an exhibit a disc containing the sound recording of the hearing.[34]
[34] Exhibit A1.
The applicants and the Minister made both oral and written submissions.
Consideration
Although the grounds in the further amended applications (and the submissions made by counsel for the applicants in support of them) are rather discursive, it became apparent during the course of oral argument that there are seven heads of challenge to the Tribunal’s decision. These are:
a)procedural unfairness;
b)apprehended bias;
c)error in testing the claimed religion of the applicants;
d)error in the application of s.91R(3) of the Migration Act;
e)no evidence to support the Tribunal’s adverse credibility findings;
f)a failure to take into account relevant considerations in relation to the adverse credibility findings; and
g)unreasonableness.
Ground 1 – breach of procedural fairness
I accept the submissions of counsel for the Minister on this issue.
This ground is misconceived. It relies upon a mistaken analysis of both the statutory provisions identified by the applicants and the nature of the decision itself.
Section 425: issues under review
The reliance on s.425 of the Migration Act is misplaced. That section requires a Tribunal to provide the applicant with a hearing to give evidence “relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review”. The High Court considered the construction and operation of s.425 in SZBEL v Minister for Immigration (SZBEL).[35] The decision in SZBEL has been considered in numerous decisions of this Court and the Federal Court and, relevantly, by Barnes FM (as her Honour then was) in SZIMM v Minister for Immigration & Anor (SZIMM).[36] I accept that her Honour’s analysis in SZIMM accurately states the current law. In particular, for the purposes of s.425:[37]
an enquiry or exercise in characterisation must be undertaken to identify what are the determinative, dispositive, critical or important issues in the sense of issues on which the decision to reject the applicant’s claim is based and that it is only such issues that meet the description of an issue… within the meaning of s.425.
[35] (2006) 228 CLR 152.
[36] [2008] FMCA 34.
[37] SZIMM at [65].
The Tribunal must give a sufficient indication to the applicant of what is in issue. If there are factual matters that go to the issue the Tribunal is not obliged to put each of those factual matters to the applicant. Rather, the Tribunal is obliged to inform the applicant of the issue but not of each fact that relates to it.[38] Thus s.425 requires:[39]
the Tribunal to raise with the applicant determinative issues in the sense of issues on which the decision to reject the claim were based, but it is not required to descend into all the underlying facts when meeting its obligation under s.425.
[38] per Bennett J in SZJUB v Minister for Immigration [2007] FCA 1486. In SZJUB, her Honour also stated that “the business and the child were not the issues on which the decision to reject the appellant’s claim were based. They were not determinative but additional factual matters that elaborated the matters to be balanced against the risk. The key point in the Tribunal’s assessment was the fact that there was a risk to the appellant and, in those circumstances, it did not accept that there was sufficient reason for her to take such a risk. The appellant was directed to that issue at the hearing, asked about it and told that the Tribunal found it difficult to accept her evidence” (at [28]).
[39] SZIMM at [69].
Section 425 does not require the Tribunal to identify the significance of the questions that it puts to a claimant or the ultimate matter or issue to which those questions go.[40]
[40] Minister for Immigration v Applicant A125 of 2003 [2007] FCAFC 162 at [88].
It is clear from a careful reading of the decision that the Tribunal dealt with the issues raised by the applicants’ claims. Those issues were correctly identified, in large part, by the areas identified by the Tribunal in its consideration of the applicants’ claims starting at [35] of the decision. The applicants had ample opportunity to lead evidence about the matters on which they relied. The Tribunal dealt with the claims in an entirely orthodox way that did not offend against the proper application of s.425.
Section 424AA: information provided orally
Section 424A requires the Tribunal to give to an applicant “clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review”. Section 424AA allows a tribunal to meet the requirements of s.424A by putting any such information orally during the hearing and when the Tribunal does so there is no requirement to meet s.424A in writing.[41] The Tribunal may, but is not obliged to, give information to an applicant at a hearing.
