FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DFQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 64
Appeal from: DFQ17 v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCCA 635 File number: NSD 369 of 2018 Judges: RARES, PERRAM AND FARRELL JJ Date of judgment: 18 April 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court – whether Court erred in dismissing appeal from Administrative Appeals Tribunal – where Tribunal found it had no jurisdiction to review application made out of time – where letter notifying of refusal of visa by Minister sent to post office box address – whether post office box address was ‘address for service’ – whether letter ‘stated’ the time in which the application for review may be made
STATUTES – Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 66, 494B – ‘address for service’ – ‘state’
Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 28A, 36
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 66, 494B, 494C
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 2.16, 4.31
Cases cited: Cao v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 586; 176 FCR 396
CGJ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1437
Chan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1292; 134 FCR 308
House of Peace Pty Ltd v Bankstown City Council [2000] NSWCA 44; 48 NSWLR 498
Polo/Lauren Company LP v Ziliani Holdings Pty Ltd [2008] FCAFC 195; 173 FCR 266
Sunrise Auto Limited v Commissioner of Taxation [1995] FCA 969; 61 FCR 446
SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; 347 ALR 405
SZVRO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 421
Vetter v Lake Macquarie City Council [2001] HCA 12; 202 CLR 439
Zhan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 327; 128 FCR 469
Date of hearing: 28 February 2019 Date of last submissions: 7 March 2019 (First Respondent)
13 March 2019 (Appellant)Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 67 Counsel for the Appellant: Ms B Tronson with Mr M Cobb-Clark Solicitor for the Appellant: Kinslor Prince Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G T Johnson SC with Mr N Swan Solicitor for the First Respondent: Minter Ellison Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 369 of 2018 BETWEEN: DFQ17
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGES:
RARES, PERRAM AND FARRELL JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
18 APRIL 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.Order 2 made by the Federal Circuit Court on 7 March 2018 be renumbered as Order 4.
3.Order 1 made by the Federal Circuit Court on 7 March 2018 be set aside and in lieu thereof:
1.DECLARE that the Second Respondent has jurisdiction to review the decision of the delegate of the First Respondent dated 3 February 2017.
2.ORDER that…
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- Case
- [2019] FCAFC 64
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was tasked with determining whether the Minister's letter, sent to a post office box, correctly served as the notification of the visa refusal decision under section 66 of the Act. Additionally, the court had to decide if the letter complied with the statutory requirement to 'state' the time for making a review application, as per section 66(2)(d)(ii). The Regulations under the Migration Act further stipulate the timeframe for lodging an application for review with the Tribunal, which is 28 days from the date of notification of the decision. The court had to resolve whether the appellant was properly notified within this timeframe when the letter was sent to a post office box.
In its decision, the court examined the statutory language and found that the letter, sent by prepaid post, was considered delivered 7 working days after dispatch, as per section 494C(4)(a) of the Act. The court acknowledged that the notification must specify the time for review, as required by section 66, but also noted the importance of clarity in communicating these statutory deadlines. The court found that while the appellant's post office box was an address for service under the Act, the Minister did not clarify that the 7-day period needed to be double-counted when calculating the 28-day review period. This omission led to the court concluding that the AAT erred in finding it lacked jurisdiction to review the decision. The court emphasised the need for explicit communication regarding the review period to avoid such jurisdictional issues.
Consequently, the court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court, and declared that the AAT had jurisdiction to review the Minister's decision. The matter was remitted to the AAT for a fresh determination in accordance with the law. The First Respondent, the Minister, was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal. This decision highlights the importance of clear and precise communication of statutory deadlines in visa refusal notifications to ensure that applicants are properly informed of their review rights.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. Order 2 made by the Federal Circuit Court on 7 March 2018 be renumbered as Order 4.
3. Order 1 made by the Federal Circuit Court on 7 March 2018 be set aside and in lieu thereof:
1. DECLARE that the Second Respondent has jurisdiction to review the decision of the delegate of the First Respondent dated 3 February 2017.
2. ORDER that the decision of the Second Respondent dated 12 July 2017 be set aside.
3. ORDER that the matter be remitted to the Second Respondent for determination according to law.
4. The First Respondent pay the Appellant’s costs of the appeal as taxed or agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Question 100 on page 24 of Part C was a statutory declaration that required the applicant to complete his or her name and address and declare to be true a long list of matters including: • I understand that if I have given false or misleading information, my application may be refused, and any visa issued may be cancelled.[…]• I undertake to inform the department if I intend to change my address for more than 14 days while my application is being considered.Consideration In Sunrise Auto Limited v Commissioner of Taxation (1995) 61 FCR 446 at 455F-G, Beaumont and Beazley JJ (with whom Drummond J agreed on this point at 473D) said that, in its ordinary meaning, “an address for service” could be described “as the place at which a person may be reached for the purpose of making formal delivery of a notice of assessment” under reg 36 of the Income Tax Regulations 1936 (Cth) that provided “Every person who furnishes a return shall, in the return, give an address in Australia for service”. A person may have several addresses, including a residential, business and postal address, perhaps also a holiday home or residential or business addresses in several locations because he or she has family or work that requires him or her to maintain more than one such address. A postal address, such as a post office box, may or may not be an address at which a person wishes to receive documents of a particular kind. However, what s 494B(4)(c) authorised was that the Minister may use a method of service by which he dates and dispatches a document by prepaid post or other prepaid means to “the last address for service provided to the Minister by the recipient for the purposes of receiving documents”. After all, the Act provides that an applicant can also choose to have a migration agent or an authorised representative receive documents on his or her behalf, so that the agent’s or representative’s address will be the address that the applicant provides to the Minister for the purposes of receiving documents. Because the Minister did not ask the appellant the question, what was the address at which she wished to receive documents, he cannot subsequently treat her answer to a different question, such as questions 37 or 38 in the application form (which the Minister framed with full knowledge of s 494B(4)) that did not seek that information, as if it had. If the applicant had a postal address different to his or her residential address, then question 38 made it mandatory for him or her to include it. The appellant’s inclusion of her postal address was not a matter of choice. It was a requirement of the application form that required her emphatically to “answer ALL questions” and warned her that any failure to do so may lead to her application being invalid. The appellant completed questions 81 and 100 in Part C by including her Australian residential address, being the same as that she gave in answer to question 37 in Part C. Question 41 in Part C asked if an applicant agreed to the Department communicating with him or her electronically. However, nothing in Parts B or C of the application form indicated that, where, as here, an applicant did not agree to receiving communications electronically and had not appointed a migration agent or authorised representative, the Minister could or would use any particular address that an application gave in response to questions in the application form as the address for service for the purpose of him or her receiving documents within the meaning of s 494B(4)(c)(i) of the Act.