Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN

Link copied
Case Copied 37 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN

[2016] FCA 516

Appeal from: SZUXN v Minister For Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 1268
File number: NSD 830 of 2015
Judge: WIGNEY J
Date of judgment: 13 May 2016
Catchwords: MIGRATION –  appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – application for protection visa –  where the findings of the Refugee Review Tribunal concerning the credibility of the visa applicant were based in part on an answer given during an initial “biodata” interview  –  where primary judge found that the findings or reasoning concerning the biodata interview were “objectively unreasonable”– where the primary judge found that the unreasonable findings or reasoning was critical to the Tribunal’s decision – illogicality or irrationality as grounds of review - whether the primary judge erred in holding that the Refugee Review Tribunal’s decision was vitiated by jurisdictional error on the grounds of legal unreasonableness by reason of its reasoning or findings concerning the “biodata”  interview – appeal allowed 
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 36
Cases cited:

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZOCT (2010) 189 FCR 577

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99

SZNKO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 123

SZRHL v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 136 ALD 641

SZSHV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 253

SZVAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 233 FCR 451

SZWCO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 51

ZRLQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 135 ALD 276

Date of hearing: 11 November 2015
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 72
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the Appellant: Mills Oakley Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Dr S Blount with Mr P Bodisco
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Westside Legal
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting appearance save as to costs
Table of Corrections
27 May 2016 Paragraph [52], first sentence – Substitute the word “rationality” for the word “irrationality”.

ORDERS

NSD 830 of 2015
BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Appellant

AND:

SZUXN

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

WIGNEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

13 MAY 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The orders of the Federal Circuit Court of 26 June 2015 be set aside and in lieu thereof order that:

(a)the first respondent’s amended application to the Federal Circuit Court dated 13 May 2015 be dismissed; and

(b)the first responded to pay the appellant’s costs of the Federal Circuit Court proceedings.

3.The first respondent to pay the appellant’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2016] FCA 516
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection appealed against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia that allowed an appeal by Mr B, a Sri Lankan national, against the rejection of his application for a protection visa. The central issue in the appeal was whether the primary judge erred in finding that the Refugee Review Tribunal’s decision was vitiated by legal unreasonableness on the basis of its finding or reasoning concerning a biodata interview conducted with Mr B during his initial interview with departmental officers.

The legal issues concerned the standard of review for decisions made by the Refugee Review Tribunal and whether the Tribunal's reasoning concerning the biodata interview was so unreasonable as to amount to a jurisdictional error. Specifically, the court had to determine if the Tribunal’s adverse credibility finding concerning Mr B’s responses during the biodata interview was irrational or illogical and whether this was critical to the Tribunal’s overall decision.

The High Court found that the primary judge erred in holding that the Tribunal's decision was vitiated by jurisdictional error due to its reasoning concerning the biodata interview. The Court held that the primary judge did not correctly apply the relevant principles in determining whether the Tribunal's reasoning was irrational or illogical. The Tribunal's findings concerning the biodata interview were not so extreme as to be beyond the range of reasonable or rational decision-making. The Court emphasised that findings of credit are generally within the Tribunal's discretion and should not be lightly overturned on the basis of irrationality or illogic. The Court concluded that the Tribunal's findings and reasoning concerning the biodata interview were matters of judgment and degree, about which reasonable minds might differ. Therefore, the primary judge's decision to set aside the Tribunal's decision was incorrect.

The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court, and dismissed Mr B's amended application. The Court also ordered Mr B to pay the Minister's costs of the Federal Circuit Court proceedings and his own costs as agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court of 26 June 2015 be set aside and in lieu thereof order that:

(a) the first respondent’s amended application to the Federal Circuit Court dated 13 May 2015 be dismissed; and

(b) the first responded to pay the appellant’s costs of the Federal Circuit Court proceedings.

