CBZ23 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs
[2023] FedCFamC2G 1199
•14 December 2023
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
CBZ23 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 1199
File number: PEG 177 of 2023 Judgment of: JUDGE KENDALL Date of judgment: 14 December 2023 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Protection visa – decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – extension of time application – lengthy delay – adequate explanation for delay provided – no prejudice to Minister if extension of time granted – no arguable case of jurisdictional error –– extension of time refused – effect of Ministerial intervention. Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 66, 412, 417, 477, 494B, 494C, 494D & 501CA and Division 4 in Part 7
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), regs 2.16 & 4.31
Cases cited: Abbas & Anor v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2020] FCCA 1051
ADF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1099
AGS20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 619
Ali v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1102
Beni v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 228
BKT17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 384
BMY18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 189
Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541
CAV18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 173
Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
DFQ17 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 64
DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784
Gallo v Dawson [1990] HCA 30
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344
Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550
Manna v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 400
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v EFX17 [2021] HCA 9
Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Parata [2021] FCAFC 46
MZABP v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392
MZAIB v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392
Nguyen v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 101 FCR 20
Sandor v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 434
Singh v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2020] FCAFC 31
Singh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 561
SZEYK v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1940
SZNZL v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 621
Tran v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2014] FCA 533
Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28
WZAVO as litigation guardian for WZAVP v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 108
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 132 Date of hearing: 7 November 2023 Place: Perth Applicant: Applicant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms G Mickle Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs Solicitor for the Respondents: Minter Ellison Lawyers ORDERS
PEG 177 of 2023 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: CBZ23
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE KENDALL
DATE OF ORDER:
14 DECEMBER 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for an order pursuant to s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) be dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE KENDALL:
BACKGROUND
The applicant is a citizen of Papua New Guinea (Court Book (“CB”) 24-25 & 44-45). He was granted a Visitor (Class TU) (Subclass 600) visa on 21 November 2016 and arrived in Australia in December 2016 as a holder of that visa (which ceased on 19 March 2017) (CB 104).
On 11 May 2018, the applicant applied for a Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa (the “visa”) (CB 24-43). Attached to that visa application were copies of the applicant’s identity documents, educational records and other supporting materials (CB 44-54).
In his visa application, the applicant answered “no” when asked whether he “authorise[d] another person to receive communication about [his] application” (CB 28). The applicant did, however, agree to the then Department of Immigration and Border Protection (the “Department”) communicating with him electronically. The applicant provided the Department with his email address so that they could do so (CB 28-29).
On 31 May 2018, the Department wrote to the applicant (by email) acknowledging receipt of his visa application and requesting a certified copy of the applicant’s current passport, fingerprints and a digital photograph (CB 58-70).
On 21 June 2018, an officer of the Department provided the applicant (via email) with details of his rescheduled “biometric appointment” with the Department and requested that the applicant provide the Department with his residential address (CB 71).
Later that same day (also on 21 June 2018), the applicant responded to the Department’s request (via email) and provided details of his residential address (CB 72-73).
On 8 May 2019, the Department invited the applicant (via email) to attend an interview at the Department’s Brisbane office on 30 May 2019 (CB 77-86).
On 10 May 2019, the applicant notified the Department that he was now residing in Perth and requested that the interview be rescheduled accordingly (CB 87-88).
On 15 May 2019, the Department wrote to the applicant (via email) confirming that the interview had been postponed (CB 89-91).
On 18 July 2019, the applicant provided the Department with a “Change of Address Details” form (CB 93).
On 30 August 2019, the Department invited the applicant (via email) to attend a rescheduled interview at the Department’s Perth office on 23 September 2019 (CB 94-96).
On 23 September 2019, the applicant attended a protection visa interview at the offices of the Department in Perth (CB 104).
On 20 November 2019, the applicant provided the Department with a further “Change of Address Details” form (CB 97-98).
On 9 March 2020, a delegate of the first respondent (the “Minister”) refused to grant the applicant the visa (CB 104-113).
The Department notified the applicant of the delegate’s decision by letter dated 9 March 2020 (the “notification letter”) (CB 100-103). That notification letter was sent to the applicant via email on 9 March 2020 (CB 99 and Annexure AT1 of the affidavit of Abby Tyagi affirmed and filed on 31 October 2023 (the “Tyagi affidavit”)) and, relevantly, provided (CB 100-101):
Review Rights
The Department cannot consider your visa application any further. However, you are entitled to apply to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) for a merits review of this decision. An application for merits review of this decision must be given to the AAT within the period of 28 calendar days, commencing on the day you are taken to have received this letter.
As this letter was sent to you by email, you are taken to have received it at the end of the day it was transmitted.
The time mentioned above in which you may apply to the AAT for merits review of this decision is prescribed by law and cannot be extended.
On 8 November 2022, the applicant applied for review of the delegate’s decision at the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) (CB 114-118). In his review applicant, the applicant answered “no” when asked whether any representative was being appointed to act on his behalf. He also provided the Tribunal with the same email address he had provided to the Department (which he had used to communicate with the Department whilst his visa application was being processed) (CB 117).
On 9 November 2022, the Tribunal invited the applicant to comment on the validity of his application for review (the “invitation letter”) (CB 121-122). That invitation letter was sent to the applicant (via email) (CB 120) and, relevantly, provided (CB 121):
It appears that your application is not a valid application as it was not lodged within the relevant time limit. Pursuant to r.4.31(2) of the Migration Regulations 1994, the period in which an application for review of a Part 7-reviewable decision must be given to the Tribunal is 28 days, commencing on the day the applicant is notified of the decision. In DZAFH v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 387, the Federal Circuit Court held that the prescribed period in r.4.31 commences on, and includes, the day the applicant is taken to have been notified of the decision: at [44] – [46].
