Re: JOHN WALTER McARDLE
And: THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
No. G2087 of 1987
Income Tax
COURT
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
Fisher J.(1)
CATCHWORDS
Income Tax - assessable income - stock options in employer company granted to certain employees - surrender by taxpayer of his rights for lump sum payment - whether the lump sum was an allowance given or granted in relation to employment within the meaning of s.26(e) - whether lump sum formed part of taxpayers gross income from all sources within the meaning of sub.s.25(1).
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 - sub.s.25(1), s.26(e), s.26AAC.
HEARING
ADELAIDE
#DATE 11:3:1988
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr. A.H. Goldberg Q.C. with Mr. S.T. O'Loughlin
Solicitors: O'Loughlin Robertson
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr. M.L. Robertson Q.C. with Dr. I.J. Hardingham
Solicitors: Australian Government Solicitor Mr. G. Gretsas
ORDER
The appeal be allowed and the appellant's objection upheld.
The Commissioner do pay to the appellant his costs of the appeal.
The assessment be remitted to the Commissioner for amendment in accordance with the terms of this judgment.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
JUDGE1
This is an appeal which comes before this Court consequent upon its transfer from the Supreme Court of South Australia pursuant to sub.s 4(3) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 1987. John William McArdle ("the taxpayer") was dissatisfied with the disallowance by the Commissioner of Taxation for the Commonwealth of Australia ("the Commissioner") of his objection to an assessment of income tax for the year of income ended 30 June 1982. He requested the Commissioner to treat his objection as an appeal and, in accordance with s.187 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 as it then provided, to forward the same to the Supreme Court of South Australia. This was done and the objection was transmitted on 15 July 1987. Subsequent to 1 September 1987 the appeal was transferred to this Court pursuant to sub.s 4(3) as abovementioned, the hearing thereof not having begun before the Supreme Court.
The taxpayer had duly lodged his return of income for the year ended 30 June 1982 and in a schedule thereto made reference as follows to a sum of $1,100,000 received by him during that year:
"ITEM 6F
During the period December 1975 to March 1980 I was granted Options to acquire stock in Delhi International Oil Corporation, a United States corporation which employed me directly or through a subsidiary company from 1967 to January 1982. On 11 November 1981 I entered into an agreement with Delhi International Oil Corporation whereby I surrendered all of my rights under the Stock Option Agreement and in consideration was paid $1,100,000. I believe this payment is in the nature of a capital receipt and is not assessable."
On 2 July 1984 the Commissioner issued his notice of assessment and included the sum of $1,100,000 in the assessable income…
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- Case
- [1988] FCA 76
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the court were whether the lump sum payment received by the taxpayer constituted an allowance given or granted in relation to his employment under section 26(e) of the relevant tax legislation, and if it formed part of the taxpayer's gross income from all sources as per subsection 25(1). The court had to interpret the statutory provisions and apply them to the specific circumstances of the case to determine if the lump sum was subject to income tax.
The court examined the terms under which the lump sum payment was made. It found that the payment was not given as a reward for services rendered but rather as compensation for the surrender of future rights to stock options. Given this interpretation, the court concluded that the lump sum payment did not form part of the taxpayer's assessable income as it was not an allowance given or granted in relation to his employment. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the appellant's objection was upheld, and the assessment was remitted for amendment in accordance with the judgment. Additionally, the Commissioner was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
The appeal be allowed and the appellant's objection upheld.
The Commissioner do pay to the appellant his costs of the appeal.
The assessment be remitted to the Commissioner for amendment in accordance with the terms of this judgment.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case originated in the Federal Court of Australia where Mr Sharp appealed against the Commissioner of Taxation's assessment. This appeal followed a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), which upheld the Commissioner's original assessment. The AAT's decision was based on the interpretation that the lump sum payment was an allowance given or granted in relation to employment. Mr Sharp's appeal contested this interpretation, arguing that the lump sum was not an assessable income under the relevant sections of the Income Tax Assessment Act. The Federal Court heard the appeal and made a determination on the legal issues presented, including whether the lump sum constituted an allowance in relation to employment and if it should be included in Mr Sharp's assessable income.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the lump sum payment received by Mr Sharp upon surrendering his stock options is an allowance given or granted in relation to his employment within the meaning of section 26(e) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth).
2. Whether the lump sum payment forms part of Mr Sharp's gross income from all sources under subsection 25(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth).
Held
1. The lump sum payment received by Mr Sharp upon surrendering his stock options is an allowance given or granted in relation to his employment within the meaning of section 26(e) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth).
2. The lump sum payment does not form part of Mr Sharp's gross income from all sources under subsection 25(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth).
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Federal Court considered the two issues regarding the lump sum payment Mr Sharp received upon surrendering his stock options. Firstly, the Court held that the lump sum payment was indeed an allowance given or granted in relation to Mr Sharp's employment within the meaning of section 26(e) of the Act. The Court reasoned that the stock options were part of Mr Sharp's remuneration package and the lump sum payment represented a benefit provided by the employer in exchange for the employee's services.
Secondly, the Court held that the lump sum payment did not form part of Mr Sharp's gross income from all sources under subsection 25(1) of the Act. The Court found that the lump sum payment was not income as it did not represent a benefit that accrued to Mr Sharp during the income year. Instead, it was a one-off payment made in exchange for surrendering his rights to the stock options. The Court concluded that the lump sum payment was not income as it did not form part of the employee's gross income from all sources.
In making its decision, the Court relied on previous cases and statutory interpretation principles. The Court also noted that the lump sum payment was not income as it did not accrue to Mr Sharp during the relevant income year. The Court found that the lump sum payment was not a benefit that accrued to Mr Sharp during the income year, but rather a one-off payment made in exchange for surrendering his rights to the stock options. This decision establishes the binding legal principle that a lump sum payment made in exchange for surrendering stock options is not income under the meaning of subsection 25(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth).