DQM18 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DQM18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 110

Appeal from: DQM18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 852
File number: VID 727 of 2019
Judges: BROMBERG, MORTIMER AND SNADEN JJ
Date of judgment: 25 June 2020
Catchwords: MIGRATION ACT – s 501CA(4) Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – application for judicial review – where Assistant Minister determined not to revoke cancellation of appellant’s visa – whether the Assistant Minister failed to perform the requisite statutory task by (i) giving meaningful consideration to various representations made by the appellant; (ii) by failing to determine the country to which the appellant would be returned; and (iii) by failing to consider that indefinite detention would be a legal consequence of the non-revocation of the cancellation of the appellant’s visa – whether any error was material to the exercise of power and therefore a jurisdictional error – decision of Assistant Minister set aside.
Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 25D

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 499, 501, 501CA

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 4.12, 4.19(3)

Cases cited:

Anees v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCAFC 28

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; 236 FCR 593

AXT19 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 32

AZAFQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 105; 243 FCR 451

BCR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 96; 248 FCR 456

BSE17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1926

CAR15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 155

Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 107; 252 FCR 352

Dang v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2019] FCAFC 220

DCP16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 91

DKX17 v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2019] FCAFC 10; 268 FCR 64

DOB18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 63; 269 FCR 636

DQM18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 852

EVK18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 49

GBV18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 17

Guclukol v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 61

Hands v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 225; 364 ALR 423

Hernandez v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 415

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34; 264 CLR 123

Minister for Home Affairs v Buadromo [2018] FCAFC 151; 267 FCR 320

Minister for Home Affairs v Omar [2019] FCAFC 188; 373 ALR 569

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BHA17 [2018] FCAFC 68; 260 FCR 523

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v DRP17 [2018] FCAFC 198; 267 FCR 492

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Maioha [2018] FCAFC 216; 267 FCR 643

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Sabharwal [2018] FCAFC 160

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; 264 CLR…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCAFC 110
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This appeal involved the appellant, a person born in 1989 with a disputed birthplace, either South Sudan or Khartoum, Sudan, and his challenge against the decision of the Assistant Minister for Home Affairs not to revoke the cancellation of his visa. The appellant's visa was cancelled under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) due to his substantial criminal record, and he sought judicial review of the Assistant Minister's decision. The court had to determine whether the Assistant Minister failed to perform the requisite statutory task by not meaningfully considering various representations made by the appellant, failing to determine the country to which the appellant would be returned, and not considering that indefinite detention would be a legal consequence of the non-revocation of the cancellation of the appellant's visa. The court also had to decide if any error was material to the exercise of power and therefore a jurisdictional error.

The court found that the Assistant Minister was not required to make findings on the speculations presented by the appellant, such as the risks of physical harm if returned to Sudan or South Sudan. The court held that it was open to the Assistant Minister to deal with the appellant's contention by accepting or rejecting it, or by reasoning that even if the appellant would be subjected to risks of physical harm, that (either alone or in light of other considerations, such as his record of violent criminality) was not sufficient to constitute "another reason" why the Cancellation ought to be revoked. The court concluded that the Assistant Minister's failure to make findings on the speculations did not amount to a jurisdictional error.

1. The appellant have leave to rely on the amended notice of appeal filed on 4 November 2019.
2. The appeal be allowed with costs, such costs to be payable directly to counsel for the appellant in accordance with r 4.19(3) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).
3. The orders made by this Court on 7 June 2019 are set aside, and in lieu thereof:
(a) An order in the nature of certiorari be issued to the Assistant Minister for Home Affairs quashing the decision made on 3 July 2018 under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) not to revoke the decision made on 4 May 2016 under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to cancel the appellant’s Class XB Subclass 200 Refugee (Permanent) visa;
(b) The matter be remitted to the Minister for the making of a decision under s 501(CA)(4) according to law;
(c) The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the application for judicial review.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appellant have leave to rely on the amended notice of appeal filed on 4 November 2019.

2. The appeal be allowed with costs, such costs to be payable directly to counsel for the appellant in accordance with r 4.19(3) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

3. The orders made by this Court on 7 June 2019 are set aside, and in lieu thereof:

(a) An order in the nature of certiorari be issued to the Assistant Minister for Home Affairs quashing the decision made on 3 July 2018 under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) not to revoke the decision made on 4 May 2016 under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to cancel the appellant’s Class XB Subclass 200 Refugee (Permanent) visa;

(b) The matter be remitted to the Minister for the making of a decision under s 501(CA)(4) according to law;