The primary decision was emailed to you on 9 March 2020 meaning that 9 March 2020 was the date on which you are taken to have been notified. In accordance with DZAFH, the last day for lodging the application for review was 6 April 2020. As the application was not received until 8 November 2022, it appears to be out of time. However this is a matter which must be determined by a Member.
If you wish to make any comments on whether a valid application has been made, you are invited to do so, in writing, by 16 November 2022. Your application, with any comments you make, will then be referred to a Member to make a decision on your application. If the Member decides that you have not made a valid application, you will be given a written statement of decision and reasons.
On 14 November 2022, the applicant sought an extension of time to respond to the invitation letter (CB 127).
An extension of time was granted to 28 November 2022 (CB 128-129).
On 24 November 2022, the applicant provided the Tribunal with a letter (sent by email) responding to the invitation letter (CB 130-132). The applicant’s response relevantly provided as follows (without alteration) (CB 131-132):
1.I was aware of the fact that I had options available to me for a lodgement of an application to review a decision not to grant me a protection visa subclass 866, noted on. Decision Letter dated 9 March 2020, and as against a deadline of 6 April 2020.
2.I am aware that I was not able to lodge the application on time and as against the deadline stated above.
3.It is important for me to inform you that due to travelling restrictions and lockdown rules throughout the start of the covid pandemic, I was prevented from travelling around for most part of the year while also being kept in isolation during the same period.
4.Since I didn't have a valid visa during this period, I was prevented from working and didn't have any reliable source of income. During this period, I was only relying on friends and some family members for help and other assistance.
5.Because of my financial situation at the time, I was unable to hire a migration agent/lawyer which should have been able to provide all legal advisories and representation at the time relating to the overall application and lodgement process.
6.At the time, I did not have any access to a computer at home. I did not have anyone at home to help me organise a lodgement of the application online.
7.While in detention and through the support of others, I have now been able to successfully lodge the same application for a review online as at 9 November 2022.
The timing of the covid pandemic had been one of the most difficult periods as I dealt with the enormous challenges of being locked down at home without any possibility of securing a job or having access to any re-occurring source of income flow.
The effect on my overall mental health has been torturing, grave and substantial.
Bases on all of the information when considered cumulatively, I request your consideration to provide an approval for an acceptance of my current application of 9th November 2022 with great degree of kindness and compassion.
On 8 December 2022, the Tribunal determined that, because the review application had not been received within the prescribed time period, the application was not valid and, as such, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction in relation to the matter (CB 140-141).
The Tribunal notified the applicant of its decision by way of a letter dated 8 December 2022 (the “Tribunal’s notification letter”) (CB 136). The Tribunal’s notification letter was sent to the applicant (via email) on 8 December 2022 (CB 135). With that notification, the applicant was also provided with a “fact sheet” containing “information about decisions” and about how he could seek review of the Tribunal’s decision (CB 137-139). Relevantly, that fact sheet provided (CB 138):
Review of decisions
Applicants can apply to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (the Court) for judicial review of our decisions. The Court will consider whether we made a jurisdictional error. If you wish to apply for review, you must do so within 35 days of the date of our decision. If you require an extension of time, you must ask for it in the application and explain why. The Court will decide whether or not to grant an extension of time.
On 23 August 2023, the applicant applied to this Court for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision (CB 1-7). The application was accompanied by an affidavit (affirmed and filed by the applicant on 23 August 2023) annexing a copy of the Tribunal’s decision (CB 8-14). Unfortunately, that application was filed outside of the 35-day time limit specified in s 477 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the “Act”).
In the circumstances, the applicant requires an extension of time to pursue the substantive proceeding in this Court.
This judgment addresses whether an extension of time should be granted.
For the reasons that follow, the Court has determined that an extension of time should not be granted.
CONSIDERATION
The materials before the Court include the application for an extension of time and the applicant’s supporting affidavit (taken as read and in evidence at the hearing), both filed by the applicant on 23 August 2023, a court book numbering 144 pages (marked as Exhibit 1), written submissions filed on behalf of the Minister on 31 October 2023, the Tyagi affidavit (taken as read and in evidence at the hearing) and a further affidavit of the applicant, sworn and filed on 6 November 2023 (also taken as read and in evidence at the hearing).
Procedural orders were made by Registrar Downing of this Court on 28 September 2023 giving the applicant an opportunity to file an amended application, any affidavits or a supplementary court book and written submissions.
The applicant appeared before this Court on 7 November 2023 without legal representation. The Court confirmed with the applicant that he had received copies of the Court Book, the Minister’s written submissions and the Tyagi affidavit.
Noting that the applicant was not legally represented, the Court explained to him that the statutory timeframe within which an applicant may seek judicial review in this Court is 35 days from the date of the relevant decisions. It was further noted that, in this matter, the Tribunal’s decision is dated 8 December 2022. The date by which the applicant was required to file his application in this Court was 12 January 2023. Unfortunately, the applicant did not file his substantive application in this Court until 23 August 2023. Hence, as explained to the applicant, the delay here is 223 days.
The Court also explained that, despite the late filing of a substantive application for judicial review, an applicant may ask the Court for an extension of time within which to file their substantive application.
In this regard, the Court notes that, pursuant to s 477(2) of the Act:
(a)an applicant must make an application for an extension of time in writing detailing why the extension should be granted; and
(b)the Court may extend the time in which to file the application in circumstances where the Court considers that it is in the interests of the administration of justice to do so.
