FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Beni v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 228
Appeal from: Beni v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2018] FCCA 756 File number: NSD 536 of 2018 Judges: MCKERRACHER, REEVES AND THAWLEY JJ Date of judgment: 14 December 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – visas – notice of – methods of notice – email – deemed receipt – definition of “transmitting” – consideration of “transmitting” in s 474C of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and reg 2.55 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)
MIGRATION – Administrative Appeals Tribunal’s power to extend the time for the making of an application for review of a Part 5-reviewable decision – consideration of Pt IV of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), specifically ss 24Z, 25 and 29 – consideration of Brown v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1643 and Brown v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2) [2018] FCA 1787
Held: appeal dismissed
Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 3, 24Z, 24Z(1), 24Z(2), 25, 25(6), 25(6)(a), 25(6)(b), 29(7), 29(8), 29(9), 29(10), 42, Pt IV
Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth) ss 5, 7A, 9(1), 9(1)(d), 9(4), 9(5), 14, 14A, 14B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5(9), 50, 74, 116, 127, 198(2), 198(6), 336(5), 338(3), 347(1), 347(1)(b), 347(1)(b)(i), 348, 379A, 494A, 494B, 494B(4), 494B(5), 494C, 494C(4), 494C(5), 494C(6), 500(6B), 501
Tribunals Amalgamation Act 2015 (Cth)
Electronic Transactions Regulations 2000 (Cth) Sch 1, item 80AB
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 1.03, 2.45, 2.54, 2.55(3), 2.55(3)(c), 2.55(3)(d), 2.55(3)(d)(ii), 2.55(5), 2.55(6), 2.55(7), 2.55(8), 4.10, 4.10(1)(b)
Cases cited: Brown v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1643
Brown v Minister for Home Affairs (No.2) [2018] FCA 1787
Buck v Comcare (1996) 66 FCR 359
Calimoso v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1335
Coshott v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2013) 96 ATR 967
Hall v University of New South Wales [2003] NSWSC 669
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 77
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355
R (on the application of Anufrijeva) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] 1 AC 604
Sainju v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 185 FCR 86
Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 2531
Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 231 FCR 573
SZEEU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 150 FCR 214
SZOBI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 2) [2010] FCAFC 151
Tay v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 183 FCR 163
Thiess v Collector of Customs (2014) 250 CLR 66
Xie v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 172
Date of hearing: 30 November 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 85 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr D Hughes Solicitor for the Appellant: D’Ambra Murphy Lawyers
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- Case
- [2018] FCAFC 228
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the notice of the decision was properly served via email and whether the AAT had the jurisdiction to extend the time for an application for review of the decision. The court examined the relevant provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) to determine the correct interpretation of the term "transmitting" in the context of notice of a decision. The court also considered the 2015 amendments to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) and their impact on the AAT's power to extend time for an application for review of a Part 5-reviewable decision.
The court found that the notice of the decision was properly served via email, as the deeming provisions in the Regulations and the Act were designed to achieve administrative certainty as to whether a document has been received by a person and the date on which such receipt is deemed to have occurred. The court held that the reasoning in Sainju and Singh 231 FCR 573, which established that the deeming provisions were correctly decided, should be followed, and the appellant's first ground of appeal could not succeed. The court also found that the AAT had the jurisdiction to extend the time for an application for review of the decision, as the 2015 amendments to the AAT Act had the effect of conferring such power on the AAT. The court rejected the appellant's contention that the AAT failed to exercise its jurisdiction and quashed the decision.
The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs. The costs of the appeal were to be assessed on a lump sum basis, and the parties were directed to attempt to agree on a lump sum figure for the first respondent's costs. If they were unable to agree, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure was to be referred to a Registrar for determination. The court also noted that the entry of orders was to be dealt with in accordance with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.
3. The costs of the appeal be assessed on a lump sum basis.
4. If the parties agree on a lump sum figure in relation to the first respondent’s costs, they are to file a joint minute of proposed orders.
5. In the absence of any joint minute of proposed orders:
(a) within 28 days, the first respondent file and serve an affidavit constituting a Costs Summary in accordance with paragraphs 4.10 to 4.12 of the Court’s Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS);
(b) within 28 days thereafter, the appellant file and serve any Costs Response in accordance with paragraphs 4.13 to 4.14 of GPN-COSTS; and
(c) the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the first respondent’s costs be referred to a Registrar for determination.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Further, the appellant argues that her construction retains the character of the deeming clause. It is said that on the appellant’s construction it is irrelevant whether the email is ever opened or actually read; but the email must reach its destination. The appellant argues that this is a similar concept to that which is employed in s 14 and s 14A of the Electronic Transactions Act (set out above) which refer to “dispatch” and “receipt” in relation to an “information system”. Consideration - ground 1 It must be accepted, and the Minister does not suggest otherwise, that “transmitting” is a word which may convey the meaning contended for by the appellant, but will not necessarily do so. The word must be read in the context in which it is used, including the object and purpose of the legislation. As observed by Jacobson J in Sainju, reg 2.55(8) is one of a number of deeming provisions in the Regulations and the Act clearly designed to achieve administrative certainty as to whether a document has been received by a person and the date on which such receipt is deemed to have occurred. The relevant deeming occurs only if the act contemplated by reg 2.55(3)(d) has occurred. The determination of the time a document is received by a person and, therefore, in any particular case, the amount of time which that person has within which to take action (such as seeking review) is critical to the basic performance of the regime. It is conceivable that on some occasions unfairness could be caused by the possibility of merits review being foreclosed, but as the Minister contends, that should be understood as reflecting the considered decision of the legislature in the circumstances being addressed. This accords with the discussion in Tay v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 183 FCR 163 per Dowsett, Stone and Bennett JJ (at [19] and [24]) where the following was said:19For reasons given below, we have concluded that the decision in Xie is not wrong nor does it produce unintended or irrational consequences. The construction of s 494C(4) in Xie and the consequent rigidity of time limits imposed on applications for review may seem harsh but, as the explanatory material referred to below indicates, they result from the considered decision of the legislature as to an appropriate way to facilitate visa applications and to clarify when documents are received. Insofar as is presently relevant, the provisions of s 494C(4) and (5) are identical and therefore the reasoning of the Full Court in Xie is equally applicable to both subsections.…24With respect, the tenor of Gleeson CJ’s comments is applicable here. Section 494C makes very detailed provision for determining when a document is taken (deemed) to have been received from the Minister. Those provisions must be construed in a statutory context of similarly detailed provisions concerning the methods by which the Minister may give documents to a person when this is a requirement (s 494B) and when it is not required (s 494A) and the identification of the authorised recipient of documents (s 494D). These provisions all evidence concern that there should be certainty in the transfer of documents from the Minister both as to the method and as to the time of delivery. This was recognised by the Full Court in Xie leading it to conclude that s 494C(4) did not create a rebuttable presumption ...(Emphasis added.)