Nayak v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Nayak v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1270

Citation: Nayak v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1270
Appeal from: Nayak v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCCA 688
Parties: KRUNAL NANDKISHOR NAYAK v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 391 of 2015
Judge: GILMOUR J
Date of judgment: 19 November 2015
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – application for a student (temporary) visa – communication of refusal by post to residential address – whether the primary judge erred in finding that the facsimile sent to the second respondent constituted a new address for service – whether the primary judge denied the appellant procedural fairness in finding that the relevant facsimile was sent by, or on behalf of, the appellant where neither party advanced the point in the court below.   
Legislation: Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) cll 572.223(2)(a)(i)(A), 5A404
Cases cited: Aneja v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 572
Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 225 CLR 88
Bulstrode v Trimble [1970] VR 840
Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital (1989) 17 NSWLR 553
Hardy v Gillette [1976] VR 392
Khant v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 112 ALD 241
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 111 ALD 15
Murphy v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 135 FCR 550
SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 232 CLR 189
SZIAI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 104 ALD 22
Tay v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 183 FCR 163
Date of hearing: 5 August 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 81
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A Kumar
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G Johnson
Solicitor for the First and Second Respondents: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent entered a submitting appearance, save as to costs.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 391 of 2015

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

KRUNAL NANDKISHOR NAYAK
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GILMOUR J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 NOVEMBER 2015

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the costs of the appeal of the first respondent.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 391 of 2015

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

KRUNAL NANDKISHOR NAYAK
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GILMOUR J

DATE:

19 NOVEMBER 2015

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1270
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Nayak v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved the appellant, an Indian national, appealing a decision from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia which dismissed his application for review of a decision made by the Migration Review Tribunal (Tribunal) to refuse his application for a student visa. The central issue was whether the Tribunal correctly communicated its decision to the appellant and if it had exercised its power to determine the review reasonably. The appellant argued that the Tribunal had failed to communicate its decision effectively because it sent the notice to his old residential address rather than his updated address.

