Beni v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Beni v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 228

Appeal from: Beni v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2018] FCCA 756
File number: NSD 536 of 2018
Judges: MCKERRACHER, REEVES AND THAWLEY JJ
Date of judgment: 14 December 2018
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – visas – notice of – methods of notice – email – deemed receipt – definition of “transmitting” – consideration of “transmitting” in s 474C of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and reg 2.55 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)

MIGRATION – Administrative Appeals Tribunal’s power to extend the time for the making of an application for review of a Part 5-reviewable decision – consideration of Pt IV of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), specifically ss 24Z, 25 and 29 – consideration of Brown v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1643 and Brown v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2) [2018] FCA 1787

Held:  appeal dismissed

Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 3, 24Z, 24Z(1), 24Z(2), 25, 25(6), 25(6)(a), 25(6)(b), 29(7), 29(8), 29(9), 29(10), 42, Pt IV

Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth) ss 5, 7A, 9(1), 9(1)(d), 9(4), 9(5), 14, 14A, 14B

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5(9), 50, 74, 116, 127, 198(2), 198(6), 336(5), 338(3), 347(1), 347(1)(b), 347(1)(b)(i), 348, 379A, 494A, 494B, 494B(4), 494B(5), 494C, 494C(4), 494C(5), 494C(6), 500(6B), 501

Tribunals Amalgamation Act 2015 (Cth)

Electronic Transactions Regulations 2000 (Cth) Sch 1, item 80AB

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 1.03, 2.45, 2.54, 2.55(3), 2.55(3)(c), 2.55(3)(d), 2.55(3)(d)(ii), 2.55(5), 2.55(6), 2.55(7), 2.55(8), 4.10, 4.10(1)(b)

Cases cited:

Brown v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1643

Brown v Minister for Home Affairs (No.2) [2018] FCA 1787

Buck v Comcare (1996) 66 FCR 359

Calimoso v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1335

Coshott v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2013) 96 ATR 967

Hall v University of New South Wales [2003] NSWSC 669

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 77

Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355

R (on the application of Anufrijeva) v Secretary of State for the Home Department  [2004] 1 AC 604

Sainju v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 185 FCR 86

Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 2531

Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 231 FCR 573

SZEEU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 150 FCR 214

SZOBI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 2) [2010] FCAFC 151

Tay v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 183 FCR 163

Thiess v Collector of Customs (2014) 250 CLR 66

Xie v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 172

Date of hearing: 30 November 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 85
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr D Hughes
Solicitor for the Appellant: D’Ambra Murphy Lawyers
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Details
Case
[2018] FCAFC 228
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Beni v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved a challenge to the Minister's decision to cancel the appellant's visa and the Minister's methods of notice regarding the decision. The appellant argued that the notice of the decision was not properly served and that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) did not have the jurisdiction to extend the time for an application for review of the decision. The matter was heard in the Federal Court of Australia.

The legal issues before the court were whether the notice of the decision was properly served via email and whether the AAT had the jurisdiction to extend the time for an application for review of the decision. The court examined the relevant provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) to determine the correct interpretation of the term "transmitting" in the context of notice of a decision. The court also considered the 2015 amendments to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) and their impact on the AAT's power to extend time for an application for review of a Part 5-reviewable decision.

The court found that the notice of the decision was properly served via email, as the deeming provisions in the Regulations and the Act were designed to achieve administrative certainty as to whether a document has been received by a person and the date on which such receipt is deemed to have occurred. The court held that the reasoning in Sainju and Singh 231 FCR 573, which established that the deeming provisions were correctly decided, should be followed, and the appellant's first ground of appeal could not succeed. The court also found that the AAT had the jurisdiction to extend the time for an application for review of the decision, as the 2015 amendments to the AAT Act had the effect of conferring such power on the AAT. The court rejected the appellant's contention that the AAT failed to exercise its jurisdiction and quashed the decision.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs. The costs of the appeal were to be assessed on a lump sum basis, and the parties were directed to attempt to agree on a lump sum figure for the first respondent's costs. If they were unable to agree, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure was to be referred to a Registrar for determination. The court also noted that the entry of orders was to be dealt with in accordance with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.

3. The costs of the appeal be assessed on a lump sum basis.

4. If the parties agree on a lump sum figure in relation to the first respondent’s costs, they are to file a joint minute of proposed orders.