3. The first respondent to pay the appellant’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The issue raised by the Minister’s appeal is whether the primary judge erred in finding that the Tribunal’s decision was vitiated by legal unreasonableness on the basis of its finding or reasoning concerning the biodata interview. THE FACTS IN BRIEF Mr B arrived in Australia as a so-called “unauthorised maritime arrival” on 28 June 2012. It would appear that the boat he arrived on had departed from India where Mr B had resided as a refugee for many years. Upon his arrival, Mr B was interviewed by an officer of the Minister’s department. A form headed “BIODATA” was completed as a record of that interview. In fact, there were two “biodata” forms: one was completed in the Sri Lankan language and one in English. Both forms were signed by Mr B, the interviewer and an interpreter. It would appear that the forms were completed by the interviewer and the interpreter on the basis of answers given by the interviewee, Mr B, during the interview. The biodata form records that the interview took 20 minutes. At the top of the form, the following appears under the heading “Introduction to client”: This is the first opportunity for you to provide information regarding your circumstances. We encourage you to be as honest and accurate with the information as you can be. Information provided by you will need to be re-confirmed at a later time. Please also consider what supporting documents or evidence you have (or have access to) that may support the information you provide. It may reasonably be inferred that the interviewer read this introduction to the “client”, in this case Mr B. The first 18 questions on the form relate to basic biographical information concerning Mr B, including his name, gender, date of birth, place of birth, citizenship, religion, ethnic group, languages spoken, marital status, most recent address and family and contacts in Australia. Question 19 asked whether Mr B had any supporting documents “to confirm who you are”. Question 20 asked whether Mr B was seeking Australia’s protection. The answer “yes” is circled. Question 21 asked “Why? (1 Sentence)”. There is very limited space in the form for a response. In Mr B’s case, the following is written: I was a refugee in India for 22 years. Unable to get citizenship to have a life. I don’t want that for my children. I want a better life. Mr B did not at any time suggest that this was not an accurate record of his response to the question. The balance of the form relates to unaccompanied minors. As Mr B was not a minor, this part of the form was not completed in his case. Mr B was next interviewed by departmental officers on 2 and 28 August 2012. That interview (or in Mr B’s case, interviews), is called an “entry interview”. The interviews were recorded and the information provided by Mr B was again reduced to writing. Much of the interview again concerned basic biographical information relating to Mr B. Importantly, however, Mr B was again asked questions about why he departed from his country of nationality and what he thought would happen to him if he returned to that country. He was also asked about his departure from his country of residence, India.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Mr B’s advisor provided a detailed response to the Tribunal’s letter. In relation to the fact that Mr B had not provided information about his claims for protection based on his father’s association with the Tamil Tigers during the biodata interview, the advisor pointed out that the interview was short, that Mr B was unrepresented at the time, and that Mr B was only asked to provide one sentence to explain why he was seeking protection. The response included the following: Pragmatically, it is impossible for the Applicant to detail his complete claims, or even a significant amount of his claims, in that box. Subsequently, the Applicant provided a generalised summary of why he is seeking asylum. Given that the Applicant was living in India prior to departing for Australia it is understandable that the Applicant would summarise that he was departing from the country because of an ability to obtain citizenship there. This is largely consistent with his claimed fear of persecution in India throughout his PV application. Without legal representation, the Applicant was not aware that he was required to detail the reasons for his fear of return to Sri Lanka.THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION AND REASONS The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision to refuse Mr B’s protection visa application. The Tribunal was not satisfied that Australia owed protection obligations to Mr B and therefore was not satisfied that Mr B met the criteria for a protection visa under s 36 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The Tribunal’s written reasons for arriving at this conclusion are extremely comprehensive, detailed and lengthy. Together with attachments, which detail the relevant law and policy, as well as so-called “country” information concerning Sri Lanka, the reasons are 67 pages long, single spaced. It is neither necessary nor desirable to attempt to summarise the Tribunal’s reasons. Perhaps the most critical finding that the Tribunal made against Mr B was that it did not accept his account of what happened to him and his family in Sri Lanka, and in particular his claims concerning his father’s association with the Tamil Tigers and the events that flowed from it. The Tribunal considered that Mr B had given inconsistent evidence, had failed to “provide significant claims” at earlier opportunities and had “developed his claims over the course of the application” (Reasons at [142]). Whilst Mr B had given various explanations for, and had made a number of submissions in relation to, those issues with his evidence, the Tribunal rejected those explanations and submissions. It found that Mr B had fabricated his claims for protection and fears of returning to Sri Lanka and was not a witness of truth (Reasons at [142]). The explanations given by Mr B for the fact that he failed to refer to the key elements of his factual claims in the biodata and entry interviews included that, at the time of those interviews, his father had not told him much about his political ideology or support for the Tamil Tigers in India. He also said that he was initially afraid to disclose his father’s association with the Tamil Tigers to the Australian authorities because he thought he might be moved to higher security detention. Mr B’s representative submitted that the biodata interview was very brief, only allowed for a small amount of information concerning Mr B’s reasons for seeking protection, and was largely administrative.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