Here, the applicant requested an extension of time in writing and provided three “grounds” which explain why he believes an extension of time should be granted. He also expanded on those grounds in his subsequent affidavit (filed on 6 November 2023).
Section 477(2)(a) of the Act is thus satisfied.
In relation to s 477(2)(b) of the Act, the Court must consider whether it is in the interests of the administration of justice to grant an extension of time.
Noting, again, that the applicant appeared without any legal assistance, the Court explained to him that the factors which may be considered in this regard are not limited. However, as per the reasoning in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 (and confirmed in Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28 (“Tu’uta Katoa”) at [12]), the most common factors considered by the Court in matters of this sort include:
(a)the length of delay;
(b)whether the respondent (or any third parties) would suffer any prejudice due to the delay;
(c)whether the explanation for the delay is adequate; and
(d)whether the proposed substantive application for judicial review has “merit”.
In relation to (d) above, it was further explained that, when determining if a proposed application has “merit”, the Court will make that assessment at a “reasonably impressionistic level”: MZABP v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392. Importantly, an applicant need only identify an “arguable case” (which may not yet be fully developed) that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error.
The Court invited the applicant to address each of the factors outlined above and highlight anything that he considered relevant to his request for an extension of time. The applicant’s responses are discussed in the consideration that follows.
Length of delay
The Court notes that an extension of time is not granted as a right: Gallo v Dawson [1990] HCA 30 at [2] per McHugh J. Further, the limitation periods specified in the Act are the “general rule” and any grant of an extension of time is an exception to that rule: Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 at 553.
As outlined above (at [27]), the delay in this matter is 223 days. The delay (of more than seven months) is lengthy and weighs against the granting of an extension of time.
Prejudice
In written submissions (filed in this Court on 31 October 2023), the Minister conceded that there is no prejudice to the Minister beyond the public interest in the finality of administrative decision making and effective disposal of litigation.
This weighs in favour of granting the extension of time.
Explanation
The court notes that the longer the delay, the more satisfactory the explanation for that delay needs to be: Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187 at 195, per Lockhart, Sheppard and Burchett JJ; Manna v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 400 (“Manna”) at [14], per Farrell J and Tran v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2014] FCA 533 at [38], per Wigney J.
In the application for judicial review (filed by the applicant on 23 August 2023), he provides three “grounds” for the extension of time which, relevantly, provide as follows (without alteration):
1. I do not have a legal representative to represent me on this matter.
2. I do not have the legal experience on how to process this application.
3.I eventually had to contact other reliable outside source to help me process this application.
The applicant also provided an affidavit to the Court (sworn and filed on 6 November 2023 and taken as read and in evidence at the hearing of this matter). That affidavit annexed medical and health related documents and records relating to the applicant, together with a statement from the applicant outlining the reasons for the delay.
Essentially, the applicant’s statement states that:
(a)despite numerous attempts, he was unable to secure legal representation to assist with his application whilst he was in immigration detention and lacked the legal knowledge to successfully lodge his application within the required timeframe;
(b)he was awaiting trial in relation to a criminal matter in the District Court of Bunbury which impacted his “mental health and depression conditions immensely”. Those charges were discontinued on 12 June 2023 (and a “Notice of Discharge” from the District Court was provided in support of that statement);
(c)he was attacked whilst in detention and sustained a severe eye injury (including stitches across his upper left eye);
(d)he struggled with “significant mental health challenges” leading to a “high-level of stress, anxiety and depression” which was exacerbated by ongoing detention; and
(e)the cumulative effect of his circumstances (as explained above) meant that he was unable to file his application within time.
To the extent that the applicant claims that he was unable to submit his application as he was unable to secure legal representation, the Court notes that there is no right to legal representation in migration proceedings: ADF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1099. Nor is a lack of legal representation a sufficient explanation alone for an extension of time: Nguyen v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 101 FCR 20 at [27], [32] & [36]; Manna at [17].
That said, the Court accepts that the applicant’s circumstances (being held in immigration detention, dealing with mental health issues, being injured whilst in detention and otherwise not being able to access services or assistance as freely as once might outside of detention) were difficult and quite tragic.
On that basis, the Court is satisfied that the applicant’s explanation for the delay in filing his application is more than adequate.
This weighs in favour of granting an extension of time.
Merits
Arguably, the most critical factor for consideration when determining whether the Court should grant an extension of time is whether the proposed application for judicial review has any “prospect of success” (viewed impressionistically only).
In this regard, the Court references the High Court’s decision in Tu’uta Katoa as follows (citations excluded):
17.French J’s observation in Seiler cannot be applied to the operation of s 477A(2) without regard to the important fact that the power considered by his Honour did not require the state of satisfaction set out in s 477A(2)(b). Even so, it may be accepted that, in determining what is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice for the purposes of s 477A(2) (or s 477(2)), it will often be appropriate to assess the merits of the proposed grounds of review at a “reasonably impressionistic level”. That is because the interests of justice are likely to be advanced by granting an extension of time to an application with some merit, depending, of course, on other relevant factors. In this regard, it may be relevant, as Mortimer J observed, that an extension of time will confer upon the applicant not only the right to a determination of their substantive application on the merits but also a right of appeal from that judgment, if adverse to the applicant.
18.However, and as the plaintiff accepted, there will be circumstances in which it is appropriate for the Court to engage in more than an impressionistic assessment of the merits. For example, if the delay is lengthy and unexplained, the applicant may be required to show that their case is strong or even “exceptional”. In such a case, a proper exercise of the power conferred by s 477A(2) will not require the judge to confine their consideration of the merits to an assessment of what is “reasonably arguable” or some similar standard. In other cases, the proposed ground of review may be hopeless but it may be necessary to examine the proposed application in some detail to reach that conclusion. The broad power in s 477A(2) does not prevent a judge from undertaking such an examination and from relying upon that determination to refuse an extension of time.
