FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
DJA21 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 91
ORDERS
SYG 1809 of 2021 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: DJA21
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First RespondentADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE PAPADOPOULOS
DATE OF ORDER:
5 FEBRUARY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the first respondent be amended to ‘Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs’.
2.The application filed on 27 September 2021 be dismissed.
3.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to these proceedings fixed in the amount of $4,189.38.
4.Pursuant to r 9.03(2) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (GFL Rules), leave is granted to the solicitor for the applicant, Mr Abu Siddque, to withdraw from the proceedings effective from the commencement of the hearing on 29 January 2025.
5.Pursuant to r 22.06(2)(b) of the GFL Rules, due to…
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- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 91
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the principles governing the extension of time under s 477(2) of the relevant Act, which include the extent of the delay, the reasons for the delay, prejudice to the respondent, the impact on the applicant if the time was not extended, and the merits of the substantive application. The applicant had not provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay, which was substantial, and had not expanded on his reasons for delay at the hearing. The applicant had merely indicated that he believed a third party had lodged the application on his behalf, which proved not to be the case. The court found that the lack of a compelling explanation for the delay, combined with the length of the delay, was sufficient to deny the extension.
The court concluded that granting an extension in this instance would not serve the broader interests of the administration of justice. The delay was significant, and the applicant's reasons were insufficient to warrant an extension. Consequently, the application for an extension of time was dismissed. The court also ordered that the applicant pay the Minister’s costs of the application.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Section 477(2)(a) of the Act is thus satisfied.Necessary in the interests of the administration of justice The second limb of s 477(2)(b) allows the Court to grant an extension of time for the filing of an application, if the Court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make such an order. In Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 96 ALJR 919 (Tu’uta Katoa) at [12], the High Court observed that the Court’s power to extend time is not focused on the interests of the applicant, rather on the broader interests of the administration of justice. The Act does not specify any criteria which must be satisfied to establish that it is in the interests of the administration of justice to grant an extension of time but the Court may look at a myriad of facts and circumstances including the length of the applicant’s delay, reasons for the delay, prejudice to the respondent, prejudice to third parties and the merits of the underlying application. The principles regarding an application under s 477(2) were considered in BTI15 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 49 (BTI15). In that case, Jagot and Halley JJ found that the Court has an obligation to ‘evaluate all of the relevant circumstances and to decide if the Court is satisfied that the extension of time is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice’: see BTI15 at [40]. Further, their Honours identified that whilst the matters to which regard may be had are not expressly confined by the Act, the following are usually relevant when considering an extension of time – although it is noted that this list is not exhaustive: (a)the extent of the delay and explanation for it;(b)any prejudice to the respondent if an extension were granted;(c)the impact on the applicant if the time was not extended;(d)the interests of the public at large; and(e)the merits of the substantive application.The extent of the delay and explanation for it As stated above, the applicant’s delay in filing his judicial review application amounts to 67 days out of time. Typically, the longer the delay the more persuasive the explanation for that delay needs to be. The absence of any satisfactory explanation of itself may be a sufficient basis to refuse extension of time in the case of long delay (see Tran v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 533 (Tran) per Wigney J at [38]; Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187 at [195]). By way of his affidavit accompanying the application, the applicant contends that an extension should be granted because he was unable to obtain legal assistance between 16 June 2021 and 25 September 2021 due to his ‘limited English and restrictions related to COVID-19’. At hearing, the applicant chose not to expand upon these reasons for delay. Instead, the applicant offered an explanation that he thought a lady he knew had lodged his judicial review application in time, but she had not done so.