FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Daksh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 612
File number(s): SYG 289 of 2023 Judgment of: JUDGE HUMPHREYS Date of judgment: 12 July 2024 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Where an email address in the Notice of Refusal was non-operational – Whether Notice of Refusal was defective – Where applicant was not misled by the defective email address – Where no jurisdictional error was made out – Application dismissed. Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 66, 347
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) sch 2, reg 4.10
Cases cited: Awan v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 594
Chan Ta Strey v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 134 FCR 308
DFQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 64
DQM18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 110
Hasan v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 184 FCR 523
Maroun v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 112 ALD 424
SZOFE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 185 FCR 129
Zhan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 327; (2003) 128 FCR 469
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 40 Date of hearing: 9 July 2024 Place: Parramatta Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Bodisco Solicitor for the Applicant: Abu Legal Counsel for the Respondents: Mr Bevan SC & Mr Kaplan Solicitor for the Respondents: MinterEllison ORDERS
SYG 289 of 2023 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: KAPILA DAKSH
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE HUMPHREYS
DATE OF ORDER:
12 JULY 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application is dismissed.
2.The Applicant is to pay the First Respondent’s costs, fixed in the amount of $8,371.00.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE D HUMPHREYS
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The applicant is an Indian national who applied for a Temporary Graduate (Post Study Work Stream) (Class VC) (Subclass 485) visa (“the visa”) on 23 June 2021, having completed a Master of Business Analytics at the University of Wollongong on 11 May 2021.
The application for the visa was refused by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (“delegate”) on 9 June 2022 on the basis that the applicant had not met the requirements contained in reg 485.216 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994
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- Case
- [2024] FedCFamC2G 612
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The applicant argued that the Notice of Refusal was defective because it included a non-operational email address, which did not comply with section 66(2)(d)(iv) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The applicant submitted that the failure to provide a functional email address meant that the notice did not fully inform him of where he could lodge an application for review, thus breaching his right to adequate notice. However, the Court found that the notice was not defective because it provided multiple means by which an application for review could be lodged, including online applications and other operational email addresses. The Court also noted that the applicant did not attempt to use the defective email address and had lodged his application via an online application, which was clearly outlined in the notice.
The Court further reasoned that even if the notice were considered defective, the defect was not material because the applicant did not suffer any prejudice as a result. The applicant was not misled by the defective email address and had ample opportunity to lodge his application within the prescribed time frame. The Court held that the consequences of any alleged non-compliance must be considered in determining whether there was a breach of the duty under section 66(2). Given that the applicant lodged his application using an alternative means provided in the notice, the Court concluded that no jurisdictional error had occurred.
The Court dismissed the application, finding that the notice was not defective and that any alleged breach was not material. The Court held that the applicant had not been deprived of the possibility of a successful outcome and that the breach, if any, did not have negative consequences for the applicant. The Court's decision underscores the importance of considering the consequences of any alleged non-compliance in determining the materiality of a breach.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Finally, even if the Court found the Notice to be defective (which is not conceded) the breach is not material as the applicant did not attempt to use the defective email address and has suffered no prejudice. Thus, any breach is not material.CONSIDERATION The issue for determination is whether the Notice is defective, such that time for the lodgement of the application for review by the Tribunal did not begin to run. The agreed defect is that the Notice contained a single email address that was non-operational. It is a common ground between the parties that the applicant did not use the defective email address. Rather, some five months after receiving the Notice, the applicant used an online application that was provided to him in the Notice letter to lodge his application. It is agreed that there is no evidence to support the proposition that the applicant tried to use the defective email address. The work of s 66(1) of the Act is to impose a duty on the Minister “to notify the applicant of the decision in the prescribed way”. Section 66(2)(d)(iv) of the Act requires the Minister to notify the applicant of “where the application for review can be made”. In this case that notification included various details of how to lodge an application via an online application, via hard form at the various registries of the Tribunal, (details of which were provided), via fax at registries or online with three separate email addresses being provided, only one of which was defective. The Court is satisfied that there is no evidence that the applicant was misled by the defective email address. There is no evidence that he tried to use it, rather he lodged the application via an online application which was set out in the Notice. SZOFE is authority that the Minister is not required to set every means by which an application could be lodged, that is by not providing every address of a Tribunal registry. Emmett J held at [30] that “it does not follow that it was the intention that any departure from those steps would result in invalidity, without consideration of the extent and consequences of the departure”. Buchanan and Nicholas JJ at [66] – [67] reasoned that it was necessary to consider the consequences of the alleged non-compliance in determining whether the duty in s 66(2) had not been performed. In the current circumstances, the Court is satisfied that the Notice was not defective. It provided clear details via a number of means by which an application for a review by the Tribunal could be lodged. The admitted error was in my view bordering on the trivial. No jurisdictional error arises. Even if the Court is wrong in this regard, in the present case there were no negative consequences to the applicant by the admitted defect. His application was made some 5 months out of time using an online application provided to him in the refusal letter. The applicant was not deprived of the possibility of a successful outcome. The breach, if there be one, is not and was not, in the facts of this case, material. Materiality must be a consideration in considering the consequences of any breach; ( see: Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Parata (2021) 284 FCR 62 at [123] per Burley J).