Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 220

Citation: Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 220
Appeal from: Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCCA 2343
Parties: HARWINDER SINGH v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: SAD 1 of 2014
Judge: PERRY J
Date of judgment: 16 March 2015
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – Practice and procedure – Where Minister seeks to uphold decision of Court below on a different ground – Where no notice of contention filed before hearing – Where appellant unrepresented, not fluent in English and relevant provisions complex – Where error by Court below not material

MIGRATION – Practice and procedure – Where question on judicial review is compliance with objective precondition, compliance with rules of evidence is required - Where Minister relies on computer print-out as evidence of transmission of email and attachments under ss 71 and 161 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – Whether computer print-out of email is sufficient proof that attachments were sent – Observations on approach to proof of such matters in cases involving unrepresented litigants

MIGRATION – Where objective precondition to Tribunal’s jurisdiction to entertain review - Where appellant had 21 days to lodge application for review – Where time does not commence to run until Minister has complied with obligation to notify of delegate’s decision - Where appellant alleges no notification was received - Whether notification of decision was “received” for the purposes of reg 4.10(1)(a) despite no actual receipt

Legislation: Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth) s 5(1)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 71, 161
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 36.24
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5(23), 66, 338(2), 338(9), 347, 353, 494B, 494C
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 1.15C, 2.55(8), 4.10(1)(a)(d), 4.10(2A), Sch 2: cl 485.215
Cases cited: Corporation of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission [2000] HCA 5; (2000) 199 CLR 135
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259
Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (Malaysian Declaration Case) [2011] HCA 32; (2011) 244 CLR 144
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Epeabaka (2001) 206 CLR 128
Sainju v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 461; (2010) 185 FCR 86
SZOBI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 2) [2010] FCAFC 151; (2010) 119 ALD 233
Tay v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCAFC 23; (2010) 183 FCR 163
Xie v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 172
Date of hearing: 27 May 2014
Place: Adelaide
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 56
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr S McDonald
Solicitors for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

SAD 1 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT…
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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 220
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved Mr Singh, an Indian citizen, who applied for a Skilled - Graduate (subclass 485) visa. His application was refused by the Minister's delegate due to a failure to meet the English language competency requirement. Mr Singh subsequently applied for review of this decision by the Migration Review Tribunal (MRT), which was dismissed as out of time. The Federal Circuit Court upheld the Tribunal’s decision, and Mr Singh appealed to the Federal Court. The central issues were whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain the review application and the sufficiency of evidence provided to establish the date of notification of the delegate’s decision.

The court examined the statutory framework governing the time limits for applications for review of MRT-reviewable decisions. It noted that the actual period within which such applications must be made is prescribed by regulations, not the Act itself. In this case, the relevant regulation prescribed a 21-day period from the date of notification. The court considered whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to review the decision despite the late filing, focusing on the objective precondition that the applicant must be notified of the decision. The court concluded that the Tribunal was correct in finding that the application was made beyond the prescribed period and thus lacked jurisdiction.

Regarding the evidence of notification, the Minister argued that a computer print-out of an email sent to Mr Singh was sufficient proof of notification under the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). The court acknowledged that the approach to proof of such matters might differ in cases involving unrepresented litigants who are not fluent in English. However, it found no error in the Tribunal’s acceptance of the print-out as evidence.