(c) The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the application for judicial review.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below, the appeal should be allowed.Factual background The factual background is not in dispute. The appellant was born in 1989. There is conflicting evidence about where he was born: whether in what is now South Sudan, or in Khartoum, which is in Sudan. He is ethnically South Sudanese. The appellant’s family was, as we describe below, caught up in the tragedies of the Sudanese Civil War. In 2011 South Sudan became an independent nation. The questions whether he was a national of Sudan or South Sudan, and whether he would be returned to Sudan or to South Sudan if his visa cancellation was not revoked, were matters of some uncertainty in the materials, and also in the Assistant Minister’s decision. The Assistant Minister accepted that:(1)as a child, the appellant witnessed numerous war atrocities in Sudan;(2)his father disappeared in the Sudanese Civil War around 1999, presumed dead;(3)his father’s disappearance and presumed death has had a traumatic effect on the appellant’s family;(4)the appellant and his family fled to Egypt, where they experienced violence from the authorities and local people; and (5)the appellant’s early life was characterised by violence and conflict. In 2005, when the appellant was 16 years old, the appellant and some of his family migrated to Australia as the holders of Class XB Subclass 200 Refugee (Permanent) visas. In submissions to the Assistant Minister, the appellant’s legal representative (Victoria Legal Aid) informed the Assistant Minister that two of the appellant’s sisters remained in a refugee camp in Sudan; that another sister was killed in the civil war; and that another sister remained in Egypt and was bringing up the son of the appellant’s deceased sister. This is what the submissions stated about the appellant’s two sisters who remain in Sudan, a matter of relevance to the appellant’s challenge to the Assistant Minister’s decision:Two of [the appellant’s] sisters (aged 33 and 30) live in [redacted] Refugee Camp in Khartoum. One sister has an 11-year-old daughter out of wedlock with no male support. According to their mother [redacted], these sisters are in unsafe and unsettled accommodation and are regularly encouraged by the authorities to return back to South Sudan, where they ethnically originate from. [The appellant’s mother] has reported that since South Sudan became independent in 2011 there has been less freedom of movement and South Sudanese are encouraged to return despite the current lack of safety and security. The appellant has a long history of offending since he arrived in Australia, commencing with offences which brought him before the Children’s Court. The offending which gave him a “substantial criminal record” within s 501(3A)(a)(i) (read with ss 501(6)(a) and (7)(c)), involved violent conduct against his former partner. For that conduct, on 22 September 2015 he was convicted in the Magistrates’ Court of Victoria of recklessly causing injury and was sentenced to 15 months of imprisonment. At the time his visa was cancelled, on 4 May 2016, the appellant was serving a full-time sentence of imprisonment in a custodial institution for an offence against State law within s 501(3A)(b), having been sentenced in March 2016 to 8 weeks’ imprisonment for common assault and breach of family violence intervention order.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

In Buadromo—which, like Omar, was another case concerning the application of s 501CA(4) of the Act—the full court identified (at 59 [46]) some circumstances in which findings regarding contentions advanced by an applicant might not be required:A finding of fact may not be required if the claim or issue is irrelevant or if it is subsumed within a claim or issue of greater generality or, to use an example advanced by the appellant in the course of submissions in this case, even assuming fact or proposition A, I (the decision-maker) do not accept that fact or proposition B follows. These are only examples and it is not possible to be comprehensive.(emphasis added) In Guclukol v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 61 (Snaden J)—a revocation case not unlike the present—I had occasion to survey those authorities and to consider their practical implications. There, the applicant complained about a decision maker’s failure to make a finding as to his submission that, if removed to his native Turkey, he would “struggle to subsist”. I made the following observations (at [28]):The difficulty that often, if not always, arises in cases such as the present (and that arose in Omar and Buadromo) is that determination of the consequences or circumstances that an applicant will face if removed from Australia—that is, the consequences or circumstances by reason of which it is said that there is “another reason” under s 501CA(4) of the Act why the decision to cancel his or her visa should be revoked—typically requires speculation. Often, it requires speculation upon imperfect or incomplete evidence, or to a degree that doesn’t easily permit of definitive findings. The present case is a good example. It is, of course, the case that the applicant’s fate if returned to Turkey is not (and cannot be) precisely known. He might, as he submitted to the Minister, “struggle to subsist”. He might not. Similar observations may be made in the present case. Opining—somewhat baldly, as the majority’s recitation of his submissions demonstrates—that his removal to Sudan or South Sudan would place the appellant at risk of physical harm necessarily involved engagement in speculation. However well-informed, speculation of that nature will always be imperfect (in the sense that history may or may not vindicate it). Plainly, it was open to the Assistant Minister to deal with the appellant’s contention by accepting or rejecting it. Equally, however, it was open to the Assistant Minister to process that contention in the way that the full court in Buadromo contemplated: in other words, by reasoning that, even assuming that the appellant would be subjected to risks of physical harm, that (either alone or in light of other considerations, such as his record of violent criminality) was not sufficient to constitute “another reason” why the Cancellation ought to be revoked. Reasoning in that way would discharge the Assistant Minister’s obligation to confront what the appellant advanced, to subject those contentions to a process of active intellectual contemplation, to grapple with the realities of the appellant’s predicament, to take responsibility for what he was doing, and otherwise to consider (in the sense contemplated by any other formulation of that concept) what it was that the appellant had submitted. Those obligations would all be discharged notwithstanding the absence of a finding, one way or the other, as to whether or not the appellant’s removal to Sudan or South Sudan would subject him to relevant risk.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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