Daksh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Daksh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 612

File number(s): SYG 289 of 2023
Judgment of: JUDGE HUMPHREYS
Date of judgment: 12 July 2024
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Where an email address in the Notice of Refusal was non-operational – Whether Notice of Refusal was defective – Where applicant was not misled by the defective email address – Where no jurisdictional error was made out – Application dismissed.
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 66, 347

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) sch 2, reg 4.10

Cases cited:

Awan v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 594

Chan Ta Strey v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 134 FCR 308

DFQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 64

DQM18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 110

Hasan v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 184 FCR 523

Maroun v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 112 ALD 424

Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Parata (2021) 284 FCR 62

SZOFE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 185 FCR 129

Zhan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 327; (2003) 128 FCR 469

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 40
Date of hearing: 9 July 2024
Place: Parramatta
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Bodisco
Solicitor for the Applicant: Abu Legal
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr Bevan SC & Mr Kaplan
Solicitor for the Respondents: MinterEllison

ORDERS

SYG 289 of 2023

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

KAPILA DAKSH

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE HUMPHREYS

DATE OF ORDER:

12 JULY 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is dismissed.

2.The Applicant is to pay the First Respondent’s costs, fixed in the amount of $8,371.00.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE D HUMPHREYS

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

  1. The applicant is an Indian national who applied for a Temporary Graduate (Post Study Work Stream) (Class VC) (Subclass 485) visa (“the visa”) on 23 June 2021, having completed a Master of Business Analytics at the University of Wollongong on 11 May 2021.

  2. The application for the visa was refused by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (“delegate”) on 9 June 2022 on the basis that the applicant had not met the requirements contained in reg 485.216 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994

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Details
Case
[2024] FedCFamC2G 612
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Daksh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs involves the applicant, Daksh, seeking judicial review of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal's (AAT) decision to dismiss his application for review of the Minister's decision to refuse his visa application. The primary issue before the Court was whether the Notice of Refusal, which contained an erroneous email address, was defective to the extent that it invalidated the applicant's right to lodge a timely application for review. This challenge was based on the assertion that the notice did not comply with the statutory requirement to inform the applicant of where an application for review could be lodged.

The applicant argued that the Notice of Refusal was defective because it included a non-operational email address, which did not comply with section 66(2)(d)(iv) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The applicant submitted that the failure to provide a functional email address meant that the notice did not fully inform him of where he could lodge an application for review, thus breaching his right to adequate notice. However, the Court found that the notice was not defective because it provided multiple means by which an application for review could be lodged, including online applications and other operational email addresses. The Court also noted that the applicant did not attempt to use the defective email address and had lodged his application via an online application, which was clearly outlined in the notice.

The Court further reasoned that even if the notice were considered defective, the defect was not material because the applicant did not suffer any prejudice as a result. The applicant was not misled by the defective email address and had ample opportunity to lodge his application within the prescribed time frame. The Court held that the consequences of any alleged non-compliance must be considered in determining whether there was a breach of the duty under section 66(2). Given that the applicant lodged his application using an alternative means provided in the notice, the Court concluded that no jurisdictional error had occurred.