[41] s.424A(2B).
If the Tribunal invokes s.424AA(a) of the Migration Act, then it must comply with the requirements of s.424AA(b). In this instance, the Tribunal did not invoke s.424AA(a) of the Migration Act. Accordingly, there was no breach of s.424AA(b) of the Migration Act.
In any event, the applicants fail to identify the adverse information which they assert the Tribunal was required to put orally at the hearing. To the extent the applicants assert that the Tribunal was required to put its adverse credibility findings to the applicants, this contention is misconceived. The Tribunal is not obliged to engage in a running commentary of its thinking processes in order to identify to an applicant how it was assessing or might assess at some future time her evidence or claims.[42] Further, inconsistencies in evidence and rejection of such evidence by a tribunal are not “information” for the purposes of section 424A.[43]
[42] SZBEL v Minister for Immigration (2006) 228 CLR 152.
[43] SZBYR v Minister for Immigration [2007] 235 ALR 609.
Section 414: review of the decision
Section 414 of the Migration Act imposes an obligation on the Tribunal, upon receipt of a valid application for a review, to review the decision.[44] Having regard to the procedure adopted by the Tribunal, it complied with that obligation. The applicants were provided with an opportunity to present arguments and evidence in support of their claims. The first applicant appeared before the Tribunal and gave further evidence. The Tribunal had regard to and considered the applicants’ claims and evidence.
[44] SZSSC v Minister for Immigration & Anor (2014) 142 ALD 150.
The Tribunal adequately dealt with the issue of the applicants’ health at [10]-[12] of its reasons.[45]
[45] CB 240.
Ground 1 fails.
Ground 2 – apprehended bias
I accept the submissions of counsel for the Minister on this ground.
In relation to allegations of bias, the following general, and well-established, principles are relevant in this case:
a)an applicant must show that a fair-minded lay person who is properly informed as to the nature of the proceedings and the matters in issue might reasonably apprehend that the Tribunal might not bring an impartial mind to bear on the matter before it;[46]
b)any assessment, relying as it does on the construct of a fair-minded observer, involves considering whether the applicant was treated in a manner that gave rise to the appearance of unfairness;[47]
c)what must be demonstrated is that the conclusions of the Tribunal have been reached with a mind that is not open to persuasion or unwilling to evaluate all the material fairly;[48]
d)in assessing a claim of apprehended bias, account must be taken of the Tribunal’s different functions and procedures;[49] it will be a rare and extreme case where bias can be demonstrated simply by reference to the reasons given by the Tribunal;[50]
e)an allegation of bias must be distinctly made and proved.[51]
[46] Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H (2001) 75 ALJR 982.
[47] per Allsop J in SZRUI v Minister for Immigration [2013] FCAFC 80.
[48] per Allsop J in NADH v Minister for Immigration [2004] 214 ALR 264 at [15]; per Gleeson CJ in Minister for Immigration v Jia Legeng [2001] 205 CLR 507.
[49] Re Minister for Immigration; Ex parte Epeabaka (2001) 206 CLR 128.
[50] SCAA v Minister for Immigration [2002] FCA 668 at [38]; SZHVL v Minister for Immigration [2008] FCA 356.
[51] Minister for Immigration v Jia Legeng [2001] 205 CLR 507.
The applicants misstate what occurred in the Tribunal’s consideration of their claims. The Tribunal set out at some length, over the course of 29 paragraphs (from [5] to [34] of the decision) the details of the applicants’ claims and the evidence relied upon by the applicants to support their claims. It identified a number of the matters that were questioned and tested by the Tribunal. The Tribunal then identified in general terms its conclusion that it did not believe the applicants’ claims and then went on to deal with them under the particular areas identified by the applicants. It is correct that the Tribunal made extensive negative credibility findings about the applicants. There was sufficient material on which to make such findings and those findings were open to the Tribunal. The Tribunal set out in detail its reasons for reaching its adverse credibility findings by reference to the evidence before it. The fact that the Tribunal disbelieved the applicants’ claims or made adverse credibility findings does not necessarily give rise to a perception of bias or demonstrate bias against the applicants.[52] There is nothing inappropriate in the Tribunal testing the applicants’ claims and concluding that it did not believe them; that is part of its statutory function. Such an approach cannot of itself support a finding of jurisdictional error: assessments of credibility are “the function of the primary decision maker par excellence”;[53]
[52] See SZTGU v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCA 859.
