DFQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DFQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 64

Appeal from: DFQ17 v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCCA 635
File number: NSD 369 of 2018
Judges: RARES, PERRAM AND FARRELL JJ
Date of judgment: 18 April 2019
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court – whether Court erred in dismissing appeal from Administrative Appeals Tribunal – where Tribunal found it had no jurisdiction to review application made out of time – where letter notifying of refusal of visa by Minister sent to post office box address – whether post office box address was ‘address for service’ – whether letter ‘stated’ the time in which the application for review may be made

STATUTES – Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 66, 494B – ‘address for service’ – ‘state’

Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 28A, 36

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 66, 494B, 494C

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 2.16, 4.31

Cases cited:

Cao v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 586; 176 FCR 396

CGJ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1437

Chan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1292; 134 FCR 308

House of Peace Pty Ltd v Bankstown City Council [2000] NSWCA 44; 48 NSWLR 498

Polo/Lauren Company LP v Ziliani Holdings Pty Ltd [2008] FCAFC 195; 173 FCR 266

Sunrise Auto Limited v Commissioner of Taxation [1995] FCA 969; 61 FCR 446

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; 347 ALR 405

SZVRO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 421

Vetter v Lake Macquarie City Council [2001] HCA 12; 202 CLR 439

Zhan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 327; 128 FCR 469

Date of hearing: 28 February 2019
Date of last submissions: 7 March 2019 (First Respondent)
13 March 2019 (Appellant)
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 67
Counsel for the Appellant: Ms B Tronson with Mr M Cobb-Clark
Solicitor for the Appellant: Kinslor Prince Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G T Johnson SC with Mr N Swan
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Minter Ellison
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 369 of 2018
BETWEEN:

DFQ17

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGES:

RARES, PERRAM AND FARRELL JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

18 APRIL 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.Order 2 made by the Federal Circuit Court on 7 March 2018 be renumbered as Order 4.

3.Order 1 made by the Federal Circuit Court on 7 March 2018 be set aside and in lieu thereof:

1.DECLARE that the Second Respondent has jurisdiction to review the decision of the delegate of the First Respondent dated 3 February 2017.

2.ORDER that…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCAFC 64
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of DFQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection concerns an appeal from the Federal Circuit Court, which had dismissed an appeal from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The dispute revolves around whether the AAT was correct in determining that it lacked jurisdiction to review the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection's refusal to grant a visa to the appellant, DFQ17. This refusal was communicated via a letter sent to a post office box address, and the central issue was whether this address qualified as the 'address for service' and if the letter properly notified DFQ17 of the time within which an application for review could be made. The statutory framework for this appeal is found in the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), particularly sections 66 and 494B, which detail the requirements for the Minister to notify an applicant of a visa refusal decision and the implications of such notification.

The court was tasked with determining whether the Minister's letter, sent to a post office box, correctly served as the notification of the visa refusal decision under section 66 of the Act. Additionally, the court had to decide if the letter complied with the statutory requirement to 'state' the time for making a review application, as per section 66(2)(d)(ii). The Regulations under the Migration Act further stipulate the timeframe for lodging an application for review with the Tribunal, which is 28 days from the date of notification of the decision. The court had to resolve whether the appellant was properly notified within this timeframe when the letter was sent to a post office box.

In its decision, the court examined the statutory language and found that the letter, sent by prepaid post, was considered delivered 7 working days after dispatch, as per section 494C(4)(a) of the Act. The court acknowledged that the notification must specify the time for review, as required by section 66, but also noted the importance of clarity in communicating these statutory deadlines. The court found that while the appellant's post office box was an address for service under the Act, the Minister did not clarify that the 7-day period needed to be double-counted when calculating the 28-day review period. This omission led to the court concluding that the AAT erred in finding it lacked jurisdiction to review the decision. The court emphasised the need for explicit communication regarding the review period to avoid such jurisdictional issues.

Consequently, the court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court, and declared that the AAT had jurisdiction to review the Minister's decision. The matter was remitted to the AAT for a fresh determination in accordance with the law. The First Respondent, the Minister, was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal. This decision highlights the importance of clear and precise communication of statutory deadlines in visa refusal notifications to ensure that applicants are properly informed of their review rights.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. Order 2 made by the Federal Circuit Court on 7 March 2018 be renumbered as Order 4.

3. Order 1 made by the Federal Circuit Court on 7 March 2018 be set aside and in lieu thereof:

1. DECLARE that the Second Respondent has jurisdiction to review the decision of the delegate of the First Respondent dated 3 February 2017.