Noting that the applicant was not represented (and noting the remarks of the Federal Court in DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784 at [8] and BKT17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 384 that it is usually appropriate for an unrepresented applicant to be given an opportunity to explain orally the matters that are said to give rise to an appeal (or review)), the Court gave the applicant an opportunity to outline orally what he thought the Tribunal “did wrong” in relation to his matter.
To assist the applicant, the Court explained to him that the only issue before the Court was whether there is an arguable case, viewed impressionistically, that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error. It was stressed that the possible categories of jurisdictional error are not exhaustive and sometimes overlap.
The Court also explained some of the categories of jurisdictional error to the applicant. For example, the Court explained that the Tribunal would fall into error if it ignored relevant material or relied on irrelevant material: Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 198.
It was also explained that this Court cannot review the merits of the Tribunal’s decisions or grant the applicant the visa that he seeks. Rather, the role of the Court is restricted to determining whether there is an “arguable case” that the Tribunal made a material error in arriving at the decisions it arrived at: Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272.
Against this background, the applicant told the Court that he did receive the notice from the Department regarding his visa refusal notice but “it was a really difficult time” for him with the start of the COVID-19 pandemic (stressing that he had “been in isolation for a lot of the time as a result of the pandemic”) and his situation made it more complicated for him to seek review by the Tribunal. He also explained that he did not have any legal knowledge to make the application and was not employed at the time which meant that he was unable to hire a lawyer to assist him in that regard.
The applicant’s oral submissions largely mirror the response he provided to the Tribunal in relation to the invitation letter (set out above). Unfortunately, they do not raise any arguable case of error on the part of the Tribunal.
The Tribunal’s decision
The Tribunal’s decision (dated 8 December 2022) is two pages in length and spans seven paragraphs. In full, it provides as follows (CB 141):
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
1.This is an application for review of a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs on 9 March 2020 to refuse to grant a protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). The review application was lodged with the Tribunal on 8 November 2022. For the following reasons, the Tribunal has found that it has no jurisdiction to review the decision.
2.As the applicant was not in immigration detention on the day the applicant was notified of the decision, an application for review of the decision had to be made within 28 days, commencing on that day: reg 4.31(2) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations).
3.The material before the Tribunal indicates that the applicant was notified of the decision by letter dated 9 March 2020 and dispatched by email. The Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant was notified of the decision in accordance with the statutory requirements.
4.On 24 November 2022 the applicant responded to a Natural Justice letter sent to him. The applicant stated that he was aware of the options available to him after receiving his decision letter of refusal on 9 March 2020 and was aware that the prescribed period to apply for review ended on 5 April 2020. The applicant further stated that he was impacted by COVID-19 lockdowns and was unable to travel around and he was in isolation. The stated that he was prevented from working and didn’t have any reliable source of income and was reliant on family and friends for help and assistance. He states that because of his financial situation he was unable to hire a migration agent to help him with the application and lodgement process. The applicant claims that he did not have a computer at home or anyone to help him with the lodgement and application for review online. The Tribunal is sympathetic regarding the applicant’s situation and the circumstances surrounding the non-lodgement of review regarding his visa refusal within the prescribed period. The Tribunal also acknowledges that the applicant was aware of his visa refusal and the prescribed period to apply for review. There is no evidence before the Tribunal that the applicant made any attempt to inform the Department of his situation at the time or seek advice.
5.The Tribunal finds that the applicant is taken to have been notified of the decision on 9 March 2020 in accordance with 494C of the Act. Therefore, the prescribed period to apply for review ended on 5 April 2020.
6.As the application for review was not received by the Tribunal until 8 November 2022 the application for review was not made in accordance with the relevant legislation and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction in this matter.
DECISION
7. The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction in this matter.
Proposed application for judicial review
The application for judicial review filed by the applicant on 23 August 2023 contains five “grounds of review” as follows (without alteration):
1.The AAT failed to assess whether legislation properly construed the obligation to accord natural justice.
2.The AAT ignored the relevant materials and identified the wrong issues and asked themselves the wrong questions.
3.The AAT made incorrect interpretations and applied applicable law in a way that affects the exercise of power.
4.The AAT did not take into consideration any of the relevant concerns and materials that were provided relating to the reasons as to why I cannot be deported to Papua New Guinea.
5.In a recent development, all previous criminal charges against me relating to the district court were dismissed on 12th June 2023 by a judge at a district court of Western Australia in Perth.
The applicant’s grounds of review are not particularised and, as such, are not as helpful as they might be had the applicant had some legal assistance. Noting that the applicant appeared before this Court without legal assistance, the Court will, in its duty to him as a self-represented litigant, read the applicant’s grounds of review as broadly as possible and remain astute and alert to the possibility of jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decisions: MZAIB v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392 (“MZAIB”). This is the now accepted approach in this Court.
Whether the applicant was properly notified of the delegate’s decision
Sandor v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs and its applicability to this matter
Before addressing the applicant’s grounds of review, the Court will first consider whether the applicant was properly notified of the delegate’s decision and whether, consequently, the Tribunal was correct in determining that it did not have jurisdiction in this matter.
This Court recently provided a detailed overview of the decision in Sandor v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 434 (“Sandor”) and the requirements for notification letters more broadly in its decision of Singh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 561 (“Singh”) (at [27]-[47]) and AGS20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 619 (“AGS20”). The analysis provided in those judgments is repeated (with minor amendments) below.