[53] Re Minister for Immigration; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 74 ALJR 405 at [67] per McHugh J.
The applicants have not pointed to any evidence from the Tribunal’s conduct of the hearing that might reasonably suggest that the Tribunal approached matters with a closed mind. The reasons themselves reflect the Tribunal’s thought processes in weighing the evidence. The applicants seek to reason from a negative outcome to a conclusion that the Tribunal must have pre-judged that outcome. That approach is particularly evident at [35] of the applicants’ submissions which endeavours to persuade the Court that the mere statement of a negative finding, and the placement of that finding, in some way discloses an apprehension of bias. The argument is conceptually unsound and is a mis-characterisation of the Tribunal’s reasons; the statement of the adverse finding is a conclusion referrable to the balance of the matters referred to at [35], [36] and [37]. The applicants’ argument is an invitation to impermissible merits review.
An additional matter was properly disclosed by counsel for the Minister during the course of oral argument. At [48] and [49] the Tribunal said:[54]
I do not accept that the applicants were non-observant Muslims prior to 2012. The first-named applicant admitted when asked the reason for their visits to Saudi Arabia and Syria in 2009 and 1997 respectively that they performed ‘umra and ziyarat. These are two forms of religious pilgrimage that would indicate an attachment to Islam that is inconsistent with their claim. The 12-year gap between trips also indicates that their affinity with Islam spanned a long period and at least until a few years prior to them leaving Iran.
I do not accept that they just went on these visits out of curiosity as they had heard so much about them, nor do I believe the reply to the 424A letter in which the second-named applicant claimed that the journey was for a shopping trip to Saudi Arabia. Given that the UAE is much closer to Iran and Dubai one of the world’s best shopping locations, as well as the difficulty of obtaining a non-pilgrimage visa for Saudi Arabia I find it implausible that such an offer would be made. Regardless, the visa category would be apparent on the Saudi visa in their old passport and their unwillingness to submit this raises further doubt as to this claim. Finally, it would be reasonable to expect that the first-named applicant would have known that she was on a shopping trip as opposed to performing ‘umra and would have mentioned this during the hearing. [footnotes omitted]
[54] CB 245.
The transcript,[55] while not entirely clear, confirms that the proposition that the purpose of the applicants’ trips to Saudi Arabia and Syria was religious came from the presiding member. It appears from the transcript that the presiding member got an affirmative answer from the first applicant to that proposition. This is confirmed by the sound recording of the hearing. It is apparent that the invitation to comment issued on 4 March 2014,[56] purportedly issued pursuant to s.424A of the Migration Act, was thought to be necessary because the source of the information was the presiding member at the hearing. The first applicant responded to that invitation to comment by statutory declaration.[57] At [3] of the declaration she resiled from the affirmative answer she gave at the Tribunal hearing. It is apparent from the Tribunal’s reasons that it did not accept that explanation. It would have been a concern if the Tribunal had, in effect, put into the mouths of the applicants the purpose of their travel to Saudi Arabia and Syria. That concern is allayed, however, by the written invitation to comment and the consideration of the response by the Tribunal.
[55] pages 17-18.
[56] CB 220-221.
[57] CB 223-224.
The assertion that the presiding member was rude or intimidating or interfered with the presentation of the applicants’ claims and evidence is not supported by the transcript or the sound recording of the Tribunal hearing.