2. ORDER that the decision of the Second Respondent dated 12 July 2017 be set aside.

3. ORDER that the matter be remitted to the Second Respondent for determination according to law.

4. The First Respondent pay the Appellant’s costs of the appeal as taxed or agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 66 requires the Minister to notify an applicant of a decision to refuse to grant a visa. Section 66(2)(d)(ii) relevantly provides:66 Notification of decision…(2) Notification of a decision to refuse an application for a visa must:…(d)if the applicant has a right to have the decision reviewed under Part 5 or 7 or section 500—state:…(ii) the time in which the application for review may be made; and… What is the time in which a review application must be made? If, as here, the applicant is not in immigration detention the issue is governed by reg 4.31(2) of the Regulations which provides:4.31 Time for lodgement of application with Tribunal…(2)For paragraph 412(1)(b) of the Act, if an applicant is not in immigration detention on the day the applicant is notified of a Part 7-reviewable decision, the period in which an application for review of the decision must be given to the Tribunal by or for the applicant is 28 days, commencing on the day the applicant is notified of the decision.Note:If the Minister gives a person a document by a method specified in section 494B of the Act, the person is taken to have received the document at the time specified in section 494C of the Act in respect of the method. Thus an unsuccessful applicant must make any review application in the Tribunal within 28 days of the day the applicant is notified of the decision or, should that decision fall on a non-working day, the next working day. When is an applicant notified of a refusal decision? The answer to this question turns upon the mode of delivery by which the refusal is communicated. In this case, the decision was sent by pre-paid post. Accordingly, the matter was governed by s 494C(4) which provides:494C When a person is taken to have received a document from the Minister…Dispatch by prepaid post or by other prepaid means(4)If the Minister gives a document to a person by the method in subsection 494B(4) (which involves dispatching the document by prepaid post or by other prepaid means), the person is taken to have received the document:(a)if the document was dispatched from a place in Australia to an address in Australia—7 working days (in the place of that address) after the date of the document; or(b)in any other case—21 days after the date of the document.… The letter was sent from an address in Sydney to a post office box in Sydney. Consequently, subclause (a) applied and the Appellant was taken to have received the decision on 14 February 2017, that being 7 working days after the date of the letter of 3 February 2017. If the letter of 3 February 2017 was an effective notification of the decision then the effect of reg 4.31(1) was that any review application with the Tribunal had to be made by the Appellant within 28 days, i.e., 13 March 2017. Pausing here, it should be noted that the calculation of 13 March 2017 from 3 February 2017 is not a straightforward exercise. Section 494C(4)(a) uses the expression ‘7 working days… after the date of the document’ whereas reg 4.31(2) stipulates ‘28 days, commencing on the day the applicant is notified of the decision’. Applying s 36(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) (which applies to reg 4.31(2) by virtue of s 13(1)(a) of the Legislation Act 2003 (Cth)) and having regard to the difference between days and working days, the 7-day period is not inclusive of the first day, weekends and public holidays but the 28-day period is inclusive of the first day, weekends and public holidays. Accordingly, 14 February 2017 must be double-counted. Whilst previous decisions of this Court have accepted that the notification letter need not draw attention to the need to double-count the day a person is deemed to have been notified of the decision (see, for example, Cao v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 586; 176 FCR 396 per North J; 176 FCR 396; CGJ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1437 per Allsop CJ), it does serve to highlight a certain need for clarity.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Question 100 on page 24 of Part C was a statutory declaration that required the applicant to complete his or her name and address and declare to be true a long list of matters including: • I understand that if I have given false or misleading information, my application may be refused, and any visa issued may be cancelled.[…]• I undertake to inform the department if I intend to change my address for more than 14 days while my application is being considered.Consideration In Sunrise Auto Limited v Commissioner of Taxation (1995) 61 FCR 446 at 455F-G, Beaumont and Beazley JJ (with whom Drummond J agreed on this point at 473D) said that, in its ordinary meaning, “an address for service” could be described “as the place at which a person may be reached for the purpose of making formal delivery of a notice of assessment” under reg 36 of the Income Tax Regulations 1936 (Cth) that provided “Every person who furnishes a return shall, in the return, give an address in Australia for service”. A person may have several addresses, including a residential, business and postal address, perhaps also a holiday home or residential or business addresses in several locations because he or she has family or work that requires him or her to maintain more than one such address. A postal address, such as a post office box, may or may not be an address at which a person wishes to receive documents of a particular kind. However, what s 494B(4)(c) authorised was that the Minister may use a method of service by which he dates and dispatches a document by prepaid post or other prepaid means to “the last address for service provided to the Minister by the recipient for the purposes of receiving documents”. After all, the Act provides that an applicant can also choose to have a migration agent or an authorised representative receive documents on his or her behalf, so that the agent’s or representative’s address will be the address that the applicant provides to the Minister for the purposes of receiving documents. Because the Minister did not ask the appellant the question, what was the address at which she wished to receive documents, he cannot subsequently treat her answer to a different question, such as questions 37 or 38 in the application form (which the Minister framed with full knowledge of s 494B(4)) that did not seek that information, as if it had. If the applicant had a postal address different to his or her residential address, then question 38 made it mandatory for him or her to include it. The appellant’s inclusion of her postal address was not a matter of choice. It was a requirement of the application form that required her emphatically to “answer ALL questions” and warned her that any failure to do so may lead to her application being invalid. The appellant completed questions 81 and 100 in Part C by including her Australian residential address, being the same as that she gave in answer to question 37 in Part C. Question 41 in Part C asked if an applicant agreed to the Department communicating with him or her electronically. However, nothing in Parts B or C of the application form indicated that, where, as here, an applicant did not agree to receiving communications electronically and had not appointed a migration agent or authorised representative, the Minister could or would use any particular address that an application gave in response to questions in the application form as the address for service for the purpose of him or her receiving documents within the meaning of s 494B(4)(c)(i) of the Act.