The Act and Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the “Regulations”) impose time limits within which applications can be made to the Tribunal for review of certain decisions. The relevant time limits begin to run when an applicant is notified of a delegate’s decision. Section 66 of the Act outlines how a visa applicant is to be notified of a decision and s 66(2)(d)(i) of the Act, in particular, requires that, where the applicant has a right of review at the Tribunal, the notification letter must state the timeframe within which the application for review must be made.
Section 412(1)(b) of the Act requires that an application for review must be lodged at the Tribunal within the prescribed period, being “a period ending not later than 28 days after the notification of the decision”. The relevant prescribed period applicable in this matter is outlined in reg 4.31(2) of the Regulations which provides (emphasis added):
4.31 Time for lodgement of application with Tribunal
(1)For paragraph 412(1)(b) of the Act, if an applicant is in immigration detention on the day the applicant is notified of a Part 7‑reviewable decision, the period in which an application for review of the decision must be given to the Tribunal by or for the applicant is 7 working days, commencing on:
(a) the day the applicant is notified of the decision; or
(b)if that day is not a working day—the first working day after that day.
(2)For paragraph 412(1)(b) of the Act, if an applicant is not in immigration detention on the day the applicant is notified of a Part 7‑reviewable decision, the period in which an application for review of the decision must be given to the Tribunal by or for the applicant is 28 days, commencing on the day the applicant is notified of the decision.
Note:If the Minister gives a person a document by a method specified in section 494B of the Act, the person is taken to have received the document at the time specified in section 494C of the Act in respect of the method.
For that 28 day period to commence, the delegate (or the Department) must notify the applicant of the decision in accordance with the requirements set out in s 66 of the Act. If the notification letter does not meet these requirements, then there has been no notification of the decision and the time period does not commence: Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Parata [2021] FCAFC 46 at [58], [75]-[76], [78] & [103].
Section 66(1) of the Act specifies that, where the Minister refuses to grant a visa, the Minister must notify the applicant of that refusal in the prescribed way.
Section 66(2) of the Act outlines how a visa applicant is to be notified of a decision and relevantly provides as follows:
66 Notification of decision
…
(2) Notification of a decision to refuse an application for a visa must:
(a)if the grant of the visa was refused because the applicant did not satisfy a criterion for the visa—specify that criterion; and
(b)if the grant of the visa was refused because a provision of this Act or the regulations prevented the grant of the visa—specify that provision; and
(c)unless subsection (3) applies to the application—give written reasons (other than non‑disclosable information) why the criterion was not satisfied or the provision prevented the grant of the visa; and
(d)if the applicant has a right to have the decision reviewed under Part 5 or 7 or section 500—state:
(i) that the decision can be reviewed; and
(ii)the time in which the application for review may be made; and
(iii) who can apply for the review; and
(iv) where the application for review can be made; and
…
Regulation 2.16(3) of the Regulations states that the Minister must notify an applicant of the decision by one of the methods specified in s 494B of the Act.
The Department is permitted to communicate with an applicant by email pursuant to ss 494B(5)(b) and 494B(5)(d) of the Act.
Where an applicant has appointed an authorised recipient, s 494D(1) of the Act requires that the Minister to give the authorised recipient (instead of the applicant) any documents that would otherwise have been given to the applicant. Further, where the Minister gives documents to the authorised recipient, the Minister is taken to have given the documents to the applicant: s 494D(2) of the Act. There is also no obligation for the Minister to provide a copy to the applicant directly (but the Minister is not prevented from doing so): s 494D(2) of the Act.
By virtue of s 494C(5) of the Act, an applicant is deemed to have received a document on the date that it was sent to the email address provided by that applicant to the Department in relation to his or her visa application. This is so even if the document is sent to an applicant’s authorised recipient (who did not forward a copy of that correspondence to the applicant) or, if the applicant did not receive those documents for any other reason.
Further, by sending the document by one of the methods set out in ss 494B or 494C of the Act, the applicant is taken to have received that document at the time specified in that section of the Act, regardless of whether the document was actually received: SZNZL v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 621 (“SZNZL”) at [36] per Barker J.
When concerns arise in this regard, it is also necessary for the Court to consider whether any relevant notification letter was “sufficiently clear”. In this regard, as outlined above, s 66(2)(d) of the Act provides that notification of a decision to refuse an application for a visa must state:
(a)that the delegate’s decision can be reviewed; and
(b)the time in which the application for review may be made; and
(c)who can apply for the review; and
(d)where the application for review can be made.
In assessing whether a notification letter states that which is outlined above, the Court has previously been guided by the considerable judicial analysis provided in relation to this issue in cases such as such as DFQ17 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 64 (“DFQ17”); BMY18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 189 (“BMY18”); Ali v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1102 (“Ali”); CAV18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 173 and Singh v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2020] FCAFC 31 (“Singh FCAFC”).
These cases clarify that in order to “state” a matter as required by the Act, the notification must do so clearly and completely and in a way that the receiver will “reasonably understand”.
A detailed overview of the principles outlined in those cases was provided by this Court in Abbas & Anor v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2020] FCCA 1051 (“Abbas”). In particular, it is noted that, when assessing whether s 66 of the Act has been complied with, the relevant case law is clear that, when considering whether an applicant has, in fact, been “validly notified”, the Court should forensically assess the content and clarity of the notification letter.
In this regard, the Court relies on and repeats its analysis in Abbas (at [78]-[79]).