5. In the absence of any joint minute of proposed orders:

(a) within 28 days, the first respondent file and serve an affidavit constituting a Costs Summary in accordance with paragraphs 4.10 to 4.12 of the Court’s Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS);

(b) within 28 days thereafter, the appellant file and serve any Costs Response in accordance with paragraphs 4.13 to 4.14 of GPN-COSTS; and

(c) the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the first respondent’s costs be referred to a Registrar for determination.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The formulation of the regime reflected in the Regulations, as with s 494C of the Act, is all directed to the ability for the Minister to know the date of notification so that the Minister knows what to put on the notification document as the date by which any review must be sought. These dates depend on which method of giving the notification is chosen. Deeming is essential in those migration decisions as visa holders may have changed contact address several times from the last known physical address or email address. If receipt had to be proven by the Minister, the Minister would not know what date to insert on the notification document because the date the notice was received could not be known by the Minister. Conclusion – ground 1 The reasoning in Sainju and Singh 231 FCR 573 cannot be faulted. They were clearly correctly decided and should be followed. Ground 1 cannot succeed.GROUND 2 Ground 2 concerns the reasoning in the recently delivered decisions of Brown v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1643 (Brown No 1) and more importantly Brown v Minister for Home Affairs (No.2) [2018] FCA 1787 (Brown No 2). Brown No 2 effectively embraces Brown No 1, in which it was held that s 29 of the AAT Act applied to an application for review of a Part 5-reviewable decision, specifically the power conferred upon the Tribunal under s 29(7) and s 29(8) to extend the time for the making of an application to the Tribunal for review of a decision. Section 29(7) and s 29(8) of the AAT Act provide as follows:29 Manner of applying for review…(7)The Tribunal may, upon application in writing by a person, extend the time for the making by that person of an application to the Tribunal for a review of a decision (including a decision made before the commencement of this section) if the Tribunal is satisfied that it is reasonable in all the circumstances to do so.(8)The time for making an application to the Tribunal for a review of a decision may be extended under subsection (7) although that time has expired. It is common ground that no provision of any statute or regulations conferred a power to extend time where an application was brought to the Migration Review Tribunal or the Refugee Review Tribunal. However, it was held in Brown No 2 that the 2015 amendments to the AAT Act have the effect that such reviews, which are now undertaken by the Tribunal, have the benefit of the provisions in s 29(7) and s 29(8) of the AAT Act. The appellant’s contentions The appellant contends that Brown No 2 was correctly determined and, as the Tribunal in this case did not consider exercising or understand that it had a power under s 29 to extend time, it therefore failed to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it and its decision should be quashed. The debate revolves around, essentially, two main provisions, s 24Z and s 25(6) of the AAT Act. The former provides: 24Z Scope of operation of this Part(1)Except for the provisions specified in subsection (2), this Part does not apply in relation to a proceeding in the Migration and Refugee Division.Note 1:For the conduct of proceedings in the Migration and Refugee Division, see Parts 5 and 7 of the [Act].Note 2:Enactments that authorise the making of applications for review to the Tribunal can add to, exclude or modify the operation of this Part.(2)The following provisions of this Part apply in relation to a proceeding in the Migration and Refugee Division:(a)section 25;(b)section 42.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Further, the appellant argues that her construction retains the character of the deeming clause. It is said that on the appellant’s construction it is irrelevant whether the email is ever opened or actually read; but the email must reach its destination. The appellant argues that this is a similar concept to that which is employed in s 14 and s 14A of the Electronic Transactions Act (set out above) which refer to “dispatch” and “receipt” in relation to an “information system”. Consideration - ground 1 It must be accepted, and the Minister does not suggest otherwise, that “transmitting” is a word which may convey the meaning contended for by the appellant, but will not necessarily do so. The word must be read in the context in which it is used, including the object and purpose of the legislation. As observed by Jacobson J in Sainju, reg 2.55(8) is one of a number of deeming provisions in the Regulations and the Act clearly designed to achieve administrative certainty as to whether a document has been received by a person and the date on which such receipt is deemed to have occurred. The relevant deeming occurs only if the act contemplated by reg 2.55(3)(d) has occurred. The determination of the time a document is received by a person and, therefore, in any particular case, the amount of time which that person has within which to take action (such as seeking review) is critical to the basic performance of the regime. It is conceivable that on some occasions unfairness could be caused by the possibility of merits review being foreclosed, but as the Minister contends, that should be understood as reflecting the considered decision of the legislature in the circumstances being addressed. This accords with the discussion in Tay v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 183 FCR 163 per Dowsett, Stone and Bennett JJ (at [19] and [24]) where the following was said:19For reasons given below, we have concluded that the decision in Xie is not wrong nor does it produce unintended or irrational consequences. The construction of s 494C(4) in Xie and the consequent rigidity of time limits imposed on applications for review may seem harsh but, as the explanatory material referred to below indicates, they result from the considered decision of the legislature as to an appropriate way to facilitate visa applications and to clarify when documents are received. Insofar as is presently relevant, the provisions of s 494C(4) and (5) are identical and therefore the reasoning of the Full Court in Xie is equally applicable to both subsections.…24With respect, the tenor of Gleeson CJ’s comments is applicable here. Section 494C makes very detailed provision for determining when a document is taken (deemed) to have been received from the Minister. Those provisions must be construed in a statutory context of similarly detailed provisions concerning the methods by which the Minister may give documents to a person when this is a requirement (s 494B) and when it is not required (s 494A) and the identification of the authorised recipient of documents (s 494D). These provisions all evidence concern that there should be certainty in the transfer of documents from the Minister both as to the method and as to the time of delivery. This was recognised by the Full Court in Xie leading it to conclude that s 494C(4) did not create a rebuttable presumption ...(Emphasis added.)