The court examined whether the Tribunal was required to use the address provided by the appellant in his application for review, or if it could rely on the last known address for service provided to the Department. The primary judge found that the Tribunal had reasonably exercised its power to determine the review, as it had sent the notice to the appellant’s last known address for service. The court also found that the appellant had not been denied procedural fairness as the issue of whether the fax sent to the Tribunal constituted a new address for service was not raised by either party in the Federal Circuit Court. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the costs of the appeal of the first respondent.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (Nayak v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 688) delivered on 26 March 2015, dismissing an application for review of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (Tribunal) made on 24 October 2013. Facts The appellant is a national of India who first arrived in Australia on a student temporary (Class TU) visa (student visa). He applied on 15 June 2011 for the grant of a student visa. The delegate of the first respondent (Minister) on 22 December 2011 refused his application on the grounds that he did not provide evidence of his English language proficiency, and accordingly did not satisfy cll 572.223(2)(a)(i)(A) and 5A404 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). The delegate was not satisfied that the appellant met the primary criteria for any of the other visa subclasses available within Class TU. On or about 29 December 2011, the appellant completed an application form for the review of the decision of the Minister’s delegate to the Tribunal. He stated his “Residential address in Australia” as G01/1 Griffith Street, Blacktown, NSW 2148 (Blacktown Address). He also provided a mobile phone number and an email address. Later, he ticked a box beside the words “to me at my address” under the heading “Please send all correspondence in connection with this review”, disclosing the following address: 5/96-98 Wigram Street, Harris Park, Sydney, NSW 2150. The pre-printed statement beside the box ticked stated: “If you tick this box, all correspondence will be sent only to the address you provide below” (emphasis in original). The Tribunal acknowledged the receipt of the application for review by letter dated 4 January 2012 (4 January Letter) posted to 5/96-98 Wigram Street, Harris Park, Sydney, NSW 2150. According to a Tribunal case note dated 4 January 2012 the Tribunal was advised that the appellant's residential address was the Blacktown Address. The appellant’s evidence, as detailed in his affidavit affirmed on 5 June 2014, is that on 16 April 2013, he informed an officer of the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (the Department) that he would provide the Tribunal with an email address for communication with him whilst he was in India. He had contacted the Department to keep it informed of his whereabouts and how to contact him prior to leaving for India to visit his brother who was seriously ill. The appellant then mailed a letter on or about that same day and before he left Australia. This fact was confirmed by a Tribunal case note, dated 23 April 2013, which stated that a letter (23 April Letter) had been received from the appellant stating that he wishes to travel to India and providing not only an email address but also an Australian phone number and two Indian phone numbers for contact with him during his stay in India. In the text of the letter he noted his address as the Blacktown Address. According to the evidence of the appellant, he sent a letter to the Tribunal and submitted that he had written his address – 82 Weston Street, Harris Park – on the back of the envelope. On 26 November 2013, that is after the Tribunal delivered its reasons, the appellant sent an email to the Tribunal attaching a letter that the appellant described in the email as “almost similar [to] what I sent you on 23/04/2013.” As the primary judge found at [23] of his Honour’s reasons, this letter was different to the 23 April Letter in that the former cited the appellant’s address as “4/82 Weston St, Harris Park 2150”, rather than the Blacktown Address.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant submits that the Tribunal was on notice that the notification that the Tribunal had sent had not been received by the appellant at the Blacktown Address and was returned to the Tribunal marked “return to sender”.Judgment of the Federal Circuit Court The following summary of proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court is, substantially, taken from the Minister’s written submissions which in this respect are not controversial. On 28 November 2013, the appellant filed an application for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision. In an amended application, filed on 11 June 2014, the appellant sought to rely upon five grounds upon which he said the Tribunal had fallen into jurisdictional error. The primary judge set out the grounds at [26] of his Honour's reasons. The primary judge at [27] identified three questions arising from the grounds pleaded in the amended application: (a)Was the power conferred by s 359C(2) of the Act engaged? (b)If engaged, was the Tribunal obliged to exercise that power reasonably? (c)If so, did the Tribunal fail to exercise the power reasonably? With respect to the first question, of the engagement of the power under s 359C(2), his Honour distilled the real issue between the parties as being whether, by posting the s 359A Letter to the appellant at the Blacktown Address, the Tribunal gave the letter to the appellant consistently with the method specified in s 379A(4) of the Act: at [33] of his Honour’s reasons. That raised a further question of whether the Blacktown Address was either the last address for service or the last residential or business address the appellant provided to the Tribunal in connection with the review. The primary judge concluded that s 359C(2) was properly engaged, and that the appellant had, by way of the 29 April Fax received by the Tribunal, lodged an address for service with the Tribunal for the purposes of reg 4.39 of the Regulations. The address for service communicated to the Tribunal in the facsimile was the Blacktown Address. The primary judge made an alternative finding that even if the 29 April Fax had not been sent to the Tribunal by the appellant, the Tribunal would have nevertheless been entitled to send the s 359A Letter to the appellant at the Blacktown Address as that was the address nominated as the appellant's residential address in his application for review to the Tribunal: at [50]. The appellant had submitted before the Court below that the Tribunal had erred by sending the s 359A Letter to the appellant as the Blacktown Address was not the appellant's address for service for the purposes of s 379A(4): at [16]-[25]. With respect to the second question, the primary judge concluded that the power of the Tribunal to proceed to determine an application for review pursuant to s 359C(2) had to be exercised reasonably: at [69]. With respect to the third question, the primary judge found that the Tribunal's decision to determine the review as it did was within the range of decisions that a reasonable decision maker, who understood the subject-matter, purpose and scope of s 359C(2), and knew the information which the Tribunal did know, or ought reasonably to have known, could have made: at [70(c)] and [81].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established