FCX18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

FCX18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 872

File number(s): SYG 2787 of 2018
Judgment of: JUDGE PAPADOPOULOS
Date of judgment: 11 June 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – judicial review – protection visa – claims of domestic violence – whether Tribunal’s credibility findings impugned – inconsistencies, implausibilities and unwarranted assumptions – legal unreasonableness – jurisdictional error established.
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 424AA(1)(a) and 424A(1)(a)
Cases cited:

AVQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 216 FCR 83; [2018] FCAFC 133

BOH17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 573

BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218

BUX17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1510

BZD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 263 FCR 292; [2018] FCAFC 94

DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 258 FCR 175; [2018] FCAFC 2

DQM18 v Minister for Home Affairs (2020) 278 FCR 529; [2020] FCAFC 110

EVI19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 518

Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; [2003] HCA 22

LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 98 ALJR 610; [2024] FCA 12

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1; [2016] FCAFC 11

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN [2016] FCA 516

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611; [2010] HCA 16

MZAIB v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 139

NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1; [2004] FCAFC 263

Sujeendran Sivalingam v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 1167

Sundararaj v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 76

SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 147 CLR 297; [2007] HCA 26

SZLGP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1198

SZSHV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 253

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 93
Date of hearing: 17 December 2024
Date of final submissions: 22 January 2025
Place: Sydney
Applicants: First Applicant In Person
Solicitor for the Respondents: Ms J Schultz, Mills Oakley

ORDERS

SYG 2787 of 2018

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

FCX18

First Applicant

FCY18

Second Applicant

FCZ18

Third Applicant

FDA18
Fourth Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE PAPADOPOULOS

DATE OF ORDER:

11 JUNE 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the first respondent be amended to ‘Minister for Immigration and Citizenship’.

2.The name of the second respondent be amended to ‘Administrative Review Tribunal’.

3.A writ of certiorari shall issue, removing the record of the Administrative…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 872
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of FCX18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs involved the applicants, a family unit, seeking protection visas from Bangladesh. The applicants' claims included allegations of domestic violence against the first applicant by her husband. The Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia reviewed the decision of the Tribunal to refuse the applicants' protection visas.

The central legal issue was whether the Tribunal erred in its credibility findings regarding the first applicant's claims of domestic violence. Specifically, the Court examined if the Tribunal made any errors in its assessment of the evidence provided by the first and second applicants concerning their residential arrangements and the significance of any inconsistencies in their testimonies.

The Court found that the Tribunal did indeed err in its credibility findings concerning the first applicant's domestic violence claims. The Tribunal did not adequately consider the explanation provided for the inconsistencies in the applicants' evidence nor did it sufficiently address the significance of these inconsistencies in light of the detailed claims of violence. The Court also found that the Tribunal's reasons did not adequately explain why certain inconsistencies were regarded as material or how they undermined the credibility of the domestic violence claims. Furthermore, the Court identified that the Tribunal's reasoning did not align with established principles, leading to a conclusion of legal unreasonableness.

As a result of these findings, the Court quashed the decision of the Tribunal and remitted the matter for reconsideration. The Court emphasised that the Tribunal must engage with the explanations provided for inconsistencies and assess their significance in the context of the overall claims and evidence presented.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow at paragraphs [41] to [61], I conclude the applicants’ grounds as raised in their originating application do not disclose error on the Tribunal’s part. However, at paragraphs [62] to [90], I conclude the Tribunal erred when making various credibility findings about the first applicant’s domestic violence claims and that this was material. The application succeeds on that basis.BACKGROUNDThe visa application On 19 May 2014, the first applicant submitted a valid application for a protection visa, in which the second, third and fourth applicants were included as members of her family unit. In her protection visa application form, she raised the following claims (reproduced below without alteration apart from changes involving deidentification):[7]I am the second child of my parents. I have two sisters and one brother. My father was a Government employee. He was a school teacher. He passed away in 2005 from cancer. We spent a lot of money for his treatment. We took him to India for treatment but it failed. We spent almost all his provident fund money. Only my elder sister was married when he died. After that we paid for our expenses from my father's pension. My younger sister and brother were studying at that time. In 2006 my father's close relative proposed his son for me. The boy's name is [name omitted]. He was studying in Australia. His parents are not alive. He was a resident of Chittagong but has no relatives there. He finished his study and went overseas with the help of his aunt. We were married on 22 July 2006. He returned to Australia after one week. I have no guardian who can give required information. I applied for a spouse visa for Australia. At that time all my expenses like application fee and ticket were paid for by my mother and elder sister because [my husband] told me he has got some financial problems. I came to Australia and saw [my husband] was sharing accommodation with [the second applicant].In December 2007 we went back to Bangladesh and I found out details about [my husband’s] first marriage. I was furious and when I inquired from him, he became aggressive and abused me. He said I should shut my mouth. Because I did not have father or brother, I did not know what to do. After we came to Australia, he started suspecting me for speaking to other males. He tortured me physically and mentally. I was very upset. During that time, [the second applicant], helped me a lot and [my husband] started suspecting that that I have relationship with [the second applicant]. During the course of that time, I developed feeling for [the second applicant] and started living with him. [My husband] them left me and now he is in Bangladesh. I fear if I go back to Bangladesh, I will face a real risk of significant harm from [my husband] and fear the conservative Bangladesh conservative society will target me for engaging in illicit relationship and living with another males without marriage. I fear I will be considered as a bad girl and will face a real risk of significant harm including torture, degrading and inhuman treatment in Bangladesh.I fear I can not get state protection in Bangladesh.See my detailed statement to follow.[7] CB 22.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