I conclude that there is nothing in the Tribunal’s reasons for decision, or the transcript, or the sound recording of the Tribunal hearing that would cause a fair minded observer, aware of the facts and circumstances, to apprehend that the presiding member might not have brought an open mind to the review.
Ground 2 fails.
Ground 3 – credibility and the testing of faith
This ground, which was added to the further amended application by leave, asserts that the Tribunal fell into error by testing the veracity of the asserted Christian faith of the applicants. Counsel for the applicants took me to useful authority on this issue, which has over the years proved a vexing one, and also to other authority which I did not find of assistance because it bore on the constitutional issue in respect of which I denied leave.
While this ground is arguable, I prefer the submissions of counsel for the Minister on it.
A convenient way in which to frame the debate on what the Tribunal did in this case in respect of the religion issue is to consider the decision of their Honours North, Bromberg and Mortimer JJ in MZZJO v Minister for Immigration.[58] The Court dealt with a claim that the Tribunal in that case had made an error of the sort discussed by Jacobsen J in SZOCT and similar authorities. The Court identified the nature of the analysis that a Court should undertake when confronted with arguments of this type as follows:
The holding of a religious belief, or adherence to a particular religion (whether organised or not) is a fundamental aspect of individual identity. Although some might see religious adherence and belief as of a more profound nature than the holding of a particular political opinion, its character is no different for the purposes of the Convention, in the sense that it is an attribute held internally and manifested (or not) depending on choice, culture and custom. For the purposes of applying Art 1A of the Convention as implemented in s 36 of the Migration Act, a decision-maker must ascertain whether a person in fact holds a particular religious belief or adheres to a particular religion as she or he claims. In some cases this may be obvious, and the genuineness of the belief may be readily apparent. In others, less so. An evaluation of an internally held attribute — such as an opinion or a belief — is likely to involve questions about how the individual understands that belief, what it means to that individual, how she or he manifests that belief. Testing a claim to hold a particular political opinion may need to be undertaken in this way and the same is true of a claim to hold a religious belief. There is no immunity from scrutiny simply because the Convention ground is religious belief. What the authorities have pointed to, however, is a need for the questioning to be rationally capable of assisting a decision whether the person’s claim to hold the belief is genuine or not. Importantly, what must be undertaken is questioning of that particular individual’s belief rather than the application of some standardised or assumed level of knowledge: see SBCC v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 129 at [45]; WALT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2007] FCAFC 2 at [28]- [32]; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLSP (2010) 187 FCR 362; [2010] FCAFC 108 at [37] per Kenny J; SZOCT 189 FCR 577; [2010] FCAFC 159 at [41], [50] per Buchanan J; SZLSP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 127 ALD 495; [2012] FCA 451 at [34]- [36] per Bromberg J (at [47].
[58] [2014] FCAFC 80.
This is, in my view, a binding and accurate statement of the current law bearing in mind the body of authority referred to by the Full Court. In MZZJO, the Court went on to note that the judgment of Jacobsen J in SZOCT was an example of where it was found that the Tribunal’s reasoning failed to disclose the requisite rational basis.[59]
[59] at [48].
The applicants’ submissions on this issue tend to obscure rather than illuminate the important distinctions identified in the authorities (as referred to above). One example of this is the applicants’ treatment of the authorities at [79]-[90] of their further submissions:
a)at [79] reliance is placed upon the decision in SBCC v Minister for Immigration.[60] A careful reading of the paragraph in question reveals that, in fact, the Court found that an “exploration of a person’s religious knowledge in determining whether he or she is an adherent to a particular religion” does provide a rational foundation for determining whether a person’s claim to profess a particular religion is genuine;
b)contrary to what is asserted at [80] of the applicants’ submissions, in Minister for Immigration v SZLSP,[61] what was discussed at [38] of the judgment is an analysis how a Court should go about distinguishing between an a priori approach (which was illegitimate) from an exploration of the nature of the applicant’s knowledge and belief (which was allowed). As the Court noted in that paragraph, “there is nothing objectionable in the Tribunal questioning an applicant about his or her beliefs” so long as it does so in a probative manner;
c)the applicants’ treatment of the judgment in SZOCT appears to include several invitations for this Court to find that certain conclusions of the Full Court were “plainly wrong”.[62] The simple answer to that invitation is that this Court is bound by the decision in SZOCT and cannot depart from it by reference to whether or not it was “plainly wrong”, a concept that is only relevant to considering of whether a court is bound by a decision of another at the same level in the judicial hierarchy. For current purposes the relevant reasoning of the Court in SZOCT (and similar cases) was correctly identified by the Full Court in MZZJO.