Relevantly, the above cases make it clear that the following principles apply:
(a)where the statement in the letter which outlines the time in which an applicant is taken to have been notified of the decision is found beneath a disconnected and incorrect heading (such as “Financial and Case Worker Assistance”) the notification will lack clarity: DFQ17; BMY18;
(b)where the statement outlining the time in which an applicant is taken to have been notified of the decision is found beneath a heading that is relevant to an applicant’s right of review (such as under the heading “Lodging an Application for Review”) this is sufficiently clear: Ali;
(c)where the statement outlining the time in which an applicant is taken to have been notified of the decision is found beneath a heading that sufficiently identifies this information and uses linking or referable language to the review rights (such as under the heading “Receiving this Letter”), the notification is clear: Singh FCAFC;
(d)the letter should be read as a whole. Hence, the fact that different pieces of information may be spread across a number of pages is not decisive in relation to the level of clarity: Ali. Where the layout is confusing, however (for example, unclear headings are used), the separation of the information may result in a lack of clarity: BMY18; and
(e)whether a notification is “clear” will turn upon the language and terms in which the notification is expressed when read as a whole by a person exercising a reasonable level of care: Singh FCAFC; Ali. It is not significant that an applicant may not speak English as a first language. The question is whether the letter conveys the required information.
As previously explained by this Court, Sandor also addresses whether a notification letter sent by the Department advising of a delegate’s decision was a proper notification (that is, whether the time period within which the appellant – Mr Sandor – could seek review by the Tribunal was made clear to him by that notification letter) and clarifies the case law summarised above. Sandor considers this issue within the specific context of a notification letter that is sent to an appellant (or applicant) via his or her authorised recipient. Until Sandor was handed down, that variable had not been specifically addressed by the Courts.
In Sandor, Justice Markovic summarised the characteristics of the relevant notification letter in that matter, noting that (at [45]):
(a)the notification letter was dated in the top left-hand corner of the first page (13 February 2018);
(b)immediately under the date, the notification letter was addressed to the visa applicant, Mr Sandor, by his name;
(c)the first page of the notification letter stated “Transmission Method: Email sent to [email protected]”;
(d)also on the first page, under the heading “Review Rights” the notification letter stated that the decision can be reviewed and that: “[a]n application for merits review of this decision must be given to the AAT within 21 calendar days after the day on which you are taken to receive this letter”;
(e)on the third page, under the heading “Receiving this letter”, the notification letter stated “[a]s this letter was sent to you by email, you are taken to have received it at the end of the day it was transmitted”; and
(f)at the end of the letter, the notification letter also stated:
The original of this letter including any attachments was sent to:
Karola SZECSKO
Ms Szeckso was Mr Sandor’s migration agent. Mr Sandor had identified her as being authorised to receive correspondence in connection with his visa application.
Justice Markovic first rejected Mr Sandor’s contention that the notification letter did not meet the requirements of s 66(2)(d)(ii) of the Act because the letter stated that it was sent to Mr Sandor when, in fact, it had been emailed to his authorised recipient: at [48]. As in Sandor, no issue in relation to s 66(2)(d)(ii) of the Act arises in this matter.
Her Honour then addressed a separate contention – that is, whether the notification letter was invalid because it was incomplete and unclear in that it did not explain that the appellant was taken to have received it at the end of the day it was transmitted to his authorised recipient: at [49]. Mr Sandor argued that, on that basis, the notification letter was invalid and, as such, the Tribunal had erred in finding that it had no jurisdiction because the time within which Mr Sandor could seek review had not begun to run.
The Minister submitted that the letter was clear, emphasising that the language reflected the terms of s 494D(2) of the Act. Relevantly, the Minister stressed that, in light of what was stated on page three (that Mr Sandor was “taken to have received it at the end of the day it was transmitted”) and page one (that it was transmitted to Mr Sandor’s authorised recipient) it was clear that the 21-day time period commenced from that date.
Justice Markovich rejected the Minister’s argument, determining as follows:
49.The second matter is whether the Notification Letter was incomplete and unclear in that it did not explain that the appellant was taken to have received it at the end of the day it was transmitted to his authorised recipient. That is, the Notification Letter did not explain the effect of s 494D(2) of the Act.
…
51.The use of the words “you are taken to have received” may incorporate the deeming effect of s 494D(2) of the Act but that is the only way in which the effect of that section on the time within which the appellant may apply for review is manifest in the Notification Letter. Acceptance of the Minister’s submissions as to the way in which the Notification Letter is to be read requires the recipient of the letter to piece together the facts which would allow him to know the time in which an application for review may be made. That is, based on the Minister’s reading of the Notification Letter, the appellant must understand that the reference to “the day the letter was transmitted” requires him to: identify to whom the letter may have been transmitted by reference to other aspects of the letter; and then put together pieces of information to enable him to calculate the time in which the application for review can be made.
52.It follows that in my opinion the Notification Letter does not comply with s 66(2)(d)(ii) of the Act. It does not state the information required by that subsection in a way which is complete or clear nor does it, adopting the formulation in EFX17, state the time on which the application for review may be made either expressly or by reference to correct objective facts from which the period could be ascertained on the face of the letter.
Is this matter distinguishable from Sandor?
As outlined above, the issue in Sandor related to the contents of the notification letter sent by the Minister’s delegate and, in particular, whether the timeframe within which the applicant could seek merits review by the Tribunal was clearly set out in that notification letter.
The contents of the notification letter in this matter are as follows (CB 100-103):
(a)the letter was dated 9 March 2020 (on the first page – CB 100);
(b)the letter was addressed to the applicant (referencing him by name) at his residential address (on the first page – CB 100);
(c)the letter indicated that the “transmission method” was via email sent to the applicant’s nominated email address (on the first page – CB 100);
(d)under the heading “Review rights” (on the first and second pages, CB 100-101), the letter stated (emphasis added):
The Department cannot consider your visa application any further. However, you are entitled to apply to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) for a merits review of this decision. An application for merits review of this decision must be given to the AAT within the period of 28 calendar days, commencing on the day you are taken to have received this letter.