An irrational or illogical finding, or irrational or illogical reasoning leading to a finding, by the Tribunal that the review applicant was not a credible or honest witness may in some circumstances lead to a finding of jurisdictional error. That would particularly be the case where the adverse credibility finding was critical to the Tribunal’s decision that it was not satisfied that the applicant met the criteria for the grant of a visa. Whilst it is frequently said that findings as to credit are entirely matters for the Tribunal, such findings do not shield the Tribunal’s decision-making processes from scrutiny: SZSHV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 253 at [31]. Considerable caution must, however, be exercised before too readily acceding to a proposition that adverse findings as to credit expose jurisdictional error: SZVAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 233 FCR 451 at 455-456 [14]-[15]. That is because assertions of illogicality and irrationality can all too readily be used to conceal what is in truth simply an attack on the merits of the Tribunal’s findings and decision. In SZMDS, Crennan and Bell JJ (at 636 [96]) made it plain that the deployment of illogicality or irrationality to achieve merits review should not be sanctioned.The biodata finding or reasoning was not irrational or illogical The reasoning of the primary judge reveals that his Honour did not apply, or correctly apply, the relevant principles in determining whether the Tribunal’s reasoning concerning the biodata interview was irrational, illogical or unreasonable such as to support a finding of jurisdictional error. In particular, his Honour did not ask himself whether the Tribunal’s findings or reasoning concerning the biodata interview constituted extreme illogicality or irrationality, in the sense that no logical or rational decision-maker could have made the same finding, or employed the same reasoning, concerning the biodata interview. His Honour did not consider whether reasonable minds might differ as to the significance of Mr B’s limited response to the question in the biodata interview concerning his reasons for seeking protection by Australia. The primary judge obviously emphatically disagreed with the Tribunal’s findings and reasoning concerning the biodata interview. His Honour plainly would not have made the same finding, or employed the same reasoning. That alone, however, does not support a finding of illogicality, irrationality or unreasonableness. Had the primary judge asked himself the correct question, it is difficult to see how he could have found that the Tribunal’s findings and reasoning concerning the biodata interview were irrational or illogical. The facts and circumstances were not such as to support a conclusion that no reasonable or rational decision-maker could have made those findings, or employed that reasoning. At the very worst, the Tribunal’s reasoning and findings concerning the biodata interview were matters about which reasonable minds might differ. They were matters of degree, impression and judgment. Different decision-makers may have accepted Mr B’s explanations for why he said what he said in answer to the question in the biodata interview and did not refer to any aspect of the claims he later advanced in support of his protection visa application. Different decision-makers may have given no weight, or very limited weight, to the fact that Mr B gave such a limited response to the question in the biodata interview in the circumstances. It was, however, in all the circumstances at the very least open to the Tribunal to find or reason that Mr B’s limited response to the relevant question in the biodata interview, together with other matters, cast some doubt on the credibility and reliability of his later evidence concerning his reasons for seeking Australia’s protection.