The appeal was ultimately dismissed, and Mr Singh was ordered to pay the Minister's costs. The Federal Court confirmed the primary judge's decision, holding that the Tribunal correctly found it lacked jurisdiction to review the decision due to the late filing of the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Ultimately no further submissions were filed by the appellant. However, the Minister filed a further submission on certain concerns raised by me at the hearing pursuant to leave granted to the parties at the hearing on the sufficiency of the evidence relied upon to establish the date on which the statutory time-limit within which to file an application for review to the Tribunal commenced.3. BACKGROUND3.1 The application for a visa and decision of the Minister’s delegate on 7 December 2012 The appellant is a citizen of India. On 18 November 2011, Mr Singh applied for a general skilled migration visa and specified his nominated occupation as being “Nurseryperson”. Schedule 2 of the Regulations sets out the mandatory criteria of which the Minister or his delegate must be satisfied before a Skilled - Graduate (subclass 485) visa can be granted. Regulation 485.215 is one of the mandatory requirements for the grant of this visa. That regulation required that an applicant have “competent English”. The phrase “competent English” is defined in reg 1.15C which, for the purposes relevant to the appellant, provides that a person will have competent English if they satisfy the Minister that they have taken a specified language test within a specified period immediately before lodging the visa application and have achieved a specified score. For the purposes of reg 1.15C, the appellant was required to achieve an IELTS test score of at least six for each of the four test components of speaking, reading, writing and listening. Although the appellant initially submitted a test reference number and indicated on his application form that he had undertaken the relevant test within the prescribed time period before lodging his application, the Minister’s Department could not find any record of the alleged IELTS test results. On 23 October 2012, Mr Singh was afforded an opportunity to provide evidence of his English ability but failed to satisfy the Minister’s delegate that he met the visa criteria. As a result, the delegate determined that Mr Singh did not meet the requirements as prescribed by the regulations and his application for the visa was refused on 7 December 2012. 3.2 The application for review to the Tribunal on 31 December 2012 On 31 December 2012, Mr Singh applied to the Tribunal for review of the decision to refuse to grant him the visa. On 19 March 2013, the Tribunal wrote to Mr Singh to invite him to comment on the validity of his application, having formed the preliminary view that the application was not valid as it was lodged outside the statutory time-limit. In that letter, the Tribunal noted that the decision was emailed to the appellant on 7 December 2012 and, on the basis that that date was the date when the appellant was taken to have been notified, the last day for lodging the application was 28 December 2012. Mr Singh sent a letter in response to the Tribunal on 4 April 2013. In that letter, he alleged that he did not receive the Department’s notification on 7 December 2012 and became aware of the delegate’s decision to refuse to grant the visa only when he checked the Department’s online system on 31 December 2012.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal wrote to Mr Singh on 16 April 2013 advising that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to determine his application and therefore could not review the decision made by the delegate. In its written reasons, the Tribunal found that it lacked jurisdiction because his application for review to the Tribunal had been made out of time. The Tribunal found that Mr Singh was notified of the delegate’s decision to refuse his application on 7 December 2012. Pursuant to s 347(1)(b) and reg 4.10, Mr Singh had 21 days within which to apply to the Tribunal for a review of the delegate’s decision. Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that the time in which he had to apply expired on 28 December 2012, before Mr Singh lodged his application for review.3.3 The decision of the Federal Circuit Court The primary judge upheld the validity of the Tribunal’s decision that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the application for review of the delegate’s decision. In so holding, the Court below held that:[4]… I am satisfied that the decision of the delegate was an MRT reviewable decision as that is defined by virtue of the combined operation of s.338(9) and s.347(1)(b)(iii) of the Act. I am satisfied that it is an MRT reviewable decision. There is nothing in the Tribunal’s reasons to indicate that, had the application been validly made, the decision of the delegate would not have been an MRT reviewable decision.