[60] [2006] FCAFC 129 at [45].
[61] (2010) 187 FCR 362.
[62] see [85], [86] and [90] of the submissions.
The effect of the applicable authorities is that the Court must undertake an examination of the Tribunal’s reasons to assess the manner in which the Tribunal went about testing and determining the question of the applicants’ religious belief and whether it was genuine. That may be a complex task depending on the nature of the decision.[63] As outlined below, an examination of what the Tribunal did in this case supports a conclusion that it went about its task in a permissible way so as to reach a properly evaluative conclusion about the applicants’ religious belief.
[63] per Kenny J in SZLSP at [37].
It should be noted that much of what the Tribunal dealt with in the decision did not deal with the question of the applicants’ religious belief. The relevant part of the decision in this regard is at [48]-[54].[64] The applicable steps in the Tribunal’s reasoning may be summarised as follows:
a)the Tribunal determined that the applicants had an “attachment to Islam” that was inconsistent with the applicants’ claims that they were non-observant. The basis for this finding was a consideration of the evidence provided by the applicants about visits that they made to Syria and Saudi Arabia in 1997 and 2009 and the explanations by the applicants as to the purpose of those visits;
b)the Tribunal considered but rejected the proposition that the first applicant had any interest in Christianity prior to coming to Australia or since she arrived. The basis of that rejection was a range of evidence before the Tribunal:
i)first, the apparent lack of effort to learn about the new religion. In this regard, her lack of knowledge was an indicator of how much effort had been made and not merely a measurement of such knowledge against an arbitrary or imposed standard;
ii)secondly, there were no substantive links with the church community other than attending church with her daughter. In so finding, the Tribunal considered that it was reasonable for someone in the applicant’s position to take instruction in a new religion from someone qualified to do so and not merely be attending church with her daughter or having her daughter read the Bible to her;
iii)thirdly, photographs inside and outside the Hillsong church were not given any weight. It may be inferred that the Tribunal considered that this, of itself, did not show whether the applicant had a genuine belief;
iv)fourthly, no member of the Hillsong church appeared as a witness or gave written statement which was not indicative of membership of the church given the applicant had been baptised a year earlier;
v)fifthly, the timing (two weeks after the applicants’ protection visa application was submitted) and the lack of preparation for the first applicant’s baptism suggested that the baptism was undertaken in order to further the protection claims.
[64] CB 245-246.
These matters, which are consistent with the approach that the Tribunal took to the first applicant’s evidence during the hearing, demonstrate that what the Tribunal evaluated was the totality of the evidence about whether the first applicant’s belief was genuine. The evidence considered by the Tribunal and the material ultimately relied upon was, in my opinion, rationally capable of assisting the Tribunal in forming its conclusions about religious belief. The Tribunal did not assume any standardised level of knowledge and, indeed, it concluded that the first applicant in fact had no relevant knowledge (a somewhat different finding).
I am satisfied that no error has occurred of the sort identified by the authorities, including SZOCT and MZZJO, which answers the different ways in which the applicants formulate this issue in their submissions.
Ground 3 fails.
Ground 4 – section 91R(3)
I agree with the submissions of counsel for the Minister on this ground.