As this letter was sent to you by email, you are taken to have received it at the end of the day it was transmitted.
The time mentioned above in which you may apply to the AAT for merits review of this decision is prescribed by law and cannot be extended.
(e)the letter was sent by email to the applicant on 9 March 2020 (CB 99 & Annexure AT1 of the Tyagi affidavit).
It is clear that the notification letter in this matter differs from the letter the subject of Justice Markovic’s decision in Sandor. The letter in this matter was sent to the applicant directly (via email sent to the applicant’s nominated email address). The notification letter in Sandor was sent (via email) to the applicant’s authorised recipient.
As previously explained by this Court in Singh and AGS20, the defect in the notification letter in Sandor was that it did not explain that the appellant was taken to have received it at the end of the day it was transmitted to his authorised recipient. That is, the notification letter did not sufficiently explain the effect of s 494D(2) of the Act. As emphasised by Justice Markovic, the fact that Mr Sandor had an authorised recipient required careful consideration of the deeming effect of s 494D of the Act in relation to the calculation of time. Having undertaken that consideration, Her Honour determined that the deeming effect of the notification letter before her was not “manifest”.
The notification letter in Sandor required the appellant to understand that he “was taken to have received” the letter on “the day the letter was transmitted” to his authorised recipient. However, the notification letter in this matter does not require the applicant to do so.
Section 66 of the Act does not require the notification letter to state a specific date by which an application for review must be filed with the Tribunal: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v EFX17 [2021] HCA 9. The decision in Sandor also stops short of requiring any notification letter to do so. That is, the notification letter in this matter did not need to advise the applicant that he had until 5 April 2020 to file an application for review with the Tribunal. All that was required was that there be sufficient information, on the face of the notification letter, to permit the applicant to correctly determine the relevant time period.
Here, the information on the face of the notification letter allowed the applicant to determine the period correctly. Relevantly, the notification letter:
(a)stated that the transmission method was by email;
(b)identified the applicant’s own email address;
(c)under a single heading titled “Review Rights” stated that:
(i)the application for review had to be given to the Tribunal within 28 days, commencing on the date that the applicant was taken to have received the letter; and
(ii)(in the very next line) the applicant was taken to have received it on the day the email was transmitted.
Importantly, the notification letter here explained that the applicant was taken to have received the letter at the end of the day it was transmitted to him (not to an authorised recipient).
On the basis of the above, the Court determines that the notification letter in this matter did comply with the requirements set out in s 66(2)(d)(i) of the Act and is thus distinguishable from the notification letter in Sandor. Further, the Court is satisfied that the applicant was validly notified of the delegate’s decision in this matter on the date that it was transmitted to him (being on 9 March 2020).
The prescribed period within which the applicant was required to apply to the Tribunal ended on 5 April 2020. The applicant did not apply within the prescribed time period. He submitted his review application to the Tribunal on 8 November 2022 (CB 114-118).
The Tribunal did not have the power to extend the time period within which the applicant could seek review by the Tribunal: Beni v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 228 at [49].
There was, accordingly, no error in the Tribunal’s decision or its conclusion as to want of jurisdiction.
No arguable case of jurisdictional error arises in this regard.
Ground 1
By ground 1, the applicant essentially claims that the Tribunal failed to afford him natural justice or procedural fairness.
The Court disagrees for the reasons that follow.
The issue of whether the Tribunal is required to adhere to common law natural justice guarantees within the context of a “no jurisdiction” decision has been canvassed by this Court in WZAVO as litigation guardian for WZAVP v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 108 (“WZAVO”) at [82]-[87].
That analysis applies equally here and is repeated (with minor amendments) below.
The Tribunal’s procedural fairness obligations in conducting a review are set out in Division 4 of Part 7 of the Act. However, those obligations are not enlivened where there is no “valid” application before the Tribunal.
As outlined by the Federal Court in SZNZL at [46]:
46.The Minister contends that the Tribunal has obligations of procedural fairness in the course of conducting a review, which are exhaustively codified by the Act in Div 4 of Pt 7; but no review is commenced unless an application is made which engages the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. While the Tribunal needs to form a view about whether it has jurisdiction in each case, it cannot conclusively determine its own jurisdiction and its opinion on the issue has no legal force in itself. Thus no issues of procedural fairness arise in connection with the Tribunal’s consideration of whether it has jurisdiction. The issue before the Court is simply whether the Tribunal’s conclusion was right, not how it arrived at that conclusion.
Here, as in WZAVO, there was no application before the Tribunal that engaged the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. Once it was clear that the application was filed late, the Tribunal lacked a “valid” application about which any further determinations could be made. Hence, as per SZNZL, no issues of procedural fairness arise in connection with the Tribunal’s consideration of whether it had jurisdiction. The only issue is whether the Tribunal’s conclusion was right – not how it arrived at that conclusion. Here, for the reasons detailed above, the Tribunal’s decision in relation to whether it had jurisdiction was correct.
In relation to the common law guarantees of natural justice, the Court again relies on its decision in WZAVO (at [83]) and notes that, to the extent that it is argued that the applicant was entitled to the common law guarantees of natural justice, the common law rules of procedural fairness only require that the Tribunal draw to the applicant’s attention the critical issue upon which a decision is likely to turn and provide the applicant with an opportunity to respond accordingly: Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 584 & 587 and SZEYK v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1940 at [35]-[36] per Bennett J.