The Court dismissed the application, finding that the notice was not defective and that any alleged breach was not material. The Court held that the applicant had not been deprived of the possibility of a successful outcome and that the breach, if any, did not have negative consequences for the applicant. The Court's decision underscores the importance of considering the consequences of any alleged non-compliance in determining the materiality of a breach.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant pressed a single ground of review, as can be found in his Amended Initiating Application filed with the Court on 26 June 2024:•The Tribunal has failed to consider the full integers of the applicant’s claim.ParticularsThe Tribunal failed to consider the full integers of the Applicant’s claim in circumstances where it erroneously directed itself that it had no jurisdiction due to its failure to discern a breach of section 66(2)(d)(iv) in the delegate’s decisionSTATEMENT OF AGREED FACTS A Statement of Agreed Facts was filed on 2 July 2024 in the following terms:· During the relevant period [9 June 2022 to 30 June 2022], the email address “registry@mrt-rrt.gov.au” was inactive, and any email sent to that address was not received by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, or anyone.· Emails sent to the email address “registry@mrt-rrt.gov.au” during the relevant period resulted in an email being automatically returned to the sender indicating that the delivery of their email had not been successful (non-delivery notification).THE APPLICANT’S SUBMISSIONS At [18] – [20] of his submissions, the applicant relied on ss 66 and 347 of the Act 1958 (Cth) to assert that it is the respondent’s obligation to notify the applicant of any decision made in relation to their matter. At [22] – [23], the applicant claims the Notice of Refusal of the Minister’s decision was erroneous. This error being that the letter listed three emails where the applicant could submit an appeal. The applicant notes that one of these emails are no longer in use. The Notice at CB 79 provided that the application forms can be lodged online through by email to mrdivision@aat.gov.au and registry@mrt.rrt.gov.au by fax. By only providing these emails on the letter, the respondent breached s 66(2)(d)(iv) of the Act which requires the applicant to be notified of where an application for review can be lodged. The applicant relied on Chan Ta Strey v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 134 FCR 308, whereby the Court noted that the purpose of s 66(2) of the Act is to ensure applicants have enough information to pursue the right to seek a review of their application. Additionally, Allsop J in Zhan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 327 (“Zhan”) held that s 66(2)(d)(iv) required direction as to the location where the making of an application might be done. In Zhan, the letter from the delegate did not specify at which registry of the Tribunal the application for review could be lodged. The applicant referred to both Hasan v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 184 FCR 523 (“Hasan”) and SZOFE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 185 FCR 129 (“SZOFE”) to assert that the distinction between those cases and this matter is “immaterial”. Hasan factually concerned an applicant who filed an application for review five months after receiving a notification of the primary decision of the delegate. The Migration Review Tribunal, as it was then known, held that it did not have jurisdiction to deal with an application filed outside of the prescribed period. North J concluded at [29] in regard to s 66 (2)(d)(iv) of the Act:The regulation appears to establish an envelope of time with a beginning and an end. It seems to require that the application be given to the Tribunal within that envelope. On this view, an application given after the end of the period would not comply with the requirement. Similarly, an application given before the start of the period would comply with the requirement.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The applicant now seeks judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision in this Court. For the reasons set out below, this application should be dismissed.THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL’S DECISION In its reasons, the Tribunal outlined the statutory framework contained in s 347(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) and reg 4.10 to the Regulations, which provide that applications for review of a delegate’s decision must be lodged within 21 days of the applicant being notified of the decision. The Tribunal stated that it was satisfied that the applicant had been given adequate notice of the delegate’s decision via a letter dated 9 June 2022 which was “dispatched by email to the email address provided with the application” [3]. As such, it noted that the final day the applicant could have sought to lodge a review application was 30 June 2022. It went on to note that the applicant’s review application was not received until 21 November 2022, outside the 21-day time limit. The Tribunal stated that it wrote to the applicant on 8 December 2022 inviting him to comment on the validity of his visa application. The Tribunal received a response via email from the applicant’s legal representative (“representative”) on 21 December 2022. It summarised this correspondence as follows:(1)The representative conceded that the applicant had failed to attend two initial health examinations, as invited by the delegate, on 1 October 2022 and 7 February. (2)The applicant booked another health examination, and this was scheduled to occur on 10 November 2021. The representative claimed the examination on this date was cancelled by BUPA, the applicant’s health provider, due to the COVID-19 pandemic. (3)The representative noted that the applicant booked and attended a health examination on 14 July 2022. (4)The applicant claimed he was not aware of the decision by the delegate to refuse him a visa until 19 November 2022, during the course of applying for a Bridging Visa B, which he was seeking in order to visit his parents in India. The applicant claimed that he had not read the decision earlier as it was in his junk mail folder.(5)The representative cited DFQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 64 to bolster his submission that the delegate had erred by not specifying a date in absolute terms in its visa refusal letter. The Tribunal, however, noted that the Court in the aforementioned case did not find that there was a requirement to state the date in the letter. The Tribunal therefore rejected that an error in notifying the applicant of the refusal had occurred in this regard. (6)The representative went on to refer to DQM18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 110 at [109] and stated that the delegate had “an obligation to have an active intellectual [process] in making such decision where the delegate had the above information that BUPA services has been disrupted due to COVID-19 and delegate had the meaningful resources to check whether the applicant had an active booking to undergo the necessary health check at the time of the decision”. The Tribunal responded to this claim by stating that it was unable to evaluate whether there were any failures on the part of the delegate, as it did not have jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decision in this case.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Finally, even if the Court found the Notice to be defective (which is not conceded) the breach is not material as the applicant did not attempt to use the defective email address and has suffered no prejudice. Thus, any breach is not material.CONSIDERATION The issue for determination is whether the Notice is defective, such that time for the lodgement of the application for review by the Tribunal did not begin to run. The agreed defect is that the Notice contained a single email address that was non-operational. It is a common ground between the parties that the applicant did not use the defective email address. Rather, some five months after receiving the Notice, the applicant used an online application that was provided to him in the Notice letter to lodge his application. It is agreed that there is no evidence to support the proposition that the applicant tried to use the defective email address. The work of s 66(1) of the Act is to impose a duty on the Minister “to notify the applicant of the decision in the prescribed way”. Section 66(2)(d)(iv) of the Act requires the Minister to notify the applicant of “where the application for review can be made”. In this case that notification included various details of how to lodge an application via an online application, via hard form at the various registries of the Tribunal, (details of which were provided), via fax at registries or online with three separate email addresses being provided, only one of which was defective. The Court is satisfied that there is no evidence that the applicant was misled by the defective email address. There is no evidence that he tried to use it, rather he lodged the application via an online application which was set out in the Notice. SZOFE is authority that the Minister is not required to set every means by which an application could be lodged, that is by not providing every address of a Tribunal registry. Emmett J held at [30] that “it does not follow that it was the intention that any departure from those steps would result in invalidity, without consideration of the extent and consequences of the departure”. Buchanan and Nicholas JJ at [66] – [67] reasoned that it was necessary to consider the consequences of the alleged non-compliance in determining whether the duty in s 66(2) had not been performed. In the current circumstances, the Court is satisfied that the Notice was not defective. It provided clear details via a number of means by which an application for a review by the Tribunal could be lodged. The admitted error was in my view bordering on the trivial. No jurisdictional error arises. Even if the Court is wrong in this regard, in the present case there were no negative consequences to the applicant by the admitted defect. His application was made some 5 months out of time using an online application provided to him in the refusal letter. The applicant was not deprived of the possibility of a successful outcome. The breach, if there be one, is not and was not, in the facts of this case, material. Materiality must be a consideration in considering the consequences of any breach; ( see: Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Parata (2021) 284 FCR 62 at [123] per Burley J).