Tay v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Tay v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2010] FCAFC 23

Citation: Tay v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2010] FCAFC 23
Appeal from: Tay v Migration Review Tribunal (No2) [2009] FCA 591
Tay v Migration Review Tribunal & Anor [2009] FMC Order 12 October 2009
Parties: SWEE YEN TAY v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number(s): SAD 82 of 2009
SAD 167 of 2009
Judges: DOWSETT, STONE AND BENNETT JJ
Date of judgment: 10 March 2010
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for leave to appeal from the decision of a single Judge of the Federal Court summarily dismissing application – application for leave to appeal from the decision of a Federal Magistrate who summarily dismissed a similar application – whether s 494C(5) creates a rebuttable presumption of fact – whether applicant entitled to lead evidence to show that she did not receive notification on the day on which the statute deemed notification to have taken place.
Legislation: Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act1976 (Cth)
Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5(23), 338(2), 494C(5)
Migration Legislation Amendment (Electronic Transactions and Methods of Notification) Act 2001
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg. 4.10
Cases cited:

Brilliant Digital Entertainment Pty Ltd v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 270; 63 IPR 373

Carr v Western Australia (2007) 232 CLR 138

Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397

Farah Constructions Pty Limited v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89

Macquarie Bank Ltd v Fociri Pty Ltd (1992) 27 NSWLR 203

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 77

Murphy v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs & Indigenous Affairs  (2004) 135 FCR 550

Sharp v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 88 ATC 4,184

Telstra Corporation Ltd v Treloar (2000) 102 FCR 595

Xie v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 172

Date of hearing: 11 November 2009
Place: Adelaide
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 27
Counsel for the Applicant: S D Ower
Solicitor for the Applicant: McDonald Steed McGrath
Counsel for the First Respondent: C B Bleby
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: P D'Assumpcao, Australian Government Solicitor (submitting appearance)

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

SAD 82 of 2009

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SWEE YEN TAY
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGES:

DOWSETT, STONE AND BENNETT JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

10 MARCH 2010

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY (VIA VIDEO LINK TO ADELAIDE)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF…

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Details
Case
[2010] FCAFC 23
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Tay v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, the applicant sought leave to appeal from a decision of a single Judge of the Federal Court who had summarily dismissed an application for leave to appeal from the decision of a Federal Magistrate who had similarly dismissed a prior application. The applicant sought review of a decision to reject her application for a Class VC Subclass 485 Skilled (Provisional) Graduate Visa. The central legal issue was whether s 494C(5) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) creates a rebuttable presumption of fact as to when a notification was received, and whether the applicant was entitled to lead evidence to show she did not receive notification on the day the statute deemed notification to have occurred.

The Court considered the applicant’s argument that s 494C(5) created a rebuttable presumption of fact, which she sought to rebut with evidence of when she actually received notification. The Court noted that the Full Federal Court had previously rejected a similar argument in Xie v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs. The Court held that a full court should only depart from an earlier full court decision if it was patently in error or had unintended and irrational consequences. The Court further observed that intermediate appellate courts and trial judges should generally not depart from decisions of other intermediate appellate courts regarding the interpretation of Commonwealth legislation. Consequently, the Court found that the decision in Xie, which held that s 494C(5) created an irrebuttable presumption, was binding and could not be rebutted by the applicant's evidence. Therefore, the Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal.

In conclusion, the Court dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to appeal, with costs. This outcome reinforces the binding nature of full court decisions and the principle that statutory presumptions regarding the receipt of notifications under the Migration Act are irrebuttable.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note:

1. The application for leave to appeal be dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The facts in this matter are not in dispute. In the following account we have drawn on submissions made by the applicant and the first respondent. As the second respondent has entered a submitting appearance in these reasons we shall henceforth refer to the first respondent simply as the respondent.BACKGROUND On 27 December 2007 the applicant applied for a Class VC Subclass 485 Skilled (Provisional) Graduate Visa. Consistent with s 494B(5), in her visa application the applicant gave the Department of Immigration and Citizenship an email address as her authorised contact address. On 22 September 2008 the Department sent to that address an email notifying the applicant that her visa application had been rejected by a delegate of the Minister and attaching a letter enclosing the decision record. The delegate’s decision was an MRT-reviewable decision within the meaning of s 338(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). On 20 October 2008 the applicant’s solicitor sent a letter by email to the Department stating that the applicant “did not receive the email informing her of the refusal of the decision until 16 October 2008”. The solicitor requested that the decision be re-notified so that the applicant could seek review in the Migration Review Tribunal. The request was refused by return email. The request for re-notification was made in the context of the time limit for seeking review of the delegate’s decision in the Tribunal being “21 days after the day on which the notice [of the decision] is received”; Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg. 4.10. The day of the receipt of the notice is determined in accordance with s 494C(5) of the Migration Act which is as follows: Transmission by fax, e-mail or other electronic means(5)If the Minister gives a document to a person by the method in subsection 494B(5) (which involves transmitting the document by fax, e-mail or other electronic means), the person is taken to have received the document at the end of the day on which the document is transmitted.Section 5(23) of the Migration Act clarifies the meaning of the phrase “is taken” by providing:(23)To avoid doubt, in this Act is taken, when followed by the infinitive form of a verb, has the same force and effect as is deemed when followed by the infinitive form of that verb. On the face of it, it would seem to follow from these provisions that the applicant is deemed to have been notified of the delegate’s decision on 22 September 2008 irrespective of whether she had in fact received it on that day or at all. Consequently the period in which the applicant could apply for review of the delegate’s decision expired on 13 October 2008. Application to Tribunal The applicant nevertheless lodged an application for review with the Tribunal on 6 November 2008. She claimed that correctly construed, s 494C(5) created a rebuttable presumption of fact and that she was entitled to lead evidence to show that she did not receive the decision until 16 October 2008. In making this claim it was necessary for the applicant to confront the hurdle imposed by the decision of the Full Federal Court in Xie v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 172 in which the Full Court rejected this approach.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In fact the bar is set considerably higher. There are numerous authorities to the effect that a full court should only depart from an earlier full court decision when that decision is patently in error or has produced “unintended and perhaps irrational consequences not foreseen by the court that created the precedent”; Telstra Corporation Ltd v Treloar (2000) 102 FCR 595 at [28] per Branson and Finkelstein JJ. The Court must also bear in mind the views expressed by the High Court in Farah Constructions Pty Limited v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89 at 135 that intermediate appellate courts and trial judges should not depart from the decisions of intermediate appellate courts in another jurisdiction in relation to the interpretation of Commonwealth legislation. In our view those observations apply equally to full court decisions of the Federal Court of Australia.The decision in Xie and the construction of s 494C The appellant in Xie applied for a student visa and gave the Department a postal address as the address for service in connection with his application. A letter notifying the appellant that his application was unsuccessful and attaching the relevant decision record was sent by registered mail, apparently on 4 August 2004, to the address for service. The appellant said that he did not collect the letter from Australia Post until 1 September 2004. His application for review filed with the Migration Review Tribunal on 8 September 2004 was held by the Tribunal to be out of time and accordingly review was refused. It was not in contention that dispatch of the letter to the address given by the appellant by registered post was in accordance with s 494B(4)(c). The Full Court accepted that this was a permitted method of notifying the appellant of the decision and referred to the observations of O’Connor and Mansfield JJ in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 77 at [29]. In Singh their Honours also observed at [30]:Neither the [Migration] Act and the Regulations, nor s 28A of the Acts Interpretation Act draw any distinction between the use of registered pre-paid mail or “regular” or ordinary pre-paid mail. … Nor is there any indication in s 29 of the Acts Interpretation Act that the legislature intended to distinguish between sending pre-paid post by ordinary mail or by registered mail. If such a distinction was intended, it is evident that it would have been recognised in those provisions. Indeed, the terms of s 29 of that Act refer to service by post or sending by post in terms which readily encompass both ordinary and registered pre-paid post. What was at issue in Xie was whether s 494C(4) of the Migration Act, which applies to documents dispatched by pre-paid post or other pre-paid means, created an irrebuttable presumption as to the time of receipt of the documents or whether evidence could be brought to establish the actual time of receipt. Section 494C(4) is as follows:Dispatch by prepaid post or by other prepaid means(4)If the Minister gives a document to a person by the method in subsection 494B(4) (which involves dispatching the document by prepaid post or by other prepaid means), the person is taken to have received the document:(a)if the document was dispatched from a place in Australia to an address in Australia – 7 working days (in the place of that address) after the date of the document; or(b)in any other case – 21 days after the date of the document.[Emphasis added]

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established