[5]I am therefore satisfied that it is covered by s.338(9) and, as a consequence of that, I am satisfied that s.347(1)(b)(iii) applies and that the application for review of the decision had to be made within the number of days prescribed in respect of the kind of decision in question, prescribed for the purposes of that subsection after the notification of the decision, and that by virtue of the operation of regulation 4.10(1) of the Regulations made under the Migration Act, that period was the period of 21 days from the date of receipt of the decision by the applicant. (emphasis added)4. CONSIDERATION4.1 What time limit was prescribed for the application for review to the Tribunal? Section 347 of the Act relevantly provides that:(1) An application for review of an MRT‑reviewable decision must:(a) be made in the approved form; and(b) be given to the Tribunal within the prescribed period, being a period ending not later than:(i) if the MRT‑reviewable decision is covered by subsection 338(2), (3), (3A), (4) or (7A)—28 days after the notification of the decision; or(ii) if the MRT‑reviewable decision is covered by subsection 338(5), (6), (7) or (8)—70 days after the notification of the decision; or(iii) if the MRT‑reviewable decision is covered by subsection 338(9)—the number of days prescribed, in respect of the kind of decision in question prescribed for the purposes of that subsection, after the notification of the decision; and(c) be accompanied by the prescribed fee (if any). Notwithstanding the impression that s 347 might convey, the section does not itself prescribe the number of days within which an application for review must be made. The “prescribed period” within which such an application must be made is prescribed by the regulations but cannot exceed the number of days referred to in s 347(1)(b)(i), (ii) or (iii), as applicable. As the Full Court held in Xie v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 172 (Xie) at [4]–[5]:Even a reasonably careful reader might (wrongly) conclude that an application must be filed within 28 days from notification of the decision. However the word ‘prescribed’ in the phrase ‘within the prescribed period’ is of critical importance. Pursuant to s 5 ‘prescribed’ means ‘prescribed by the regulations’. Subs 347(5) offers some explanation of the statutory intention. It provides:‘Regulations made for the purposes of paragraph (1)(b) may specify different periods in relation to different classes of MRT-reviewable decisions (which may be decisions that relate to non-citizens in a specified place).’Subsection 347(1) fixes the maximum period within which applications may be made but authorizes the making of regulations prescribing shorter periods.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge upheld the validity of the Tribunal’s decision that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the application for review of the delegate’s decision. In so holding, the Court below held that:[4]… I am satisfied that the decision of the delegate was an MRT reviewable decision as that is defined by virtue of the combined operation of s.338(9) and s.347(1)(b)(iii) of the Act. I am satisfied that it is an MRT reviewable decision. There is nothing in the Tribunal’s reasons to indicate that, had the application been validly made, the decision of the delegate would not have been an MRT reviewable decision.[5]I am therefore satisfied that it is covered by s.338(9) and, as a consequence of that, I am satisfied that s.347(1)(b)(iii) applies and that the application for review of the decision had to be made within the number of days prescribed in respect of the kind of decision in question, prescribed for the purposes of that subsection after the notification of the decision, and that by virtue of the operation of regulation 4.10(1) of the Regulations made under the Migration Act, that period was the period of 21 days from the date of receipt of the decision by the applicant. (emphasis added)4. CONSIDERATION4.1 What time limit was prescribed for the application for review to the Tribunal? Section 347 of the Act relevantly provides that:(1) An application for review of an MRT‑reviewable decision must:(a) be made in the approved form; and(b) be given to the Tribunal within the prescribed period, being a period ending not later than:(i) if the MRT‑reviewable decision is covered by subsection 338(2), (3), (3A), (4) or (7A)—28 days after the notification of the decision; or(ii) if the MRT‑reviewable decision is covered by subsection 338(5), (6), (7) or (8)—70 days after the notification of the decision; or(iii) if the MRT‑reviewable decision is covered by subsection 338(9)—the number of days prescribed, in respect of the kind of decision in question prescribed for the purposes of that subsection, after the notification of the decision; and(c) be accompanied by the prescribed fee (if any). Notwithstanding the impression that s 347 might convey, the section does not itself prescribe the number of days within which an application for review must be made. The “prescribed period” within which such an application must be made is prescribed by the regulations but cannot exceed the number of days referred to in s 347(1)(b)(i), (ii) or (iii), as applicable. As the Full Court held in Xie v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 172 (Xie) at [4]–[5]:Even a reasonably careful reader might (wrongly) conclude that an application must be filed within 28 days from notification of the decision. However the word ‘prescribed’ in the phrase ‘within the prescribed period’ is of critical importance. Pursuant to s 5 ‘prescribed’ means ‘prescribed by the regulations’. Subs 347(5) offers some explanation of the statutory intention. It provides:‘Regulations made for the purposes of paragraph (1)(b) may specify different periods in relation to different classes of MRT-reviewable decisions (which may be decisions that relate to non-citizens in a specified place).’Subsection 347(1) fixes the maximum period within which applications may be made but authorizes the making of regulations prescribing shorter periods.