Here:
(a)as outlined above, the applicant was properly notified of the delegate’s decision (by way of the Department’s notification letter) and the timeframe for lodging his application for review (CB 100-103);
(b)the applicant was invited (on 9 November 2022, by email sent to the applicant’s nominated email address) to comment on the validity of his application (CB 120-122);
(c)the applicant sought (and was granted) and extension of time to respond to the invitation letter (CB 127-129);
(d)the applicant responded to the Tribunal’s invitation letter by email on 24 November 2022, explaining the reasons for the delay in filing his review application with the Tribunal) (CB 130-132); and
(e)the Tribunal expressly considered that response in its decision (at [4], CB 141).
Here, as in WZAVO, it cannot be said that the applicant was denied the right to participate in or otherwise present his case. Further, even if the applicant had been invited to attend a hearing or had otherwise been allowed further opportunities to comment on his application (in circumstances where the applicant had already been asked to comment and did so) this would not have assisted him. As explained by the Court (above), the Tribunal had no power to extend the time within which the applicant could lodge a review application with the Tribunal and the application in this matter had clearly been filed out of time.
No arguable case of jurisdictional error arises in relation to ground 1.
Grounds 2, 3 and 4
Grounds 2, 3 and 4 provide as follows:
2.The AAT ignored the relevant materials and identified the wrong issues and asked themselves the wrong questions.
3.The AAT made incorrect interpretations and applied applicable law in a way that affects the exercise of power.
4.The AAT did not take into consideration any of the relevant concerns and materials that were provided relating to the reasons as to why I cannot be deported to Papua New Guinea.
Insofar as the applicant claims that the Tribunal identified the wrong issue or asked itself the wrong question, the Court disagrees.
The only issue for the Tribunal to determine was whether the review application was filed within the prescribed time period. The Tribunal identified that issue and considered the relevant legislation in that regard. As outlined above, the Court is satisfied that, having considered the relevant legislative requirements and applicable case law, the Tribunal was correct in determining that it did not have jurisdiction in this matter.
To the extent that the applicant claims that the Tribunal failed to consider information or concerns or ignored relevant materials, the Court disagrees.
As outlined above, the Tribunal in this matter considered the applicant’s response to the invitation letter (in relation to why his review application was filed outside of the requisite time period) and determined that it did not have jurisdiction in the matter. Once the Tribunal had reached that conclusion, there was no valid application before the Tribunal and it was thus not required (and had no power) to consider any additional materials or protection claims raised by the applicant or the merits of the applicant’s review application.
No arguable case of error arises in relation to grounds 2, 3 or 4.
Ground 5
Ground 5 states:
5.In a recent development, all previous criminal charges against me relating to the district court were dismissed on 12th June 2023 by a judge at a district court of Western Australia in Perth.
This statement, while factually correct (see Annexure 3 of the applicant’s affidavit filed on 6 November 2023), does not raise any arguable ground of error on the part of the Tribunal.
The discontinuance of criminal charges against the applicant occurred after the Tribunal made its decision and is therefore not information that was before the Tribunal. Further, the information has no bearing on the core question before the Tribunal (being whether the application for review was filed with the Tribunal within the requisite time period).
No arguable case of jurisdictional error arises in this regard.
Applicant’s affidavit
The affidavit filed by the applicant (on 23 August 2023 in support of his application for judicial review) raised additional concerns in relation to the Tribunal’s application of Ministerial Direction No. 90 and the mandatory cancellation of the applicant’s bridging visa under s 501CA of the Act.
As correctly submitted by the Minister (at [28] in written submissions filed on 31 October 2023), those complaints do not relate to the Tribunal’s decision the subject of this review (relating to the refusal of the applicant’s visa).
There is no decision relating to the cancellation of the applicant’s bridging visa before this Court, nor does the Court have any jurisdiction in relation to that cancellation decision.
No arguable case of jurisdictional error arises in this regard.
Conclusion regarding merits of the substantive application
The applicant’s “grounds of review” and concerns raised the applicant’s affidavit (filed in support of his judicial review application), assessed at a reasonably impressionistic level, do not identify any arguable case of jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. The Court has also been unable to identify any arguable grounds of error of the sort that this Court can address.
This weighs heavily against granting an extension of time.
MINISTERIAL INTERVENTION
The circumstances of this case are most unfortunate. The applicant suffered from, and continues to suffer from, serious mental health issues (impacted and exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and associated lockdowns) and was the subject of an attack and injury whilst in immigration detention. The applicant also referenced the cancellation of a bridging visa on the basis of criminal charges which now appear to have been discontinued by the District Court of Western Australia.
When the matter came before the Court, the applicant was clearly distressed by his situation and told the Court of his difficult circumstances and restrictions whilst held in immigration detention. He pleaded with the Court to grant him the extension of time. Unfortunately, the Court’s jurisdiction is limited and, without evidence of any arguable case of jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal, the Court is unable to assist the applicant in this regard.
The Court does, however, consider that the applicant’s circumstances to be compelling. While the Court has no power or ability to compel or indeed ask the Minister to exercise one of his discretionary powers, the Court notes that the Minister can do so (as per s 417 of the Act).
The Court strongly encourages the applicant to seek Ministerial intervention in relation to his matter.
CONCLUSION
The lengthy delay in filing and the lack of any arguable case of jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal (judged at an impressionistic level) are such that it is not in the interests of the administration of justice for the Court to grant an extension of time in this matter.
The application for an extension of time is, accordingly, dismissed.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and thirty-two (132) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Kendall. Associate:
Dated: 14 December 2023
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
-
Immigration & Refugee Law
Legal Concepts
-
Jurisdiction
-
Limitation Periods
-
Protection visa
-
Extension of Time
8
32
2