This ground rests on a misunderstanding of the Tribunal’s reasons. A careful reading of the decision discloses that the Tribunal’s findings in relation to s.91R(3) were made in [51] of the decision. The Tribunal noted that:
… the first-named applicant’s baptism and their church attendance has been deliberate and targeted. As I advised the applicants during the interview and in the s.424A letter, s.91R(3) requires me to disregard this conduct in determining whether the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution. (emphasis added)
The conduct referred to is set out in more detail in [52] of the decision (and it is foreshadowed to some degree in [50] but in a slightly different and broader context). It is apparent that the conduct referred to, which forms the basis of the Tribunal’s finding about s.91R(3), is the conduct of the applicants after they arrived in Australia. The applicants’ claims in this respect dealt with their involvement in the Hillsong Church and the baptism of the first applicant. Those matters were disregarded on grounds that were open to the Tribunal as a reading of [50]-[53] make clear.
It is also clear that the Tribunal did not at any stage conflate the concepts of persecution and complementary protection in its application of s.91R(3). The Tribunal pointed out that it was open to have regard to such evidence in assessing the applicants’ claims under s.36(2)(aa) and went on to draw a separate conclusion, with a different conceptual foundation, based on its rejection of the applicants’ evidence about their religious conversion (including the evidence of their religious practices whilst living in Australia).
Ground 5 – no evidence
There is no substance to this ground. It is plain that the Tribunal’s adverse credibility findings are squarely based upon the applicants’ evidence and claims. The Tribunal’s disbelief of the applicants’ claim had a logical basis in analysis of their evidence.
Ground 5 fails.
Ground 6 – relevant considerations
This ground may be disposed of shortly.
The only relevant considerations are the applicants’ claims.[65] Further, as a general proposition: [66]
… a failure to refer to, or adequately to consider, evidence, whether or not it might be thought probative, does not give rise to jurisdictional error, even though it may have led to an erroneous finding of fact.
[65] Minister for Immigration v MZYHS (2011) 119 ALD 534 (MZYHS), [24] (Kenny J); MZWBW v Minister for Immigration [2005] FCAFC 94 at [27]-[28] (Black CJ, Sundberg and Bennett JJ); Dang v Minister for Immigration [1999] FCA 38, [32] (Moore J); and Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24, 39-40 (Mason J).
[66] MZYHS at [24].
In their written submissions, the applicants set out the Tribunal's findings with respect to their claims and evidence. Given this, it is difficult to understand how the Tribunal failed to take into account those claims and evidence. A fair reading of the decision discloses that the Tribunal did not merely note or read the applicants’ claims or evidence. Rather, by reference to the applicants’ claims and evidence, the Tribunal provided detailed reasons for rejecting them.
Ground 6 fails.
Ground 7 – unreasonableness
The present case can be readily distinguished from the authorities upon which the applicants rely. It is plain that the Tribunal decision rested upon adverse credibility conclusions. There is nothing manifestly illogical or irrational in those conclusions. The Tribunal’s adverse credibility conclusions are matters upon which reasonable minds can differ. In my opinion, there is a rational and logical basis to the Tribunal’s reasoning but even if there were illogicality or irrationality that is not necessarily sufficient to constitute jurisdictional error. The decision would have to be one at which no rational or logical decision maker may or could arrive at the same evidence.[67]
[67] Minister for Immigration v SZMDS & Anor (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [130].
In my opinion, the Tribunal’s adverse credibility findings and its rejection of the applicants’ claims were reasonably open to it on the material before it.
Ground 7 fails.
Conclusion
I conclude that the applicants have failed to demonstrate any jurisdictional error in the decision of the Tribunal. The decision is therefore a privative clause decision and the application must be dismissed.
I will so order.
I will hear the parties as to costs.
I certify that the preceding seventy-one (71) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Driver
Associate:
Date: 29 April 2015
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
-
Administrative Law
-
Immigration
Legal Concepts
-
Judicial Review
-
Procedural Fairness
-
Natural Justice
-
Jurisdiction
23
2