At paragraphs [75]-[80] of its decision, the Tribunal set out a series of adverse credibility findings. These subsidiary findings formed the foundation for its rejection of the first applicant’s claims of domestic violence. The Tribunal identified five distinct bases underpinning its ultimate conclusion. I now proceed to examine each of those bases in turn, with a view to determining whether the Tribunal fell into error in making any particular credit finding.First basis - inconsistencies between the evidence of the first and second applicant At paragraph [77] of its decision, the Tribunal identified the first and second applicants gave inconsistent evidence at hearing of:(a)whether a particular man was living in the unit when the applicant arrived in Australia and had witnessed the domestic violence;(b)whether they had ever shared a room at the unit before moving out; and(c)whether they moved out of the unit before the first applicant’s husband moved out. The Tribunal then summarised the explanation given for the inconsistencies by way of noting the first applicant’s declaration that the second applicant was ‘under a lot of stress and has memory issues and his responses were not accurate’. It also recorded the first applicant’s declaration ‘that these are minor inconsistencies and should not affect the outcome of the matter’. This is a brief but accurate summation of the first applicant’s submissions and evidence in response to the concerns raised about these inconsistencies. At paragraph [78] of its decision, the Tribunal found that the inconsistencies related to ‘material aspects of the evidence’. The Tribunal’s reasons do not disclose any consideration of the first applicant’s claims or evidence concerning the violence she alleged to have suffered at the hands of her husband while he was in Australia. Rather, the first basis of the Tribunal’s credibility assessment was confined to an evaluation of whether the first and second applicants’ respective accounts of certain residential arrangements were consistent. While it is open for the Tribunal to have found that the first and second applicants gave inconsistent evidence on these matters, the Tribunal’s reasons do not engage with the explanation provided for the inconsistencies in order to then determine their significance and the weight to be attributed to them when rejecting the claimed narrative of domestic violence: see ASB17 at [43]; AVQ15 at [28]. The failure to grapple with the explanation and provide more detailed reasons as to the significance of these inconsistencies reveals a gap in the Tribunal’s reasons. I am unable to discern from the reasons why the Tribunal determined these inconsistencies to be of any particular significance. Furthermore, having regard to the material before the Tribunal, including the detailed claims advanced by the first applicant concerning multiple and varied incidents of domestic violence, her vulnerability, and the conduct of her husband towards her, it is also not apparent from the Tribunal’s reasons why the identified inconsistencies were regarded as relating to ‘material aspects of the evidence’. Nor is it clear how, in the context of the detailed claims of violence that were recited in the decision, those inconsistencies were assessed as sufficiently significant to warrant an adverse credibility finding.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 16 May 2018, the representative provided the Tribunal with the results of a DNA test, dated 14 May 2018, which confirmed the second applicant is the third applicant's ‘genetic father’.[16] This material was provided to the Tribunal to address a concern raised at hearing about the identity of the third applicant’s father.[16] CB 277 to 281.The Tribunal’s decision On 12 September 2018, the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review to refuse to grant the applicants protection visas.[17][17] CB 285 to 307. The Tribunal accepted various claims made in relation to the first applicant’s family composition including:(a)that the first applicant had been married to her husband who had departed Australia on 7 September 2010; and(b)that the first and second applicants were in a de facto relationship and biological parents of the third and fourth applicants. However, the Tribunal rejected the first applicant’s domestic violence claims. At paragraphs [75]-[80] of its decision, the Tribunal gave five reasons upon which it grounded its rejection of this central set of claims:[18](a)First, the first and second applicants gave inconsistent evidence regarding several matters, being: whether a specific individual was living in the unit at the time of the first applicant’s arrival and had witnessed the domestic violence, whether the applicants had ever shared a room in the unit, and whether they moved out of the unit before the first applicant’s husband did.(b)Secondly, the claims were implausible because if the second applicant had witnessed the domestic violence over a period of 18 months and had ‘develop[ed] feelings’ for the first applicant, he would have called the police, encouraged the first applicant to call the police or given her advice and assistance to find domestic violence support services. It did not accept the explanation given for the second applicant not having done so ‘solely because of his own fear of not having his unlawful immigration status exposed’.(c)Thirdly, the Tribunal had concerns about whether the ‘marriage relationship’ between the first applicant and her husband was ever ‘genuine’ because the first applicant gave inconsistent evidence in relation to whether her husband was physically present at their marriage. It did not accept the explanation for this discrepancy was that ‘she may have mistaken his visit with the honeymoon trip following the marriage…and that a significant period of time had passed and her memory was not so good’.(d)Fourthly, because the first applicant’s support of her husband’s permanent skilled migration visa application ‘contradicts her claims that they had separated in July 2008 and he was violent towards her and she was afraid of him’. It did not accept the explanation that she continued to support her husband’s visa application and ‘present as his wife in this period under duress due to blackmail threats by him to expose [the second applicant’s] unlawful status’.(e)Fifthly, there was no evidence of the husband having informed the Department of the second applicant’s unlawful status at any time between 2008 and 2014 which undermined the claim that the first applicant’s husband ‘harbours vindictive or hostile intent towards the [first] applicant or the [second] applicant’.[18] CB 297 to 299, [75] to [80].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

By way of correspondence sent to the Minister’s representative and the Court on 22 January 2025, the first applicant made a number of submissions which served to agitate the merits of the case but failed to advance any discernible argument as to how the Tribunal had acted in a legally unreasonable manner when forming any particular adverse credibility findings or ultimately deciding the review against the applicants on the basis of such findings. Nevertheless, it is apparent from this correspondence that the first applicant takes issue with the Tribunal’s disbelief of her domestic violence claims.Consideration of the Tribunal’s findings At paragraphs [75]-[80] of its decision, the Tribunal set out a series of adverse credibility findings. These subsidiary findings formed the foundation for its rejection of the first applicant’s claims of domestic violence. The Tribunal identified five distinct bases underpinning its ultimate conclusion. I now proceed to examine each of those bases in turn, with a view to determining whether the Tribunal fell into error in making any particular credit finding.First basis - inconsistencies between the evidence of the first and second applicant At paragraph [77] of its decision, the Tribunal identified the first and second applicants gave inconsistent evidence at hearing of:(a)whether a particular man was living in the unit when the applicant arrived in Australia and had witnessed the domestic violence;(b)whether they had ever shared a room at the unit before moving out; and(c)whether they moved out of the unit before the first applicant’s husband moved out. The Tribunal then summarised the explanation given for the inconsistencies by way of noting the first applicant’s declaration that the second applicant was ‘under a lot of stress and has memory issues and his responses were not accurate’. It also recorded the first applicant’s declaration ‘that these are minor inconsistencies and should not affect the outcome of the matter’. This is a brief but accurate summation of the first applicant’s submissions and evidence in response to the concerns raised about these inconsistencies. At paragraph [78] of its decision, the Tribunal found that the inconsistencies related to ‘material aspects of the evidence’. The Tribunal’s reasons do not disclose any consideration of the first applicant’s claims or evidence concerning the violence she alleged to have suffered at the hands of her husband while he was in Australia. Rather, the first basis of the Tribunal’s credibility assessment was confined to an evaluation of whether the first and second applicants’ respective accounts of certain residential arrangements were consistent. While it is open for the Tribunal to have found that the first and second applicants gave inconsistent evidence on these matters, the Tribunal’s reasons do not engage with the explanation provided for the inconsistencies in order to then determine their significance and the weight to be attributed to them when rejecting the claimed narrative of domestic violence: see ASB17 at [43]; AVQ15 at [28]. The failure to grapple with the explanation and provide more detailed reasons as to the significance of these inconsistencies reveals a gap in the Tribunal’s reasons. I am unable to discern from the reasons why the Tribunal determined these inconsistencies to be of any particular significance. Furthermore, having regard to the material before the Tribunal, including the detailed claims advanced by the first applicant concerning multiple and varied incidents of domestic violence, her vulnerability, and the conduct of her husband towards her, it is also not apparent from the Tribunal’s reasons why the identified inconsistencies were regarded as relating to ‘material aspects of the evidence’. Nor is it clear how, in the context of the detailed claims of violence that were recited in the decision, those inconsistencies were assessed as sufficiently significant to warrant an adverse credibility finding.